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 REPRESENTATIONS OF SPACE IN SEVENTEENTH CENTURY PHYSICS 
David Marshall Miller, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2006
 
The changing understanding of the universe that characterized the birth of modern science 
included a fundamental shift in the prevailing representation of space – the presupposed 
conceptual structure that allows one to intelligibly describe the spatial properties of physical 
phenomena.  At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the prevailing representation of space 
was spherical.  Natural philosophers first assumed a spatial center, then specified meanings with 
reference to that center.  Directions, for example, were described in relation to the center, and 
locations were specified by distance from the center.  Through a series of attempts to solve 
problems first raised by the work of Copernicus, this Aristotelian, spherical framework was 
replaced by a rectilinear representation of space.  By the end of the seventeenth century, 
descriptions were understood by reference to linear orientations, as parallel or oblique to a 
presupposed line, and locations were identified without reference to a privileged central point.  
This move to rectilinear representations of space enabled Gilbert, Kepler, Galileo, Descartes, and 
Newton to describe and explain the behavior of the physical world in the novel ways for which 
these men are justly famous, including their theories of gravitational attraction and inertia.  In 
other words, the shift towards a rectilinear representation of space was essential to the 
fundamental reconception of the universe that gave rise to both modern physical theory and, at 
the same time, the linear way of experiencing the world that characterizes modern science. 
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PREFACE 
“He remarked to me then,” said that mildest of men, 
“‘If your Snark be a Snark that is right: 
Fetch it home by all means – you may serve it with greens, 
And it’s handy for striking a light.’”  (Lewis Carroll, The Hunting of the Snark) 
I would be remiss and ashamed if I failed to acknowledge the support and guidance of the many 
who contributed to this project.  Their collective help carried me through the cycles of frustration 
and inspiration that produced this dissertation. 
First, I owe the deepest gratitude to the faculty and students of the Department of History 
and Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh.  Much of the ideas presented here 
were developed in discussions with them, whether in seminars, in the hallways and offices of the 
Cathedral of Learning, or over beers at the Holiday Inn and elsewhere.  I profited immensely 
from the collegiality, openness, and intelligence of every member of the department.  Their 
ideas, encouragement, and advice was and will always be welcome. 
My advisors, Peter Machamer and Ted McGuire, merit the highest praise and 
appreciation for their firm yet restrained supervision.  This dissertation bears the marks of their 
alternating approval and criticism, which cajoled me through its writing.  I could not have 
wished for a better pair of teachers, scholars, and friends to guide me.  Jonathan Scott (of the 
History Department) and Paolo Palmieri were also especially important resources upon whom I 
had the pleasure to call. 
Amongst my peers, I gained untold benefit from the friendship and conversation of Zvi 
Biener, and, especially, Greg Frost-Arnold.  Greg, along with Karen Frost-Arnold, must be 
thanked for so many particular acts of insight, friendship, and tolerance I cannot begin to list 
them here. 
I could not have completed this project without the support of my parents, grandparents, 
and brother.  My family’s sympathy with my scholarly aspirations is remarkable and 
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commendable, even if they are ultimately the source of them.  They share any credit that may be 
given to me or this work. 
Above all, there is Dana LeVine.  Her steadfast love, caring, and sensitivity, as well as 
her intelligence, diligence, and energy, will always be my model.  I am endlessly thankful for her 
devotion and companionship.  She can teach me more in three minutes than all books could teach 
me in seventy years. 
The bulk of this dissertation was written in a carriage house (which itself deserves some 
credit) in Athens, Georgia, with the support of a Mellon Dissertation Fellowship from the 
Faculty of Arts and Sciences of the University of Pittsburgh.  I am also grateful for the support of 
the Philosophy Department of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
In addition to the few I have named, there are countless others who contributed to this 
dissertation.  They have all helped me avoid the boojums that threatened me and my work.  For 
their sake, I hope this is a Snark that is right.  With their assistance I have fetched it home by all 




1.0  INTRODUCTION:  PHYSICAL UNDERSTANDING AND REPRESENTATIONS 
OF SPACE 
This thesis argues that the seventeenth century witnessed a profound shift in the representation 
of space employed by physicists and philosophers to describe and explain the phenomena of the 
natural world.  The concepts and presuppositions that conditioned one’s experience of physical 
space markedly changed – from a spherical, Aristotelian framework widely accepted at the 
beginning of the century to the rectilinear, Cartesian framework accepted at its close.  Moreover, 
it will be suggested, this shift both accompanied and enabled the remarkable developments in 
physical explanations that occurred during the same period.  The shift in representations of space 
came about as an iterative reciprocation between the ways philosophers explained, described, 
and conceived phenomena in space.  Developments at one of these levels allowed and 
necessitated adjustments at the others.  The novel representation of space was both cause and 
effect of the new physics, and vice versa. 
This project should be considered a work of intellectual history – a study of the 
intellectual causes and effects of ideas.  The subject of this dissertation is philosophical.  It 
examines the spatial epistemology of early modern natural philosophy, and proposes a 
philosophically justified framework by which to study that epistemology – namely, 
representations of space.  However the argument will develop by ostension, which is to say, 
historically.  It will attempt to demonstrate how the iterative reciprocation resulting in the shift in 
spatial concepts occurred in the work of several seventeenth-century authors.  The aim here is to 
make the intellectual iteration and epistemological shift apparent in the historical account.1
                                                 
1 The following is an “account” in the sense that it attempts a chronological reconstruction and explanation of an 
intellectual change based on the examination of representations of space.  It argues by ostension in that it tries to 
point out – in the account itself – the constitutive and causal role of representations of space in the iterative 
reciprocation by which physical thought developed.  These aims are meant to be mutually reinforcing.  The 
coherence and likelihood of the historical reconstruction will support the plausibility of the philosophical analysis by 
which it is constructed, and vice versa.  See section 1.2, below. 
 1 
1.1 THREE LEVELS OF UNDERSTANDING 
1.1.1 Explanations and Descriptions 
Before we begin our account, however, some preliminaries are in order.  In what follows, the 
examination of representations of space will be used as a tool for a historical investigation.  At 
first blush, this might seem anachronistic – we are seeking something of our own devising in the 
work of historical authors.  We should, therefore, explain precisely what is meant by a 
“representation of space” in order to allay this concern.  We will try to motivate the sense that 
representations of space are necessary elements of physical understanding, regardless of period.  
Thus, it is reasonable to seek them in texts from the past.  Additionally, our explanation will 
allow a more precise statement of the dissertation’s thesis.  It will also enable us to explain how 
the present project stands in relation to some of the relevant literature. 
This dissertation is motivated by the basic intuition that human physical understanding 
consists in the ability to explain facts about the physical world.  Understanding, it seems at least 
in part, is the ability to provide satisfactory explanations – we say we understand a phenomenon 
when we can give an account of it.2  This fundamental intuition has led philosophers interested 
in explicating the nature of human understanding to attempt a clear explication of the concept of 
explanation. 
Following the seminal work of Carl Hempel,3 most philosophers examining explanations 
agree that they consist of a set of statements.  This set includes an explanandum and an 
explanans.  The explanandum is a statement (or statements) describing the phenomenon to be 
explained.  The explanans is a set of statements which are meant to account for the phenomenon 
explained by the explanandum.  A satisfactory explanation, therefore, is one in which the 
statements in the explanans and explanandum, and the relationships between them, satisfy certain 
conditions.  However, it is a matter of great debate, in the seventeenth century as much as today, 
what conditions a satisfactory explanation must satisfy.  Philosophers, especially since Hempel, 
have proposed various criteria, including logical entailment, statistical relevance, causal 
                                                 
2 See Michael Friedman, “Explanation and Scientific Understanding,” in Theories of Explanation, ed. Joseph C. Pitt 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). 
3 Carl G. Hempel, “Studies in the Logic of Explanation,” in Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in 
the Philosophy of Science (New York: Free Press, 1965). 
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relevance, and many others.  It is not the aim of this project, however, to adjudicate the debate 
concerning the essence of explanation.4  Nor will we try to evaluate the claims of modern 
philosophers with regard to seventeenth century evidence.  That is, we will not come out in favor 
of one model of explanation over any other. 
What interests us, instead, is the fact that explanations, even in the most general sense, 
rely on descriptions, which rely, in turn, on concepts.  Thus, understanding is the ability to 
explain, but this ability rests on more than just the construction of explanations.  This point is 
clear from the fact that at least some of the sentences, both in the explanandum and in the 
explanans, must be descriptions.  On the one hand, the explanandum is meant to identify some 
feature of the physical world that is meant to be explained.  Hempel, for example, defined an 
explanandum as a “sentence describing the phenomenon to be explained.”5  That is, the 
explanandum is a description of some fact about the world.  Hempel’s definition is girded by the 
difficulty imagining how one might set about explaining an explanandum that is not a 
description.  How could one try to provide an explanation if one does not know what to explain?  
There must be some phenomenon that is the target or “topic”6 of an explanation, and this topic 
must be specified in the explanandum.  The specification of the phenomenon requires a 
description.  (Being a description is a necessary but not sufficient condition for an explanandum.  
There are descriptions which are not explicable:  e.g., “The distance from New York to San 
Francisco is (roughly) 2900 miles.”7) 
On the other hand, it also seems reasonable to assume that at least one of the sentences in 
the explanans must be a description.  If a physical explanation is meant to show how the 
properties and relations of physical objects account for the feature of the world described by the 
explanandum, then some specification of those properties and relations must appear in the 
explanans.  In other words, the explanans must include descriptions of the facts about the world 
that account for the phenomenon in question.  For example, the explanans might include 
descriptions of the initial conditions that occasioned the phenomenon to be explained.  Or it 
                                                 
4 If, in fact, it is judicable, which I doubt.  See Peter Achinstein, “Can There Be a Model of Explanation,” in 
Explanation, ed. David-Hillel Ruben (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993). 
5 Hempel, “Studies in the Logic of Explanation.” 
6 The term “topic” is due to Bas van Fraassen.  Wesley C. Salmon, “Four Decades of Scientific Explanation,” in 
Scientific Explanation, ed. Philip Kitcher and Wesley C. Salmon (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1989), 139. 
7 The example is from Bromberger via Salmon.  Ibid., 39. 
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might include a description of the physical context in which the phenomenon took place (the 
forces acting and so on).8
One could even argue that all of the statements in an explanation are descriptions.  In a 
broad sense, even the law-like generalizations or statistical rules that are adduced in order to link 
initial conditions with the phenomenon to be explained can be considered as descriptions.  Like 
other descriptions, they specify facts about the world.  They assert that the world is such and 
such a way.  Or they assert that certain objects invariably have such and such features (including 
dispositions).9  On this view, an explanation is simply a marshalling of facts that account for 
another fact.  To give an explanation, then, is to provide a description of each of these facts.  
Thus, the requirement that explanations include descriptions does not speak against “ontic”10 
conceptions of explanation, where an explanation is not considered as an argument, but as a 
collection of sentences or propositions reporting objective facts that account for (causally, 
statistically, or otherwise) for the phenomenon to be explained.11  For present purposes, 
however, we do not have to prove this point.  It will suffice if just one statement in an 
explanation is a description. 
Note that we are taking “description” in a very loose sense.  We use the term to refer to 
any specification of a (putative) fact about the world.  This need not take the canonical form of a 
description-sentence, “x is p,” where x is some definite or indefinite term and p is some predicate 
clause.12  By defining descriptions in this manner, we can avoid the concern that legitimate 
explanations can be provided in which no sentential descriptions appear.  For instance, Paul 
Humphreys has suggested that explanations can be legitimately invoked that have noun clauses 
as explananda.  He suggests that explanations can be given for “the increase in volume of a gas 
maintained at constant pressure; of the high incidence of recidivism among first-time offenders; 
                                                 
8 For a detailed perspective on descriptions in the explanans, see Donald Davidson, “Causal Relations,” The Journal 
of Philosophy 64, no. 21 (1967); Michael E. Levin, “The Extensionality of Causation and Causal-Explanatory 
Contexts,” Philosophy of Science 43, no. 2 (1976); James Woodward, “A Theory of Singular Causal Explanation,” 
in Explanation, ed. David-Hillel Ruben (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).  These authors assume that the 
explanans describes the salient features of the situation that cause the phenomenon to be explained.  They debate, 
however, whether the description appearing in the explanans must be extensional. 
9 Additionally, one can point out that most philosophers allow that generalizations themselves can be explained.  In 
such cases, they are explananda and, a fortiori, descriptions. 
10 See Wesley C. Salmon, Causality and Explanation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 54. 
11 See Salmon, “Four Decades,” esp. 86ff. 
12 See Peter Ludlow, “Descriptions,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Ed Zalta (Stanford: Stanford 
University, 2004). 
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of the occurrence of paresis in an individual; [etc.]”13  These possible explananda are not 
sentences.  Hence, they would not satisfy Hempel’s definition of an explanandum, which 
requires them to be sentences.  Nevertheless, these terms do specify facts about the world.  In 
Humphreys’s words, they specify “usually explicitly, sometimes implicitly... the occurrence or 
change of a property associated with a system.”14  Hence, they would qualify as descriptions in 
our sense.  Non-sentential statements of fact in explanantia can be handled similarly.  Our 
interest is not the syntactic form of a description, but its semantic content – whether and how it 
specifies a phenomenal fact.15
In this context, we can also set aside the issue of descriptive reference.  One might worry 
that an explanation can include specifications of fictions, rather than facts.  Objectively speaking 
these specifications are not descriptions, since they do not refer to any facts about the world.   
Suppose, for example, a magician explains the fall of an apple by appealing to malign astral 
influences.  His putative explanation would, presumably, include descriptions of astral influences 
and their behavior, even though astral influences, as far as we know, do not exist.  We are willing 
to count the magician’s explanation as legitimate so long as he thinks he is describing something.  
As we shall discuss below, descriptions are relativized to the cognitive context in which they are 
generated and interpreted.  This relativization includes their status as descriptions.  Hence, the 
magician’s appeals are explanatory if he really believes that astral influences exist and that his 
descriptions really specify facts about them.  If, on the other hand, the magician is 
disingenuously appealing to entities he knows or believes not to exist, then we would count his 
statements as neither descriptive nor explanatory.  Rather, we would claim he was perpetrating a 
                                                 
13 Paul W. Humphreys, “Scientific Explanation:  The Causes, Some of the Causes, and Nothing But the Causes,” in 
Scientific Explanation, ed. Philip Kitcher and Wesley C. Salmon (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1989), 298. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Hempel’s account of explanation generally glosses over the relationship between phenomenon and description.  
He assumes that phenomena are always already described.  See Michael Scriven, “Explanation, Predictions, and 
Laws,” in Theories of Explanation, ed. Joseph C. Pitt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 65-66. 
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trick or fraud on his audience.16  In either case, we avoid accepting an explanation that is devoid 
of descriptions.17
Philosophers of science usually require that the statements constituting an explanation be 
true, in some relevant sense.  In the case of descriptions, they require that they accurately reflect 
facts about the world, however that accuracy is measured.18  Our definition of description, 
however, obviates this condition.  The reason for this has to do with the historical aims of our 
project.  Philosophers of science aim to provide the criteria a good and definitive explanation 
must satisfy.  The explanations provided by an outdated theory are wrong, so they cannot be 
good explanations.  They do not adequately account for the phenomena.  Thus, it seems 
reasonable to reject them as scientific explanations.  Otherwise, one is forced to accept the 
“awkward consequence” that “originally [an] explanatory account was a correct explanation, but 
that it ceased to be one later, when unfavorable evidence was discovered.”19  Our project, 
though, is a historical study of outdated theories.  It would be anachronistic to say that because 
the theories turned out to be wrong, the accounts of phenomena their proponents provide are not 
explanations.  Instead, so long as an account is proposed as an explanation, we will treat it as an 
explanation.  We require only that an author accept, given whatever resources he has at hand in 
his time, that his assertions adequately account for the phenomenon in question.  (The principle 
of charity will lead us to assume that this is usually the case.)  We will say that, whether or not 
an explanation is correct, it is still an explanation.20
Despite our argument that explanations necessarily include descriptions, we do not mean 
to suggest that explanations are merely descriptions.  Explanations are distinct from descriptions 
                                                 
16 I am reminded of the comic strip Calvin and Hobbes, in which Calvin asks his father to explain why pictures 
taken before a certain time are in black and white.  Calvin’s father responds that the pictures are actually color 
photographs.  The world, he says, was actually black and white, and only turned color sometime around the 1950’s.  
Presumably, this is a joke.  Yet, if a credulous Calvin were to repeat this account, we would take his statements as an 
explanation, however poor. 
17 In a more specific context, Salmon presupposes that “the phenomenon we endeavor to explain did occur – that the 
putative fact is, indeed, a fact.”  That is, he assumes that the explanandum is a legitimate description of a real 
phenomenon.  He allows, however, that one might “suspend belief” in certain cases.  Thus, it would be legitimate to 
attempt an explanation of a unicorn’s horn if one temporarily suspends the belief that unicorns do not exist.  In this 
context, statements about a unicorn’s features would be legitimate descriptions, insofar as they specify putative facts 
about the world.  See Salmon, “Four Decades,” 6n2. 
18 I will not attempt any analysis of empirical adequacy or truth.  The subject is tangential. 
19 Hempel, “Studies in the Logic of Explanation,” 248. 
20 For a more extended discussion of this historiographical issue, see Daniel Garber, Descartes Embodied 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), ch. 1; Quentin Skinner, “A reply to my critics,” in Meaning and 
Context:  Quentin Skinner and His Critics, ed. James Tully (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), 246-47. 
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insofar as they evince some sort of active principle or entity.  In other words, an explanation, 
either by its structure or content, should relate the phenomenon in question to some underlying 
productive cause.  With this caveat, we are again following most post-positivistic philosophers 
who have cautiously rejected Humean skepticism about the epistemic accessibility of causal 
relationships.  Our intuition is that, in the words of Wesley Salmon, the “commonsense notion of 
explanation seems to take it for granted that to explain some particular event is to identify its 
cause and, possibly, point out the causal connection.”21
By requiring an elucidation of causes, we are also following seventeenth century practice 
in natural philosophy.  In the somewhat tortuous heritage of Aristotelian logic, a prevailing view 
of the early modern period was that the proper form of a physical explanation followed a 
regressus argument.  This entailed two separate demonstrations, each of which established a 
relationship between the effect to be explained and its proximate cause.  One first had to relate 
the effect to a proximate cause by a demonstratio quia.  Then the effect was deduced from the 
cause by a demonstratio propter quid.  Once these demonstrations were complete, the effect was 
considered explained.  In other words, an effect was not explained until its causes had been 
identified and it had been shown that the causes produced the effect. 
The insistence on regressus demonstrations should not be taken as a complete 
seventeenth century theory of explanation.  It was only a general condition of explanation.  The 
precise form of regressus demonstrations was problematic during the period.  What counted as a 
satisfactory demonstration quia and propter quid varied from author to author.  Moreover, the 
need for regressus arguments at all was questioned at the time (e.g., by Galileo and Newton), so 
there is no guarantee an author is adhering to this view of explanation.  Our point is only that 
philosophers of the period thought causes should play a role in explanation, so it makes sense for 
us to think so, as well.22
                                                 
21 Salmon, “Four Decades,” 46. 
22 See Peter Barker and Bernard R. Goldstein, “Theological Foundations of Kepler's Astronomy,” Osiris 16 (2001); 
Peter Dear, “Method and the study of nature,” in The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, ed. 
Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Nicholas Jardine, “Galileo's 
Road to Truth and the Demonstrative Regress,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 7, no. 4 (1976); Steven 
Nadler, “Doctrines of explanation in late scholasticism and in the mechanical philosophy,” in The Cambridge 
History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, ed. Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998); William A. Wallace, Prelude to Galileo: Essays on Medieval and Sixteenth-Century 
Sources of Galileo's Thought (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1981); William A. Wallace, “Randall Redivivus:  Galileo and 
the Paduan Aristotelians,” Journal of the History of Ideas 49, no. 1 (1988). 
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We should also note that the seventeenth century palette of acceptable “causes” was 
much broader than today’s.  One effect of the mechanical tradition has been a severe limitation 
of what can count as a cause.  Though modern philosophers do not agree on what should and 
should not count as a cause, most would reject many of the causes proposed by early modern 
philosophers.  Chief amongst these are the “natural,” teleological causes central to Scholastic 
accounts of nature, as well as the frequent appeals to God’s will.  While the status of these as 
causes was questioned during the early modern period, there is no reason to dismiss them out of 
hand.  Throughout the following, we will not advance any particular explication of causation, 
modern or otherwise.  Instead, we will respect what each author himself considered a legitimate 
cause or legitimate causal explanation, without trying to unite all views into a theory of 
causation. 
The condition that explanations include some appeal to causes allows us to distinguish 
explanations from mere descriptions.  Suppose that it is possible to deduce, from a series of 
descriptions of the present behavior of a physical system, any past or future behavior of that 
system.  Unless the deduction appeals to causes, we would not count the deduction as an 
explanation of the system’s behavior.  A prediction or retrodiction, in other words, does not an 
explanation make.23  A seventeenth century case in point is the distinction between astronomy 
and physics.  In general, most commentators thought astronomy was primarily concerned with 
providing descriptions of the motions of the heavens, which could then be used to predict and 
retrodict planetary positions.  The astronomical systems of Ptolemy and Copernicus alike were 
seen as calculating methods, not explanations of the motions they described.  To explain celestial 
phenomena, even after Copernicus, philosophers relied on Aristotelian physical theories, which 
appealed to the nature of celestial matter as the cause of its motion.24  Explanations include an 
appeal to causes.  Descriptions can include causes, but need not.25
                                                 
23 For a contemporary take on this matter, see Salmon’s distinction between explanatory and descriptive knowledge. 
Salmon, “Four Decades,” 126-35. 
24 As we shall see, Kepler broke with this tradition and tried to unify physics and astronomy.  See Barker and 
Goldstein, “Theological Foundations of Kepler's Astronomy.”; Nicholas Jardine, The Birth of History and 
Philosophy of Science: Kepler's A Defence of Tycho Against Ursus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); 
Robert S. Westman, “The Melanchthon Circle, Rheticus, and the Wittenberg Interpretation of the Copernican 
Theory,” Isis 66, no. 2 (1975). 
25 We leave it as an open question as to how causes can appear in explanations.  It is entirely possible that causes 
appear in descriptions.  That is, part of the explanans might consist of descriptions of causes and the ways they 
operate.  We do not wish to prejudge this issue by claiming that descriptions, as a rule, do not include appeals to 
causes (though mere descriptions, by definition, do not).  We only wish to claim that explanations do. 
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A shorthand, but not entirely rigid, way of couching the distinction between description 
and explanation is in the terms of kinematics and dynamics.  Kinematics concerns the 
measurement and specification of physical behaviors – speeds, distances, positions, etc.  As such, 
it is a descriptive enterprise.  Dynamics investigates the principles that cause physical 
phenomena.  It is an explanatory pursuit.  Thus, when we come across kinematic terms – motion, 
speed, distance, quantity, etc. – we can generally assume the author is describing a phenomenon.  
By contrast, wherever we encounter dynamical terms – force, power, action, cause, etc. – the 
author is usually engaged in physical explanation.  By paying heed to these terms, we can begin 
to divine an author’s meaning.26
It should be reiterated that this project is not intended to solve the vast philosophical 
problems concerning explanation, description, and causation in both modern science and that of 
the early modern period.  We are not advocating a particular theory or model of explanation, 
description, or causation.  We are not concerned with judging the merits of any philosophical 
system in relation to early modern intellectual endeavor.  We only claim 1) that explanations 
contain descriptions and 2) explanations must appeal to causes.  We can then set about 
elucidating different author’s approaches to physical phenomena and the relationships between 
the descriptions and explanations they provide.  It does not seem that we are treading heavily on 
any philosophical toes by adhering to these claims.27
1.1.2 Descriptions and Concepts 
So far, we have argued that understanding of the physical world consists in the ability to provide 
explanations of physical phenomena.  We have also asserted that explanations consist, at least in 
part, of descriptions.  Now we turn to the relationship between descriptions and concepts. 
                                                 
26 For the medieval history of the distinction between kinematics and dynamics, see Marshall Clagett, The Science of 
Mechanics in the Middle Ages (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1959), ch. 4. 
27 David-Hillel Ruben calls our position the “standard view.”  He writes:  “Causal explanation of one chunk of the 
world... by another, it is often held, is relative to a description...  Thus, on the standard view, what is to be explained 
is never an event per se, but a fact or an existential generalization or something with some sort of propositional 
structure.  This view holds that the explanation relation relates relata which are not themselves entirely mind-
independent.”  Causal explanations are relativized to the manner by which they refer to facts about the world.  As 
Ruben notes, and as we shall argue below, this entails that explanations depend on the subjective cognitive 
frameworks in which they are produced.  David-Hillel Ruben, “Introduction,” in Explanation, ed. David-Hillel 
Ruben (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 15. 
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Just as explanations rely on descriptions, descriptions depend on concepts.  We cannot 
generate or comprehend descriptions unless they are set in the context of a cognitive framework 
– the set of concepts that give meaning to the terms used in the descriptions.  Concepts allow the 
generation and interpretation of descriptions since they regulate what the descriptions mean. 
Consider, as an example, the description “The apple falls down.”  This statement 
describes the behavior of a physical object.  It specifies an object – the apple – as well as its 
behavior – a particular form of motion, falling.  The statement also specifies the direction of the 
motion – down.  Altogether, then, the statement “The apple falls down” can be comprehended as 
a meaningful description of the phenomenon.  It specifies a certain fact about the world:  the 
behavior of the apple – i.e., it moves in a particular manner in a particular direction. 
The meaning of “apple,” “falls,” and “down” in this description, however, are not 
inherently and immediately intelligible.  The description must be further interpreted in order to 
make its meaning patent.  “Apple” must be interpreted to mean a particular object.  The term 
“falls” must be interpreted as a particular kind of accelerated motion.  “Down” must be 
interpreted as a specific direction or path.  This interpretation requires concepts.   
Now, it is probably fair to say that there is no general consensus amongst philosophers, 
cognitive scientists, psychologists, or any other group about what a “concept” actually is.  There 
is no well-articulated concept of “concept.”  This is not a problem we are about to solve.  
However, it seems fairly well accepted that concepts perform a specific function – namely, to 
allow the interpretation and generation of descriptive terms as applied to phenomena.  Thus, the 
concept of “apple” allows the interpreter of the description “The apple falls down” to identify the 
object described.  The concept of “falls” allows the interpreter to understand that the apple 
undergoes an accelerated motion, while the concept of “down” picks out which direction is 
meant by the description.  Similarly, an observer of a falling apple would employ the concepts of 
“apple,” “falls,” and “down” in order to generate the description “The apple falls down.”  
Interpreters and generators of descriptions can only operate within the context of some cognitive 
framework – the set of all concepts one possesses – that includes the concepts of the terms of 
their descriptions.  Put simply, the very possibility of description relies on concepts.  
In a very basic sense, a concept operates normatively.  It consists of the set of implicit 
and explicit rules by which the propriety of a descriptive term is judged.  Let us focus, for the 
time being, on the term “down.”  As noted, this specifies a direction, but which direction is not 
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clear from the description alone.  The actual direction is fixed by the concept of “down,” which 
provides criteria for determining which direction (or directions) can be properly described as 
“down.”  In other words, the concept provides rules by which one can judge whether “down” is a 
correct description of a direction.  Using the criteria given by concepts, the generator of a 
description can decide which terms adequately describe a phenomenon, and an interpreter can 
“decode” the resulting description. 
There are many different kinds of rules which can be used to constitute concepts.  In the 
case of directional terms, concepts usually appeal to presupposed reference points or privileged 
orientations which fix the particular direction intended by a description.  For example, the 
concept of down might refer to a privileged location – the center of the earth, say – by which the 
propriety of the description “down” can be judged.  In this case, the concept might include the 
rule: 
The direction in question can be called “down” if and only if the direction is 
toward the center of the earth. 
On this concept, “down” specifies the direction directly toward the stipulated location.  If the 
actual direction fits this criterion – i.e., it is directed toward the center of the earth – then the 
description “down” is judged an appropriate description.  Conversely, an interpreter interpreting 
the description “The apple falls down” would understand that the apple moves toward the center 
of the earth. 
The rules comprising a concept can vary.  Rather than the direction toward a privileged 
location, one’s concept of “down” might refer to a presupposed direction by which the 
description of direction can be oriented.  “Down,” for instance, may be understood as being 
along one’s head-to-toe axis.  In this case, a rule in the concept might be: 
The direction in question can be called “down” if and only if it is parallel to and 
in the same sense as the axis between one’s head and toes. 
If an apple falls in the presupposed direction, it can be described as moving “down.”  The head-
to-toe axis orients the meaning of “down” to a specific, antecedently understood direction.  
Something like this concept is applied when we describe certain phenomena in a bed.  For 
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example, we turn blankets “down,” along the head-to-toe axis of someone lying in the bed.  This 
description is intelligible because we understand it in relation to the head-to-toe axis.28
In most cases, these variations amongst concepts do not raise significant difficulties for 
the generation and interpretation of descriptions.  In order for speakers of a language to 
communicate, they must share roughly similar concepts.  Thus, two observers operating with the 
two concepts of “down” just mentioned would nevertheless agree that an apple falls “down.”  
Communication, and the possibility of description, breaks down only when interlocutors possess 
different or radically divergent concepts.  Thus, if one were to say, on observing the apple, that 
“The apple falls umpwise,” one might think it was a description, but an interpreter of the 
description lacking a concept of “umpwise” would be unable to understand its meaning.  
Likewise if the interpreter’s concept of “down” meant toward the center of the sun, in which case 
he would deny that the description “The apple falls down” is an acceptable description of the 
phenomenon.29   Usually, such failures of description are rare and limited to extreme cases (at 
least amongst contemporaries), and speakers of a language can simply assume that their audience 
shares their concepts.  Thus, generators of descriptions usually describe phenomena without 
explicating the concepts they employ.  (As we shall note below, though, the rarity of explicit 
conceptual explication raises historiographical difficulties for this project.) 
Of course, the examples given are overly simplistic.  The concept of “down” cannot be 
given in a one sentence rule.  Another, equally legitimate concept would be a concatenation of 
the rules above.  For example, one’s concept of “down” might include: 
1.  For most cases, the direction in question can be called “down” if and only if 
the direction is toward the center of the earth. 
2.  If describing a phenomenon in a bed, the direction in question can be called 
“down” if and only if it is parallel to and in the same sense as the axis between 
one’s head and toes when one is lying in the bed. 
Further qualifications and cases might also be present.  For example, the above plus: 
                                                 
28 George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things:  What Categories Reveal About the Mind (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1987). 
29 The point here is similar to Philip Kitcher’s discussion of “reference potentials.”  According to Kitcher, 
interlocutors must at least possess overlapping “reference potentials” for the terms they use in order to communicate.  
If the reference potentials do not overlap (i.e., share at least one common possible referent), the interlocutors cannot 
interpret the reference of each other’s utterances.  Here, of course, the meaning constituted by a concept is not 
limited to reference.  See Philip Kitcher, “Theories, Theorists and Theoretical Change,” The Philosophical Review 
87, no. 4 (1978). 
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3.  If describing a phenomenon on a bench, or plank, or other suitable horizontal 
surface, the direction in question can be called “down” if and only if it is parallel 
to the axis of the horizontal surface in either sense.   
4, 5, 6...  (Other rules in the concept delineating what qualifies as a “bench,” 
“plank,” and “suitable horizontal surface.”)   
It is readily apparent, then, that the concept of down can be very complicated.  At the very least, 
it is linked to other concepts (e.g., those of “head-to-toe axis,” “center of the earth,” and even 
“plank”), and it may not be clear where the concept of “down” ends and another concept begins.  
Moreover, it is not clear that all the rules in a concept can be verbally expressed.  Some rules 
may refer to exemplars – particular objects – that cannot appear in sentential rules.  For instance, 
one might have in mind one’s own dog when judging whether another object can be described as 
“a dog.”30  The relevant rule, in this case, would entail a comparison to the exemplar in mind.  
Also, the rules comprising a concept may be simply heuristic and therefore subject to 
inexpressible exceptions.  These complications make it difficult to express the rules that can 
constitute a concept and thus make it hard to identify just what the concept of any given term 
actually is. 
Despite this complexity, our basic characterization of concepts remains.  Concepts 
consist of implicit and explicit rules by which the ascription of terms is judged.  The concept of 
“down” is whatever legitimates the term “down” as a description of a direction.  So long as we 
are catholic about what counts as a rule, it does not seem that this general, functional notion of 
concepts is particularly objectionable.  In what follows, we will be satisfied to identify particular 
features of a limited set of concepts.  We will leave it to elsewhere to try to provide more general 
and articulated characterizations of concept function and formation.  Meanwhile, the need for 
concepts to ground the generation and interpretation of descriptions is not limited to directions 
such as “down.”  We can generalize our basic argument to all elements of descriptions.  It is easy 
to see how descriptions of location, shape, distance, speed, color, size, etc., require the normative 
                                                 
30 This is a particularly simple example.  In fact, exemplars may be quite technical and complicated.  Galileo’s 
appeal to the behavior of bitumen on a hot iron pan, for example, helped make his description of sunspots 
intelligible.  Similarly, he often used the lever to generate descriptions of phenomena, as in the cases of floating 
bodies and inclined planes.  Machamer calls these exemplars “models of intelligibility.”  See R. Feldhay, 
“Producing Sunspots on an Iron Pan,” in Science, Reason, and Rhetoric, ed. Henry Krips, J.E. McGuire, and Trevor 
Melia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995); Peter K. Machamer, “Comment:  A New Way of Seeing 
Galileo's Sunspots (and New Ways to Talk Too),” in Science, Reason, and Rhetoric, ed. Henry Krips, J.E. McGuire, 
and Trevor Melia (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995). 
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criteria (some more expressible than others) provided by concepts in a cognitive framework to be 
properly generated and comprehended. 
Physical understanding, then, can be divided into three distinct levels.  On the surface, 
understanding is simply the ability to provide explanations of phenomena.  As we have seen, 
though, explanations include descriptions.  In order to generate an explanation, one must 
describe the phenomenon in question.  Descriptions, in turn, rely on concepts, which give 
meaning to descriptions.  Without concepts, one cannot generate or interpret descriptions, and 
one cannot provide explanations.  Understanding subsists on all three levels. 
1.1.3 Representations of Space 
A representation of space, finally, is the subset of the concepts in a cognitive framework that 
concern spatial properties and relations.  It includes, among many others, the concepts of “up,” 
“down,” “above,” “below,” “far,” “near,” and so on.  Thus, a representation of space is the set of 
concepts that underwrites descriptions of directions, locations, sizes, shapes, distances, and any 
other spatial property or relation.  Altogether, a representation of space constitutes one’s 
conception of space.  Hence, a representation of space is an important element of the 
understanding of physical phenomena, since such phenomena occur in physical space.  It forms 
part of the conceptual context in which physical phenomena are described and explained.  Our 
representation of space conditions our understanding of the natural world.31
A representation of space, however, denotes more than just a bare set of concepts.  
Concepts are not held in vacuo, one by one.  Each is invariably linked to others, forming 
intellectual complexes and structures.32  For example, “up” is usually the opposite of “down.”  If 
“down” is conceived as directly toward a presupposed location, “up” is usually conceived as 
directly away from the same location.  The concepts of “above” and “below,” “top” and 
“bottom” will also often refer to the same location, such that if “above” is further from the 
                                                 
31 I do not intend to sketch a concept of space here.  To do so would be prejudicial and anachronistic, since the 
concept of space is the very issue of this dissertation, and the historical authors discussed all have their own view.  
Moreover, I am only interested in the epistemological aspects of spatial concepts, and an attempt to give a full, 
metaphysical description of space would be tangential.  For the time being, I will simply appeal to the reader’s 
intuitive notion of what space is.   
32 Lakoff calls this feature of cognitive systems “polysemy.”  Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things:  What 
Categories Reveal About the Mind, 12. 
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location, “below” is nearer, “top” is furthest, and “bottom” is nearest.  Thus, the interrelations 
between the concepts included in this representation of space form a coherent structure, built 
around a single presupposed location to which each of the concepts refers.  A similar structure 
will result if the concepts are referred to a presupposed axis, as well.  A representation of space 
includes such relationships between concepts.  It is a conceptual structure in which each of its 
constitutive concepts has a place. 
It is possible to characterize the geometry of these conceptual structures.  If, for example, 
the concepts in a representation of space generally refer to a presupposed, privileged location, 
then directions, such as “up” and “down” will converge or diverge toward or away from the 
presupposed location.  That is, the direction an observer employing this representation of space 
will describe as “down” will converge towards the central point his or her concept of “down” 
refers to.  Each region of space may also be conceived with a determinate privileged orientation 
– e.g., the direction toward or away from the privileged location.  The observer will be able to 
tell which way is “up” or “down.”  And different regions of space will be conceptually 
distinguishable from one another by their distance from the privileged location.  The observer, 
therefore, will be able to describe regions of space as “higher” and “lower.”  Put another way, a 
representation of space that presupposes a single privileged location is convergent, anisotropic, 
and heterogeneous.  This is a spherical representation of space, since the conceptual structure 
exhibits the properties of a spherical geometry. 
Perhaps the best way to illustrate a spherical representation of space is with an example.  
Consider Aristotle’s description of the “simple motions” in De Caelo: 
Now revolution about the center is circular motion, while the upward and 
downward movements are in a straight line, ‘upward’ meaning motion away from 
the center, and ‘downward’ motion towards it.  All simple motion, then, must be 
motion either away from or towards or about the center.33
Aristotle conceives of directions in relation to a presupposed privileged location, namely, the 
center of the universe, which happens to coincide with the center of the earth.  The center of the 
universe is a primitive feature of Aristotle’s representation of space.  The location is presumed in 
order to make descriptions of direction intelligible.  “Downward” means toward the center.  
                                                 
33 De Caelo I.2, Aristotle. The Complete Works of Aristotle, Jonathan Barnes, ed., (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1984), 448. 
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“Upward” means away from it.  In other words, Aristotle’s geometrical structure of space is 
spherical – it is structured spherically around a single, privileged location. 
This spherical representation of space allows the description of three “simple motions” – 
upward, downward, and about the center.  Motion in these directions is simple because a body 
moving along these paths does not change direction.  The direction of the motion is always 
described the same way – upward, downward, or about the center.  The motion is thus described 
because the direction is conceived in relation to the center.  Hence, the simple motions are either 
linear (towards or away from the center) or circular (around the center).  These motions are 
simple because direction is conceived in relation to the spherical representation of space.  The 
“simplicity” of the motions depends on how direction is conceived and, thus, how the motion is 
described. 
The explanatory consequences of this spherical geometry in Aristotle’s physical theories 
are well known.  Aristotle can distinguish different regions of space, or “places,” by their 
distances to the center.  This heterogeneity of space allows him to use locations as (in later 
terms) termini a quo and termini ad quem in his physical explanations.  He can then argue that 
bodies possess inherent natures that cause motion towards their proper places.  Thus, the heavy 
elements earth and water naturally move “downwards,” toward the center.  The light elements air 
and fire naturally rise “upward,” away from the center (or toward the periphery), and the celestial 
spheres remain in “place,” naturally rotating around the center.  Aristotle also argues that, since 
they are simple bodies, the elements should move simply – with simple motions.  Hence, the 
heavy and light elements move linearly toward and away from the center, and the heavens rotate 
circularly around it.  As we have seen, though, Aristotle’s description of “simple motions” also 
relies on his spherical representation of space. 
These basic physical explanations have further consequences.  For example, the earth’s 
center and the geometrical center of space must coincide.  Otherwise, as Aristotle notes, the earth 
would “fall” towards the center.  Also, the earth must remain motionless at the center of the 
moving heavens, since its parts are all “balanced” upon the center, and there is no cause of 
additional motion.34  The spherical representation of space conditions Aristotle’s descriptions of 
locations and directions, and thus of motions.  As a result, it grounds the physical explanations 
he provides. 
                                                 
34 De Caelo II.14, Ibid., 487f. 
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Consider, by contrast, a representation of space in which the concepts are referred to a 
presupposed line or axis, rather than a privileged location.  In this case, “down” might mean 
along the line in one direction, “up” along the line in the other.  Similarly, “above” would be 
further along the line in the “up” direction, “below” would be further along the “down” direction.  
Here, directions would be self-parallel.  The direction described as “up” or “down” in one part of 
space would be parallel to the direction described as “up” or “down” in another.  By the same 
token, an observer would be able to distinguish a privileged direction in each part of space.  In 
other words, the representation of space is self-parallel and anisotropic. 
In this case, space would also be conceived as homogeneous.  Without a presupposed 
privileged location by which other locations could be uniquely specified, there is no way to 
determinately distinguish different parts of space.  One region of space might be correctly 
described as “higher” than another, but it could also be described as “lower” than a third.  More 
generally, a single region of space can be both “further” and “closer” to other regions.  There is 
nothing inherently distinguishing about the way any location is conceived.  No feature of the 
spatial concept allows a unique specification of place.35
This kind of spatial concept could be called Euclidean, since its structure is similar to that 
of “Euclidean” geometry.  The label, however, is somewhat misleading, since Euclid himself 
was ecumenical in his approach to geometry.  His methods presupposed, on an equal footing, 
both lines, in the form of the straight edge, and central points, in the form of the compass point.  
Someone trying to describe phenomena could appeal to Euclid’s proofs, whether his own 
representation of space was spherical, “Euclidean,” or otherwise.  In what follows, we will call 
representations of space that presuppose a privileged line (rather than a point) rectilinear. 
One example of a rectilinear representation of space is the one employed by Epicurus in 
his “Letter to Herodotus:”   
Moreover in speaking of the infinite we must not use ‘up’ or ‘down’ with the 
implication that they are top or bottom, but with the implication that from 
wherever we stand it is possible to protract the line above our heads to infinity 
without danger of this ever seeming so to us, or likewise the line below us (in 
                                                 
35 Consequently, this kind of representation of space is fundamentally relative.  An observer can describe locations 
only relative to other locations.  To do so, he or she stipulates a location to serve as a reference point, but whose 
location is not itself specified. 
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what is conceived to stretch to infinity simultaneously both upwards and 
downwards in relation to the same point).36
Epicurus conceives of “up” and “down” in relation to a line protracted “above our heads” and 
“below us” – i.e., the extrapolation of the head-to-toe axis.  “Up” is along the line in one 
direction, “down” along it in the other.  “Above” is further “up;” “below” is further “down.”  The 
spatial concepts in his representation of space refer to a presupposed line.  Moreover, the 
directions and other concepts remain “parallel” to themselves throughout the space, since they 
retain the same relation to the line extended above and below us. 
Epicurus, as an intellectual heir of the early atomists, held that space was an infinite void.  
This infinite space, he argued, could have no boundary and no center.  As a result, he explicitly 
rejects any appeal to privileged locations in his conception of space.  Directions stretch to 
infinity.  “Up” and “down” are directions simpliciter.  They are not to be conceived as toward a 
“top” or “bottom.”  There is no terminus a quo or terminus ad quem by which directions or other 
spatial concepts can be designated: 
Therefore it is possible to take as one motion that which is conceived as upwards 
to infinity, and as one motion that which is conceived as downwards to infinity, 
even if that which moves from where we are towards the places above our heads 
arrives ten thousand times at the feet of those above, or at the heads of those 
below, in the case of that which moves downwards from where we are.  For each 
of the two mutually opposed motions is none the less, as a whole, conceived as 
being to infinity.37
There is no “place above our heads” such that motion towards that place is “up.”  When an 
object moving upward reaches those “places above our heads,” it continues to move “upward” 
(in the infinite void) even though, having arrived at and passed any given place, it moves away 
from, rather than toward, any point we might use to identify “up.”  The same is true for 
“downward” motion.  The directions are “conceived as being to infinity,” not toward (or away 
from) a location.  The Epicurean rectilinear representation of space, therefore, is self-parallel, 
anisotropic, and rigorously homogeneous.  As Epicurus writes, “For this [i.e. that there should be 
a top and bottom] is unthinkable.”38,39
                                                 
36 Epicurus, “Letter to Herodotus,” in The Hellenistic Philosophers, ed. A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley (New York: 




This conception of space, of course, is important for Epicurean physics, which holds that 
the atoms have weight which causes them to forever fall “downwards” through the void.  This 
assumes that the physical space inhabited by the atoms is already oriented such that 
“downwards” is determinable.40  In other words, the explanation that atoms naturally fall “down” 
is based on the rectilinear representation of space which gives meaning to the description 
“downwards.” 
This discussion is not meant to suggest that representations of space fall neatly into two 
categories, spherical and rectilinear.  There can be countless variations within each kind of 
spatial concept.  In fact, each author we address will have a slightly different conceptual scheme, 
and it is the point of this thesis to show that aspects of those representations changed over time.  
Nevertheless, broadly speaking, the representation of space natural philosophers used to frame 
their descriptions and explanations of phenomena at the beginning of the seventeenth century 
was spherical.  Authors tended to presume privileged locations – e.g., the “center of the 
universe” – and conceive of spatial properties and relations by referring to those points.  By the 
end of the period we will discuss, however, the prevailing representation of space was rectilinear.  
Authors presupposed privileged lines in order to describe and explain phenomena. 
Hopefully, the foregoing discussion has dispelled any concerns over the legitimacy of 
representations of space as a historical reality rather than anachronistic figment.  We have tried 
to show that representations are a necessary part of any physical understanding,41 since they 
                                                                                                                                                             
39 As Max Jammer puts it, Epicurus “...conceived space as endowed with an objectively distinguished direction, the 
vertical.  It is in this direction in which the atoms are racing through space in parallel lines.  According to Epicurus 
and Lucretius, space, though homogeneous, is not isotropic.”  Max Jammer, Concepts of Space (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1954), 13.  See also Maurice Clavelin, “Conceptual and Technical Aspects of the Galilean 
Geometrization of the Motion of Heavy Bodies,” in Nature Mathematized, ed. William R. Shea (Dordrecht: D. 
Reidel, 1983); David J. Furley, “Aristotle and the Atomists on Motion in a Void,” in Motion and Time, Space and 
Matter, ed. Peter K. Machamer and Robert G. Turnbull (Ohio State University Press, 1976); David E. Hahm, 
“Weight and Lightness in Aristotle and His Predecessors,” in Motion and Time, Space and Matter, ed. Peter K. 
Machamer and Robert G. Turnbull (Ohio State University Press, 1976); Peter Machamer, “Aristotle on Natural 
Place and Natural Motion,” Isis 69, no. 3 (1978). 
40 The rectilinear structure of space also led to trouble for Epicurean philosophers.  Since “downwards” is 
everywhere parallel to itself, atoms simply falling “downwards” would never encounter one another, and the world 
would never change.  As Lucretius wrote, “…everything would be falling downward like raindrops through the 
depths of the void, and collisions and impacts among the primary bodies would not have arisen, with the result that 
nature would never have created anything.”  “Sideways” motions – the “swerve” – had to be introduced to bring 
about collisions between atoms that could bring about change.  Such motions were uncaused, however, which made 
their philosophical warrant suspect.  See Furley, “Aristotle and the Atomists on Motion in a Void,” 96-98; Lucretius, 
“De Rerum Natura,” in The Hellenistic Philosophers, ed. A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987), 11. 
41 Regardless of temporal or cultural context. 
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enable the description of the phenomena to be described and explained in space.  Though 
representations of space can be constrained by the context of a phenomenon, they are not trivial.  
They are an essential part of physical understanding.  Therefore, it behooves the historian of 
scientific understanding to describe representations of space developed in concert with changes 
in physical explanations of phenomena. 
This, then, is the first part of the thesis to be defended in this project:  the first half of the 
seventeenth century witnessed a profound and rapid shift in the representation of space used by 
natural philosophers to understand the physical world.  A convergent, heterogeneous, and 
anisotropic spatial concept was replaced by a self-parallel, homogeneous, and (unlike Epicurean 
space) isotropic42 framework.  That is, space was conceived spherically at the beginning of the 
period and rectilinearly at its end.43
1.1.4 Reciprocal Iteration 
Beyond establishing, we hope, that a shift in the prevailing representation of space actually 
occurred during the early modern period, we can try to say something about how that shift came 
about.  In other words, we can try to establish the intellectual mechanism that produced the new 
representation of space. 
When we began this project, we assumed that the representations of space employed by 
various authors would be the results of influences from outside the proper domain of natural 
philosophy.  That is, an author’s representation of space would “come from” his thoughts about 
art or mathematics or something else.  We also assumed that shifting representations of space 
would lead to changing physical explanations.  However, upon investigation, we found that, 
                                                 
42 On a lesser note, we will also point out that the shift from spherical to rectilinear representations of space was 
accompanied by an abstraction of spatial concepts from the physical objects of the world.  In other words, by the end 
of the period we examine, philosophers no longer believed that the geometrical structures they presupposed in order 
to describe and explain phenomena were actually instantiated by the phenomena themselves, as in the heavenly 
spheres or the vertical fall of the atoms.  Instead, philosophers recognized that their assumptions about the structure 
of space were, at least in part, subjective presuppositions.  This abstraction brought about a shift from fixed 
orientations taken to be imposed by the physical furniture of space to arbitrary orientations imposed by those trying 
to describe the physical furniture.  In other words, the shift in representations of space included a move from 
anisotropy to isotropy.  However, the discussion of this move should not be taken as a central part of this thesis. 
43 For a more (mathematically) rigorous characterization of various authors’ representations of space (and time) see 
John Earman, World Enough and Space-Time (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1989). 
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while “external” influences may have played a part in altering representations of space,44 
considerations within natural philosophy had a more direct effect on representations of space 
during the period.  Moreover, the patterns of intellectual development were reciprocal – not only 
did representations of space affect physical explanations, but explanations affected 
representations.  The shift from spherical to rectilinear representations of space occurred 
piecewise, as an iterative reciprocation amongst the three levels of understanding (concepts, 
descriptions, and explanations) – both within the work of individual authors and in the body of 
natural philosophy as a whole. 
To prepare the ground, we should say something at this point to establish the plausibility 
of this proposed mechanism.  That is, we should establish the possibility of an iterative 
reciprocation between the levels.  From what has been said already, it is almost trivial to claim 
that explanations depend on descriptions.  A change in the way a phenomenon is described 
entails a change in the way it is explained (or even if it can be explained at all) since the 
explanation includes at least a partial description of the phenomenon in the explanandum, if not 
also in the explanans.  We can further motivate this point by noting that explanandum-
descriptions determine what features of a phenomenon are to be explained.  As Hempel writes: 
Indeed, requests for an explanation of the aurora borealis, of the tides, of solar 
eclipses in general or of some individual solar eclipse in particular, or of a given 
influenza epidemic, and the like have a clear meaning only if it is understood 
what aspects of the phenomenon in question are to b/e explained; and in that case 
the explanatory problem can again be expressed in the form ‘Why is it the case 
that p?’, where the place of ‘p’ is occupied by an empirical statement specifying 
the explanandum.45
We do not attempt to explain every aspect of a phenomenon at once.  Instead, we explain 
particular features of a phenomenon, such as the frequency of the tides.  Other features of the 
phenomenon, such as the height of the tide, or even the color of the water, are left to other, 
associated but distinct, explanations.  In order for an explanation to be provided, it must be clear 
which features of the phenomenon are in question.  Precisely which features of a phenomena are 
to be explained, meanwhile, are specified by the explanandum-statement – a description of the 
                                                 
44 See our discussion of Gilbert and geography, for example. 
45 Carl G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science (New York: 
Free Press, 1965), 334.  Here, Hempel is using “explanandum” to refer to the phenomenon itself, whereas we have 
used the term to refer to the statement describing it, which Hempel himself does elsewhere.  See Hempel, Aspects of 
Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, 336. 
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phenomenon which only includes features we seek an explanation for.  The explanans can then 
account for the features included in the explanandum.  The explanandum-description separates 
the phenomenal features of interest from the folderol of the natural world. 
Of course, if we change the way a phenomenon is described, we change the explanation 
that is given to explain it.  In particular, if we change what features of the phenomenon are 
included in the explanandum, we change what is required of the explanans.  Suppose an 
explanadum is “The apple separates from the tree.”  In this case, the task is to explain why the 
separation takes place, and we would refer to dehiscence zones, fruit maturation, temperature, 
season, and so on.  The apple’s attraction to the earth is a secondary matter, simply assumed, if 
addressed at all.  If the phenomenon were described as “The apple falls down,” however, the 
attraction would be made the focus of our explanation, and we would account for it by referring 
to weight, gravity, etc.  We would not address the physiology of fruit maturation.  The 
explanation changes relative to the description of the phenomenon.46
Changing descriptions can similarly affect explanantia.  Since an explanans presumably 
contains a description, it too would change if that description were to change.  For example, if 
initial conditions were described differently, a different explanans, and thus different 
explanation, would necessarily result.  In the above example, our explanation of the apple’s 
separation from the tree might depend on whether we describe the tree as well-irrigated or 
drought-stricken. 
It is equally clear that descriptions, and thus explanations, depend on concepts.  By 
altering concepts, one can change the way a phenomenon is described and explained.  Consider 
the case of the falling apple.  If “down” is conceived as “toward the center,” the description “The 
apples fall down” will be taken to mean that the apple falls toward the center.  The phenomenon 
can then be explained by appealing to the apple’s inherent tendency to move toward the center.  
Suppose, however, that “down” is conceived as “along the head-to-toe axis.”  In this case, the 
description is taken to mean that the apple falls along the axis.  That is, the meaning of the 
description changes.  In this case, the original explanation is not adequate, since it presupposes 
that the motion of the apple is toward the center of the earth.  Even if the ultimate cause of the 
apple’s motion – the apple’s natural tendency to move toward the center – is the same, the 
explanation must include some statement to the effect that the direction “toward the surface” 
                                                 
46 See Woodward, “A Theory of Singular Causal Explanation.” 
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coincides with the direction “toward the center.”  The changed concept of “down” affects the 
meaning of the description “down,” and thus the way the phenomenon is explained. 
It is only slightly more difficult to establish that intellectual influence can work in the 
reverse direction – that is, explanations can affect descriptions and concepts.  In seeking 
satisfactory explanations, one might come to accept an explanation or theory.  However, 
acceptance of a certain explanation forces adherence to a particular way of describing 
phenomena – namely that exemplified by the descriptions appearing in the explanandum and 
explanans.  These descriptions, in turn, rely on a particular set of concepts, which must also be 
accepted.  Hence, to accept a theory entails acceptance of its descriptions and concepts.  For 
example, Kepler, as we shall see, was frustrated by his inability to satisfactorily explain the 
movement of Mars in its orbit.  As a result, he adopted parts of Gilbert’s magnetic theory of 
planetary motion.  This theory, however, entailed that the behavior of a planet’s magnetic axis be 
described as a non-motion, rather than a rotation.  To describe the phenomenon this way, 
however, required a novel conception of direction, which Kepler also accepted.  In order to put 
Gilbert’s explanations to use, Kepler was forced to adopt Gilbert’s description of the 
phenomenon and the concept of direction that grounded it.47
In general, a change at any level of understanding both enables and brings about changes 
at the other levels.  This leads to further adjustments at the level of the original change, which 
might lead to new changes, and so on.  Thus, the whole edifice of understanding – our ability to 
account for phenomena – advances via an iterative reciprocation between the concepts, 
                                                 
47 We will encounter circumstances in which a single phenomenon is described in different ways.  Of particular 
interest will be cases in which a phenomenon is described both as a change or motion and as a non-change or non-
motion.  In either case, authors are called upon to explain the phenomenon as described.  The explanations they 
provide, however, are quite different depending on the description.  In general, a “change” requires a more 
sophisticated account than a “non-change.”  The author must explain why the change takes place, and why the 
change occurs in the particular way it does, rather than simply why the situation is as it is and stays constant.  In 
fact, authors, like Kepler, sometimes change their descriptions of phenomena in response to explanatory difficulties, 
describing a “non-change” rather than trying to provide an account of a “change,” or vice versa. 
 Note, however, that a shift from describing a “motion” to describing a “non-motion” is not a shift of 
explanation.  One must still explain the cause of the motion or non-motion.  It is just that the causes in each instance 
are usually quite different.  Copernicus, for example, ascribed some of the observed changes in planetary positions 
to the earth, rather than the planets themselves.  This was not an explanation.  Copernicus’s claim was simply that 
the description “moving” should not apply to the planets, but to the earth.  Thus, the planets’ motions were merely 
“apparent,” due to the earth’s “real” motion.  Copernicans still needed to appeal to physical causes to explain the 
“motion” of the earth, just as Ptolemaic astronomers had appealed to (Scholastic) physical causes to explain the 
motions of the planets as they had described them. 
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descriptions, and explanations that constitute it.  In this project, we are interested in the iterative 
advancement of understanding insofar as it involves representations of space. 
Putting our general point another way, understanding is relativized to a cognitive 
framework.  Understanding can only be obtained in the context of a particular set of concepts, 
since concepts are needed to generate descriptions, and thus to constitute understanding.  
Consequently, if one’s conceptual framework were to change, the content of one’s understanding 
would change as well.  This relativization of understanding to concepts has been extensively 
noted in the philosophical and historical literature, especially by those trying to explicate 
scientific “progress.”48  Many authors have worried that the conceptual change that accompanies 
changes in theoretical explanations renders comparison of explanatory theories impossible.  
Others have sought ways to compare explanations despite their conceptual relativity.49  Thus, the 
basic notion that understanding relies, at least in part, on concepts, is not new. 
This project accepts the assumption that conceptual change underlies the development of 
explanatory theories.  However, we will assume that that the conceptual change accompanying 
theoretical development is gradual and open to historical investigation, rather than cataclysmic 
and idiosyncratic, as some have argued.  It may well be, to use Hanson’s example, that Kepler 
and Tycho possess different concepts regarding astronomical phenomena, and thus would 
describe or even experience50 the rising of the sun differently.  We will hold, though, that they 
each came to hold those concepts via a process of rational contemplation open to historical 
analysis.51  The intellectual development that occurred during the seventeenth century was self-
motivating.  Concepts and theories in the light of natural phenomena exerted intellectual 
                                                 
48 We have in mind Sellars, Kuhn, Feyerabend, Hanson, and their successors. 
49 See, for example, Philip Kitcher, “Explanatory Unification and the Causal Structure of the World,” in Scientific 
Explanation, ed. Philip Kitcher and Wesley C. Salmon (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989). 
50 I am not sure how one would distinguish between descriptions and experience.  What does Tycho experience?  If 
we ask him, he will give us a description (e.g., “The sun moving.”).  If we conjecture about his thought processes, 
we speculate about how he would describe or “see” the phenomenon (e.g., Tycho “sees” the sun moving).  In either 
case, the descriptions attributed to Tycho would be different from those attributed to Kepler.  This descriptive 
difference, it seems, is the basis for saying they have different experiences.  In any case, 400 years later, we have no 
evidence of Kepler’s and Tycho’s experience besides their descriptions, so, for the purposes of this project, the 
question is moot. 
51 We reject Kuhn’s contention that the final stage of a paradigmatic shift “how an individual invents (or finds he 
has invented) a new way of giving order to data now all assembled – must here remain inscrutable and may be 
permanently so.”  Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1996), 90.  It must be noted, though, that Kuhn’s notion of a paradigm shift includes, but is not identical to, 
the conceptual shift we are discussing here.  A paradigm comprises shared concepts (and therefore leads to shared 
descriptions of phenomena and the ability to communicate within a field of study), but it also consists of shared 
practices that go beyond mere conceptual understanding.  
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pressures which brought about the advances of the period.  This dissertation will trace one 
feature of the conceptual changes underlying the theoretical achievements of the seventeenth 
century – the shift in representations of space.   
This project, however, is not an attempt to comment generally on the problems related to 
conceptual change in science.  The historical account we will elaborate is specific to our 
discussion and should not be taken as a general model.52  We will not claim that the 
reciprocation follows any strict pattern.  The adjustments made at each of the levels by the 
authors we discuss are, for the most part, peculiar and unique the circumstances.  By outlining a 
process of reciprocal iteration, we only mean to suggest that the process of conceptual and 
theoretical change can be traced through the works we cite.  It is open to investigation, rather 
than buried in the inscrutable workings of genius. 
Finally, we also claim that, since the process of intellectual development was reciprocal, 
the development of physical understanding – that is, at the level of explanation – was both 
enabled by and a cause of the conceptual shift we aim to illustrate.  The shift in representations 
of space allowed the development of novel physical explanations, and the development of 
explanations brought about the shift in representations. 
1.2 METHOD OF INVESTIGATION 
In this project, we will be trying to identify the representations of space held by various authors, 
as well as the relationships between their representations and their physical theories.  We should 
comment briefly on the methods we will use to carry out this investigation. 
1.2.1 Historical Description 
As we have noted, representations of space can vary.  Individuals interpret and generate 
descriptions in the context of their own schema, with possibly different privileged geometrical 
                                                 
52 On the other hand, there is nothing to prevent this project from being used as evidence for a general model of 
theoretical or conceptual change.  That is, this historical study can establish desiderata such models might be 
expected to satisfy.  Models can then be tested against the actual theoretical and conceptual changes described here. 
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objects and conceptual structures.  In fact, spatial concepts may even vary from situation to 
situation for one individual.  We tend, for example, to employ a spherical scheme when 
observing the stars, but a rectilinear one describing objects in a room.  Despite this variation, a 
particular situation usually presents obvious privileged objects and a convenient geometrical 
structure.  It simply makes sense, for example, to use a spherical geometry to represent the vault 
of the heavens and a rectilinear geometry in a room with flat walls, floors, and ceiling at right 
angles to one another.  The obvious features of a given situation tend to constrain the 
frameworks individuals use to a limited set that are similar enough to allow meaningful 
communication between individuals.  Hence, though one person may understand “down” in 
relation to her head-to-toe axis and another in relation to the center of the earth, both conceive 
the phenomenon described as “falling down” in roughly the same way – as something like the 
accelerated motion towards the center of the earth.  In other words, the frameworks are 
congruent in this context since applying either set of criteria yields descriptions and explanations 
that are effectively indistinguishable.  They become distinguishable only when the 
representations of space are directly compared or when they are extended to other contexts, such 
as in a bed, where the descriptions and explanations they generate diverge. 
Since the situation usually constrains the frameworks one uses, generators and 
interpreters of descriptions only rarely need to explicate the representation of space they use to 
fix their meanings (so long as the situational context of their description is clear).  As a result, 
spatial concepts are often adopted without comment.  Indeed, they may not even be consciously 
acknowledged.  This raises a problem for our project.  Only rarely will an author state, for 
example, that he thinks “the cosmos is spherical.”  In most cases, the framework an author is 
assuming must be “read back” from the descriptions he provides.  Only by examining the ways 
in which the author describes phenomena and eliciting the underlying presuppositions can we 
understand his representation of space. 
Notice that spherical and rectilinear representations of space can generally be 
distinguished by the geometrical entities they take as primitives.  Aristotle, for example, assumes 
that the universe has a center.  As a result, the concepts in his representation of space refer to that 
center as a privileged reference point.  Epicurus, meanwhile, assumes the universe is oriented 
along a privileged vertical axis.  His representation of space is thus constructed with reference to 
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that axis.  The spherical representation of space presumes a point (or a sphere).  The rectilinear 
representation of space presumes a line. 
Therefore, one way we can characterize an author’s representation of space is by 
investigating which geometrical entities are taken as primitives in his conceptual scheme.  This 
suggests several specific questions we can ask of a text in order to discover its underlying 
representation of space.  Most importantly, we might ask what the basic geometrical elements of 
space are.  Does the author presuppose spheres or lines?  Does he presuppose fixed points or not?  
We might also ask how an object is located in space.  That is, how is an object’s location 
specified?  What objects are referenced by this specification?  What features of the objects are 
important?  What geometrical presuppositions are necessary for the specification?  Again, we 
may ask how direction is specified at a given point in space and what objects (geometrical or 
otherwise) are referenced by this specification.  The answers to these questions will all point to 
the basic elements of the conceptual “structure” of space and, in turn, to the author’s 
representation of space. 
Though the representations of space are often merely implicit, and discovered only by 
interrogating a text, we will find that those describing phenomena sometimes find it necessary to 
explicitly describe the framework they employ in order to make themselves understood.  We 
shall also see instances where the framework in use is not apparent or is inadequate, rendering 
the resulting descriptions confusing or even unintelligible.  In these cases, deciphering the 
representation of space at work is easier.53
1.2.2 Historical Explanation 
In addition to describing the changing representations of space employed by early modern 
natural philosophers, this project offers to explain how the representations of space changed:  
namely, by reciprocal iteration.  This mechanism was described above, and an argument was 
given to make this explanation at least plausible.  It should be noted, however, just how this 
mechanism will be discovered in the texts here under investigation.  That is, the criteria by which 
                                                 
53 Gilbert, for example, explicitly adds a rectilinear orientation to his implicit spherical geometry.  Galileo’s 
spherical framework, meanwhile, is inadequate for his rectilinear physics.  See chapters 3 and 5, below. 
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historical explanations will be identified should be explicated and defended.  In this way, the 
underlying structure of the following account can be brought to the fore. 
In the first place, it will be simply assumed that the texts studied below, whatever else 
they might have been, were, at least in part, works of natural philosophy intended to provide an 
understanding of natural phenomena.  Thus, it is supposed from the outset that the authors tried 
to provide a satisfactory understanding of facts about the natural world.  This assumption should 
not be very worrisome.  In a fairly obvious way, the texts examined below are all about the 
natural world.  They discuss physical phenomena, and they at least include assertions about 
physical causes and principles, however defined.  The texts may have been intended to fulfill 
other tasks, even primarily so, but they do contain some natural philosophy. 
This assumption is also very weak.  The assumption that the authors intended to explain 
natural phenomena does not say anything about how they went about doing so.  In particular, it 
does not dictate anything about what counted as a satisfactory explanation.  The standards used 
to judge whether a physical explanation was satisfactory and adequate varied according to the 
intellectual resources and constraints pertaining to each author.  Each author held his 
explanations to different standards of judgment, and these standards were grounded by 
idiosyncratic considerations.  The assumption of a natural philosophical intent does not imply 
any transcendent (and possibly anachronistic) standard of explanatory adequacy or success.  Nor 
does the assumption imply any of the authors actually achieved explanatory success, even by 
their own standards.  The assumption made here is only about the kind of problems authors were 
trying to solve.  It is not about the solutions they gave. 
We can also assume that the authors intended their texts as attempts to solve natural 
philosophical problems – inability to satisfactorily explain a phenomenon or phenomena given 
the theoretical and conceptual resources at their disposal.  To think otherwise is tantamount to 
holding that the texts discussed below were (and are) pointless, in which case it becomes 
impossible to understand why they were written at all.  Since, as is assumed, the authors were 
trying to provide satisfactory understanding, i.e., the ability to generate satisfactory explanations, 
the failure to do so motivated authors to adjust their explanatory resources (meaning concepts, 
descriptions, and explanations) in order to bring their understanding into satisfactory alignment 
with the phenomena.  In other words, these problems exerted the intellectual pressure referred to 
above.  Of course, explanatory problems can occur at and generate adjustments at any level of 
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understanding, and each adjustment can lead to new problems, thereby bringing about a 
reciprocal iteration amongst the levels of understanding.  Thus, the intellectual shifts this project 
describes were, in a historical sense, caused by the intellectual pressures exerted by failures of 
understanding. 
For the purposes of this project, then, explaining an intellectual change at any level of 
understanding entails identifying the intellectual problem the change was meant to overcome.  
As noted, though, this identification must proceed against the background of an author’s own 
conditions of explanatory satisfaction and adequacy.  The problem can only be offered as a 
plausible explanation of an intellectual change if the author recognizes the problem as a 
problem.  Furthermore, the problem can only explain the change if the change solves the 
problem.  In other words, the change must be shown to alleviate the difficulty that the author has 
been shown to recognize. 
Therefore, a historical explanation, in the context of this dissertation, must meet several 
criteria.  First, some difficulty in generating a satisfactory and/or adequate understanding of 
some phenomenon or phenomena must be identified.  Then, it must be shown that the author 
recognizes this problem and why the author does so.  This entails elaborating the standards of 
explanatory adequacy employed by the author and demonstrating why the available explanatory 
resources fail to meet these standards.  Finally, it must be shown that the author offers the change 
in question as a (possible) solution of the problem.  That is, it must be demonstrated that the new 
explanatory apparatus allows explanations that (seem to) meet the standards of satisfaction and 
adequacy employed by the author.  Obviously, satisfying all of these criteria is sometimes quite 
difficult.  Authors typically do not make their motivations explicit, and, even when they do, their 
statements are often hard to interpret.  Instead, authors present their solutions without describing 
the intellectual problems they are meant to solve.  In particular, authors often leave their 
idiosyncratic standards of explanatory adequacy unelucidated.  Hence, as with representations of 
space, rendering these standards clear requires thorough interrogation of the authors’ texts. 
Some readers might worry that this methodology assumes knowledge of the inaccessible.  
In particular, they might hold that any attempt to discern an author’s intentions will inevitably be 
colored by the historian’s own post hoc perspective.  Consequently, any attempt to understand a 
text in terms of what an author intends to do or, more to the point, what problem an author 
intends to solve will be fruitless, at best, and seriously misguided, at worst.  Hence, there might 
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be concern that the explanations offered here are distorted by the historian’s own assumptions, 
rather than actual accounts of the historical phenomena themselves. 
While it is not possible to completely avoid this objection, perhaps these fears can be 
minimized.  In the first place, whatever the case may actually have been, the authors examined in 
this project were offering solutions to some problems.  Therefore, it is at least reasonable to seek 
some problem by which to explain an author’s assertions in his texts.  A historian has grounds to 
attempt a plausible reconstruction of the problem that led to the assertions, including the author’s 
standards of explanatory adequacy that make the problem problematic. 
This does not completely solve the historiographical problem.  Textual interrogation will 
always fail to fully determine the explanatory problems and, especially, the explanatory 
standards that motivated an author.  Thus, there will always be room for a historian’s own 
perspective and interpretation to pollute his reconstruction of the historical phenomena.  Note, 
though, that the historian’s position is exactly analogous to that of the natural philosopher.  Both 
are attempting to generate satisfactory and adequate explanations in the face of underdetermining 
phenomena.  Both might allow assumptions and prejudices to affect their explanations.  Both are 
always subject to correction.  Given these concerns, though, the historian, like the philosopher, 
should not retreat in despair.  Rather, he should go ahead and attempt a reconstruction, 
attempting to bring his own explanatory framework into line with the text.54  Nevertheless, he 
should be aware that his successors might reject or modify his understanding for reasons of their 
own.  The explanations given here are not presented as definitive and beyond reproach.  They are 
intended only as the best reconstruction given the reading and reasoning of one historian.  Just as 
the authors studied below brought about a the physical understanding of the world by a process 
of iterative reciprocation, so might the present project become part of the reciprocal iteration that 
develops the historical understanding of their work. 
                                                 
54 I am here advocating a position somewhere between those of Skinner and Gadamer.  I agree with Skinner that, 
though the unadulterated reconstruction of an author’s intent is the ideal goal of intellectual history, reconstructions 
are always affected by the historian’s own perspective, “paradigm” (in Skinner’s term), or “horizon” (in 
Gadamer’s).  I agree with Gadamer that the proper hermeneutic strategy is “play” – a continual re-adjustment of 
understanding in the face of the text that brings historical understanding into line with authorial intent, both by 
individual and successive historians.  A reciprocal iteration is one way of describing the process of play, though it is 
here used in relation to the natural world, instead of texts.  See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. Joel 
Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2nd, revised ed. (New York: Continuum, 1989); Quentin Skinner, “Meaning 
and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” History and Theory 8, no. 1 (1969); Skinner, “A reply to my critics.” 
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1.3 DISTINCTION FROM THE LITERATURE:  JAMMER AND KOYRÉ 
We should pause for a moment to say what this project is not about in order to distinguish its 
territory from that already covered by other authors.  This is a historical, not philosophical 
project.  As stressed above, we are not interested in providing general models of explanation, 
causation, or description.  Nor are we suggesting any generalized theory of conceptual change.  
This discussion should be considered only in the particular intellectual/historical context 
addressed in this project.  We have no pretensions of being a cognitive scientist or philosopher of 
language or mind.  We will leave for elsewhere the details about what concepts consist of, how 
they are formed, and how they function in the conditioning of experience, whether or not others 
have actually done so.  Furthermore, we will not address whether representations of space should 
be considered as conventions or something else.  Nor are we interested in the a priori/a 
posteriori and synthetic/analytic status of representations of space.55  It will suffice, for our 
purposes, to point out simply that representations of space, even if they are implicit, must be 
employed to make sense of any description or explanation of a physical phenomenon.  This 
project will study how they were once employed. 
Also, notice that a representation of space is a conception of space, not a concept of 
“space.”  We are interested in how ideas about space affect descriptions and explanations of 
phenomena.  We are not concerned with the existence of space itself.  Put another way, this is a 
project in the history of spatial epistemology, not in the history of spatial ontology.  Though 
clearly related, these lines of inquiry pose rather different questions. We will ask how spatial 
concepts condition an author’s descriptions of locations, directions, and so on.  We will not ask if 
an author believes space to be infinite, eternal, void, a plenum, an attribute of God, etc.  Our 
subject is the function of the concept of space, not what the concept of space is.   
Of course, questions about the ontology of space spawned significant lines of inquiry in 
natural philosophy during the period we are studying.  Up to a point, however, those 
developments remained separate from the ones that concern us.  Metaphysics only applied 
external constraints on the explanatory projects faced by natural philosophers.  Certain kinds of 
                                                 
55 Note, though, that the term “representation of space” is taken from Kant’s Transcendental Aesthetic, where he 
argues that a “representation of space” is synthetic and a priori.  See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, 
trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 175. 
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explanation might be ruled in or out on metaphysical grounds.  Within these constraints, natural 
philosophers still had to go about the task of actually fitting explanations to phenomena.  For 
example, Scholastic philosophers as well as Descartes appealed to the perfection of divine 
creation.  This metaphysical position grounded explanations based on the immutability of nature.  
Yet, for the Scholastics, the immutability of the heavenly spheres explained their continued 
circular motion, while Descartes maintained that the immutability of God’s action implied the 
conservation of linear motion.  In these cases, essentially the same metaphysical position lay 
behind rather different physical accounts.  This is not to say that metaphysics did not influence 
the physical project – we will have occasion to comment on metaphysical considerations, 
especially in relation to Descartes – but only that discussion of the two projects can be teased 
apart.  The ontic significance of space in early modern thought can be treated separately from the 
epistemic advances we trace here.56
This attitude sets the present project apart from the foremost historical studies of thinking 
about space during the early modern period:  Max Jammer’s Concepts of Space and Alexandre 
Koyré’s From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe.57  Both authors recognize the 
fundamental importance of spatial concepts in the understanding of the natural world.  They also 
both acknowledge the distinction between the epistemological and the ontological aspects of the 
“concept of space.”  At least for the early modern period, however, they focus on ontological 
thinking about space, whereas this dissertation addresses the epistemic significance of spatial 
concepts.  Jammer and Koyré leave out the internal physical problems that actually drove the 
changes we are interested in. 
Jammer, for his part, writes that “we may safely regard the concept of space as an 
elementary and primary notion,”58 and expresses surprise that “no historical research on the 
concept of space has been published so far that deals with the history of the subject from the 
                                                 
56 Our ability to elaborate a coherent narrative in the chapters that follow is the best argument for this.  That said, we 
will argue in chapter 6 that the epistemic and ontic aspects of the spatial concept became significantly entangled in 
the work of Descartes. 
57 Other basic treatments include Edwin A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science, Rev. 
ed. (Garden City: Doubleday, 1954); Herbert Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science, 1300-1800 (New York: 
Free Press, 1965); E. J. Dijksterhuis, The Mechanization of the World Picture, trans. C. Dikshoorn (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1961); Arthur Koestler, The Sleepwalkers (New York: Macmillan Co., 1968); Stephen 
Toulmin and June Goodfield, The Fabric of the Heavens:  The Development of Astronomy and Dynamics (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1961). 
58 Jammer, Concepts of Space, 6. 
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standpoint of physics.”59  To fill the lacuna, Jammer addresses a vast period, from antiquity all 
the way to the late twentieth century.  At least temporally, much of Jammer’s work falls outside 
the scope of this project. 
As for the epistemological and ontological aspects of space, Jammer attempts to cover 
them both: 
It is the purpose of this monograph to show the development of the concept of 
space in the light of the history of physics.  On the one hand the most important 
space conceptions in the history of scientific thought will be explained and their 
influence on the respective theories of mechanics and physics will be 
investigated; and on the other, it will be shown how experimental and 
observational research – together with theological speculations – affected the 
formulation of the corresponding metaphysical foundations of natural science as 
far as space is concerned.60
Jammer aims to investigate how the concept of space conditions understanding of the natural 
world.  That is, how different concepts of space affect “theories of mechanics and physics.”  At 
the same time, he discusses how the ontology of space – the “metaphysical foundation of natural 
science as far as space is concerned” – developed over the course of history.  In other words, 
Jammer tries to provide a history of the concept of space as a whole, including both its epistemic 
and ontic aspects.  Even so, he acknowledges that his treatise follows “two more or less 
independent intellectual developments reaching back to antiquity and coming together in 
Newton’s theory of absolute space.”61
To be fair, Jammer’s treatment of the ancient and medieval periods focuses on the 
epistemic import of concepts of space.  Hence, it is thematically very similar to this project.  In 
fact, Jammer’s work constitutes an appropriate prelude to our own.  Unfortunately, Jammer 
interrupts his epistemological study when he addresses the early modern period.  At that point, 
he turns his attention to the ontological and theological aspect of concepts of space.  In 
particular, he is concerned with the influence of platonic and neoplatonic metaphysics on the 
ontic conception of space.  Thus, he addresses figures such as Bernadino Telesio, Franciscus 
                                                 
59 Ibid., 1-2. 
60 Ibid., 2. 
61 Ibid., 3.  As noted above, we will argue that the entanglement comes in Descartes’ relative space, rather than 
Newton’s theory. 
 33 
Patritius, Giordano Bruno, Thomas Campanella, and Henry More before arriving at Newton, 
Huygens, Leibniz, and Pierre Gassendi. 
On the other hand, Jammer omits those generally thought to be responsible for 
advancement of scientific theories during the seventeenth century – such as Gilbert, Kepler, 
Galileo, and Descartes (the omission of the last being especially questionable).  He does not 
investigate how concepts of space affected physical explanations during the early modern period, 
despite the clear implication of his study of earlier periods that they play some role.  Jammer 
only resumes the study of the epistemic features of concepts of space when he examines the 
period after Newton, where his work is again similar to our own. 
Koyré’s study is closer to our own in terms of period studied.   His narrative begins, aside 
from a prelude about Nicholas of Cusa, with Copernicus and ends with Newton and Leibniz.  
Thematically, however, Koyré takes a very different tack.  Like Jammer, Koyré separates the 
intellectual developments of the early modern period into two related but distinct strands.  He 
claims that the “changes [in the early modern world-view] brought forth by the revolution of the 
seventeenth century” are “reducible to two fundamental and closely connected actions that I 
characterised [in Galilean Studies] as the destruction of the cosmos and the geometrization of 
space.”62  The “destruction of the cosmos,” he goes on to explain, refers to 
...the substitution for the conception of the world as a finite and well-ordered 
whole, in which the spatial structure embodied a hierarchy of perfection and 
value, that of an indefinite or even infinite universe no longer united by natural 
subordination, but unified only by the identity of its ultimate and basic 
components and laws.63
The “destruction of the cosmos,” then, is a characterization of a shift in the ontological 
considerations of the world that occurred during the seventeenth century.  This shift revolved 
around the finitude of the heavens, the ethical ordering of the universe, and (because He is the 
ultimate arbiter of such ordering) God’s role in the world.  The “geometrization of space,” 
meanwhile, is “the substitution for the concrete space of pregalilean physics of abstract space 
with Euclidean geometry.”64,65  (By “concrete space,” Koyré refers to the spherical geometry 
                                                 
62 Alexandre Koyré, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1957), viii. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Alexandre Koyré, Études Galiléennes (Paris: Hermann, 1966), 15.  In Closed World, “geometrization of space” is 
defined as “the replacement of the Aristotelian conception of space – a differentiated set of innerwordly places – by 
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instantiated by the celestial and elemental spheres postulated in Scholastic physics.)  In other 
words, the “geometrization of space” is Koyré’s term for the very epistemic shift we aim to 
describe in this project.  It comprises the move from spherical to Euclidean representations of 
space.  Koyré recognizes the fundamental role played by this shift in the early modern 
development of physical understanding. 
However, Koyré supposes the epistemic shift is a derivative of the ontological one.  That 
is, the “destruction of the cosmos” leads to the “geometrization of space:” 
This [destruction of the cosmos], in turn, implies the discarding by scientific 
thought of all considerations based upon value-concepts, such as perfection, 
harmony, meaning and aim, and finally the utter devalorization of being, the 
divorce of the world of value and the world of facts.66
In Koyré’s view, the eschewal of value judgments about the physical world forced philosophers 
to abandon “all considerations based upon value-concepts.”  In particular, they had to discard 
any reference to privileged places.  In a “devalorized” cosmos, no location is inherently different 
from any other.  Hence, philosophers could no longer employ the heterogeneous, spherical 
representation of space to describe and explain phenomena.  Such a representation presupposes a 
special location – the center – but this assumption was no longer legitimate.  In its place, says 
Koyré, philosophers were forced to adopt the homogeneous, isotropic Euclidean representation 
of space.  The ontological move caused the epistemic one.  The “destruction” brought about the 
“geometrization.” 
From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe, therefore, is a book about the 
seventeenth century shift in the ontic conception of space.  Koyré describes how shifting 
metaphysical conceptions of space led to an acceptance of an infinite, homogeneous void.  He 
does not discuss in any detail how the changing epistemic conception of space affected the 
physical understanding of the period.  Indeed, he barely discusses physical theories at all, 
focusing instead, like Jammer, on the metaphysical and theological positions of philosophers like 
                                                                                                                                                             
that of Euclidean geometry – an essentially infinite and homogeneous extension – from now [i.e., the seventeenth 
century] on considered as identical with the real space of the world.”  Koyré, From the Closed World to the Infinite 
Universe, viii. 
65 The term “geometrization of space” is perhaps misleading.  It implies that geometrical conceptions were not 
applied to space – i.e., space was not “geometrized” – before the early modern period, a suggestion that is clearly 
not true.  The celestial spheres were geometrical entities as much as they were (hypothetical) physical ones.  Not to 
mention the geometrical reasoning of astronomers like Ptolemy. 
66 Koyré, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe, 2. 
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Nicholas of Cusa, Thomas Digges, Giordano Bruno, Henry More, and Joseph Raphson.  Even 
those, like Gilbert, Descartes, Newton, who made significant contributions to physics capture his 
attention only insofar as they advanced metaphysical theories of space. 
In the end, Koyré may be right.  The ontological development of concepts of space may 
have caused the epistemic development of representations of space.  Certainly, the two issues 
became significantly entangled at some point during the period (though we are inclined to place 
this point relatively late, after the development of rectilinear representation of space67).  Even if 
this is so, however, there is no reason not to study the epistemological shift as it occurred.  Just 
because the “geometrization” of space is assumed to be an effect rather than a cause does not 
mean it is useless to undertake a study of that effect.  Having done so, moreover, one finds that 
Koyré’s assumption that the ontic is prior to the epistemic is, at best, in need of revision.  As we 
hope to show, philosophers, at least before Descartes, altered their representations of space not in 
response to metaphysical commitments regarding space, but because of epistemological 
difficulties they encountered while trying to understand nature.  It is too much of a simplification 
to dismiss, as Koyré does, the contributions of Kepler and Galileo toward a rectilinear 
conception of the world simply because they fail to move toward a belief in the infinite void.68  
At least in these cases, the epistemic shift was orthogonal to the ontic. 
This project, therefore, covers significantly different territory than those by Jammer and 
Koyré.  It concerns the development of spatial epistemology during the first part of the 
seventeenth century in relation to the advance of physical understanding.  It avoids discussing 
the development of spatial ontology, however, which is the primary interest of Koyré and, at 
least during the same period, Jammer.  It follows the line of intellectual development those 
authors acknowledge but neglect. 
                                                 
67 See chapter 6. 
68 As Koyré notes, Kepler believed that space was finite and Galileo had nothing to say one way or the other.  As a 
result, for Koyré’s historical thesis, Kepler is a recalcitrant anomaly and Galileo is irrelevant.  The present project 
will treat them quite differently.  See Ibid., chs. 3,4, esp. p. 95. 
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1.4 PLAN OF CHAPTERS 
We begin our account in the following chapter with a discussion of Copernicus, who recognized 
a deep conflict between Scholastic explanatory principles and the mathematical descriptions of 
planetary phenomena in Ptolemaic astronomy.  Copernicus attempted to rectify the situation by 
replacing the Ptolemaic descriptions with his own, which, he thought, could be reconciled with 
Scholastic explanations.  Though influenced by neoplatonic theories, Copernicus believed he 
was adhering in many ways to the Aristotelian physics that prevailed amongst his learned peers.  
Nevertheless, Copernicus’s new astronomical hypotheses raised difficulties at both the 
explanatory and conceptual levels, with which subsequent authors were forced to deal.  Yet, 
most of Copernicus’s successors thought that he did not provide an adequate explanation of the 
phenomena he described.  They sought ways to fill this theoretical hole in his theory.  Moreover, 
Copernicus described astronomical phenomena by presupposing “many centers.”  That is, he 
employed at least two different representations of space, each constructed around its own center.  
Though each of these frameworks was spherical, they could not be brought together into a single 
conceptual structure applicable to the whole.  Copernicus’s successors were forced to adjust their 
concepts of space to render his descriptions commensurable with themselves and with the 
explanations they provided.  As we shall see, these explanatory and conceptual difficulties are 
especially well-illustrated by the “Third Motion” of the earth, which was a problem of significant 
interest to those following Copernicus. 
The third and fourth chapters examine the rectification of celestial and (ultimately) 
gravitational phenomena, beginning with the work of William Gilbert.  We provide a detailed 
exposition of Gilbert’s De Magnete, where he employs what we call a geographical 
representation of space appropriate to his subject matter.  Our main interest, though, is Gilbert’s 
treatment of the “Third Motion.”  Faced with an inability to satisfactorily explain this 
phenomenon as described by Copernicus, Gilbert described the same phenomenon as a stasis.  
To do so, though, Gilbert added a presupposed rectilinear direction to his conception of space.  
This conceptual move simplified Gilbert’s explanatory task, and it constituted a move toward a 
rectilinear representation of cosmic space. 
Johannes Kepler, as we discuss in the fourth chapter, sought a reconciliation of 
astronomical explanations and descriptions.  This project, as Kepler described in a 1605 letter to 
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David Fabricius, was frustrated by a problem similar to that posed by Copernicus’s “Third 
Motion.”  At a crucial juncture, Kepler was inspired by Gilbert’s solution to that difficulty.  The 
solution, though, entailed the use of a rectilinear representation of space to describe and explain 
an important aspect of the planetary motions. 
Turning to the effect of Copernicanism on inertial phenomena, we examine the work of 
Galileo in the fifth chapter.  Galileo sought to explain phenomena on a moving earth.  To do so, 
he appealed to both “natural” and “impressed” theories of motion, which he brought together 
under the single rubric of “inertia.”  As evidenced by Galileo’s fleeting adumbrations of the 
deflection of projectiles (the Coriolis effect), however, he could not reconcile the spherical 
representation of space underlying “natural” explanations of motion with the linear geometry 
grounding appeals to “impressed” motion.  Despite intimations of linearity, Galileo adhered to a 
spherical representation of space as the more fundamental way to conceive of the world. 
In the sixth chapter, we show that René Descartes, perhaps influenced by his early work 
in optics and geometry proper, adopted a truly rectilinear representation of space in order to 
describe and explain inertial phenomena.  He uses this spatial concept to describe and explain 
small scale phenomena – namely, collisions between individual bodies, which he takes to be the 
sole physical interactions in the natural world.  We shall also see how his rectilinear 
representation of space becomes associated with metaphysical considerations about the basis of 
physical laws and our knowledge of them.  Descartes, however, does not know how to extend his 
rectilinear treatment of individual collisions to the behavior of ensembles of bodies.  As a result, 
he continues to use a spherical framework when dealing with large-scale phenomena including 
many objects.  Nevertheless, we find in Descartes’ work, for the first time, a space that is self-
parallel, homogeneous, and isotropic. 
Finally, in the seventh chapter we will summarize the progress from spherical spatial 
concepts to rectilinear representations of space described up to that point.  We will then suggest 
further lines of inquiry not covered by this dissertation.  In particular, we will try to hint how the 
representations of space used by Kepler, for celestial/gravitational phenomena, and Descartes, 
for terrestrial/inertial phenomena, were further adapted by Isaac Newton and Christiaan 
Huygens.  We leave a more detailed treatment of those topics, however, to elsewhere. 
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2.0  PLURIBUS ERGO EXISTENTIBUS CENTRIS:  COPERNICUS, 
ASTRONOMICAL DESCRIPTIONS, AND THE “THIRD MOTION” 
By the beginning of the Renaissance, Scholastic philosophers had constructed a broad system of 
physical understanding founded on Aristotelian appeals to “natures.”  This adherence to 
Aristotelian explanatory principles was accompanied (as described in the previous chapter) by a 
commitment to the spherical representation of space upon which they were based.  The resulting 
Scholastic understanding of nature constituted a remarkably powerful and coherent edifice.  
Every physical body had its proper place in a single, universal order, determined by the place’s 
distance to the center.  The behavior of all bodies could then be explained with respect to these 
“natural places.”  Heavy terrestrial bodies, for example, tend in straight lines toward their natural 
places near the center.  Light bodies tend toward their places further from the center.  Celestial 
elements, meanwhile, rotate circularly about the center, maintaining the place they already 
inhabit.  By supposing a natural order centered on a single point, the Scholastic physics could 
account for phenomena throughout the physical world, in both the superlunary and sublunary 
realms. 
In the superlunary realm, the prevailing descriptions of phenomena were those due to the 
Ptolemaic astronomers, who could provide a reasonably accurate account of each planet’s 
motion.  Moreover, the Ptolemaic geocentric hypotheses1 accorded well with the conceptual 
framework underlying the Scholastic physics, which also placed earth at the center.  Nicolaus 
Copernicus, however, noticed a subtle discrepancy between the Ptolemaic descriptions of 
planetary motions and the Scholastic/Aristotelian principles meant to explain them.  Specifically, 
Copernicus thought that Ptolemy’s equant point, a mathematical device used to describe the 
                                                 
1 We are speaking broadly here.  The Ptolemaic astronomy is only roughly geocentric, since the centers of its 
planetary models do not exactly correspond with the center of the earth.  Nevertheless, the system is geocentric in 
the sense that all the planets orbit around the earth.  See J. L. E. Dreyer, A History of Astronomy from Thales to 
Kepler (New York: Dover, 1953), ch. 9; O. Neugebauer, The Exact Sciences in Antiquity (Providence: Brown 
University Press, 1957), 191-207. 
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unequal motion of the planetary orbits, violated the Aristotelian principle that celestial bodies 
rotate uniformly.  As a result, Copernicus sought to alter the Ptolemaic descriptions of 
phenomena in order to do away with the equant and bring them into line with the explanatory 
principles proposed by Aristotle. 
To do so, however, Copernicus was forced to reject the Ptolemaic descriptions of 
planetary phenomena and the unitary geometrical system upon which the descriptions were 
based.  Though he remained committed to a spherical representation of space, Copernicus 
bifurcated the universe into two (if not more) distinct realms, each with its own geometrical 
center:  the celestial realm centered by the sun, and the terrestrial realm centered by the earth.  
This disjointed geometry, in turn, raised problems for the Scholastic physics Copernicus sought 
to retain, since it relied on the assumption of a single center.  In order to preserve the universal 
ordering of bodies and the explanations based on it in light of Copernicus’s geokinetic 
hypothesis, philosophers subsequently had to decide which was the true center of the universe – 
the earth, the sun, or some other point – or if the universe had a center at all. 
This general difficulty was exemplified in particular by the trouble surrounding 
Copernicus’s description of the “third motion” of the earth.  This “motion” is in fact an artifact of 
Copernicus’s representation of space.  Given the spherical framework with which he was 
working, Copernicus described the behavior of the earth’s axis as a motion.  However, 
Copernicus could not explain the motion he had described.  His successors were forced to 
explain the motion – a difficult task, since it did not admit an obvious cause. 
Copernicus himself did not intend to cast doubt on the system of Scholastic explanations 
of physical phenomena.  On the contrary, he was trying to strengthen the physical basis of 
astronomy by appealing to the Scholastic system.  Nevertheless, his work raised unforeseen and 
significant problems.  While he solved neither the general problem of centers, nor explained the 
third motion, Copernicus posed questions subsequent authors were forced to answer.  Eventually, 
the answers to these questions brought about the remarkable shift from spherical to rectilinear 
representations of space and the attendant demise of Scholastic physics. 
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2.1 SPHERICAL UNIVERSE 
In the De Revolutionibus, it is clear that Copernicus envisions a spherical universe.  The book’s 
first chapter is entitled “That the universe is spherical,” and it presents several arguments for the 
assertion: 
First we must remark that the universe is globe-shaped, either because it is the 
most perfect shape of all, needing no joint, an integral whole; or because that is 
the most capacious of shapes, which is most fitting because it is to contain and 
preserve all things; or because the most finished parts of the universe, I mean the 
Sun, Moon and stars, are observed to have that shape, or because everything tends 
to take on this shape, which is evident in drops of water and other liquid bodies, 
when they take on their natural shape.  There should therefore be no doubt that 
this shape is assigned to the heavenly bodies.2
None of these arguments presents any compelling empirical evidence for the sphericity of the 
universe.  Instead, they rely on a priori assumptions such as the perfection of the sphere and the 
universe, or the “natural” shape of bodies.  On the other hand, Copernicus had no pressing need 
to support his contention.  None of his contemporaries would have seriously challenged him.  
The spherical shape of the heavens was a long-accepted truth.  Indeed, Copernicus is simply 
repeating arguments similar to those found in classical sources, including Aristotle, Plato, and 
Ptolemy.3  Copernicus, then, is just assuming that the universe is spherical. 
This assumption indicates that Copernicus, like Aristotle (and Ptolemy), employs a 
spherical representation of space.  In spherical representations of space, a center is presupposed.  
Locations and directions are then specified by reference to that center.  Locations are given by 
distances from the center.  Directions are specified by reference to a radius to the center.  In 
effect, this means direction at a given point is specified by an angular deflection from a radius 
from that point to the center.  For example, the direction toward the center is 0° deflected, that 
away from the center is 180° deflected, and the circular direction around the center is 90° 
deflected. 
                                                 
2 Nicolaus Copernicus, On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres, trans. A. M. Duncan (London: David & 
Charles, 1976), 36. 
3 Compare Copernicus’s statement that the sphere is “the most capacious of shapes”, for example, with Ptolemy’s 
argument in the Almagest:  “since of different shapes having an equal boundary those with more angles are greater 
[in area or volume], the circle is greater than [all other] surfaces, and the sphere greater than [all other] solids; 
[likewise] the heavens are greater than all bodies.” See Claudius Ptolemy, The Almagest, trans. G. J. Toomer (New 
York: Springer-Verlag, 1984), 40.  (Brackets are translator’s interpolations.)  
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We can see this geometrical conception of space throughout the De Revolutionibus, 
where motions and locations are always specified in relation to a presupposed center.  For 
example, in Copernicus’s “order of the heavenly spheres,” the sun is stipulated (for a variety of 
reasons) as the center.  The “first and highest” of the spheres, that is, the sphere furthest from the 
center, is that of the fixed stars.  The next sphere, closer to the center, is the sphere of Saturn, 
“the highest of the wandering stars.”  The other planets are similarly described, each “below” the 
last.  In each case, the location or “height” of a sphere is described by reference to the center – 
the sun.4
The spherical representation of space also allows Copernicus, like Aristotle, to specify 
three “simple” directions.  The direction directly toward the center has the same description at all 
points of space – in effect, 0° deflected from a radius to the center.  The same is true for the 
radial direction away from the center (everywhere 180° deflected), and the circular direction 
around the center (everywhere 90° deflected).  These simple directions lead, as in Aristotle,5 to 
descriptions of “simple” motions: 
Further, of simple motions, one kind is up, another down.  Wherefore every 
simple motion is either towards the middle, which is down; or away from the 
middle, which is up; or about the middle and is itself circular...  That is Aristotle’s 
theory.6
A motion toward, away from, or circularly around the center always maintains the same angular 
deflection.  Hence the description applicable to the direction of these motions is always the same.  
That is, motion in these directions is “simple” – the direction does not change. 
Copernicus uses these “simple” motions, which result from his spherical representation of 
space, to describe phenomena.  Consider, for example, Copernicus’s description of falling 
bodies.  He believes that the earth rotates daily about its axis.  Falling bodies, however, also 
move towards the center of the earth.  As a result, he argues, falling terrestrial bodies have a 
“compound motion”: 
                                                 
4 See Copernicus, De Rev, 46-51. 
5 De Caelo I.2, Aristotle. The Complete Works of Aristotle, 448.  See section 1.1.3, above.  
6 Copernicus, De Rev, 43. 
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We have indeed to admit that the motion of falling… bodies is a dual motion in 
comparison with the universe, and is no less a compound of straight and circular 
motion.7
In other words, the real motion of the falling body, which is some unspecified trajectory both 
around and toward the earth’s center, can be described as a dual motion consisting of two simple 
motions – the circular motion around the earth’s center and a linear motion towards the center.  
Since the actual motion of the body is complicated, i.e., not “simple,” it is described as a 
composition of two simple motions, each following the radial/circular geometry of the 
presupposed spherical representation of space.8
It should be mentioned that Copernicus’s statement in this context that the sphere of the 
fixed stars is “the location of the universe, to which the motion and position of all the remaining 
stars is referred”9 is misleading.  What Copernicus means is that the location of a planet is 
specified by referring to a fixed star or constellation, as in “Jupiter is in Libra.”  This does not 
imply, however, that Jupiter is really amongst the stars of Libra.  Instead, the description implies 
that Jupiter is along a radius connecting the assumed center, whatever it may be, with the 
constellation Libra.  Similarly, a description of the planet’s speed, e.g., “10° per month,” is a 
specification of the angular velocity at which the radius from the center, passing through the 
planet, and extending to the fixed stars, rotates around the center.  Thus, the center is always 
presumed in the representation of space underlying Copernicus’s specifications of motions and 
positions.  The sphere of the fixed stars is only “the location of the universe” in that it is the fixed 
background by which these specifications are made.  Both the center and the fixed sphere must 
be presumed in order to understand descriptions of motion and position. 
                                                 
7 Ibid., 45. 
8 Copernicus is careful to point out that this composition is not real, but merely “intellectual.”  It is the description of 
the motion that can be decomposed, not the real motion itself.  He compares this kind of distinction to that “between 
a line, a point and a surface,” even though “one cannot exist without the other, and none of them without a body.”  
That is, we can describe lines, points, and surfaces, but these only really exist intermingled in real bodies.  Similarly, 
we can describe the motion of the falling body as a composition of linear and circular, but the two motions only 
really exist intermingled in the real motion.  See Ibid. 
9 Ibid., 49. 
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2.2 SCHOLASTIC PHYSICS 
Copernicus aims to use Aristotle’s physics to explain celestial phenomena.10  Thus, in addition to 
an Aristotelian representation of space, Copernicus also adheres to Aristotelian physical 
principles.  On this view, all motions are to be explained by what is “natural” for a mobile.  
Bodies with simple natures, for example, will have simple motions – motions that, as we have 
seen, do not change direction (as described on the basis of a spherical representation of space).  
Such bodies will move either linearly towards or away from a center, or circularly around a 
center.  These motions are explained by appealing to the bodies’ simple natures.  They move 
simply because they are naturally simple. 
Copernicus argues, for example, that the celestial spheres, which he believes carry the 
planets about, rotate because circular motion is the natural motion of a sphere: 
The next point is that the motion of the heavenly bodies is circular.  For the 
movement of a sphere is a revolution in a circle, expressing its shape by the very 
action, in the simplest of figures, where neither beginning nor end is to be found, 
nor can be the one be distinguished from the other, as it moves always in the same 
place.11
The celestial spheres are simple bodies, expressed in the “simplest of figures.”  Their natural 
motion, therefore, must be one of the simple motions:  toward, away from, or around the center.  
The heavenly spheres, however, are already and forever in their natural places.  Their natural 
motion, therefore, is motion in place – that is, rotation about the center.  Thus, the motions of the 
planets are understood to be caused (i.e., explained) by the natural rotation of the spheres 
carrying them about. 
Of course, the motion of the planets is not simply circular and uniform.  They speed up 
and slow down.  They oscillate between north and south.  The superior planets (Mars, Jupiter, 
and Saturn) usually move west to east, but sometimes stop, move east to west, stop again, and 
resume their usual motion across the field of fixed stars (a phenomenon called retrograde 
motion).  Still, all the planets return, time after time, to the same parts of the sky in regular and 
                                                 
10 Edgar Zilsel has detailed Copernicus’s adherence to the “teleological conception of nature” that is the hallmark of 
Aristotelian explanation, especially with regard to celestial motions.  See Edgar Zilsel, “Copernicus and 
Mechanics,” Journal of the History of Ideas 1, no. 1 (1940). 
11 Copernicus, De Rev, 38-9. 
 44 
predictable patterns.  Despite the various, complicated movements of the heavens, this regularity 
can only be accounted for by circular motion: 
Nevertheless it must be admitted that their motions are circular, or compounded 
of a number of circles, because they pass through irregularities of this kind in 
accordance with a definite law and with fixed returns to their original positions, 
which could not happen if they were not circular.  For only a circle can repeat a 
previous state of affairs…12
The irregularities of planetary movements may be due to the motion of several interconnected 
spheres, each contributing to the motion of the planets, but each motion is, in itself, circular.  
Only circular motion can explain the cyclical movements of the heavens as they return, over and 
over, to their former positions. 
These circular motions, meanwhile, must all be uniform around their centers.  That is, the 
angular velocity of each motion, measured from the center of the motion, must be constant.  
Other kinds of motion, Copernicus insists, simply cannot be explained.  There is no possible way 
to account for non-uniform circular motion: 
…it is impossible for a heavenly body which is simple to move irregularly in a 
single sphere.  That would have to be due either to changes in the moving power, 
whether derived from elsewhere or from its intrinsic nature, or on account of 
unevenness in the revolving body.  Both these possibilities are unacceptable to the 
reason, and it is inappropriate to attribute such a thing to bodies which are 
established in an ideal state.13
The celestial spheres are ideal and simple bodies, without part or joint.  They do not have, 
therefore, any internal “unevenness” that could explain irregular motion.  Nor can irregular 
motion be attributed to the source of a sphere’s motion, since the spheres move only according to 
their internal, simple, and therefore (again) uniform, nature.  As Copernicus puts it: 
It must therefore be agreed that though their motions appear to us irregular they 
are regular…14
                                                 




Celestial motions are only explicable if they are thought to be uniform.  In other words, the 
complicated, irregular motions of the planets can only be properly explained if they are 
described as compositions of uniform, circular motions. 
2.3 PTOLEMY’S DESCRIPTIVE AIMS 
The requirement of uniform motion was the crux of Copernicus’s rejection of Ptolemaic 
astronomical descriptions.  To account for the various irregularities of the planetary motions, 
Ptolemy had employed three geometric models of planetary orbits:  the eccentric, the epicycle, 
and the equant.  The first consisted of a circle rotating uniformly around a geometrical center 
which is not the bodily center of the orbit.  In the second model, the planet orbits uniformly on a 
small circle, the epicycle, the center of which rotates uniformly around the center of the orbit on 
a circle called the deferent.  In the last model, a circle rotates with a constant angular velocity 
measured, not at the center of the circle, but at another point, called the equant.  Each of these 
models could account for a part of the planet’s irregularity and, combined, they accounted for the 
three apparent motion for each planet.  Thus, for example, Ptolemy’s models for the superior 
planets consist of an epicycle moving on an eccentric deferent.  Meanwhile, the speed of the 
center of the epicycle around the deferent is uniform at an equant point that is neither the earth, 
the bodily “center” of the orbit, nor the center of the deferent.15
In the Almagest, Ptolemy is explicit that his ultimate aim is not a theoretical explanation 
of planetary motion, but a description adequate for prediction: 
Rather, if we are at any point compelled by the nature of our subject to use a 
procedure not in strict accordance with theory… or [if we are compelled] to make 
some basic assumptions which we arrived at not from readily apparent principle, 
but from a long period of trial and application, or to assume a type of motion or 
inclination of the circles which is not the same and unchanged for all planets; we 
may [be allowed to] accede [to this compulsion], since we know that this kind of 
inexact procedure will not affect the end desired, provided that it is not going to 
result in any noticeable error; and we know too that assumptions made without 
proof, provided only that they are found to be in agreement with the phenomena, 
could not have been found without some careful methodological procedure, even 
                                                 
15 See Ptolemy, The Almagest, 480ff.  
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it is difficult to explain how one came to conceive them (for, in general, the cause 
of first principles is, by nature, either non-existent or hard to describe)…16
Thus, for Ptolemy, the “end desired” is the absence of “noticeable error.”  Mathematical 
expedients found by “trial and application,” without basis in theory or “readily apparent 
principle,” are acceptable so long as the results “are found to be in agreement with the 
phenomena.”  In other words, the ultimate goal is descriptive accuracy – accurate description of 
planetary positions, so that the planet is, quite simply, where you say it is at any given moment.  
Explanation by appeal to first principles is merely incidental.17
Without general astronomical principles by which similar models can be constructed for 
all the planets, Ptolemy is willing to countenance a wide variety of models to describe the wide 
variety of planetary motions: 
…we know, finally, that some variety in the type of hypotheses associated with 
the circles [of the planets] cannot plausibly be considered strange or contrary to 
reason (especially since the phenomena exhibited by the actual planets are not 
alike [for all])… 
Ptolemy admits models that do not apply to all of the planets equally.  The models cannot be 
said, therefore, to obey unifying principles.  This is not surprising, though, given that the planets 
exhibit a wide variety of phenomena. 
Nevertheless, Ptolemy clings to the more general Aristotelian physical principle of 
celestial motion – uniform rotation.: 
…for, when uniform circular motion is preserved for all without exception, the 
individual phenomena are demonstrated in accordance with a principle which is 
more basic and more generally applicable than that of similarity of the hypotheses 
[for all planets].18
Even though there may be no general astronomical principles by which similar hypotheses may 
be constructed for all the planets, all models preserve the principle of uniform circular motion.  
                                                 
16 Ibid., 422-23.  
17 In a separate text, the Planetary Hypotheses, Ptolemy did attempt a fuller elaboration of the heavenly spheres 
causing the planetary movements.  However, the few extant portions of this work only came to the attention of 
Western scholars in the early twentieth century.  See Bernard R. Goldstein, “The Arabic Version of Ptolemy's 
Planetary Hypotheses,” Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 57, no. 4 (1967); Alexander Jones, 
Provisional Translation of Ptolemy's Planetary Hypotheses, Book 1 Part 1 (2004 [cited 2005]); available from 
http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/~ajones/ptolgeog/PlanHyp1.pdf. 
18 Ptolemy, The Almagest, 422-23. 
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Each element of each model – eccentrics, epicycles, and equants – can be said to rotate 
uniformly. 
2.4 COPERNICUS’S REDESCRIPTION 
Here, Copernicus objects.  He has no trouble with eccentrics and epicycles, but equants, in his 
view, are a mathematical fudge by which one calls uniform that which is not uniform at all.  
Speaking of Ptolemy’s model for lunar motion, which includes an epicycle moving about an 
eccentric deferent with a motion uniform only at an equant point, Copernicus writes: 
…[W]hat shall we reply to the axiom that ‘the motion of the heavenly bodies is 
regular, except when it seems to be irregular as far as appearance is concerned’, if 
the apparently regular motion of an epicycle is in actual fact irregular, and exactly 
the opposite to the established principle and assumption happens?  But if you say 
that it moves regularly around the centre of the Earth, and that takes care of the 
need for regularity satisfactorily, then what kind of regularity will it be which is 
on a circle not its own, although its motion is not on that circle but on its own 
eccentric?19
Ptolemy’s “regular” motion, Copernicus argues, is not regular at all.  For Ptolemy has an 
epicycle rotating uniformly only with respect to an equant, which is neither the centre of the 
Earth, nor the center of its orbit (the deferent).  Thus, the epicycle may sweep equal arcs of a 
circle centered on the equant in equal times, but this is not a truly regular motion, since the 
epicycle itself will travel unequal arcs of the deferent in equal times.  Ptolemy might be satisfied 
that the motion is regular about some point, but this is a purely mathematical conceit, not 
uniform motion.  Indeed, Copernicus claims, Ptolemy has violated Aristotle’s fundamental 
“axiom” of planetary motion, circular uniform motion. 
Ptolemy saw explanation on the basis of physical principles as incidental.  He was willing 
to countenance mathematical expedients in order to give adequate descriptions of appearances.  
Copernicus is not so flexible.  He aims to place astronomy on the firm basis of explanatory 
principles: 
                                                 
19 Copernicus, De Rev, 188. 
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They [Ptolemaic astronomers] therefore concede in this instance that the 
regularity of a circular motion can refer to centre which is alien and not its own…  
But this has already been sufficiently refuted in relation to the Moon.  This and 
similar points occasioned us to think about the mobility of the Earth and other 
means of preserving regularity and the first principles of our science…20
The equant model of planetary motion does not admit explanation on the basis of uniform 
motion.  Hence, Copernicus aims to eliminate its use from astronomy, thereby “preserving 
regularity and the first principles.”  Copernicus is trying, unlike Ptolemy, to reconcile 
astronomical descriptions with explanations of planetary motions.  He is no radical, however.  
The explanations he seeks are Aristotelian – uniform, circular celestial motions resulting from 
the simple and perfect nature of the heavenly spheres.  Thus, Copernicus is not trying to generate 
new explanations for phenomena.  Rather, he is trying to create new descriptions for phenomena 
that are compatible with and susceptible to explanation by classical physics – the “first principles 
of our science.” 
In Ptolemaic astronomy,21 planetary longitudinal positions are calculated on the basis of 
the planet’s mean motion and its total irregularity or “anomaly.”22  Given a date and time, one 
simply combines the mean motion and anomaly of a planet (obtained from a table or by 
calculation) to generate the position of the planet.  Ptolemy, meanwhile, separates the total 
anomaly into two parts.  First is the synodic anomaly, which, in modern terms, accounts for the 
fact that the sun, not, as Ptolemy assumed, the earth, is the center of the solar system.  Since this 
anomaly depends on the location of the sun,23 it is the same for all the planets.  Second is the 
ecliptic anomaly, which accounts, again in modern terms, for the fact that planetary orbits are 
really elliptical and irregular, rather than circular and uniform.  For superior planets, Ptolemy 
uses an epicycle model to account for the synodic anomaly.  The ecliptic anomaly, meanwhile, 
consists of two corrections – one generated by an eccentric, the other by an equant.  For Venus, 
the ecliptic anomaly is accounted for by an epicycle, while the synodic anomaly consists of 
                                                 
20 Ibid., 238. 
21 In the following discussion, I am ignoring Ptolemy’s discussion of the moon and Mercury.  The moon, of course, 
really does orbit the earth, so its anomalies arise from slightly different reasons than the other planets.  Mercury’s 
orbit is decidedly more complicated than the other planets’.  It is a glaring exception in both Ptolemy’s and 
Copernicus’s systems, since both resort to oscillations not found in any other planetary model in order to account for 
Mercury’s motion. 
22 The mean motion of the planet is the motion it would have if it moved with constant angular velocity around the 
orbital center (i.e., the Earth).  The rate is equal to 360° over the orbital period.  The anomaly is the angular 
deflection from the mean motion due to the non-uniformity of the planet’s actual motion. 
23 Actually, in Ptolemy’s system, it depends on the mean motion of the sun. 
 49 
corrections generated by an eccentric and an equant model.  Thus, each of the planets’ anomalies 
consists of three angular corrections to the mean motion, generated, respectively, by an epicycle, 
an eccentric, and an equant.24
To remove equants from Ptolemaic astronomy, Copernicus must remove one of the 
corrections for each planet, leaving the other two to be generated by an epicycle and an eccentric.  
He assumes that the earth is in motion around the sun.  Thus, the synodic anomaly for each 
planet is not generated by an irregularity in the planet’s motion, but is a result of the earth’s 
motion.  Thus, it is merely an “apparent” irregularity, and the “axiom that ‘the motion of the 
heavenly bodies is regular, except when it seems to be irregular as far as appearance is 
concerned’” is preserved.  In other words, by putting the earth in motion, Copernicus redescribes 
the observed phenomena.  The irregularities in planetary motion associated with solar position 
are now described as “appearances,” rather than real motions.  Thus, the synodic part of the total 
anomaly can be eliminated from the planetary models, leaving the ecliptic anomaly. 
Copernicus models the planetary orbits using an epicycle and an eccentric deferent 
around the sun, each rotating uniformly around its own center.25  As a result, Copernicus can 
describe the orbit of each planet without appeal to equants.  He is left with uniform circular 
motions, albeit around several centers, which permit explanation by Aristotelian principles of 
celestial motion.26
The point to be made here is that Copernicus’s achievement is only a redescription of 
phenomena.  He rejected the Ptolemaic theory because its descriptions of the phenomena did not 
admit explanation on the basis of Aristotelian physics.  In place of Ptolemaic astronomy, 
Copernicus introduces a system of descriptions in which the phenomena – i.e., planetary 
positions – are described on the basis of the earth’s motion, as well as that of the planets 
themselves.  This makes the description of the phenomena at least compatible with existing 
physical theories. 
Copernicus, however, does not offer any new explanations of phenomena.  He does not 
seriously try to expand or revise Aristotelian explanations of planetary motions.  In fact, 
Copernicus makes notoriously little attempt to explain anything regarding his models.  He almost 
                                                 
24 See . Figure 1
25 Again, excluding Mercury. 
26 See .  For a general summary of Copernican astronomy, see Dreyer, A History of Astronomy from Thales 
to Kepler, ch. 8. 
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never specifies the causes of the motions he describes.  He simply assumes that the “first 
principles” of astronomy – Aristotelian physics – can and will be applied to his system.27  
Copernicus’s advance comes at the level of description, not explanation or concepts.  Indeed, it 
was Copernicus’s intention to adhere to Aristotelian physical principles that brought him to the 
novel description of the earth as a planet. 
2.5 DIFFICULTIES RAISED 
Copernicus’s redescription of the solar system does raise significant problems, however, both at 
the level of concepts and at the level of explanations.  First, Copernicus is forced to bifurcate his 
representation of space.  Aristotle employed a single spherical representation of space, centered 
on a point that coincides with the center of the earth, for the descriptions of the entire universe.  
For Aristotle, therefore, descriptions in the heavens and on the earth refer to the same point.  
“Down” and “lower” have the same significance in all parts of the universe.  Thus, Aristotle 
presents, at least in this sense, a unified system.  Copernicus, on the other hand, considers two 
centers.  Descriptions of terrestrial phenomena refer to the center of the earth, while descriptions 
of celestial phenomena refer to the sun.28  Heavy bodies fall “down” toward the earth, but Mars 
is “below” Jupiter, closer to the sun.  Copernicus employs two different representations of space:  
one for the description of terrestrial phenomena, another for celestial. 
Copernicus’s use of multiple representations of space is perfectly acceptable for 
generating descriptions.  Indeed, he is always clear which he is using in a given context, and the 
reader of De Revolutionibus is never confused as to the significance of a description.  It is, 
however, conceptually unsatisfying.  For one thing, descriptions of different situations will be 
conceptually incommensurate.  The representation of space that grounds descriptions of one 
situation will be different from that which grounds another.  For example, a heavy body can be 
described as falling “downward” in a terrestrial context, but this description loses its meaning in 
                                                 
27 Copernicus’s disciple, Georg Joachim Rheticus, reported that he was “fully convinced that for him [Copernicus] 
there is nothing better or more important than to walk in the footsteps of Ptolemy and to follow, as Ptolemy himself 
did, the Ancients and those who came before him.”  Alexandre Koyré, The Astronomical Revolution: Copernicus, 
Kepler, Borelli, trans. R. E. W. Maddison (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1973), 30.  
28 To be precise, the center of Copenicus’s system is the center of the earth’s orbit – a point near the sun. 
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the solar-centered celestial context, where “downward” means something different.  One 
consequence of this is that the physical explanations generated under differing representations of 
space will be fundamentally disjoint, since the descriptions they explain are incommensurate.  
The explanation given for the “downward” motion of a body on the earth has no significance or 
relevance to the “downward” motion of a body in the heavens.  The terrestrial system centered 
on the earth will be explanatorily distinct from the celestial system centered on the sun.  This 
fundamentally undermines the singular, unified ordering of all things in the Scholastic system 
and becomes a considerable obstacle for those seeking “universal” physical explanations.29  The 
“Newtonian Synthesis” will eventually repair this rift, but only by referring to a geometrical 
representation of space that does not presuppose centers and is therefore capable of reconciling 
Copernicus’s celestial and terrestrial representations.30
A second, more specific problem also arises in the context of Copernicus’s description of 
a moving earth.  Though it is not the true subject of his inquiry, Copernicus also adheres to 
Aristotelian physics when dealing with terrestrial phenomena.  According to Aristotle, terrestrial 
bodies seek out their natural places as determined by the substantial elements that constitute 
them.  Earthy bodies seek the “place” or sphere of earth around the terrestrial center, watery 
bodies seek the sphere of water around the earth, fiery bodies seek the periphery of the terrestrial 
realm (below the lunar sphere), and airy bodies seek the sphere of air between the water and the 
fire.  Hence, on the earth’s surface (at the junction of earth, air, and water), earth and water are 
heavy and move towards the center, while air and fire are light and move away from the center. 
                                                 
29 I do not wish to imply that Copernicus himself sought such explanations.  His primary concern, like Ptolemy’s, 
was a correct description of the planetary phenomena.  His aim was not a consistent explanation of the entire 
universe.  Thus, he was content with distinct celestial and terrestrial realms.  The difficulty of reconciling this 
disjoint picture of the cosmos was addressed mainly by his successors. 
30 Putting the problem differently, a spherical space is heterogeneous and anisotropic.  Different parts of space 
cannot be superimposed on one another by translation or rotation (about points other than the center).  A part of 
space near the center is qualitatively different from a part further away, and all parts possess a privileged direction 
toward the center that precluded rotational superposition. 
 If a single spherical structure is used to represent space, different parts of space are each homogeneous with 
themselves – each portion of space can be superimposed on itself.  Thus, the properties and relations pertaining to 
that part of space will be uniquely determined.  If more than one spherical structure is used to represent the space, 
however, it loses this property.  A given portion of space represented in one frame is not homogeneous with the 
same portion as represented in another frame, even though, objectively, they are the same space.  The two 
representations will also be anisotropic in different ways, because the privileged direction will be directed toward 
different centers.  As a result, the spatial properties and relation found in any part of space will be described 
differently according to the different spatial concepts used to represent it.  This is troublesome, though not 
inconsistent, since the properties and relations are objectively unitary, and one usually desires them to be 
represented as such.  Such descriptions violated nature’s “consonance with itself” – a fundamental desideratum of 
physical systems in any age. 
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Copernicus employs these Aristotelian explanations in his own account of terrestrial 
phenomena: 
Straight line motion is imparted to objects which wander or are pushed from their 
own natural place, or in any way overstep this volume.  But nothing is more 
repugnant to the whole pattern and form of the universe than for something to be 
out of its own place.  Hence straight line motion does not occur except in objects 
not in their proper state, when they are separate from the whole of which they are 
part, and detract from its unity.31
For Copernicus, as for Aristotle, the universe has a spatial order in which all bodies have a 
proper place.  When bodies are removed from these places, they tend to return to them along 
straight lines. 
Furthermore, Copernicus does not question Aristotle’s arrangement of natural places.  In 
the case of fire, for example, Copernicus himself notes that “[fire’s] expansive motion is away 
from the middle towards the circumference; and similarly if something from Earthy parts has 
caught fire, it is carried upwards away from the middle.”32  When discussing the arrangement of 
earth and water, meanwhile, he writes: 
Hence the Ocean which surrounds the Earth pours out its seas far and wide and 
fills the deeper hollows… the water should not wholly swallow up the land, as 
both of them by their weight strive towards the same centre…33
Copernicus follows the Aristotelian arrangement of water surrounding the earth, but also notes 
that both seek out a presupposed center.  They “strive” because of their “weight,” their natural 
tendency to seek their proper place.  In sum, Copernicus adopts the Aristotelian view that 
terrestrial bodies seek their natural places – heavy bodies, like water and earth, nearer the center, 
lighter ones, like fire, further from the “middle” – along straight lines. 
However, the Copernican bifurcated representation of space undermines the Aristotelian 
explanations of terrestrial phenomena in at least two ways.  Aristotelian explanations assume a 
representation of space centered on a single, unmoving point.  Yet, in the first place, Copernicus 
holds that there are at least two centers in the universe.  The question immediately arises as to 
why some physical bodies respect one center while other bodies respect another.  The motion of 
                                                 
31 Copernicus, De Rev, 45. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid., 37. 
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heavy bodies cannot be simply ascribed to a “tendency to seek the center” when “the center” 
might not be the center of the earth. 34  In the second place, Copernicus suggests that the centers 
are moving with respect to one another.  The “natural” motion of simple bodies cannot be simply 
rectilinear when they also partake of the circular motions of the earth.  How, then, does one 
account for the “natural motion” of objects on a moving earth?  How is one supposed to explain 
motions when there is more than one center?  
As we glimpsed above, Copernicus attempts to solve these problems.  He argues that 
terrestrial motion is really a “dual motion:” 
We have indeed to admit that the motion of falling and rising bodies is a dual 
motion in comparison with the universe, and is no less a compound of straight and 
circular motion…  Since therefore circular motion belongs to wholes, and straight 
line motion to parts, we can say that circular motion accompanies straight just as 
an animal can at the same time be in the class of sick things.35
Thus, falling bodies have two motions.  First, since they are out of place, they seek their proper 
place near the terrestrial center.  But since they are part of the terrestrial globe, they take part in 
the rotational motion of the whole, which is caused by the globe’s nature and place in the 
heavens. 
This solution is far from satisfactory.  First of all, it ascribes a complex motion to simple 
bodies, contrary to Aristotle’s principles.  It also raises a host of other questions, none of which 
can be answered by Aristotelian theories.  For instance, why are the effects of the earth’s (rapid) 
motion unobservable?36  Why do falling bodies seek out a moving point (the center of the 
terrestrial globe), and why that point in particular?  Why is the sun in the center of the celestial 
motions, and not another body?  And if the sun is the center of celestial motion, why does the 
moon rotate around the earth, not the sun, like the rest of the planets?  Generally speaking, to 
make use of Aristotelian explanations, one has to stipulate a (unique) center.  Where, then, is 
Copernicus’s center? 
                                                 
34 Copernicus himself stumbles on this block.  Though he appeals to Aristotelian explanations of heaviness while 
discussing the shape of the earth, he abandons this position once he asserts the earth’s motion around the sun:  “I 
myself consider that gravity is merely a certain natural inclination with which parts are imbued by the architect of all 
things for gathering themselves together into unity and completeness by assembling into the form of a globe.”  
(Ibid., 46.)  Whereas Copernicus had said that the earth was spherical because its parts all sought a geometrical 
center, he now proposes that bodies gravitate because of a “desire” to be part of a sphere. 
35 Ibid., 45. 
36 Ptolemy raised this question in response to early heliocentrists.  See Ptolemy, The Almagest, 44-45. 
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Copernicus haltingly provides weak and ad hoc answers to some of these questions,37 but 
in the end, he throws up his hands: 
Therefore there is more than one centre, and it is not too daring to doubt in the 
case of the centre of the universe also whether it is in fact the centre of terrestrial 
gravity or a different one.38
Copernicus’s multiple representations of space hopelessly complicate physical explanations.  
Aristotelian explanations rely on the stipulation of a single center.  Copernicus stipulates at least 
two, each moving in relation to the other.  As a result, the Aristotelian explanations of terrestrial 
phenomena are not sufficient to fully account for terrestrial phenomena.  It is a problem he 
cannot solve.  It is left to later authors to formulate a terrestrial physics compatible with the 
motion of the earth. 
2.6 THE “THIRD MOTION” 
Finally, a very specific problem arises in the context of Copernicus’s dual representations of 
space.  Copernicus ascribes three motions to the earth.  The first is the daily rotation of the 
earthly globe around its axis, which accounts for the apparent daily motion of the stars, sun, 
moon, and planets across the sky.  The second motion is the annual revolution of the earth about 
the sun.  As noted above, this motion accounts for some of the apparent irregularities of the 
planetary motions.  These motions, moreover, are explained on the basis of the earth’s nature.  
Since the earth is a globe, rotation about its axis is “naturally fitted for it.”39  Also, since the 
                                                 
37 For example, Copernicus appeals to neoplatonic authority to support his placement of the sun at the center:  “For 
who in this most beautiful of temples would put this lamp in any other or better place than the one from which it can 
illuminate everything at the same time.  Aptly indeed is he named by some the lantern of the universe, by others the 
mind, by others the ruler.  Trismegistus called him the visible God, Sophocles’ Electra, the watcher of all things.  
Thus indeed the Sun as if seated on a royal throne governs his household of Stars as they circle round him.”  
(Copernicus, De Rev, 50.)  These neoplatonic arguments are out of place in an otherwise Aristotelian and 
astronomical text.  They make no reference to the sort of empirical evidence and natural explanations that are 
offered elsewhere throughout the work.  Koyré, for his part, calls Copernicus’s arguments in this context 
“superficial, and even just words [superficielle, et même verbale].”  Koyré, Études Galiléennes, 168. 
38 Copernicus, De Rev, 46. 
39 Ibid., 44. 
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earth “can be regarded as one of the wandering stars” it is appropriate that it, as is natural for a 
planet, orbits the sun. 
The third motion, however, is more complicated.  Copernicus knew that, as it orbits the 
sun, the earth’s axis remains pointed towards the same region of the fixed stars (near Polaris, the 
North Star).  As a result, near the summer solstice, the axis is tilted towards the sun, but near the 
winter solstice, it is tilted away from the sun.40  This implies that the plane of the earth’s axis 
rotates with respect to the earth-sun radius.  The angle between the plane of the axis and the 
radius increases continually through the year.  Since, in a spherical representation of space 
centered on the sun, this angle specifies direction, the direction of the earth’s axis changes – it 
moves.41  Copernicus labeled this the “third motion of the earth.”   
This is a strange motion, however.  For one thing, though completely independent from 
the second motion, it follows it almost exactly, but in the opposite direction.  Both the revolution 
of the earth around the sun and the rotation of its axis occur once every year, the first west to 
east, the other east to west.  Thus: 
These motions being almost equal to each other and in opposite directions, the 
result is that the axis of the Earth, and… the equator, face almost the same part of 
the universe, just as if they remained motionless…42  
In other words, the third motion creates the appearance of motionlessness.  The net effect is that 
the axis remains pointed at the same point in the sky.  Moreover, Aristotelian principles offer no 
explanation for anything like the third motion.  The motion is not a simple rotation around an 
axis.  It is a rotation of the axis of the first motion about another axis, like the wobble of a 
spinning top.  Copernicus does not even attempt an explanation, as he does for the first two 
motions.  He leaves it as completely unexplained.43
                                                 
40 See . Figure 3
41 See Figure 4. 
42 Copernicus, De Rev, 52. 
43 In the Commentariolus, Copernicus comments on the third motion that “it has seemed to most persons [i.e., 
Ptolemaic astronomers] that the firmament has several motions in conformity with a law not yet sufficiently 
understood.  But it would be less surprising if all these changes should occur on account of the motion of the earth.  I 
am not concerned to state what the path of the pole is.”  That is, Ptolemaic astronomers, who believed the axis of the 
ecliptic to move, had no law or principle by which to explain the motion.  Copernicus, who ascribes the motion to 
the earth’s axis, likewise has no explanation, and is not even sure what the actual path of the motion really is.  See 
Edward Rosen, “The Commentariolus of Copernicus,” Osiris 3 (1937); Noel M. Swerdlow, “The Derivation and 
First Draft of Copernicus's Planetary Theory:  A Translation of the Commentariolus with Commentary,” 
Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 117, no. 6 (1973). 
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In fact, the third motion is simply an artifact of Copernicus’s representation of space.  In 
a spherical representation of space centered on the sun, where direction is specified in relation to 
a radius to the sun, the behavior of the earth’s axis is described as a motion.  If one were to 
employ a spherical representation of space centered on the earth, or a rectilinear representation of 
space, one would say, as we do today, that the earth’s axis does not move,44 which is why it 
remains pointed towards a fixed point in the sky. 
Copernicus was unable to give an explanation for the motion he described.  It fell on his 
successors to explain it.  This was no easy task, since the “motion” is, in fact, no motion at all.  
Indeed, the problem of the “third motion” eventually led to a questioning of the spherical 
geometry by which it was described.  A new representation of space eventually allowed authors 
to describe the behavior of the earth’s axis as a “staying” rather than a motion, and this greatly 
simplified the task of explaining it, as we shall see. 
2.7 CONCLUSION 
Copernicus is the natural starting point for our history of seventeenth century representations of 
space.  Copernicus’s heliocentrism called into question the Aristotelian spherical conception of 
space that had dominated physical thought since the classical age.  What was once a single 
framework centered on a single point was now a bifurcated system centered on two, if not many, 
centers.  The Copernican hypothesis also required a new physical system to explain the various 
features of celestial and terrestrial phenomena as they were now described.  Eventually, the 
solution of these problems required the development of a new representation of space, catalyzed, 
in particular, by difficulties surrounding Copernicus’s “third motion.”  We can now turn to the 
development of this new, rectilinear representation of space. 
It should be mentioned that, besides the difficulties of explaining terrestrial and celestial 
phenomena arising within the De Revolutionibus, an explanatory challenge was raised by the 
reception of Copernicus’s work.  As mentioned above, Copernicus does not seriously try to 
expand upon Aristotelian explanations of physical phenomena.  He simply assumes that the 
                                                 
44 Ignoring a very slow precession. 
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existing Scholastic physics will be applied to his system.  As a result, he says very little about the 
causes of the planetary motions he describes in the De Revolutionibus.  This seeming silence 
allowed many of his readers to assert that Copernicus was following Ptolemy’s Almagest by 
limiting the discussion to descriptions and avoiding any treatment of causes.  On this view, the 
De Revolutionibus, and astronomy in general, was purely mathematical work, useful for 
predicting planetary positions, but devoid of comment about the causal structure of the heavens.  
By subscribing to this operationalist position, proponents of the so-called “Wittenberg 
interpretation” could sidestep the trouble of reconciling Copernicus’s geokinetic theory with the 
apparently geostatic descriptions found in Scripture.45  Even readers, such as Kepler, Gilbert, and 
Tycho, who did not accept the operationalist view of astronomy came to believe that Copernicus 
had left his task incomplete.  They thought he had only worked a posteriori – from the 
phenomena – and it remained to give an account a priori – from the causes.  Of course, 
Copernicus’s intention was to bring together astronomical descriptions and physical causes, not 
to divorce them.  He thought he could appeal to the Scholastic explanations already at hand.  
Under influence of the Wittenberg interpreters, his readers missed the subtle appeal to 
Aristotelian physics that motivated Copernicus’s project from the start. 
This was, in the end, a fertile oversight.  Copernicus’s failure to explicitly address causes 
led subsequent authors to take up what they (though not Copernicus) thought unfinished business 
and attempt causal explanations of the planetary motions Copernicus had described.  Kepler, for 
example, had “no hesitation in asserting that everything that Copernicus has demonstrated a 
posteriori and on the basis of observations interpreted geometrically, may be demonstrated a 
priori without any subtlety of logic.”46  Kepler simply failed to recognize the subtle a priori 
nature of the argument in the De Revolutionibus, and was led to provide causal explanations of 
his own.  Copernicus had tried to reconcile his novel descriptions with existing explanations.  
For his followers, like Gilbert and Kepler, the task now became to provide novel explanations to 
reconcile with the existing Copernican descriptions.  A reciprocal iteration took place – a shift in 
descriptions to save explanations led to a shift in explanations to save descriptions. 
                                                 
45 To make matters worse, this was the position suggested by the anonymous preface appended to the De 
Revolutionibus that, before its true author, Andreas Osiander, was revealed by Kepler in the Astronomia Nova, made 
it seem as if Copernicus himself advocated this interpretation.  See Westman, “The Melanchthon Circle, Rheticus, 
and the Wittenberg Interpretation of the Copernican Theory.” 











Figure 1.  Ptolemy’s Model for a Superior Planet.  In Ptolemy’s system, the planet, P, moves on an 
epicycle, the center of which, D, moves on an eccentric deferent with center C.  D‘s angular velocity is uniform 
about an equant point, Q.  Assume that one eighth of the planet’s orbital period has passed since its last apogee, 
towards G.  If the planet were to move at constant velocity on a circular orbit centered on the earth, it would arrive at 
A (angle GEA = 45°).  However, angular velocity is constant only around Q, so the planet is actually somewhere on 
the segment QB (where EA is parallel to QB).  In fact, D lies on the circle with center C.  The planet, at P, lies on 
the epicycle on the segment DP, where DP is parallel to EM, the vector connecting the earth and the mean sun, M.  
Thus, angle AED is the ecliptic anomaly consisting of two corrections:  the angle AEB generated by the uniform 
motion around the equant, and the small angle BED generated by the eccentric orbit of D.  Angle DEP is the synodic 
anomaly related to the motion of the mean sun, M.  Angle GEA is the mean motion of the planet, which is corrected 
by the total anomaly, AEP.  Ptolemy’s model for Venus, an inferior planet, is similar, except that the angle AED 








Figure 2.  Copernicus’s Model for a Superior Planet.  In Copernicus’s system, both the planet, P, and the 
earth, E, move on epicycles whose centers, A and D, move on deferents eccentric (at C and Q) with the sun, S.  
Thus, the planet’s position in relation to the sun, angle SEP, is given by calculating six quantities, three each for the 











Figure 3.  The Earth’s Axis.  As the earth orbits the sun, its rotational axis NS (for North-South) remains 
parallel to itself.  Near the summer solstice, the north end of the axis (the north pole) is tilted toward the sun.  Near 





Plane of Earth’s axis
 
Figure 4.  The Third Motion.  In a spherical representation of space centered on or near the sun, direction is 
specified by angle α, the deflection from the radius to the sun.  As the earth orbits the sun, the plane of its axis 
remains parallel to itself.  As a result, its deflection from the earth-sun radius continually increases.  Since this 
deflection correlates to the description of direction, the phenomenon is described as a changing direction – in other 
words, a motion. 
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3.0  GILBERT’S “VERTICITY” AND THE “LAW OF THE WHOLE” 
In chapter 1, we spoke of an iterative reciprocation between concept, description, and 
explanation that led to a new representation of space during the seventeenth century.  Copernicus 
is an illustration of this process.  His adherence to Aristotelian explanations of celestial motion 
led him to novel descriptions of phenomena.  These new descriptions, in turn, led to problems at 
both the conceptual and explanatory levels.  One of the first authors to grapple with these new 
difficulties was the Englishman William Gilbert of Colchester, royal physician to Queen 
Elizabeth I and King James I. 
As we shall see, Gilbert constitutes another iteration of the process we are describing.  
Gilbert aims to fill some of the explanatory gaps opened by Copernicus.  To do so, he focuses on 
a particular set of phenomena, namely, those associated with magnetism.  These phenomena, 
however, are described on the basis of a particular representation of space appropriate to the 
magnetic subject matter, which Gilbert then applies to the description of the earth itself.  This 
altered description of the earth, in turn, helps Gilbert give the explanations he seeks (though they 
may remain unconvincing).  In other words, Gilbert carries the intellectual process we have been 
describing full circle.  A new conceptual framework leads to new descriptions.  The new 
descriptions allow new explanations. 
3.1 GILBERT’S RESPONSE TO COPERNICUS 
As we saw in the last chapter, Copernicus left an important explanatory gap in his theory of the 
solar system.  He showed that one can account for the apparent phenomena by describing a 
moving earth, but he did not offer any new causal explanations of the earth’s motion.  He did not 
say why or how the earth moves.  Any follower of Copernicus would have to fill this explanatory 
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lacuna in order to answer his opponents, who, on the basis of Aristotelian physics, saw the 
motion of the earth as a physical impossibility.  Gilbert is one such Copernican.  He accepts that 
the earth is in motion, and he sets out to explain this movement.1
Unlike Copernicus, however, Gilbert is not an astronomer.  Save for a brief excursion at 
the very end of De Magnete (1600), his interest is restricted exclusively to terrestrial 
phenomena.2  As a renowned physician with an appointment at court, Gilbert probably had little 
leisure to make regular celestial observations.  Nor does he demonstrate the mathematical 
acumen necessary for any serious foray into mathematical astronomy, even by seventeenth 
century standards.3  Indeed, De Magnete is striking if only for its near complete lack of 
quantitative descriptions.  Even Gilbert’s discussion of Copernicus’s theory of equinoctial 
precession is simply a qualitative summary of the corresponding passages of De Revolutionibus.4
As a result of this curtailed purview, Gilbert does not seek to explain all Copernicus’s 
earthly motions.  He aims to explain the motions Copernicus ascribes to the earth in and of itself 
– i.e., the first and third motions.5  That is to say, Gilbert seeks to explain the earth’s daily 
rotation and why the axis of this rotation remains pointed towards one region of the fixed stars.  
Gilbert does not, on the other hand, have anything to say about Copernicus’s second motion, the 
annual orbit of the earth around the sun.  Any investigation of this motion would require a 
discussion of the earth’s position relative to other heavenly bodies, observations of which Gilbert 
                                                 
1 I agree with John Henry’s contention, contra Zilsel, that “the whole point of De Magnete was to offer a solution to 
a crucial problem for Copernican theory…  Copernicus effectively left unanswered the question as to how the earth 
might be able to move and keep on moving.”  See John Henry, “Animism and Empiricism:  Copernican Physics and 
the Origin of William Gilbert's Experimental Method,” Journal of the History of Ideas 62, no. 1 (2001): 106; Edgar 
Zilsel, “The Origins of William Gilbert's Scientific Method,” Journal of the History of Ideas 2, no. 1 (1941). 
2 Gilbert’s other, posthumously published work, De Mundo Nostro Sublunari Philosophia Nova (1651), is likewise 
generally restricted to terrestrial phenomena.   There is some discussion of the earth’s movement and the substance 
of the heavens, which we will touch on below, but the book is primarily concerned with sublunar phenomena, such 
as elemental substance, heat and cold, weather, and tides.  The manuscript, compiled by Gilbert’s half-brother and 
placed in the library of Henry, Prince of Wales, around 1607/8, was read by Francis Bacon and Thomas Harriot.  
The latter told Kepler about the work in 1608.  Though he requested a copy, there is no evidence Kepler ever saw it.  
Otherwise, the book, published long after Gilbert’s death, had little influence on Gilbert’s successors.  We will not 
devote much attention to it here.  See William Gilbert, De Mundo Nostro Sublunari Philosophia Nova 
(Amstelodami: Ludovicum Elzevirium, 1651).  Sister Suzanne Kelly, The De Mundo of William Gilbert 
(Amsterdam: Menno Hertzberger & Co., 1965). 
3 Gilbert, apparently, had some facility in mathematics.  He was a mathematics examiner at Cambridge from 1565.  
Whatever ability Gilbert possessed, however, does not evidence itself in De Magnete.  Rufus Suter, “A Biographical 
Sketch of Dr. William Gilbert of Colchester,” Osiris 10 (1952): 271. 
4 See Zilsel, “The Origins of William Gilbert's Scientific Method,” 3. 
5 As well as the precession of the equinoxes, which he also attributes to a motion of the earth. 
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is not prepared to handle.  In fact, nowhere in De Magnete does Gilbert explicitly affirm that the 
earth moves through the cosmos.6
This is not to say, though, that Gilbert does not believe that the earth moves around the 
sun.  His project, after all, owes its existence to Copernicus, and he follows Copernicus at many 
points, including questioning the earth’s centrality: 
But the stars or the planetary globes do not move in a circle round the centre of 
the earth; nor is the earth the centre – if it be in the centre – but a body around the 
centre.7  
Gilbert accepts, without comment, Copernicus’s conclusion that the earth is not the center of 
planetary orbits.  As a result, like Copernicus, he wonders whether the earth really is the center 
of the universe.  It might be that the earth is not at the center, but revolving around another point.  
And even if the earth is at the center, its centrality is accidental.  The center is a geometric point, 
unrelated to the body of the earth itself, which just happens to be “around the center.”  But this is 
as much as Gilbert will say on the matter. 
Far more telling, though, is the very fact that Gilbert sees the need to explain the third 
motion at all.  Recall that Copernicus introduces the third motion to account for the apparent 
stability of the earth’s axis, given that the earth is orbiting the sun.  If one assumes, conversely, 
that the earth does not orbit, and remains in place, presumably one would also assume that its 
axis would remain in place, obviating any need to explain the appearance of stability.  Hence, the 
very fact that Gilbert sees it necessary to explain the fixity of the earth’s axis implies that he 
accepts Copernicus’s second motion.  One must assume that Gilbert believes the earth circles the 
sun.8
                                                 
6 He is agnostic about the earth’s motion in De Mundo, as well.  See Gilbert, De Mundo, 196ff; Kelly, The De 
Mundo of William Gilbert, 66ff.  
7 “…nec terra si fuerit in centro, centrum est, sed corpus circa centrum.”   William Gilbert, De Magnete, trans. P. 
Fleury Mottelay (New York: Dover Publications, 1958), 337-38.  (Hereafter “On the Magnet” to distinguish it from 
the Latin text.)  William Gilbert, De Magnete, Magneticisque Corporibus, et de Magno Magnete Tellure, 
Physiologia Nova (London: Peter Short, 1600), 227. 
8 This is consistent with Gilbert’s neoplatonic description of the sun as the source of vegetation and nourishment, 
which the earth “seeks and seeks again,” implying (though he does not say so) that the sun inhabits the center as the 
source of vital energy in the universe.  Compare this comment also to Copernicus’s own neoplatonic description of 
the sun as the “lantern of the universe,” etc.  Copernicus, De Rev, 50ff; Gilbert, On the Magnet, 333ff.  For further 
support of Gilbert’s heliocentrism, see Gad Freudenthal, “Theory of Matter and Cosmology in William Gilbert's De 
magnete,” Isis 74, no. 1 (1983): 33ff. 
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3.2 THE DE MAGNETE 
3.2.1 Book I 
Gilbert begins De Magnete with an extensive investigation of the properties of magnets in 
general and spherical lodestones in particular.  Book I includes encyclopedic details about prior 
descriptions of magnetism; the different kinds and names of iron ore, and where they are found; 
how magnetism is found in iron ore, smelted, and wrought iron; and the medicinal uses of 
magnets.  Upon noticing the collocation of lodestones and iron ore in mines, the magnetism of 
both, and the similarity of their chemical traits, Gilbert concludes “that loadstone and iron ore are 
the same” and their “form, appearance, and essence are one.”9
…thus loadstone is by origin and nature ferruginous, and iron magnetic, and the 
two are one in species… and the better sort of iron ore is weak loadstone, just as 
the best loadstone is the most excellent iron ore in which we will show that grand 
and noble primary properties inhere.  It is only in weaker loadstone, or iron ore, 
that these properties are obscure, or faint, or scarcely perceptible to the senses.10
Lodestone and iron ore are essentially the same substance.  Lodestone is just a superior form of 
ore, in which the special magnetic powers inhere particularly strongly. 
The conclusion of Book I is presented in its seventeenth chapter, where Gilbert argues 
that the earth itself consists of magnetic material akin to the lodestone and iron ore.  Though the 
surface of the earth is “defaced by all sorts of waste matter and by no end of transformations,”11 
it exhibits an immutable magnetic power that influences, not only lodestones, but 
…[all] sorts of fissile stone of different colors; also clays, gravel, and several sorts 
of rock; and, in short, all of the harder earths found everywhere, provided only 
they be not fouled by oozy and dank defilements like mud, mire, heaps of putrid 
matter, or by the decaying remains of a mixture of organic matters…12
                                                 
9 Gilbert, On the Magnet, 59-60. 
10 Ibid., 63. 
11 Ibid., 67. 
12 Ibid., 70. 
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Once the “dank defilements” of organic matter are removed, all earthy substances demonstrate 
their inherent magnetic nature.  Ignoring the transformations of the imperfect organic world, 
then, earth’s “inmost nature” and “marrow”13 is magnetic stuff: 
Such, then, we consider the earth to be in its interior parts; it possesses a magnetic 
homogenic nature.  On this more perfect material (foundation) the whole world of 
things terrestrial [is based], which, when we search diligently, manifests itself to 
us everywhere, in all magnetic metals and iron ores and marls, and multitudinous 
earths and stones…14
According to Gilbert, the fact that the earth consists of magnetic matter means the earth is 
essentially magnetic.  For the earth is a celestial body, endowed with a peculiar and special 
nature. 
But the true earth-matter we hold to be a solid body homogenous with the globe, 
firmly coherent, endowed with a primordial and (as in the other globes of the 
universe) an energic form.15
All heavenly bodies, including the earth, have a primordial form, presumably endowed by the 
Creator.  The earth’s substance, then, must partake of the earth’s special form.  Gilbert has 
shown, though, that earth-matter, whatever it really is, is magnetic.  Hence, this “primordial” and 
“energic” form is, or at least comprises, magnetism.  That is, magnetism is the form of the earth 
and earth-matter.16
A lodestone, therefore, shares the essential magnetic form of the earth itself, as do all 
other magnetic substances, in varying degrees: 
A strong loadstone shows itself to be of the inmost earth, and in innumerable 
experiments proves its claim to the honor of possessing the primal form of things 
terrestrial…  So a weak loadstone, and all iron ore, all marls and argillaceous and 
other earths (some more, some less, according to the difference of their humors 
and the varying degrees in which they have been spoilt by decay), retain, 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 68. 
14 Ibid., 69. 
15 “Sed terram veram volumus esse substantiam solidam, telluri homogeneam, firmiter cohaerentem, primaria, & (ut 
in globis aliis mundi) valida forma praeditam”  Ibid., 68; Gilbert, De Magnete, 42. 
16 Gilbert also favorably quotes Guillermo Cardano’s proposition that “the loadstone is true earth.” Gilbert, On the 
Magnet, 69-70.  See also Freudenthal, “Theory of Matter and Cosmology in William Gilbert's De magnete,” 24-26. 
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deformed, in a state of degeneration from the primordial form, magnetic 
properties, powers, that are conspicuous and in the true sense telluric.17
There is a real, formal, affinity between a lodestone, or any other magnetic material, and the 
earth.  They share a single form and nature.  Thus, whatever is natural for a lodestone – whatever 
is a result of its form – will also be natural for the earth itself.  In particular, Gilbert will want to 
assert, the earth’s motions are natural, caused by its inherent magnetic nature: 
Thus every separate fragment of the earth exhibits in indubitable experiments the 
whole impetus of magnetic matter; in its various movements it follows the 
terrestrial globe and the common principle of motion.18
Experiments performed on “separate fragments of the earth” – i.e., lodestones – will exhibit the 
true nature of magnetic matter, including its principles of motion, “common” to lodestone and 
earth.  Hence, whatever motions are found in the lodestone can be ascribed to the earth, as well. 
Thus, in Book I of De Magnete, Gilbert has laid the groundwork for an explanation of the 
earth’s motion on the basis of an investigation into the nature of the lodestone.  Whatever 
magnetic properties exist in the lodestone will exist in the earth simply because they share a 
common magnetic nature.19
3.2.2 Book II 
Book II begins Gilbert’s investigation of the magnetic characteristics of lodestones and their 
motions.  He focuses his attention on spherical lodestones, which he labels terrellae, because the 
spherical shape is also that of the earth.  Thus, a terrella will have 
                                                 
17 Gilbert, On the Magnet, 70.  
18 Ibid., 71. 
19 It is interesting to note that, in this context, Gilbert has adopted the Scholastic structure of explanation based on 
substantial form.  As in Scholastic matter theory, the form is responsible for the properties of the body.  In this case, 
however, the form is magnetism – an active principle akin to neoplatonic affinities and spirits.  Gilbert accepts the 
notion that a form inheres in earthy matter and gives it its various attributes, but he explicitly rejects the Aristotelian 
view of earth as an ideal, inert, and utterly passive element.  The postulated ideal earth, “Aristotle’s ‘simple 
element,’ and that most vain terrestrial phantasm of the Peripatetics,” is merely a product of the imagination and 
“never appeared to any one even in dreams.”  Magnets, observable and active, are the true terrestrial substance.  
Gilbert accepts the outline of the Aristotelian theory of matter, but rejects the specific description of the earthy 
element.  Earth is an Aristotelian element, but it is essentially magnetic, not, in Gilbert’s words, “formless, inert, 
cold, [and] dry.”  Ibid., 69. 
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…got from art the orbicular form that nature in the beginning gave to the earth, 
the common mother; and it is a natural little body endowed with a multitude of 
properties whereby many abstruse and unheeded truths of philosophy, hid in 
deplorable darkness, may be more readily brought to the knowledge of 
mankind.20
A spherical lodestone is most like the earth, so the properties associated with a terrella will be 
most like the earth’s as well.  Because the forms have such close similarity, investigation of the 
properties of the terrella can reveal “truths of philosophy” regarding the earth. 
The phenomena associated with a terrella immediately suggest a particular representation 
of space to be used to describe them, the spherical system of meridians and poles used by 
geographers and astronomers.21  Even the most rudimentary examination of a terrella – indeed, 
of any magnet – reveals diametrically opposed poles where the strength of the magnet’s 
influence is concentrated.  A simple procedure locates them on the surface of the sphere: 
To find, then, poles answering to the earth’s poles, take in your had the round 
stone, and lay on it a needle or a piece of iron wire;  the ends of the wire move 
round their middle point, and suddenly come to a standstill.  Now, with ochre or 
with chalk, mark where the wire lies still and sticks.  Then move the middle or 
centre of the wire to another spot, and so to a third and a fourth, always marking 
the stone along the length of the wire where it stands still:  the lines so marked 
will exhibit meridian circles, or circles like meridians on the stone or terrella; and 
manifestly they will all come together a the poles of the stone.22
This method of finding the poles reveals “lines of force” marked out on the terrella.  On a 
spherical magnet, these will, as Gilbert describes, form great circles, converging at two opposing 
poles, “like meridians.” 
Notice, however, that a meridian is not identifiable in a spherical representation of space 
constructed around an assumed center.  Recall, a representation of space legitimates spatial 
descriptions.  Suppose we are presented with the claim, “the line is like a meridian.”  If all we 
presuppose is a sphere around a center, all we can determine is whether the line is a great circle 
of the sphere.  But this is not enough to test the claim.  We must also determine whether the great 
                                                 
20 Ibid., 24. 
21 Gilbert may have been introduced to the rudiments of cartography by his friend, the mathematician Edward 
Wright, who worked out the modern theory of Mercator projections in Certaine Errors of Navigation (1599).  See 
Suter, “A Biographical Sketch of Dr. William Gilbert of Colchester,” 376.  Wright, incidentally, is the author of the 
dedicatory address included in De Magnete. 
22 Gilbert, On the Magnet, 24. 
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circle connects the poles.  Thus, in addition to the sphere (and its center), we must also stipulate 
poles as privileged locations on the sphere to which we can refer our description.  We need to 
include poles in our representation of space to legitimate descriptions including meridians.  In 
other words, descriptions involving meridians can only be understood in the context of a 
spherical representation of space that includes poles.  The same is true, for example, of 
descriptions including equators, parallels, and the poles themselves.  All such descriptions 
require a presupposed spherical representation of space with poles. 
When Gilbert says that the lines of force on a terrella are “like meridians,” he is 
implicitly assuming that the reader knows what a meridian is and where it might lie on the sphere 
of the terrella.  This requires the assumption that the reader is supposing a spherical 
representation of space with poles.  The phenomena exhibited by the lodestone, then, are 
described by reference to the sphere and its poles.  The descriptions can be understood because 
the reader shares Gilbert’s conceptual framework that makes the descriptions sensible.  That is, 
both reader and Gilbert assume a spherical representation of space that includes stipulated poles.  
We will call this the geographical representation of space. 
Gilbert clearly endorses the geographical representation of space as the proper framework 
for his description for magnetic phenomena. 
Astronomers, in order to account for and observe the movements of the planets 
and the revolution of the heavens, as also more accurately to describe the 
heavenly order of the fixed stars, have drawn in the heavens certain circles and 
bounds, which geographers also imitate so as to map out the diversified 
superficies of the globe and to delineate the fairness of the several regions.  In a 
different sense we accept those bounds and circles, for we have discovered many 
such, both in the terrella and in the earth; but these are determined by nature itself, 
and are not merely imaginary lines.23
Gilbert, like a geographer, will use presupposed “circles and bounds” – meridians, poles, 
equators, etc. – to describe the behaviors of his terrellae.  The lines of magnetic force, for 
example, pass along meridians, and so on. 
The presupposition of a geographical representation of space allows the specification of 
direction and location on the surface of the sphere.  As Gilbert writes: 
                                                 
23 Ibid., 125. 
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And neither in earth nor in terrella do the poles exist merely for the sake of 
rotation; they are furthermore reference points of direction and of position – on 
the one hand towards one’s destination on the earth, and on the other hand as 
regards the angular distance between them.24  
Position, for example, is measured as angular distance from the pole, measured at the center – 
i.e., latitude.  Direction is also referred to the pole as a “destination.”  One can be directed toward 
or away from the pole, or one can be directed around it, neither toward nor away.  (Gilbert has in 
mind the compass rose.  The north/south/east/west specifications of geographers are understood 
as toward, away from, and around the poles.) 
Gilbert’s geographic framework is apparent throughout his investigation of the terrella.  
Consider, for example, his description of “variation,” one of the five “magnetic movements” 
caused by a terrella’s magnetic nature.  Variation is defined as “deflection from the meridian.”25  
In other words, the meridian is considered the null direction.  Variation is a change of this 
direction, measured with respect to the meridian.  If something, a compass needle, say, is pointed 
along the meridian, it has not undergone variation.  If the compass needle is deflected from the 
meridian, it has moved.  Thus, the meridian, and the geographic representation of space, is 
essential to Gilbert’s description of variation.  The description assumes a meridian. 
A similar point can be made regarding another of Gilbert’s magnetic movements:  
declination, “a descent of the magnetic pole beneath the horizon.”26  On a terrella, and on the 
earth, a magnetic needle only lies parallel to the sphere’s surface at the (magnetic) equator.  
Closer to the poles, it will incline, or dip, towards the pole.  At the pole, the needle will stand on 
end, perpendicular to the surface of the magnet.  Notice, however, that Gilbert describes this 
motion as a “descent” “beneath the horizon,” where the horizon is defined as the plane tangential 
to the sphere.27  The description presupposes a sphere, so that the direction tangential to the 
sphere is a null direction.  Needles that lie tangential to the sphere exhibit no “descent” and, 
hence, no declination.  The declination increases, however, as the needle moves “below” the 
tangent to the sphere, reaching maximum (the perpendicular) at the pole.  Gilbert’s description of 
declination, as of variation, demonstrates his use of a geographical representation of space. 
                                                 
24 “Neq; etiam hi in tellure aut terrella vertendi tantum gratia existunt; sed etiam termini sunt dirigendi, & 
consistendi, tum versus destinatas mundi regiones; tum etiam inter se iustis conversionibus.”  I have altered 
Mottelay’s translation slightly.  Ibid., 129; Gilbert, De Magnete, 81. 
25 Gilbert, On the Magnet, 73. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid., 128. 
 70 
3.2.3 The Instantiation of the Geographical Representation of Space 
Gilbert’s representation of space is actually an important component of his overall argument 
concerning the earth’s motion.  Gilbert asserts that the geographic representation of space is 
more than just a conceptual framework used to generate descriptions.  While astronomers and 
geographers use the geographical representation, with its meridians and poles, “to account for 
and observe the movements of the planets” or “delineate the fairness of the several regions” of 
the world, it is just a conceptual device.  The meridians, parallels and poles are merely 
“imaginary lines.”28  In the context of magnetism, however, these geometrical structures are 
physical features of the terrella, 
…for we have discovered many such, both in the terrella and in the earth; but 
these are determined by nature itself, and are not merely imaginary lines.  
Geographers make a division of the earth chiefly by defining the equator and the 
poles; and [in the terrella] these bounds are set and defined by nature.  Meridians, 
too, indicate tracks from pole to pole, passing through fixed points in the equator; 
along such lines the magnetic force proceeds and gives direction.29
In geography, the geographical representation of space is imposed by the geographer, who 
“defines” its elements.  In magnetism, the geographical framework is fixed by nature, which 
“sets” and “defines” its structure.  Thus, these “lines,” the meridians, the equator, the polar axis, 
etc., are determined by the nature of the terrella and can be discovered in it.   
Gilbert’s argument, then, amounts to a claim that the terrella, by virtue of its magnetic 
nature, instantiates the geographic representation of space.  The geometric features of the 
framework are physical features of the spherical magnet, with real and observable effects in 
phenomena.  A meridian, for example, is a geometric structure.  It “indicates tracks from pole to 
pole.”  On the terrella, though, the meridians are instantiated by the magnetic force, which 
“proceeds” along them.  Poles, meanwhile, are geometric points, which are also the foci of 
magnetic attraction, where the attractive power is strongest.  Similarly, the equator is the line 
which separates the terrella into two halves, each “imbued with equal energy,” and where 
attraction is weakest.30  The parallels are loci of constant magnetic declination.31  These “metes 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 125. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., 126. 
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and bounds” are real features of the magnetic body.  The representation used to describe 
magnetic phenomena is not just “imaginary,” but in the very nature of the phenomena described.  
It is not imposed on the phenomena, but “discovered” in them. 
Gilbert’s claim that the geographic representation of space is “discovered” in the terrella 
is, in one sense, circular and misleading.  As Gilbert himself acknowledges, the geographic 
framework is a presupposed geometry employed to make descriptions possible.  This framework 
is purely intellectual and subjective, however.  Its “metes and bounds” are “merely imaginary” in 
the mind of the descriptor.  One can always assume a different geometric structure.32  The 
resulting descriptions might not be as useful or specific as one desires, but descriptions can be 
generated all the same. 
In the case of the terrella, Gilbert finds that a particular geometric framework – the 
geographic system – generates the most satisfactory descriptions of the phenomena.  This is 
because the phenomena exhibit certain features, such as concentrations of magnetic action, that 
are easily identified with features of the geometric structure, like stipulated poles.  Thus, the 
phenomena are best or most satisfactorily described – for Gilbert, at least – by appealing to the 
geographic representation of space.  This is not a necessary conclusion, though.  The foci of 
magnetic attraction are not geometric points, and nothing entails that they should be described as 
such.  Others might find different representations that are, in their estimation, more satisfactory 
(though it is admittedly hard to imagine what the other representations might be). 
Gilbert concludes, meanwhile, that the close correlation of geometry and phenomena 
entails that the geographic framework is not subjective and “imaginary,” but objective and 
“discovered” in the phenomena.  The terrella’s “metes and bounds” are generated by its inherent 
magnetic nature, not by the observer trying to describe it.  In this way, Gilbert slides over the 
distinction between intellectual framework and objective phenomena.  He makes the concepts 
used to generate the description part of the description. 
This subtle slide results in a somewhat circular argument.  Gilbert begins by assuming a 
certain geometry.  He assumes a sphere.  He assumes poles.  When observing the terrella, he 
finds certain features that answer to these presupposed structures.  Then he describes the 
                                                                                                                                                             
31 Ibid., 127. 
32 Kepler, for example, will employ a spherical representation of space to describe the magnetic action of the sun.  
One consequence is Kepler’s focus on the spherical propagation of magnetic action from the magnetic center.  See 
below. 
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terrella’s features as the assumed structures.  The conclusion that the terrella has real, objective 
poles relies, in part, on the subjective assumption that the terrella has poles. 
Of course, Gilbert’s choice of geometric framework does not come in a vacuum.  As it 
turns out, the geographic representation of space is very appropriate to the terrella, and allows 
specific and detailed descriptions of its properties.  Indeed, the terrella immediately suggests the 
geographic structure, as we have seen, and it is difficult to imagine another conceptual 
framework that could be substituted.  Thus, Gilbert’s conclusion that the geographic structure is 
an objective feature of the terrella can be weakened to the sounder, almost equivalent claim that 
the physical features of the terrella can best be described on the basis of the geographic 
representation of space.  Thus, the foci of the magnetic attraction are not poles, per se, but best 
described as poles.  Lines of magnetic force, meanwhile, are not meridians, but best described as 
meridians.  By contrast, a spherical representation of space, for example, does not provide as 
easy a way to describe the terrella’s magnetic action.  Since such a representation provides for 
the assumption of neither poles nor meridians, there would be no simple way to describe the foci 
or lines of magnetic force.  In the end, as we shall see, this weakening will make little difference 
to Gilbert’s argument, and he may perhaps be excused for eliding the distinction in the first 
place. 
3.2.4 Books III-IV:  Magnetic Motions 
Book I of De Magnete established the common magnetic nature of the earth and terrella, which 
Gilbert promised to exhibit in “indubitable experiments.”  Book II begins the presentation of 
these “experiments.”  First, it introduces the five “magnetic motions” caused by the magnetic 
nature of the earth and terrella:  coition, direction, variation, declination, and revolution.  The 
latter part of Book II examines coition, “an impulsion to magnetic union” “commonly called 
attraction.”33  Coition, Gilbert reasons, is a result of the joint nature of both attractor and 
attracted, rather than, as in the case of electric attraction, the action of the attractor alone.34  He 
                                                 
33 Gilbert, On the Magnet, 73. 
34 “Thus the magnetic coition is the act of the loadstone and of the iron, not of one of them alone:  it is… conactus 
(mutual action) rather than sympathy.”  Ibid., 110.  Gilbert argues that coition is caused by the natural desire for 
bodies with the same or similar natures to cohere.  This is reminiscent of Copernicus’s awkward explanation of 
gravitation.  See Copernicus, De Rev, 46. and p. 53 above. 
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also presents numerous experiments demonstrating how magnetic power can be increased (by 
armoring the stone) or decreased (by corrosion or heating).  The essential conclusion of this 
discussion, however, is that coition follows the inherent spherical geometry of both earth and 
terrella.  Coition respects magnetic poles, where it is strongest, and an equator, where it is 
weakest.35  Also, in the terrella and the earth, the strength of magnetic action decreases in 
proportion to distance from the center of the sphere.  This implies the “shape” of magnetic action 
is spherical.  The terrella produces a magnetic “orb of virtue,” whose center, the “center of 
force,” coincides with the center of the magnet.36  Coition reveals the inherent spherical shape of 
magnetic action.  
Book III investigates the phenomenon Gilbert calls “direction,” the movement of a 
magnet or needle to align its poles with those of the earth and the terrella.  Here, Gilbert presents 
experiments demonstrating that magnetized needles will align with the meridians of a terrella.  
He also shows that magnetized needles (and even wrought iron, suitably worked) will align with 
the north and south poles of the earth, and how this movement can be used profitably for 
timekeeping, surveying, navigation, and so forth.  Most important for Gilbert, though, is the fact 
that direction is manifested on both earth and terrella.  This similarity constitutes empirical 
evidence for the affinity between earth and lodestone that is essential to Gilbert’s argument. 
For reasons we will come to, Gilbert assumed that the earth’s magnetic axis coincides 
with its rotational axis.  Of course, as we now know, this is not the case.  As a result, compass 
needles will not perfectly align themselves with the rotational pole, along what Gilbert call the 
“true meridian,” but along the magnetic meridian towards the magnetic pole: 
Yet very oft it happens, afloat and ashore, that a magnetic needle does not look 
toward the true pole, but is drawn to a point in the horizon nigh to the meridian, 
and that there is a deflection not only of the needle and magnetized iron in general 
and of the mariner’s compass, but also of a terrella…; for they often look with 
their poles toward points different from the meridian.37
As we have seen, Gilbert calls this deflection from the rotational meridian “variation.” 
Variation occurs on the earth, but not on the terrella.  This dissimilarity calls Gilbert’s 
analogy between earth and terrella into question.  Book III of De Magnete, therefore, is dedicated 
                                                 
35 Gilbert, On the Magnet, 115ff. 
36 Ibid., 150ff. 
37 Ibid., 230. 
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to an argument that variation is merely a “perverted motion.”38  It is caused, Gilbert asserts, not 
by the true magnetic form of the earth, but the irregularity of its surface – the inequality among 
the earth’s elevations.”39  Landmasses, projecting from the globe of the earth, form irregular 
concentrations of earthy, magnetic matter, disturbing the “direction” caused by the earth’s true 
nature, resulting in variation.  If similar protuberances are constructed on a lodestone, similar 
disturbances of “direction” are observed.  Variation, then is a “perversion” of the true action of 
the earth, caused by the transient world of “transformations” on its surface.  If the earth were a 
smooth sphere, compass needles would all align with its true, immutable, magnetic – and 
rotational – poles. 
Book V of De Magnete comes to “declination,” the “descent of the magnetic pole 
beneath the horizon.”  Gilbert describes how, on a terrella, magnetized needles will “dip” 
towards the poles.  Gilbert then describes experiments that demonstrate the same phenomenon on 
the earth.  The demonstration of magnetic declination is supposed to clinch Gilbert’s argument 
that the earth and the terrella are of one kind. 
We come at last to that fine experiment, that wonderful movement of magnetic 
bodies as they dip beneath the horizon in virtue of their natural verticity; after we 
have mastered this, the wondrous combination, harmony, and concordant 
interaction of the earth and the loadstone (or magnetized iron), being made 
manifest by our theory, stand revealed.40
Declination conclusively reveals the similarity between earth and lodestone.  Magnetized needles 
on the earth decline according to latitude, just as they do on the terrella.  Of course, Gilbert’s 
“theory” is that this similarity is due to a shared magnetic nature.  Thus, the harmony and 
concordance witnessed in the phenomenon of declination is a testament to the formal likeness of 
all magnets, including the earth and terrella. 
The earth and terrella share a magnetic nature.  Direction is seen in both.  Variation, 
peculiar to the earth, is a spurious motion that may be dismissed.  Most wonderful of all, 
declination is observed exactly on the earth as it is on the terrella.  Hence, 
All the experiments that are made on the terrella, to show how magnetic bodies 
conform themselves to it, may – at least the principal and most striking of them – 
                                                 
38 Ibid., 73. 
39 Ibid., 235. 
40 Ibid., 275. 
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be shown on the body of the earth; to the earth, too, all magnetized bodies are 
associate.41
All the observed phenomena, so clearly expounded in the first five books of De Magnete, 
indicate that the earth and the terrella are of the same nature.  All that is natural for the terrella is 
natural for the earth. 
Notice that this conclusion comes mainly at the level of description, but the conclusion 
itself has explanatory import.  The earth may be a magnet, but this means only that it can be 
described in the same ways any other magnet is described.  The features and properties of 
magnets are the features and properties of the earth.  Yet, since the earth can be described this 
way, one can go on to say that the earth moves because it is a magnet – it has a magnetic nature.  
This nature, moreover, causes the certain motions common to all magnets.  This much is an 
explanation.  Gilbert has not shown, though, why the earth is a magnet – why it is endowed with 
its peculiar nature – or even why magnets exhibit the behaviors they do.  This is left to the 
inscrutable wisdom of the Creator.  Gilbert’s explanation only reaches so far.  The real move is 
to describe the earth and terrellae as members of a single class – magnets – over which 
ascriptions of features, including motions, can be generalized.42
3.2.5 Book VI:  The Earth’s Motions 
Finally, in Book VI, Gilbert is ready to put the pieces of his argument together.  Recall Gilbert’s 
assertion that the terrella instantiates the geographical geometry.  Meridians, poles, and equator 
are to be taken as real features of the terrella, determined by its nature.  Since the earth is a 
terrella, and shares this nature, it also instantiates the geographical representation of space: 
And first, on the terrella the equinoctial circle, the meridians, parallels, the axis, 
the poles, are natural limits:  similarly on the earth these exist as natural and not 
merely mathematical limits.43
                                                 
41 Ibid. 
42 For one account the explanatory shortcomings of Gilbert’s theory, see Mary B. Hesse, “Gilbert and the Historians 
(II),” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 11, no. 42 (1960). 
43 Gilbert, On the Magnet, 313. 
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Just as poles, meridians, and equator are real features of a terrella, they are real features of the 
earth.  They are not merely “imaginary” or “mathematical” structures used to describe the earth, 
but elements of the inherent magnetic nature of the terrestrial globe. 
That the earth has real poles is of critical importance for Gilbert’s argument in favor of 
the earth’s motion.  It is clear that the apparent movement of the sun, stars, and planets daily 
across the sky is a result of either a rotation of the entire heavens, or a rotation of the earth, “for 
in no third mode can the apparent revolutions be accounted for.”44  Now: 
Bodies that by nature move with a motion circular, equable, and constant, have in 
their different parts various metes and bounds.45
That is, bodies that move with a uniform circular motion have certain identifiable features.  In 
particular, they exhibit poles, points where the circular motion is minimal, and an equator, where 
the motion is maximal.  From these, other “metes and bounds” can be derived, such as meridians 
and parallels.  The debate between Gilbert and his geo-stationary opponents is whether the 
heavens or the earth rotates.  Gilbert reduces this to a question of geometry.  The body that 
exhibits poles, meridians, equators, and so forth, must be the body in motion.  If the earth really 
has these features, it is moving.  Otherwise they belong to the rotating heavens. 
Of course, and this is Gilbert’s point, the earth has these characteristics.  Gilbert’s 
magnetic experiments are meant to prove that they are real features of the earth: 
Now the earth is not a chaos nor a chance medley mass, but through its astral 
property has limits agreeable to the circular motion, to wit, poles that are not 
merely mathematical expressions, an equator that is not a mere fiction, meridians, 
too, and parallels’ and all these we find in the earth, permanent, fixed, and natural; 
they are demonstrated with many experiments in the magnetic philosophy.46
Magnetism has provided independent evidence for the existence of the geometric features of 
motion in the earth.  The earth has real poles, real meridians, and a real equator, each determined 
                                                 




by its nature and demonstrable by its magnetic action, without reference to its motion.  Thus, the 
earth is “fitted” – has the necessary geometric features – for diurnal rotation.47
The geometric features ascribed to the heavens, meanwhile, have no real existence: 
But no revolutions of bodies, no movements of planets, show any sensible, natural 
poles in the firmament or in any primum mobile; neither does any argument prove 
their existence; they are the product of imagination.48
The firmament of fixed stars is homogeneous and isomorphic.  It gives no observable evidence 
whatsoever for the existence of inherent, natural poles.  The celestial poles are “the product of 
imagination,” ascribed to the heavens as a result of their apparent motion, not because of their 
nature.  The earth, on the other hand, possesses its particular motion as a result of it poles, “for 
nature has set in the earth definite poles and has established definite and not confused 
revolutions” around those pole.49
The earth is a terrella.  Like all terrellae, therefore, it instantiates the geographical 
representation of space.  The poles are real features of the earth.  The earth, not the heavens, 
must be the moving body.50
We pointed out above that Gilbert’s ascription of real poles to the terrella is somewhat 
misleading.  A magnetic exhibits foci of magnetic attraction.  Gilbert describes these foci as 
“poles.”  Thus the “poles” are, at bottom, descriptions of phenomena, not phenomena 
themselves.  However, Gilbert’s argument goes through even if one assumes that the terrella 
does not possess physical poles, but only features best described as poles.  As Gilbert himself 
points out in his presentation of his opponents’ claims, it is not that a rotating body has poles – 
these are merely geometric points used to describe the features of the rotating body.  A rotating 
body has real features – parts where its motion is minimal – that are best described as poles.  
Thus, if the earth is rotating, it should exhibit features best described as poles.  Gilbert can show, 
on the basis of magnetism, that this is the case.  From this point, the argument follows.  The 
earth’s magnetic properties imply that it should be considered the body in motion. 
                                                 
47 In effect, Gilbert has used magnetism to expand Copernicus’s proposition that the earth is “naturally fitted” for 
circular motion because it is spherically shaped and circular motion is the natural motion for spheres.  See 
Copernicus, De Rev, 38ff. 
48 Gilbert, On the Magnet, 328. 
49 Ibid., 338. 
50 For a fuller discussion of the metaphorical nature of Gilbert’s argument see Peter Dear, Discipline and 
Experience:  The Mathematical Way in the Scientific Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), ch. 
6. 
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The distinction between the phenomena and description does highlight, in a way not 
apparent in Gilbert’s text, the accidental coincidence of the magnetic and rotational poles.  For 
Gilbert’s argument to go through, of course, he must assume the earth’s magnetic axis coincides 
with its rotational axis.  Yet, that the earth has a magnetic feature best described as a pole does 
not entail that the description “pole” also applies to a feature of its motion (or non-motion).  By 
saying that the earth has an objective pole – without specifying whether it is magnetic or 
rotational – Gilbert can skirt the distinction without arguing that the two necessarily coincide.  
All the same, observed “variation” raised this problem empirically, since it indicates that 
magnetized needles on the earth respect a magnetic pole different from the earth’s “true” 
rotational one.  For this reason, Gilbert goes to great lengths in Book IV to dismiss variation as a 
spurious, “perverted” motion. 
3.2.6 A Blind Alley 
At this point, Gilbert’s argument from magnetism runs into a blind alley.  He wants to explain 
the diurnal revolution of the earth – Copernicus’s first motion – on the basis of magnetic 
movements.  If it can be shown that terrellae naturally revolve around their axes, Gilbert can 
argue that the earth’s diurnal rotation is caused by its magnetic nature.  The earth’s magnetic 
nature would explain Copernicus’s motion.  Gilbert cannot, however, show that “revolution” – 
his term for rotation about the axis – is actually exhibited by spherical lodestones. 
Gilbert has observed the rotation of terrellae, but this phenomenon does not support his 
conclusion that terrellae, and thus the earth, undergo revolution: 
That the earth is fitted for circular movement is proved by its parts, which, when 
separated from the whole, do not simply travel in a right line… but rotate also.  A 
loadstone placed in a wooden vessel is put in water so that it may float freely, 
rotate, and move about.  If the [north-seeking] pole B of the loadstone be made to 
point, unnaturally, toward the south F, the terrella revolves round its centre in a 
circular motion on the plane of the horizon toward the north E, where it comes to 
a rest…51
                                                 
51 Gilbert, On the Magnet, 331. 
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Here, a terrella indeed moves circularly around its center, but not around its axis, and not 
continually, as Gilbert would have the earth move.  The motion described realigns the terrella’s 
poles with the earth’s poles, i.e., along the meridian.  It is the terrella’s axis itself that rotates 
around an axis perpendicular to the magnetic axis.  Once the terrella has reoriented itself in its 
“natural” configuration, the motion ceases.  In other words, the experiment supports Gilbert’s 
ascription of “direction” to the terrella and, hence, the earth: 
The whole earth would act in the same way, were the north pole turned aside from 
its true direction; for that pole would go back, in the circular motion of the whole, 
toward Cynosura [the constellation toward which the rotational pole points].52
The terrella (and the earth) will naturally rotate about its center to “direct” its magnetic axes in 
the “true direction,” but this gives no evidence, in the terrella or the earth, for continuous 
“revolution” around the magnetic axis. 
Indeed, Gilbert is forced to reject a report that spherical lodestones rotate.  He simply 
cannot repeat the experiment: 
I omit what Petrus Peregrinus so stoutly affirms, that a terrella poised on its poles 
in the meridian moves circularly with a complete revolution in twenty-four hours.  
We have never chanced to see this:  nay, we doubt if there is such movement…53
Such a motion, if observed, would be evidence that the earth naturally revolved around its axis.  
If it could be shown that terrellae revolve around their axes, then one could conclude that the 
earth, a giant terrella, exhibits the same motion.  Gilbert, however, has “never chanced” to 
observe Peregrinus’s rotation, even though, presumably, he has tried to replicate the result. 
The motion of the terrella indicates only that it moves with a natural circular motion about its 
center, not that it revolves around its axis.  This does imply, Gilbert argues, that the earth can 
move circularly. 
The natural movements of the whole and of the parts are alike:  hence, since the 
parts move in a circle, the whole, too, hath the power of circular motion…  And 
this circular movement of the loadstone… shows that the whole earth is fitted, and 
by its own forces adapted for a diurnal circular motion.54
                                                 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid., 332. 
54 Ibid., 331-32. 
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Since the motion of the whole earth will be like its parts, the terrellae, the earth must, like the 
terrellae, be capable of circular motion.  This is a hollow conclusion, however.  The behavior of 
the terrella shows that the earth is “fitted” for circular motion, but it is the wrong kind of circular 
motion.  It is not a continuous, diurnal revolution around the magnetic axis, but a short-lived 
rotation of the axis itself. 
In the end, Gilbert’s magnetic philosophy successfully describes the earth’s magnetic 
nature.  It can show that the earth has a magnetic axis and that it is “fitted” for circular motion.  
Yet it fails to support the desired conclusion:  the earth’s magnetic nature causes a daily rotation.  
Gilbert can set the earth upon its pole, but he cannot make it spin. 
To complete his explanation of Copernicus’s first motion, Gilbert appeals to causes 
beyond those demonstrated by his observation of magnets.  He employs neoplatonic affinities, 
astral natures, and terrestrial animism to explain the motion of the earth.  The earth rotates 
because of its “magnetic mind:” 
And were not the earth to revolve with diurnal rotation, the sun would ever hang 
with its constant light over a given part, and, by long tarrying there, would scorch 
the earth, reduce it to powder, and dissipate its substance, and the uppermost 
surface of earth would receive grievous hurt:  nothing of good would spring form 
earth, there would be no vegetation; it could not give life to the animate creation, 
and man would perish.  In other parts all would be horror, and all things frozen 
stiff with intense cold…  And as the earth herself cannot endure so pitiable and so 
horrid a state of things on either side, with her astral magnetic mind she moves in 
a circle, to the end there may be, by unceasing change of light, a perpetual 
vicissitude, heat and cold, rise and decline, day and night, morn and even, 
noonday and deep night.  So the earth seeks and seeks the sun again, turns from 
him, follows him, by her wondrous magnetical energy.55
The earth is animate, Gilbert argues, and seeks out the best preservation of itself.  This entails a 
continuous diurnal rotation, forever towards the “benefit” of the heavenly bodies.  For, if the 
earth did not rotate, it “would receive grievous hurt” from the sun on one side, and “all would be 
horror” on the other.  Altogether, then, the animate earth moves itself in harmony with the 
heavens to receive their most propitious influences. 
                                                 
55 Ibid., 333-34. 
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The motion of the whole earth, therefore, is primary, astral, circular about its 
poles…so that the globe by a definite rotation might move to the good, sun and 
stars inciting.56
Gilbert, finally, can explain the earth’s diurnal rotation.  The earth has a natural axis 
because it is a terrella – a spherical magnet.  Poles are set out by its magnetic nature.  It spins 
around this axis, however, because it is animate, and seeks out the harmony and benefit provided 
by the other heavenly bodies.  In the end, however, this explanation is no more supported by 
evidence than the Aristotelian appeals to quintessence and elemental natures that Gilbert 
rejects.57
3.3 GILBERT’S TREATMENT OF THE “THIRD MOTION”:  VERTICITY AND 
THE LAW OF THE WHOLE 
We now can turn our attention, finally, to Gilbert’s proposed explanation of Copernicus’s “third 
motion,” the supposed rotation of the earth’s axis.  Recall that Copernicus attributed a motion to 
the earth to account for the fact that the earth’s rotational axis remains pointed at roughly the 
same part of the heavens throughout the year.  We have argued that Copernicus is led to describe 
the phenomenon as a motion because of his spherical representation of space.  Gilbert’s 
geographical representation of space leads him to a quite different description.  He will say that 
                                                 
56 Ibid., 334-35. 
57 Note that this position places Gilbert in between several intellectual positions of his day.  His argument relies on a 
Peripatetic notion of substantial form, but the form is active, like an alchemical principle.  Gilbert’s analytic 
approach to the substance of the magnet also evinces the thinking of the chemists.  In addition, Gilbert appeals to 
astral intellects and influences, hearkening to neoplatonism and natural magic.  All told, it is difficult to classify 
Gilbert with any of these groups, let alone as a “traditional” or “modern” thinker.  He is a transitional figure, 
responding to the intellectual climate of his time, to whom labels do not easily apply.  Gilbert intrigued 
contemporaries of all persuasions, but satisfied none.  This has not stopped historians from trying to categorize 
Gilbert.  Heilbron, for example, calls him a “moderate peripatetic” and a “plagiarist” prone to “Renaissance 
bombast.”  Henry claims him for the magicians.  Freudenthal, meanwhile, puts him in the modern camp, but is more 
careful to note Gilbert’s awkward position between Aristotelianism and neoplatonism.  Zilsel names him the first 
experimental philosopher, who gained his insights from nascent capitalists more than any scholarly tradition.  Burtt, 
The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science, 162-67; Freudenthal, “Theory of Matter and 
Cosmology in William Gilbert's De magnete.”; J. L. Heilbron, Electricity in the 17th and 18th Centuries (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1979), 169; Henry, “Animism and Empiricism:  Copernican Physics and the Origin 
of William Gilbert's Experimental Method.”; Zilsel, “The Origins of William Gilbert's Scientific Method.” 
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the earth’s axis does not move.  In so doing, however, he appeals to an important and novel 
feature of the representation of celestial space. 
Gilbert has drawn an analogy between the earth and the terrella.  Both have an essential 
magnetic nature, and both exhibit certain natural motions, such as (perhaps) revolution, 
declination, coition, and direction.  Now, as we have seen, direction is the ability of a spherical 
magnet to align other magnets and magnetic materials to its meridians.  Thus, magnetized 
needles will point to the poles, both on the terrella and the earth.  This is not all, however. 
Like the earth, the loadstone has the power of direction and of standing still at 
north and south; it has also a circular motion to the earth’s position, whereby it 
adjusts itself to the earth’s law [quo se ad illius normam componit].58
In addition to directing needles, a terrella will conform itself to the surrounding magnetic field – 
“the earth’s law.”  It will orient itself and remain in the north-south orientation dictated by the 
earth, such that the axes of terrella and earth lie in the same plane.  Thus, a lodestone not only 
has the power to direct needles, but the power to move itself according to an external magnetic 
action.  Gilbert labels this power of the lodestone “verticity.” 
Of course, Gilbert’s argument all along has been that whatever movements are natural for 
a terrella are natural for the earth as well.  Hence, the earth itself has verticity: 
For like as a loadstone… does by its native verticity, according to the magnetic 
laws, conform its poles to the poles of the common mother, -- so, were the earth 
to vary from her natural direction and from her position in the universe, or were 
her poles to be pulled toward the rising or the setting sun, or other points 
whatsoever in the visible firmament (were that possible), they would recur again 
by a magnetic movement to north and south, and halt at the same points where 
now they stand.59
Just as a terrella has the ability to conform itself to the “law of the earth,” the earth has the ability 
to conform itself to a cosmic magnetic field or “law of the whole.”60
But what is this “law of the whole” to which the earth adheres?  A lodestone instantiates 
the geographic representation of space.  Included in this conceptual framework are poles, which 
are instantiated as the foci of the magnetic force of the magnet.  The poles, however, are not 
                                                 
58 Gilbert, On the Magnet, 67.  Gilbert, De Magnete, 42. 
59 Gilbert, On the Magnet, 180. 
60 “…the loadstone possesses the actions peculiar to the globe, of attraction, polarity, revolution, of taking position 
in the universe according to the law of the whole [totius normam]…”  Ibid., 66.  See also Gilbert, De Magnete, 41. 
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symmetric.  They can be distinguished from one another by their activity.  One seeks the Earth’s 
north pole, the other the south pole.  Hence, the poles give the magnet itself an inherent direction 
or orientation – a way in which it is “pointed.”  This “pointing” is indicated along the line 
connecting the two poles – i.e., the axis, from “south” to “north.”  So, when the lodestone 
conforms its poles to the poles of the earth, it is bringing its own orientation into line with the 
“earth’s law”.  It “points” itself along the meridian – north pole towards north pole, south 
towards south.  The earth, like any other lodestone, also has this inherent linear direction 
indicated by its poles and the ability to align this internal direction to an external magnetic virtue.  
The lodestone aligns itself with the earth’s orientation.  The earth aligns itself with the 
orientation of the cosmos.  The “law of the whole” is an extrapolation of the earth’s linear 
direction to the universe itself. 
This extrapolation is interesting, however.  Unlike Aristotle and Copernicus, Gilbert does 
not assume that the universe has a recognizable center.61  Directions in the cosmos are not 
referred to a central point.  Notice that even if the earth were to “vary from her position,” the 
poles “would recur again” and “halt at the same points where now they stand.”  At any arbitrary 
place in the universe, Gilbert is arguing, the orientation of the “law of the whole” is the same, 
towards the same points of the heavens.  Here, the “same points” are not points in the field of the 
fixed stars, but points in the line of the earth’s axis as it extends through the universe.  Hence, the 
return to the “same points in the heavens” means that the orientation which the poles of the earth 
would assume (if it moved) is everywhere parallel.  If the earth were to revolve around the sun, 
for example, the “lines of the axis of the earth [would be] parallel at equinoxes and solstices.”62  
The orientation, therefore, must be rectilinear and self-parallel.  Gilbert is referring the 
orientation to a presupposed line – the line connecting the earth’s rotational poles.  This is the 
null direction to which direction at all other positions is referred.  Direction is not specified in 
relation to a central point.  In short, the “law of the whole” is a rectilinear, self-parallel 
orientation of space itself, instantiated by a magnetic virtue. 
                                                 
61 Gilbert also eschews an assumed center in his account of terrestrial gravity.  He vehemently rejects the 
Aristotelian view that heavy bodies seek a geometric point or place.  Instead, he argues that bodies fall because they 
seek unity with like matter.  (A view similar to that of Copernicus.)  However, Gilbert is inconsistent regarding the 
salient features of matter that result in this desire for unity.  Sometimes, he says that electrical activity, which has to 
do with moisture, brings bodies together.  Elsewhere, he says it is magnetic mutual attraction that draws and keeps 
bodies together.  In any case, centers, as geometric points, do not play any role.  See Gilbert, On the Magnet, 97, 
142; Gilbert, De Mundo, 116. 
62 “Axis telluris lineae in aequinoctiis & solstitiis sunt parallelae…”  Gilbert, De Mundo, 166. 
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The direction of the earth’s axis is described, moreover, on the basis of this orientation.  
Since the earth’s axis is always directed along this orientation, and would remain so even if the 
earth moved, the direction of the earth’s axis, so conceived, does not change.  That is, the axis is 
described as stable and fixed.  It does not move.  Compare this to Copernicus’s description on 
the basis of a radius to the center of his representation of space.  As the earth moves, the 
direction of its axis, described in relation to the radius, changes.  For Copernicus, then, the 
behavior of the axis is described as a motion.  Gilbert’s assumption of a cosmic orientation 
allows him to describe the phenomenon as a staying – a non-motion. 
This yields Gilbert’s explanation of the “third motion.”  The axis of the earth remains 
pointed towards a fixed point in the heavens not because it moves, but because it stays.  It is held 
in place by the earth’s verticity and the magnetic “law of the whole” to which it conforms: 
But why the terrestrial globe should seem constantly to turn one of its poles 
toward those points and toward Cynosura [constellation of the Lesser Bear], or 
why her poles should vary from the poles of the ecliptic by 23 deg. 29 min., with 
some variation not yet sufficiently studied by astronomers, -- that depends on the 
magnetic energy.63
The stability of the earth’s poles, even if the earth moves “from her position in the universe” is 
explained by its conformity to a magnetic “law of the whole.”  The third motion is not a motion 
at all, but a staying: 
This third motion introduced by Copernicus is not a motion at all.  The direction 
of the earth is stable, and if it were to go in a great circle, then it would constantly 
regard one part of the heavens.64
Even were the earth to revolve around the sun, its axis would stay in the same, self-parallel 
direction, specified by reference to the assumed orientation of the cosmos. 
Gilbert’s redescription of the behavior of the earth’s axis greatly simplifies the task of 
explaining it.  To explain Copernicus’s “third motion,” one would have to appeal to an active 
cause – some power that brings about a change; in this case, the changing direction of the earth’s 
axis.  The description of this cause, moreover, would have to account for various features of the 
change.  Thus, the purported cause would have to explain, for example, the speed and sense of 
                                                 
63 Gilbert, On the Magnet, 180. 
64 “Tertius his motus a Copernico inductus, non est motus omnino, sed telluris est directio stabilis, dum in circulo 
mango fertur, dum unam partem coeli constanter respicit.”  Gilbert, De Mundo, 165. 
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the axis’s rotation.  It would have to bring about a yearly rotation from east to west and not, say, 
a monthly rotation from west to east.  On the other hand, Gilbert’s description of the phenomena 
as a “staying” allows him to explain it by appealing to a static cause – a cause that maintains a 
status quo.  Gilbert does not need to say how his static “law of the whole” operates.  He does not 
need, for instance, to say how fast the axis would move under its influence.  In other words, the 
cause required to explain the phenomena is simpler when the phenomena is described as a 
“staying” rather than a motion.  Hence, the redescription of the phenomena simplifies the task of 
explaining it. 
Of course, the “law of the whole” cannot be properly described or understood without 
assuming a rectilinear orientation.  Once the orientation has been presupposed, it becomes 
possible to describe the “law of the whole” as a real magnetic virtue that follows its structure.  
And it is on the basis of this virtue that Gilbert explains the fixity of the earth’s poles.  Gilbert, in 
other words, has endowed the universe with an orientation.  He has added a rectilinear 
orientation to his representation of cosmic space. 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
William Gilbert attempted to respond to part of the explanatory challenge posed by Copernicus’s 
heliocentric description of the solar system.  He tried to account for two of the three motions of 
the earth Copernicus had described but left unexplained.  Gilbert carefully investigated and 
described the phenomena associated with magnets; spherical magnets, or terrella, in particular.  
He then drew a detailed analogy between terrellae and the earth itself.  He showed how the 
phenomena of one could be described in the same way as the phenomena of the other.  On the 
basis of this similarity, Gilbert concluded that the earth is a magnet and suggested that its 
motions are caused by its magnetic nature.  His attempts to show how a magnetic nature could 
cause the rotation of the earth, however, were unsuccessful. 
Gilbert’s argument is mainly descriptive.  The point is to describe the phenomena 
associated with magnets and the earth in the same way so that the two can be identified under the 
rubric of magnetism.  The ultimate cause of magnetism, however, is ascribed to an unelucidated, 
Aristotelian form.  Gilbert’s descriptions, meanwhile, rely on a geographic representation of 
 86 
space quite different from the spherical frameworks presupposed by Aristotle, Ptolemy, and 
Copernicus.  Gilbert’s magnetic spheres are described by referring to poles, not centers.  The 
descriptive similarity at the crux of Gilbert’s work hinges on his “discovery” of this geometric 
structure in magnets and the earth.  That is, the argument relies on the fact that the geographic 
representation of space underwrites descriptions applicable to all spherical magnets, the earth 
included. 
The geographic representation of space is also particularly important for Gilbert’s 
treatment of Copernicus’s “third motion” of the earth.  The representation warrants Gilbert’s 
appeal to the earth’s axis and its “verticity.”  By extrapolating this geometric feature of the earth 
to the universe itself, Gilbert establishes a fixed, rectilinear orientation of space.  On the basis of 
this orientation, he can then describe the behavior of the earth’s axis as a “staying” rather than a 
motion.  He can also appeal to a simple cause – the “law of the whole,” which instantiates the 
orientation – to explain the phenomena.  Rather than confront the explanatory problem posed by 
the “third motion” directly, Gilbert shifted the conceptual basis of description, thereby greatly 
simplifying the explanatory task. 
As we shall see in the next chapter, when Kepler later found himself in a similar 
explanatory bind, he followed the same path out of the quandary.  To make the explanatory task 
tractable, Kepler shifted the conceptual basis of description by adding a rectilinear orientation to 
his representation of space. 
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4.0  KEPLER AND THE DISCOVERY OF COSMIC LINEARITY 
4.1 PROLOGUE:  O MALE FACTUM! 
In the Mysterium Cosmographicum of 1596, the twenty-five-year-old Johannes Kepler rashly 
banished lines from use in “the pattern of the universe.”  The presupposition of lines does not 
allow the specification of privileged locations by which one could construct a spatially ordered 
universe.1  Lines “scarcely admit of order,” Kepler wrote.  Hence, God Himself could have no 
use for them in laying out the structure of this “complete, thoroughly ordered, and most splendid 
universe.”2  Twenty-five years later, Kepler reissued his Mysterium with additional notes and 
revisions.  To the passage repudiating lines, he appended a note remarkable for its exclamatory 
tone: 
[O male factum.]  O, what a mistake!  Are we to reject them [lines] from the 
universe?... For why should we eliminate lines from the archetype of the universe, 
seeing that God represented lines in his own work, that is, the motions of the 
planets?3
In the years between editions of the Mysterium, Kepler had discovered that God had use for 
lines, after all.  They were necessary to lay out the elliptical orbits of the planets.  Thus, lines 
were essential parts of the universe:  they were elements in God’s transcendental archetype of the 
creation. 
What is it that caused Kepler, in 1621, to lament the rashness of his youth?  How did the 
motions of the planets demonstrate God’s need for lines?  The answer lies deep in the details of 
                                                 
1 As Epicurus had argued.  See chapter 1 above. 
2 Johannes Kepler, Mysterium Cosmographicum: The Secret of the Universe, trans. A. M. Duncan (New York: 
Abaris, 1981), 95-97.  Kepler does admit finite straightness as the “distinguishing features” – i.e., the geometrical 
boundaries – of solid bodies.  His argument is that the universe itself is inherently ordered by God and, therefore, 
laid out spherically about a single center. 
3 Ibid., 102-3. 
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Kepler’s discovery of elliptical orbits.  Kepler struggled to find an empirically adequate 
description and physically plausible explanation of Mars’s path through the cosmos.  He found, 
however, that a spherical representation of space was insufficient to describe and explain the 
motion of the planet.  The solution came only when Kepler turned to William Gilbert’s 
magnetism and the rectilinear spatial orientation instantiated by the “law of the whole.”  
Adopting an oriented space, Kepler could finally derive the ellipse – the true path of the planet.  
In so doing, Kepler had shifted, at least partially, to a rectilinear representation of space, 
introducing lines into the universe. 
4.2 INTRODUCTION:  SOURCES AND AIMS 
In what follows, we will attempt to reconstruct Kepler’s discovery of the elliptical orbit of Mars.  
Kepler came to the ellipse sometime in 1605 and published his achievement in the Astronomia 
Nova (1609).4  Our investigation, however, will be based on a lengthy letter written by Kepler to 
David Fabricius, an East Frisian cleric whom Kepler had encountered when both were assistants 
of Tycho Brahe in Prague in 1601.5  This approach is a stone aimed at several birds.  It allows us 
to sidestep a historiographical problem that afflicts all reconstructions of the development of the 
Astronomia Nova.  Kepler himself presents the Astronomia Nova as a narrative history of his 
thinking.  It is clear, however, that the narrative style is a rhetorical device employed to make an 
argument, so its historical veracity is questionable.6  One cannot, therefore, use the Astronomia 
                                                 
4 Johannes Kepler, New Astronomy, trans. William H. Donahue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
5 See appendix.  Fabricius and Kepler never actually met, though each worked for Tycho for a short, but separate, 
period.  Over the years, the pair exchanged numerous correspondences.  In this essay, though, we are only interested 
in Kepler’s 1605 letter, which served as a “scratch-pad” for the ellipse.  James R. Voelkel, The Composition of 
Kepler's Astronomia Nova (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 170. 
6 The Astronomia Nova is constructed as a straightforward narrative of chronologically ordered facts.  In effect, 
Kepler says, “First I did A, then I did B, then I did C, and eventually I found D.”  The expositions is meant to lead 
the reader inexorably through Kepler’s logic so that he or she also arrives at D (much like a cruder form of 
Descartes’ Meditations).  However, a perusal of Kepler’s notes, correspondence, and other materials indicates that 
Kepler's story is a lie.  At best, the narrative in the Astronomia Nova is suggestive of Kepler’s process of discovery, 
but it is clear that it is not completely accurate.  In actuality, Kepler might have first done B, then did A, puttered off 
into dead ends X, Y, and Z, figured out the answer had to be D, then found C, and so on.  The narrative in the 
Astronomia Nova is false.  It does not describe what it purports to describe, namely, Kepler's method of discovery.  
Yet just what was Kepler’s method and how suggestive his narrative is are questions open to and demanding of 
historical investigation. 
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Nova as a historical source without leaving significant questions of interpretation open to 
dispute. This letter, on the other hand, was begun sometime in early 1605 (probably February, 
perhaps March), set aside and resumed several times,7 and finally posted on 11 October 1605.  
As a result, the letter presents a candid, if incomplete, chronology of Kepler’s thinking.  We can 
be fairly certain that the sequence of arguments in the letter was in fact the sequence of Kepler’s 
thoughts. 
During this same period, Kepler was also busy composing his “Commentaries on Mars,” 
which were to become the Astronomia Nova.8  It was sometime in the late summer or early fall 
of 1605, while the letter was still on his desk, that Kepler completed his initial work on the 
ellipse, a process he describes in detail to Fabricius.  Clearly, Kepler subsequently referred to the 
letter while writing the book.  Sections of the letter appear, almost verbatim, in the text, 
especially in chapters 56-60, though the Astronomia Nova reorders the sequence of arguments 
presented in the letter.  Still, the book is useful to fill lacunae in the letter, and vice versa.  Taken 
together, then, the letter, supplemented by the Astronomia Nova as it was eventually published, 
provides an accurate and detailed picture of Kepler’s thoughts, especially regarding the crucial 
discovery of the ellipse. 
By the same token, this chapter aims to provide a fairly detailed exegesis of some of the 
content of a letter historians almost universally acknowledge as significant, but to which they 
rarely devote more than cursory attention.  Still, there is a great deal of the letter we must leave 
aside. 
Finally, and most importantly, the letter to Fabricius sets into high relief the importance 
of William Gilbert’s influence on Kepler’s thought.  This influence appears, of course, in the 
Astronomia Nova, but its significance is shaded amongst the greater breadth of issues addressed 
in the book.  In the letter, Gilbert’s ideas lead directly and almost immediately to the ellipse.  In 
the book, the path from one to the other is more convoluted and less clear. 
                                                 
7 Unfortunately, I did not have access to manuscript copies of this letter, so I am not entirely sure where the letter 
breaks off and resumes.  On the other hand, Kepler usually indicates a hiatus in the text:  “I return to [Mars] after 
some weeks…,” for example.  Kepler’s manuscript is in the Archive of the Russian Academy of Sciences, St. 
Petersburg, designated Pulkovo X. 
8 Kepler had completed a great deal of the Astronomia Nova before 1605.  Comparing the contents of the letter to 
the finished book shows that he had probably already written most of chapters 1-55.  Moreover, by March 1605, 
Kepler had sent a manuscript of the work to the Emperor and a description of its contents to Michael Maestlin. 
Kepler, Astronomia Nova. 
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4.3 BACKGROUND:  RELIGIOUS EPISTEMOLOGY 
To begin tracing the development of Kepler’s conception of space, we must first comment on his 
metaphysical motivations and underlying assumptions, as these have important effects 
throughout his work.  It is important to remark that Kepler was heavily influenced by religious 
considerations.  A Protestant neoplatonism infused every aspect of his inquiries.  In particular, he 
adopted the neoplatonic account of creation in which the created universe is an emanation of 
God’s primordial intellect.  This emanation proceeds according to the transcendental archetype 
or “Idea” of the universe, contained in the divine mind, and coeternal with it.  The primordial 
Idea is thus the plan or form of the cosmos.  When substantiated by God’s overabundant, 
emanating being, this form generates the physical world.9
While Kepler’s neoplatonism may have precluded him from taking Lutheran orders, his 
native Protestantism was no less important in shaping his beliefs.10  For Protestantism stressed 
that all men were created in God’s image.  Thus, all men possessed an image of God’s mind and 
the primordial Idea therein.  Therefore, by studying God’s words, in scripture, and works, in 
nature, man could come to some understanding of God’s own divine intellect, including the 
transcendental form of the world.  This understanding was open to all.  It did not require the 
intercession of divine inspiration.  All could share in some knowledge of God’s ways, which 
were accessible to all mankind.11
Of course, according to Christian teaching in general, human understanding was always 
flawed.  It could never match the perfection of the divine mind.  Yet, on Kepler’s view, one 
could approximate divine understanding and, by diligent effort, continually improve one’s 
approximation.  Thus, human knowledge could asymptotically approach God’s, just as straight 
lines could asymptotically approximate curves. 
                                                 
9 It is this “pattern” or “archetype,” by the way, from which Kepler banishes infinite lines in the first edition of the 
Mysterium.  See Barker and Goldstein, “Theological Foundations of Kepler's Astronomy.”; Herbert Butterfield, The 
Origins of Modern Science (London: G. Bell, 1957), 75-79; Max Caspar, Kepler, trans. C. Doris Hellman (London: 
Abelard-Schuman, 1959), 376ff; Johannes Kepler, The Harmony of the World, trans. E. J. Aiton, A. M. Duncan, and 
J. V. Field (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1997), xiii-xiv; Kepler, Mysterium, 23ff. and ch. II.   
10 See Barker and Goldstein, “Theological Foundations of Kepler's Astronomy.”; Caspar, Kepler, 51-52. 
11 See Barker and Goldstein, “Theological Foundations of Kepler's Astronomy,” 99; Caspar, Kepler, 375ff; Kepler, 
Mysterium, 55f; Voelkel, The Composition of Kepler's Astronomia Nova, 32, 60. 
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For in this one respect Nicholas of Cusa and others seem to me divine, that they 
attached so much importance to the relationship between a straight and a curved 
line and dared to liken a curve to God, a straight line to his creatures; and those 
who tried to compare the Creator to his creatures, God to Man, and divine 
judgments to human judgments did not perform much more valuable a service 
than those who tried to compare a curve with a straight line, a circle with a 
square.12
The approximation between God’s knowledge and Man’s can always be closer, but never 
perfect.13
Altogether, these religious and philosophical beliefs entail constraints on the nature of 
God’s knowledge and the universal archetype.  Most importantly, the universal Idea must at least 
resemble something comprehensible by a human intellect, since, in the fullness of time, 
humankind’s understanding can come arbitrarily close to the divine.  Thus, God’s design is not 
shrouded in impenetrable mystery, but something nearly comprehensible.  In effect, this means 
that the principles by which the universe operates are at least amenable to rational investigation.  
Conversely, the universe cannot operate on principles that are impossible to understand.  For 
example, the ratio between two related physical quantities cannot be arbitrary, according to 
Kepler.  It must be “knowable,” where “knowability” is determined by the powers of human 
reasoning.14
  This epistemic constraint had far reaching implications for Kepler’s investigation of 
nature.  For one thing, Kepler rejected the operational “Wittenberg interpretation”15 of 
Copernicus that prevailed amongst his peers.  On this view, astronomy was only meant to 
“produce calculations that agree with observations,”16 that is, accurate predictions of planetary 
motions.  Astronomical models, therefore, were merely “hypotheses” – mathematical conceits 
that facilitated calculation.  The causes of the motions were beyond the scope of science, because 
the omnipotent God could arrange the heavens in innumerable ways to produce the observed 
                                                 
12 Kepler, Mysterium, 93. 
13 For discussion of Cusa’s influence on Kepler, see E. J. Aiton, “Infinitesimals and the Area Law,” in 
Internationales Kepler-Symposium, Weil der Stadt 1971, ed. Fritz Krafft, Karl Meyer, and Bernhard Sticker 
(Hildesheim: Gerstenberg, 1973); Kepler, Mysterium, 24. 
14 In the Harmonice Mundi, for example, Kepler argues that irrational proportions are unknowable, even by God. 
Kepler, Harmonice Mundi, 139. 
15 Westman, “The Melanchthon Circle, Rheticus, and the Wittenberg Interpretation of the Copernican Theory.” 
16 Osiander’s anonymous preface to the De Revolutionibus.  Copernicus, De Rev, 22.  Osiander’s preface is the locus 
classicus of the “Wittenberg” interpretation.  Significantly, it was Kepler who famously revealed its authorship in 
the Astronomia Nova. 
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phenomena.  Simply put, the astronomer could not know how the universe was really arranged.  
Astronomy was merely a descriptive science.  Thus, Copernicus’s heliocentrism was merely a 
useful calculating tool, whose physical reality was beyond human knowledge. 
Kepler, on the other hand, rejected a priori limits on the human understanding of nature.  
He thought that understanding the physical causes of planetary motions was within the realm of 
possible human knowledge.  The physical reality of hypotheses, therefore, was within the 
purview of astronomy.  As a result, Kepler set out to construct an astronomy that could both 
describe the heavens and explain them.  He called the eventual fruition of this project the New 
Astronomy Based Upon Causes or Celestial Physics – the Astronomia Nova.  Kepler’s 
astronomy was, if not entirely novel, then at least exceptional precisely because it considered the 
physical causes of celestial phenomena.17
Given this attitude, Kepler had two general desiderata for astronomical hypotheses.  First, 
they had to accurately describe phenomena.  That is, he desired a way to calculate planetary 
positions that agreed with what was actually observed in the sky, in the future, present, or past.  
This just meant deriving a longitude and latitude of a planet for a given time.  Of course, none of 
Kepler’s contemporaries (or even predecessors) would have disputed that this was a central goal 
of astronomy.  However, Kepler was also interested in the physical reality of his hypotheses.  
Now, these models also predicted planetary distances, which could also be checked against 
observations, at least indirectly.  A planetary model could not be considered an accurate 
description of phenomena if it did not predict or retrodict proper distances.  Thus, Kepler 
requires that a hypothesis agree with observations in three respects:  longitude, latitude, and 
distance.  In the present chapter, we will be concerned primarily with the longitudes (which 
Kepler calls “eccentric equations”) and distances. 
Second, Kepler required that astronomical hypotheses have plausible physical 
explanations.  This desideratum must be situated in the context of Kepler’s philosophical and 
religious commitments.  Since God’s creation is, in principle, comprehensible, so must the 
causes of planetary motions.  This is not to say, however, that Kepler requires absolute proof that 
a cause he proposes is the cause of the observed behavior.  God could always do things 
differently.  Still, God’s action is amenable to human grasp, so the cause must be something 
                                                 
17 See Jardine, The Birth of History and Philosophy of Science: Kepler's A Defence of Tycho Against Ursus, esp. chs. 
6-7. 
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accessible to reason.  Hypotheses that do not admit reasonable explanations cannot be realized.  
So, when Kepler suggests a physical explanation, he seeks to demonstrate only that the 
hypothesis is compatible with human reason, and thus within the realm of possible truth.  Kepler 
only requires that a hypothesis is physically plausible – it can be explained in a humanly 
comprehensible manner.18  In general, Kepler’s discussion of physical causes is in the 
hypothetical voice.  He leaves aside the question of whether the proposed explanation really 
accounts for the phenomena.19
Still, Kepler sometimes blurs this fine distinction.  A case in point is Kepler’s talk of 
“planetary minds.”20  Often it seems that Kepler is really attributing spiritual minds to the 
planets.  He then implies that the minds are responsible for moving the planets about.  One might 
think, then, that the minds are to be taken as the causes of planetary motions.  This is not 
Kepler’s real meaning.  Instead, Kepler uses minds as stand-ins for physical mechanisms he does 
not understand.  This is coherent if we remember that Kepler is only trying to test the plausibility 
of his hypotheses.  Could an ellipse, Kepler asks, for example, be comprehensibly constructed 
(other than by mere stipulation)?  The easiest way to answer this is to assume that the planet 
itself is rational.  Then, if the planetary mind has a method to “measure” its position and 
“deduce” its proper movement, then the resulting path can be rationally constructed.  If this is the 
case, then the ellipse is a possible path for the planet.  The unknown real cause of the motion 
will a fortiori be rationally comprehensible, as well.21
This attitude also accounts for Kepler’s ubiquitous appeals to magnetism.  In a word, 
actions at a distance are, for the seventeenth century theorist, weird.  The obvious relationship 
between the several heavenly bodies, including the earth, is very difficult to explain given the 
immense distances separating them.  In Kepler’s view, however, magnetism is an action at a 
                                                 
18 We say rather “plausible,” rather than “possible” to emphasize the epistemic constraint on hypotheses.  All 
hypotheses are “possible,” but only those that admit reasonable explanation are “plausible.”  Note that Kepler’s 
criteria for admissible hypothesis is not so different from Copernicus’s reason for rejecting the Ptolemaic system.  
Copernicus argued that Ptolemy’s use of an equant did not admit of explanation on the basis of accepted physical 
principles, and was therefore implausible. 
19 Kepler writes that all physical sciences include “a certain amount of conjecture.”  Kepler, Astronomia Nova, 47. 
20 E.g., in Johannes Kepler, Epitome of Copernican Astronomy & Harmonies of the World, trans. Charles Glenn 
Wallis (Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1995), 52ff; Kepler, Astronomia Nova, ch. 57. 
21 Bruce Stephenson, Kepler's Physical Astronomy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 3.  Kepler’s 
method here is akin to Descartes’ subsequent method of radical doubt in his Meditations on First Philosophy.  Just 
as Kepler assumes planetary minds as a limiting case of knowability, Descartes assumes a deceiving Demon as a 
limiting case of unknowability.  See René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. John Cottingham 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 12-15. 
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distance that lies within the grasp of human understanding.  This is merely a stipulation.  Kepler 
does not speculate on the mechanism underlying magnetic action.22  Yet, if Kepler is able to 
make the planets seem like they are responding to some cause similar to magnetism, Kepler can 
then claim that they have a plausible physical cause.  As a result, Kepler slathers magnetism on 
the heavens with a thick brush, using it when he requires some sort of action at a distance.  Seen 
in this light, Kepler’s claims about magnetic forces are similar to his claims about planetary 
minds.  In both cases, he is using his proposed cause to set a limit on the unknown true cause.  
Since the former is within the realm of reason, so must be the latter.  Kepler, despite his apparent 
sincerity, should not be taken as claiming that magnetism and minds are real causes.  The upshot 
of his physical explanations is only that the effects he explains are, because they are explicable, 
possibly real.  We will return to these points at the end of our discussion.23
4.4 SETTING UP 
For the sake of getting to the point, we will pass over Kepler’s rejection of earlier planetary 
hypotheses and the correction of the earth’s orbit (i.e., the material presented in chapters 1-39 of 
the Astronomia Nova).  These topics have been addressed elsewhere,24 and there is no need to 
rehearse them here.  By the time Kepler begins his letter to Fabricius, he already knows the orbit 
of Mars is not circular, but somehow “narrower” than a circle.  He also knows how to correct 
observations in order to calculate accurate planetary distances.  The problem at hand, then, is the 
construction of this “narrower” orbit so that it properly accounts for observations, including 
distances, and can be plausibly explained by physical causes. 
                                                 
22 Magnetism is a mundane phenomenon.  Kepler assumes that it is ipso facto humanly comprehensible.  See 
Rhonda Martens, Kepler's Philosophy and the New Astronomy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 81-4. 
23 Consider, for example, Kepler’s descriptions of the “anima motrix” in the Mysterium Cosmographicum and 
Astronomia Nova.  Kepler describes this force broadly, as “magnetic.”  The claim is not that it really is the same 
force as that between terrestrial magnets, and Kepler never compares the sun’s force with terrestrial magnetism.  
Indeed, the prehensive force acts in ways no magnet would.  It suffices for Kepler that it is like magnetism, or 
“magnetical,” and therefore reasonable.  See also Kepler’s casual willingness to exchange planetary minds for 
magnetic action in the Astronomia Nova. Barker and Goldstein, “Theological Foundations of Kepler's Astronomy,” 
109; Kepler, Mysterium, ch. 22; Kepler, Astronomia Nova, chs. 34, 57. 
24 Stephenson, Kepler's Physical Astronomy; Voelkel, The Composition of Kepler's Astronomia Nova; Curtis 
Wilson, “Kepler's Derivation of the Elliptical Path,” Isis 59, no. 1 (1968). 
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It must be noted that, by early 1605, part of the physical story had already been told.  As 
early as the Mysterium Cosmographicum (1595), Kepler proposed an anima motrix emanating 
from the sun which caused the revolutions of the planets.  This “extrinsic force” is something 
similar to both light and magnetism (Kepler’s description changes over time), and decreases in 
some relation to distance.  Kepler generally assumes that force is proportional to speed.  Thus, 
Kepler could explain why planets further from the sun have longer periods, as well as why a 
planet orbits faster near perihelion than at aphelion.   By 1605, Kepler had settled on a magnetic 
action emanating from the sun such that there was a direct proportion between distance from the 
sun and “delay” in an arc of the orbit.  That is, the time a planet took to traverse equal (small) 
arcs of the orbit was proportional to the distance the (small) arc was from the sun.  This “distance 
law” is presented in chapter 32 of the Astronomia Nova.25
A planet’s general revolution around the sun could be explained by this “magnetic” force.  
However, planets do not move at constant speed around the sun.  Instead, they speed up and slow 
down as they approach and recede from the sun.  Kepler attributed this change in speed to a 
second power, a vis insita inherent in the planet itself, which somehow regulates a planet’s 
distance from the sun.26  If the planet can move itself to the correct distance, the sun’s own 
“magnetic” power will account for the speed of the revolution.  Thus, as Kepler begins his letter 
to Fabricius, he is concerned with the nature of this planetary vis insita.  He needs to figure out 
how the planet gets itself to the right distance in order to be carried along at the proper speed.  
First, however, Kepler needs to figure out what the right distances are.  In other words, Kepler 
seeks both an accurate description of the orbit and the nature of the intrinsic force that explains 
it. 
As we shall see in what follows, Kepler works both ends towards the middle.  Though 
quite confusing at times, this method is a particularly clear demonstration of the iterative process 
of reciprocation between description and explanation.  When faced with failures of a 
hypothesis’s descriptive accuracy, Kepler considers its physical causes.  When faced with 
physical problems, he considers descriptions.  Thus, Kepler’s thought plays out as a continual 
solving and posing of objections and obstacles, such that the essential problem he tries to solve 
                                                 
25 Kepler, Mysterium, 62-65; Kepler, Astronomia Nova, 372-75.  By 1605, Kepler only possessed a preliminary 
version of the Area Law for which he is famous.  It was not worked out in full generality until the Epitome.  See 
Aiton, “Infinitesimals and the Area Law.”; Stephenson, Kepler's Physical Astronomy, 161ff. 
26 Kepler, Astronomia Nova, 404ff. 
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gets pushed around like a bump in a rug.  One difficulty is reduced to another and then converted 
to a third.  Our exposition will follow the general problematic shifts in the letter to Fabricius, 
culminating in the ultimate derivation of the ellipse. 
4.5 THE PROBLEM OF SHAPE:  THE ELLIPSE 
At the beginning of the letter, Kepler is working on descriptions.  He is trying to construct a 
geometric model that will generate accurate predictions of planetary positions.  In this context, 
Kepler reconsiders two planetary hypotheses he had constructed previously, in 1602 and 1603.  
Both are based on a concentric deferent-epicycle system with an equant, as in Figure 5.  Thus, 
the planet (F) moves on an epicycle (RSF) around a point (D) that moves around a deferent 
(EDG) with speed uniform at an equant point (C).  The sun (A), meanwhile, is the center of the 
deferent, on a line connecting the apsides (E and G) and the equant (C).  In this system, Kepler 
assumes that the epicycle rotates uniformly, completing one revolution in a Martian year.  Thus, 
when the epicycle is centered at D, the planet will have rotated through an angle equal to ECD, 
the mean anomaly of the planet’s motion.  The two hypotheses differ as to where in the epicycle 
this angle is measured from.  In other words, Kepler asks, where would the planet be if the 
epicycle did not rotate?  In Kepler’s terminology, what is the “true apsis” of the epicycle? 
If the angle is measured from the line connecting the center of the epicycle, D, and the 
equant point, C, the path of the planet will be a circle, centered on the equant point, with a radius 
equal to the deferent’s, AE. 
And thus, if the line CDR equals the true apogee27 of the epicycle, then the path 
of the planet follows a perfect circle.  For DF is led parallel to AC, RDO equals 
ADC, and ODF equals DAE, and RDF equals DCE, the mean anomaly, because 
the period [return] of the epicycle and concentric are equal…  Now, joining F and 
                                                 
27 Kepler consistently labels the apsides of the Martian orbit “apogee” and “perigee.”  This is a confusing mistake, 
held over from Ptolemaic astronomy, when the Earth was considered the center of the orbit.  He should call them 
“aphelion” and “perihelion,” since they designate maximal and minimal distances to the sun, not the earth. 
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A makes a line so long, that if from C a perfect eccentric is described with radius 
AE, it will indeed cross at F.28
In this hypothesis, the angle RDF will always equal angle DCE, and line DF will always be 
parallel to the line of apsides, AC.  The result is simply to shift the deferent along the line of 
apsides a distance equal to DF, which is assumed to be equal to AC.  Thus, the path will be a 
circle, equal in size to the deferent, with radius AE, but centered on the equant point, as in Figure 
6. 
Alternatively, if the true apsis of the epicycle is the line connecting the center of the 
epicycle, D, with the sun, A, the radius of the epicycle containing the planet, DF, will “incline” 
toward the apsidal line EG. 
On the contrary, C remains the equant point of D, line ADO follows the line of 
true apsides of the epicycle, and O is the true apsis of the epicycle; as it is DCE, 
the mean anomaly, is constituted equally by ODF, and DF is inclined to AC, 
which is equally if the said epicycle moves equally in equal time around its 
center.  Now this is the very close hypothesis, which I use in 1603…  And which 
had a tolerable natural cause.29
Angle ODF is equal to DCE, so the line DF will be more “inclined” to AC than if DF were 
parallel to AC.  Thus, the path generated by this model will fall inside the path generated by the 
previous model.  In other words, the path of the planet will be “narrower” than a circle.  Indeed, 
Kepler has already discovered that this path forms an ellipse, as in Figure 7. 
Both these models, however, fail to describe the phenomena.  Specifically, they 
inaccurately predict and retrodict planetary distances.  Their failure is intriguing, however, 
because the 1602 circular orbit is too wide by exactly the same proportion that the 1603 ellipse is 
too narrow – 429 parts of 100,000.  Thus, the true path of Mars must fall exactly between the 
circumscribing circle and the inscribed ellipse (see Figure 8): 
Seeing the distances constructed from a perfectly circular eccentric sin in excess... 
just as much as my ellipse (which varies very little from the oval), which I 
described numerically to you above, sins in the defect:  very rightly I have argued 
this [following] way.  The circle and ellipse are from the same genre of figures, 
and fail equally in different ways, therefore the truth is in the middle, and the 
                                                 
28 Johannes Kepler, Johannes Kepler Gesammelte Werke, ed. Walther von Dyck and Max Caspar, vol. XV 
(München: C.H. Beck, 1937), 248. 
29 Ibid. 
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figures between ellipses are nothing but ellipses.  And thus, the path of mars is 
definitely an ellipse, the leftover little moon shape [lunula] of half the width of 
the previous ellipse.30
The true width of the orbit (its radius at around 90° anomaly), derived from observations, is 
precisely halfway between the circle and the ellipse:  the former “sins in excess” exactly as much 
as the latter “sins in defect.”  Still, geometrically speaking, the only figure that falls exactly 
between a circle and an ellipse is another ellipse.  Therefore, Kepler concludes, the true path of 
Mars must be elliptical. 
The moment Kepler wrote this, sometime in the spring of 1605, is, in one sense, the 
“discovery of the ellipse.”31  While it is true that Kepler became convinced that the planet of the 
true orbit could be described as an ellipse,32 this was not the definitive statement it might seem.  
Significant problems remained.  Most importantly, at this point, Kepler did not know how to 
construct the proper ellipse.  He had no geometric model that would generate the correct path.  
Nor did Kepler have any plausible physical explanation for an elliptical path besides the faulty 
one he had already derived and dismissed.  Kepler may have known an ellipse was his ultimate 
goal, but he had no idea how to get there. 
4.6 THE PROBLEM OF DISTANCE:  THE SECANT MODEL 
As Kepler writes to Fabricius, one possible construction of the ellipse is suggested by the failed 
epicyclic models.  There is a third, as yet unexplored, possibility for the “true apsis” of the 
epicycle, namely, the line connecting the epicyclic center, D, with some point on the apsidal line 
between the sun and the equant: 
But, deducing from the first excess [of the eccentric] and the second defect [of the 
ellipse], CA is to be halved or bisected in B, and BDS is to be the true apsis of the 
epicycle, and thus C hitherto the equant center of D.  But now, SDF is equal to 
                                                 
30 Ibid., 247-8. 
31 See Caspar, Kepler, 134; Voelkel, The Composition of Kepler's Astronomia Nova, 189-90. 
32 Kepler had at least considered the possibility of elliptical orbits earlier.  As early as July 1603, he wrote to 
Fabricius, “if only the shape [of the orbit] were a perfect ellipse all the answers could be found in Archimedes’ and 
Appollonius’ work.”  But Kepler did not actually accept that the orbit was an ellipse at this point.  Kepler, Werke 
XV, 409f; Koestler, The Sleepwalkers, 330. 
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DCE, the mean anomaly, and DF is less inclined to AC than before.  And with 
this hypothesis, the distance of F from A is now closer to the truth than before, 
and FAE is closer to the true coequated [anomaly].  Indeed, I say “closer,” but not 
“true,” so as to allow the construction of the computation of the physical 
equation.33
If the eccentricity of the equant is “bisected” – that is, by a point B (in Figure 9) precisely 
halfway between the sun, A, and the equant, C – then the radius of the epicycle including the 
planet, DF, will be roughly half as inclined to the line of apsides as in the prior ellipse.  This, it 
seems to Kepler, could generate an orbit half as “narrowed” as before, as the true orbit must be.  
The model, Kepler thought, might describe the phenomena more accurately than before. 
Considering causes, however, Kepler was not particularly pleased with this model.  He did not 
see how it could be physically explicable: 
Still, this hypothesis (as I may go on in the laying out of my ratiocinations) did 
not satisfy me, since the point B lacked a natural cause.  For point C will have a 
natural cause, which is to say AC and DF are made equal, which amounts to, if I 
may say, the distances being [proportional to] the delays in equal arcs of the 
eccentric.  On the other hand, another thing attracted me to the natural cause:  this, 
of course, which I have seen helping the secant of the greatest equation of the 
epicycle.34
The eccentric circle around the equant (point C) has a reasonable physical cause since it results 
in the planet-sun distances being proportional to the time taken to traverse each arc of the 
eccentric, which conforms to the area law governing the magnetic force moving the planets.  
Similarly, the 1603 ellipse has a “tolerable natural cause” in that the rotation of the epicycle was 
measured from the line to the sun, a real, physical body.  In the present model, however, the 
planet would have to move itself with respect to point B, which is an empty point in space with 
no physical significance.  There does not seem to be any physically plausible way a planet could 
relate its motion to an empty point.  The hypothesis might be “closer,” but without a plausible 
explanation it could not be “true.”35
Despite his dissatisfaction with the physical causes of his model, Kepler began 
calculating the distances it predicted at various points in the orbit.  He did not get far.  The model 
would, of course, be accurate at aphelion and perihelion, where it predicted the same distances as 
                                                 
33 Kepler, Werke XV, 249. 
34 Ibid. 
35 See Kepler, Astronomia Nova, 127, 410. 
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the two previous models, but what would it predict around quadrature?  The result of this 
calculation, probably Kepler’s first (it is the only one he reports), brought him up short: 
On the other hand, another thing attracted me to the natural cause:  this, of course, 
which I have seen helping the secant of the greatest equation of the epicycle. 
AF [see Figure 10], that is, (at angle 5 degrees 18 minutes) would be 100429.  
And thus, FA is longer than DA, by 429 small parts.36
Around quadrature, the epicycle would reach its “greatest equation” – the point at which the 
planet is maximally elongated from the radius of the deferent, and thus where the angular 
correction of the planetary longitude derived from the epicycle is greatest.  This position is easily 
calculated since it entails the radius of the epicycle including the planet, DF, is perpendicular to 
the radius of the deferent including the center of the epicycle, DA.  If we assume, as Kepler did, 
the radius of the deferent is 100,000 units, and that of the epicycle is 9264,37 the angle of 
elongation at “greatest equation” will be 5° 18’ 30”, and the distance from the planet to the sun 
will be 100,429, the secant of the angle (normalized to the radius).38
This result, 100,429, struck Kepler because 429 parts was exactly what he needed for the 
“true hypothesis.”  The eccentric had to be “narrowed,” and the ellipse “widened,” by precisely 
this amount.  Thus, if the secant of the angle were substituted for the radius of the deferent, the 
“right distances” would be produced in the “middle longitudes” – i.e., near quadrature, when the 
planet had completed about a quarter of its orbit.39
Instead of completing his calculations for the epicyclic model, whose physical causes he 
doubted, Kepler took this fortuitous calculation to suggest an entirely new model of the Martian 
orbit. 
And because the distance FA follows from the re-utilization of the perfect 
eccentric, and 429, found above, is exactly the shortening of distances for the true 
                                                 
36 Kepler, Werke XV, 249. 
37 This is equal to half the eccentricity, which is determined (from observations) by the apsidal distances. 
38 Kepler did not happen on this calculation “quite by chance,” as he reports in the Astronomia Nova.  He was 
checking the predictions of a possible hypothesis. Kepler, Astronomia Nova, 543. 
39 The meaning of “middle longitude” is vague, since a “quarter” of the orbit can be measured several different ways 
– e.g., by mean anomaly, coequated anomaly, eccentric anomaly, etc. – all of which are similar but not equivalent.  
Here, Kepler is working with the “width” of the orbit – the point of maximum elongation from the apsidal line.  This 
will be equivalent to the distance at 90° eccentric anomaly, but he has not established this yet. 
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hypothesis.  Therefore, if we substitute FA for DA, we have the right distances in 
the middle longitudes.40
He resurrects an eccentric orbit,41 now centered on B, the point halfway between sun and equant, 
and substitutes the secant of the optical equation (the angle formed at the planet by the rays 
connecting it to the eccentric center and to the sun) for the radius.  This substitution gives the 
“right distances in the middle longitudes” as well as at apsides, where the optical equation is null. 
In effect, however, this substitution treats the planet as if it were always along the line 
connecting the sun to the center of the epicycle, rather than somewhere on the epicycle’s 
circumference.42  For example, when the planet is 100,429 units from the sun, it will be at 
“middle longitudes” only if it is at the center of the epicycle, not on its circumference.  As a 
result, Kepler is rejecting the epicyclic model in favor of a “libration:” 
At once, I seized on this for the natural hypothesis:  the planet does not rotate in 
the circumference of the epicycle GFI, but librates in the diameter HDK.  And 
now I constructed the distances and the whole table of equations from this.43
If the planet were to “librate” – reciprocate sinusoidally – along the diameter of the epicycle, it 
would be constrained to the line connecting the center of the epicycle with the sun, as required 
by the substitution of the secant.  Optimistic about this possibility, Kepler leaves off his letter 
intending to test the positions predicted by his new theory against observations. 
Some time later, however, Kepler returns to the letter despondent: 
But yet, I am a wretch. [At miser.]  This Easter holiday at last I tested the thing, 
which I had been considering.  I was able to remember now the earlier 
demonstration in my commentaries, that this kind of path of the planet does not 
compose an ellipse, which my above argument stated, but in the octants expands 
in cheeks from the ellipse towards the perfect circle.44
Kepler has compared his theory to observed positions.  The libration model, so promising at 
middle longitudes, simply fails to work in the rest of the orbit.  Yet, besides a diagram and the 
somewhat cryptic remark that “an earlier demonstration” had shown that the path was not an 
                                                 
40 Kepler, Werke XV, 249. 
41 Kepler had previously considered and rejected an eccentric orbit. 
42 Because AF is a line from the sun to the circumference, while AD is to the center.  Substituting one for the other 
places the planet F on the line AD. 
43 Kepler, Werke XV, 249. 
44 Ibid. 
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ellipse, but a “puff-cheeked” orbit, Kepler does not elaborate the reasons for this failure.  To 
follow the train of his thoughts during the letter’s hiatus, we must turn to the other text Kepler 
was composing at the time, the Astronomia Nova. 
We find the libration model presented in chapter 56.  Here, Kepler first points out that the 
secant hypothesis is equivalent to one he has already calculated, albeit in a different context, in 
chapters 39-40.  There, Kepler had used the secant of the optical equation to estimate the area 
swept out by the planet on a circular orbit.45  Now, he uses the secant as measure of the true 
distance.  Kepler reintroduces the diagrams (see Figure 11) from the earlier chapters, and 
summarizes the new model: 
…quite by chance I hit upon the secant of the angle 5° 18’, which is the measure 
of the greatest optical equation.  And when I saw this was 100,429, it was as if I 
were awakened from sleep to see a new light, and I began to reason thus.  At the 
middle longitudes the lunule or shortening of the distances is greatest, and has the 
same magnitude as the excess of the secant of the greatest optical equation 
100,429 over the radius 100,000.  Therefore, if the radius is substituted for the 
secant at the middle longitude, this accomplishes what the observations suggest.  
And, in the diagram in chapter 40, I have concluded generally if you use HR 
instead of HA, VR instead of VA, and substitute EB for EA, and so on for all of 
them, the effect on all the eccentric positions will be the same as what was done 
here at the middle longitudes…  And so the reader should peruse chapter 39 
again.  He will find that what the observations testify here was already urged 
there, from natural causes, namely that it appears reasonable that the planet 
perform some sort of reciprocation, as if moving on the diameter of the epicycle 
that is always directed toward the sun.46
Starting with an eccentric around B, the point halfway between the sun and equant, substitute the 
length of the secant of the optical equation (e.g., HR at angle AHR) for the radius to the sun 
(e.g., HA).  Consequently, the planet will be found at some point X along HA, such that the 
distance XA is equal to HR.  Just as the correct distance is given at middle longitudes, the correct 
distances will be given at “all the eccentric positions.”  As Kepler notes, this model suggests that 
the planet is “librating” along the radius from the planet to the sun.  That is, in Figure 11, the 
planet moves along the moving radius HA, EA, VA, etc., such that at equated anomaly CAH, the 
planet has “descended” from the circumscribing eccentric CED along AH to point X.  The 
                                                 
45 The secant is the height of the “Archimedean triangles” he employs to measure the area.  See Kepler, Astronomia 
Nova, 422-3. 
46 Ibid., 544. 
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planet’s approach toward the sun is maximal at equated anomaly EAB, after which the planet 
recedes, coinciding with the eccentric once more at perihelion, D. 
Kepler’s reference to the epicycle in the above passage elides the fact that this eccentric, 
secant model can also be reproduced by an equivalent epicyclic model.  Assume a deferent of a 
radius equal to that of the eccentric, centered on the sun, and an epicycle of radius equal to the 
eccentricity, as in Figure 12.  The secant model is exactly reproduced if the epicycle is assumed 
to rotate through an angle equal to the eccentric anomaly, measured from the radius to the sun 
(angle ODF), and the planet’s position is given by a projection onto the same radius (i.e., X), 
instead of a point on the circumference of the epicycle.  Thus, in this model, the planet also 
appears “to perform some sort of reciprocation, as if moving on the diameter of the epicycle that 
is always directed toward the sun.”  That is, the planet seems to librate along the diameter ODP, 
which is always along OA, the line to the sun.47
At the end of chapter 56, Kepler tests his secant/versed sine model against observations at 
known equated anomalies.  He finds that the calculated distances agree with those derived from 
observations. 
For I previously used this same method of reciprocation to find out the distances 
of Mars from the sun which I presented in order to compute Mars’s apparent 
positions [in chapters 39-40].  And since they are in agreement with the 
observations, they are therefore correct. 
                                                 
47 The planetary distances predicted by these two models are equivalent.  In the epicyclic model ( ), the 
distance is given as the sum of the deferent radius, AD, and the epicycle radius, DO, minus the descent, OX.  That 
is: 
Figure 12
Distance = AD + DO – OX 
Now, AD is by assumption R, the radius of deferent and eccentric (assumed to be 100,000).  DO is e, the 
eccentricity of the planetary orbit.  By construction, OX is the versed sine of the eccentric anomaly ε.  Thus: 
Distance = R + e – e versine ε 
Versed sine is the same as 1 – cosine.  Substituting, we have 
Distance = R + e – e (1 – cos ε) 
Simplifying yields 
Distance = R + e cos ε 
Now, in the eccentric-secant model ( ), notice that the distance is the sum of the eccentric radius, R, and the 
small addition BR (for eccentric anomaly ε).  Consider the small right triangle ABR.  BR is equal to the cosine of 
angle ABR, which is equal to the eccentric anomaly, ε.  Hence, 
Figure 11
Distance = R + e cos ε 
as in the epicyclic model.  Kepler himself prefers the epicylcic formula for distance, R + e – e versine ε.  His 
geometry does not include complementary functions, including cosines.  Thus, the versed sine of the eccentric 
anomaly is a more direct calculation than the secant of the optical equation, which must be first derived from the 
eccentric anomaly. 
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As you see, therefore, the distances measured on the diameter, found a priori in 
ch. 39, are confirmed by closely spaced and very reliable observations throughout 
the entire perimeter of the eccentric.48
Kepler had calculated the distances from the secants in chapter 39.  Now he finds they are, 
indeed, accurate.  This confirms that his calculation of distances using the secant or versed sine 
gives the true path of Mars.  In other words, Kepler has now satisfied one part of his descriptive 
project.  He knows how to derive satisfactory distances for a given anomaly.  He has solved the 
problem of describing distance. 
Several problems remain, however.  Kepler’s task is to give the actual place of the planet 
– its equated anomaly (longitude) and its distance – for a given time, expressed as a mean 
anomaly.  So far, Kepler has computed a distance from a given equated anomaly, but he has not 
computed an unknown anomaly from a given time.  He still needs to overcome this obstacle to 
derive the path of the planet. 
4.7 THE PROBLEM OF LONGITUDE:  THE ELLIPSE 
Chapter 58 of the Astronomia Nova describes Kepler’s first, ultimately faulty attempt to deduce 
longitude from time: 
Therefore, by what has previously been demonstrated in ch. 56, AE [in Figure 13] 
will indubitably be the correct distance at this eccentric anomaly.  The question 
remains how much time was taken to arrive at it.  Now the versed sine of its arc, 
GC, which, after multiplication, becomes LE, when subtracted from GA, yielded 
the correct distance AE.  These indications persuaded me that the other end of AE 
should be sought… at the point I of the line DB, such that if I were to draw the arc 
EIF about center A with radius AE, it would intersect DB at I.  Thus, according to 
this persuasion, AI would be the correct distance, both in position and length, and 
IAG would be the true equated anomaly.49
The comparison with observations completed in chapter 56 has convinced Kepler that the versed 
sine of the eccentric anomaly yields the correct distance.  It seems natural to assume, then, that 
the eccentric anomaly would also give the longitudinal position of the planet.  That is, the planet 
                                                 
48 Kepler, Astronomia Nova, 546. 
49 Ibid., 574. 
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should be found at I, somewhere along the radius DB, where GBD is the eccentric anomaly.  
Leaving aside the thorny question of deriving the eccentric anomaly from the mean anomaly, 
both the distance AI and the equated anomaly IAG can then be derived from the eccentric 
anomaly by solving triangle AIB, where AI is the calculated distance, AB the eccentricity, and 
angle ABI the supplement of the eccentric anomaly.  Thus, both distance and longitude can be 
calculated from the eccentric anomaly. 
Much to Kepler’s dismay, though, this solution fails.  A quick glance at the distance 
calculations (already completed in chapter 40) shows that the planetary distances and longitudes 
are correct at apsides and quadrature.  However, in between apsides and quadrature, at the 
“octants,” the planet falls outside the ellipse of the proper width.50  Thus, the path “expands in 
cheeks from the ellipse toward the perfect [eccentric] circle.” 
This, finally, brings us back to the despondent Kepler resuming his letter to Fabricius 
following the Easter holiday.  The promising libration hypothesis, clearly correct at apsides and 
quadrature, has failed utterly.  Kepler has realized that it is equivalent to “an earlier 
demonstration” – the one in chapters 39-40 of the Astronomia Nova – and that it produces a puff-
cheeked orbit. 
The argument, therefore, has been all wrong:  Libration in the diameter of the 
epicycle equals the ellipse in the middle longitudes and in apsides, therefore 
equals it wherever.  False!  And thus this [hypothesis], as before in the old false 
hypothesis, performs neither the duty of distances nor of eccentric equations.  O 
fruitful society of both things [i.e., the earlier models], which never does not 
direct me into total perplexity.51
Despite Kepler’s perplexity, however, the episode has not been a total loss.  Though the orbit 
fails, Kepler has convinced himself that the versed sine of the eccentric anomaly (or the secant of 
the optical equation) yields accurate distances.  The problem is that, if the planet moves in an 
ellipse, the eccentric anomaly is not measured to the planet itself.  The issue, then, becomes one 
of correlating distance and longitude.  That is, given an eccentric anomaly, which gives the 
distance, what is the equated anomaly – the longitude? 
                                                 
50 In the upper part of the orbit (around aphelion).  In the letter to Fabricius, for reasons that are unclear, Kepler 
indicates that this is also true in the lower part of the orbit (around perihelion).  In fact, near perihelion, the path falls 
within the ellipse, making the path “fat-headed” – too wide in the upper part and too narrow below – rather than 
“puff-cheeked.”  Kepler corrects this error in the Astronomia Nova, but retains the same name for the mistaken orbit. 
51 Kepler, Werke XV, 249. 
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At this point, Kepler falls back on what he knows for sure – the elliptical shape of the 
orbit: 
Therefore, I now have this, Fabricius:  the path of the planet is truly an ellipse, 
which Dürer has similarly called an oval, or certainly insensibly different from 
some ellipse…  And thus the whole hypothesis I will delineate to you.52
The orbit must be an ellipse, and therefore must have the properties of an ellipse.  This 
requirement alone should give enough constraints to construct an orbit.  Forgetting physical 
considerations for the time being, Kepler sets out to derive the orbit geometrically. 
He assumes a construction like that in Figure 14.  DEG is an ellipse inscribed in a circle 
DFG.  Now, a property of the ellipse is that the proportion of FC to EC is the same as HB to IB, 
for all points F on the circle.  Kepler also knows that if the radius of the circle DFG is 100,000, 
HI is 430 and BA is 9246.  If the eccentric anomaly, ε, is given, again setting aside how this is 
derived from the mean anomaly, Kepler seeks to find the equated anomaly, γ, and the distance 
EA.  He gives the derivation to Fabricius thus: 
Have the eccentric anomaly as you multiply the sine of 45 deg., 70711, in 430 
parts, giving 303, which you take from the sine 70711, leaving 70408.  You take 
therefore the sine of the complement of the eccentric anomaly, to it you add the 
eccentricity 9264 in the upper semicircle of the eccentric, that is from 270 to 90.  
You subtract in the lower, from 95 1/3 to 264 2/3.  Or from the eccentricity you 
steal the sine of the complement if it is less.  Then let it be that to that shortened 
sine, this sum or remainder, thus the whole sine to the tangent, which gives the 
angle of the coequated anomaly.  This will be either the coequated anomaly itself, 
or the excess of the coequated over a semicircle, or otherwise the complement of 
these to the semicircle, for the thing born.  Of this angle, you cut off a secant, and 
let it be that as the whole sine is to the sum or remainder, thus this secant is to the 
genuine distance from Mars to the sun.53
This passage is, to say the least, dense.  We will take the opportunity to elaborate it in modern 
notation. 
Kepler is deriving the orbit by solving triangle AEC.  He assumes that the eccentric 




EC =  
                                                 
52 Ibid., 249-50. 
53 Ibid., 250. 
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Now, FC is the sine of the eccentric anomaly, multiplied by the radius.  HB is equal to the radius, 







εε sin430sin000,100 −=EC  
For ε equal to 45°, this is: 
7040830370711 =−=EC  
That is, EC is calculated as you “multiply the sine of 45°, 70711, in 430 parts, giving 303, which 
you take from the sine 70711, leaving 70408.” 
BC, meanwhile, is simply the radius multiplied by the cosine of the eccentric anomaly.  
In Kepler’s terminology, this cosine is the “sine of the complement of the eccentric anomaly.”  
Hence, AC, the second side of the triangle, is BC added to the eccentricity, AB, when the 
eccentric anomaly is less than 90°, “in the upper semicircle of the eccentric.”  When the anomaly 
is greater than 90°, side AC is the difference of the cosine and the eccentricity.  Now, side EC, 
“that shortened sine,” will be to side AC, “this sum or remainder,” as the “whole sine,” 100,000, 









Solving this equation yields γ, the equated anomaly.54
The secant of the equated anomaly gives the remaining side, AE, the true distance to the 
planet.  As Kepler puts it, “you cut off a secant, and it may be that as the whole sine,” 100,000, 
“is to the sum or remainder,” side AC, “thus this secant is to the genuine distance from Mars to 





+== ACAE  
                                                 
54 Kepler does not calculate tangents (or sines) of greater than 90°.  Thus he adds that the solution will either be the 
“equated anomaly itself” (for 0°<ε<90°), the “excess of the equated anomaly over a semicircle” (for 180°<ε<270°), 
or the complement of these to the semicircle (i.e., the supplement of the equated anomaly, for 90°<ε<180°, and the 
supplement of the excess, for 270°<ε<360°).  In modern terms, the solution given is general. 
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The geometric validity of this equation is easily shown.  Solving for AE gives the distance in 
terms of the eccentric anomaly and the equated anomaly.  The latter, however, was just derived 
from the eccentric anomaly, so the distance is now also a function of the eccentric anomaly.55
It remains for Kepler to deduce the eccentric anomaly from a given mean anomaly.  His 
area law dictates that the area swept out by the radius from the sun to a point on the eccentric 
(not the planet, as in the modern formulation) will be equal in equal times.  Thus, in Figure 14, 
area DFA is the mean anomaly, not an angle, though the area is expressed as a proportionate 
angle.56  This requires a general re-definition of astronomical terms: 
And so although DEG is shorter than DFG, nevertheless if DEG is allowed to be 
called 180 deg., then part DE is allowed to be called that which DF really has.  
Therefore, the eccentric anomaly here is DE.  Thus not arc DBE, which had 
deceived me from the time of Christmas to this Easter time.  FC is greater than 
EC as area DFA is to area DEA.  Therefore... if area DEG retains the same name 
as area DFG, parts DEA and DFA will also have the same name, similarly DEB 
and DFB, as well as AEB and AFB, the area measuring the part of the physical 
equation.  Therefore, if the circle is given, then DF, or DBF, will be the eccentric 
anomaly, and area DFA will be the mean anomaly.  But now, in the ellipse, not 
DBE, but DE is the eccentric anomaly, and area DEA is the mean anomaly, and 
angle DAE is the coequated anomaly, and AE the true distance.57
Kepler uses angular measures on the circumscribing circle to designate points on the ellipse.  
Thus, arc DE is “named” by arc DF.  The eccentric anomaly, really arc DE, is specified by angle 
DBF, where F is a point on the circle.  Similarly, area DEA is the mean anomaly, but this is 
proportional to area DFA, and the two will “have the same name.”  Finally, the equated anomaly 
is, as before, the planetary longitude itself, angle DAE.  The new terminology solves the problem 
which had “troubled” Kepler from the end of the previous year, when he had begun considering 
his two old models, to the construction of the via buccosa during the Easter holiday.  The 
eccentric anomaly now measures the angle to D, not the planet itself.  Thus, the planetary 
                                                 
55 Note that this is not the construction of the ellipse Kepler gives later in the letter or in the Astronomia Nova.  Not 
satisfied with the physical basis of his secant/versed sine distance model, Kepler derives the planet-sun distance 
from the properties of the ellipse (i.e., geometrically).  When he has secured the causes of his libration model, he 
calculates the distance directly (i.e., from the formula).  See Kepler, Werke XV, 259; Kepler, Astronomia Nova, 
592ff. 
56 For example, in one quarter of the periodic time, area DFA will contain one quarter of the area of the whole 
eccentric circle.  Expressed as an angle, the mean anomaly is 90° – one quarter of 360°. 
57 Kepler, Werke XV, 250-1. 
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distance can be calculated from the eccentric anomaly, even if the planet itself is not along the 
radius to the eccentric center.58
Given this adjusted terminology, to find the eccentric anomaly from a given mean 
anomaly, Kepler has to find the area, DFA, of the circle that is to the whole circle as the mean 
anomaly is to the periodic time (when expressed as a time from apsides) or 360° (when 
expressed as an angle).  Kepler, though, has no way to derive this area directly.  He can only 
tabulate it, as he explains to Fabricius: 
From tables thus:  the maximum equation from equations of triangular areas, 
which is 5 deg. 18 min. 30 sec., resolve this into seconds and divide this sum for 
all steps of the eccentric anomaly, then reduce back into the steps; and put [them] 
to your steps of the anomaly such that at 90 deg., the eccentric anomaly will be 5 
deg. 18 min. 30 sec.  Therefore, at 95 deg. 18 min. 30 sec. of mean anomaly, 90 
deg. of eccentric anomaly is selected.  Indirectly, the same eccentric anomaly is 
thus selected.  While before semicircularity it is always less than mean anomaly, 
afterwards more, by conjecture you preconceive how much smaller, such that if a 
mean anomaly of 48 deg. 46 min. 0 sec. were given, I would conclude that the 
eccentric anomaly would be 45 deg.   This sine in sums of seconds 5 deg. 18 min. 
30 sec. multiplied and by 100000 divided, should give me 3 deg. 46 min. 0 sec. if 
I calculated well, at 45 deg, and 3 deg. 46 min. gives the mean anomaly.59
Kepler can only work “by conjecture.”  He selects some arc DF (in Figure 14), which he 
“preconceives” is the eccentric anomaly.  The area of the maximum optical equation, triangle 
HBA, expressed as a proportion of the whole circle of 360°, is 5° 18’ 30”.  Kepler “resolves” this 
into seconds (5° 18’ 30” = 19,110”), then multiplies by the sine of the selected arc, FC, yielding 
the area FBA in seconds.  He “puts” this area to the area of the sector DF, adding it before 
semicircularity (from 0° to 180° eccentric anomaly), subtracting it afterwards (from 180° to 360° 
eccentric anomaly).  This yields area DFA, expressed as seconds of an angle.  If the angle equals 
the given mean anomaly, then arc DF is indeed the correct eccentric anomaly.  If not, a different 
arc must be selected and the calculation rechecked.60  Working this way, however, Kepler can 
construct a table of mean anomalies calculated from given eccentric arcs.  The table can then be 
used to work from mean to eccentric. 
                                                 
58 Voelkel, The Composition of Kepler's Astronomia Nova, 196-7. 
59 Kepler, Werke XV, 250. 
60 See Kepler, Astronomia Nova, 592-3, 600n8.  For the given example, Kepler selects an arc of 45° as the eccentric 
anomaly.  The sine of 45° times 19,110” gives 13,513”.  This is equivalent to 3° 45’ 13” (about 3° 46’), which is 
added to the selected arc to give the mean anomaly (i.e., about 48° 46’).  
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In the end, this indirect method is the best Kepler can do, and he leaves the direct solution 
as a challenge to posterity: 
But given the mean anomaly, there is no geometrical method of proceeding to the 
equated, that is, to the eccentric anomaly… that is, unless you were to have 
constructed tables and to have worked from them subsequently. 
 This is my opinion.  And insofar as it is seen to lack geometrical beauty, I 
exhort the geometers to solve me this problem: 
Given the area of a part of a semicircle and a point on the diameter, to find the arc 
and the angle at that point, the sides of which angle, and which arc, encloses the 
given area.  Or, to cut the area of a semicircle in a given ration from any given 
point on the diameter. 
 It is enough for me to believe that I could not solve this a priori, owing to 
the heterogeneity of the arc and the sine.  Anyone who shows me my error and 
points the way will be for me the great Apollonius.61
As it turns out, this “Keplerian Problem” is demonstrably insoluble.  Tables remain the only 
method available.  Still, they do provide a way to find the eccentric anomaly from the mean 
anomaly, and once the eccentric anomaly is found, the longitude and distance follow.62
At this point in his letter, then, Kepler has finally constructed an elliptical orbit by which 
he can calculate planetary distances and longitudes from a given mean anomaly.  Moreover, 
these calculations agree reasonably well with observations: 
I have computed the eccentric equations in acronychal positions, they take the 
task to the nail; of the distances I would say almost the same, but the method of 
examining them is somewhat more lax, which always leaves me about 100 parts 
in doubt, while the observations are optimal.  Indeed, you know the best 
observations can err by one minute.  But one minute vitiates the distance 
immensely, if the planet is near [the sun] or [opposition with the sun].  This, 
though, you will have as certain, that we come near the truth.63
Kepler is satisfied that his orbit is accurate within observational error.  Subsequent observations 
may adjust the orbital parameters, but Kepler is confident he has “come near the truth.”  In other 
words, he has accomplished his descriptive project.  The elliptical orbit is an accurate description 
                                                 
61 Ibid., 600-1. 
62 In the letter, Kepler writes that this solution “is not geometrical, and how can the concluder be so happy?  A true 
objection, but it suffices from me that a geometric table can be constructed from given eccentric anomalies, which I 
have had for some time, and from where I have brought this so happy conclusion.”  Kepler, Werke XV, 259. 
63 Ibid., 250. 
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of the true planetary orbit.  It provides predictions and retrodictions of longitudes and distances.  
Kepler has described the true orbit of Mars. 
4.8 THE PROBLEM OF EXPLANATION:  CONSIDERATION OF CAUSES 
Despite the success of this orbit, Kepler remains unsatisfied.  Recall that Kepler also seeks a 
plausible causal explanation of the Martian orbit.  Yet to reach this ellipse, Kepler has had to 
abandon physical causes altogether and work directly from geometry.  Indeed, Kepler does not 
see how this orbit could have a physical explanation. 
But there is also that which I desire in this hypothesis:  namely that, though [I am] 
stretching [my mind] all the way to insanity, I cannot fashion the natural cause 
why mars, which with such great probability should librate in the diameter 
(indeed, the thing was reducing so beautifully to magnetic virtues for us), should 
rather want to go in an ellipse or some path close to it.  Nevertheless, I think 
magnetic virtues may not always respect the sine, but something somewhat 
different.64
Libration along a diameter of the epicycle seemed physically plausible, even probable, yet that 
model failed.  Instead, the planet moves in an ellipse, which seemingly cannot be constructed on 
the basis of libration.  Kepler is at a loss, “stretching to insanity,” trying to explain his elliptical 
hypothesis. 
As Kepler indicates, libration along a diameter of an epicycle directed toward the sun has 
a plausible physical explanation.  Kepler, as he is wont to do, likens it to the effect of magnetism.  
He assumes that the planet is magnetically attracted to the sun from aphelion to perihelion and 
repelled from perihelion to aphelion.  This explanation conforms to Kepler’s explanation of the 
action of the sun that causes the planets to revolve in their orbits, which he also attributes to a 
magnetical force.  It seems eminently reasonable that the planets themselves should also act 
according to some “magnetic virtue.”  What is more, assuming a libration along the diameter, 
however it might come about, gives rise to the secant/versed sine models of planetary motion, 
which do generate accurate distances for all points in the orbit.  Every indication, then, is that the 
                                                 
64 Ibid., 251. 
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force moving the planet is magnetic.  As Kepler writes, the motion of Mars “smacks entirely of 
magnetic force.”65
Yet, it appears to Kepler, magnetism cannot account for an elliptical orbit.  It is important 
to understand why.  We have seen above how, according to Kepler, the planet’s motion is 
brought about by the composition of the “extrinsic force” emanating from the sun and the 
planet’s own “intrinsic force” [vis insita].  At issue here is the speed of the planet’s approach to 
the sun, which is to say the strength of the intrinsic force.  At first, Kepler assumed that this force 
would follow a simple magnetic libration, in keeping with the action of the extrinsic force.  Thus, 
the epicycle “measuring” the libration would be rotated at the same rate as the planet revolves 
around the sun.  This is to say, both the position of the planet and the libration would be given by 
the eccentric anomaly – as the planet’s forward motion increased, so would its approach, in the 
same proportion.  Physically speaking, then, the intrinsic force is simply proportional to the 
extrinsic force.  Geometrically, this can be represented as in Figure 13, where DI is to DB as LE 
is to LA.  This also entails that the planet is always to be found on the radius to the eccentric 
center (e.g., along DB or PB).  Of course, this assumption produces the via buccosa, which fails 
to square with observations.  The approach is too slow near apsides and too fast at quadrature. 
The ellipse, which observations show to be the proper orbit, dictates that the “measure” 
of the speed of the approach is not the forward motion of the planet, but its sine.  As Kepler will 
later explain,66 the small “incursions” from the circumscribing eccentric orbit to the ellipse 
increase proportionally to the sine of the eccentric anomaly.  Moreover, these approaches are 
directed along the perpendicular, not along any radius.  Thus, in Figure 14, when the eccentric 
anomaly is angle DBF, the perpendicular approach FE is to the greatest approach HI as the 
perpendicular FC is to the radius BD.  That is, the perpendicular FC “measures” the approach 
FE.  This also entails that the planet is always along the perpendicular dropped from the point on 
the eccentric circle corresponding to the eccentric anomaly (i.e., F).  As before, the extrinsic 
force accounts for the increase of the eccentric anomaly, but Kepler does not understand how the 
planet’s intrinsic force can be related to the perpendicular and direct its approach along it.  That 
is, he cannot fathom how the planet’s intrinsic force can be made to “respect the sine.” 
                                                 
65 Ibid. 
66 See Kepler, Astronomia Nova, ch. 60. 
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To foreshadow our conclusion, we can point out that the problem here has to do with 
direction.  Working under the assumption of planetary minds (the limiting case of physical 
plausibility), Kepler believes that the planet must somehow measure its position in orbit, and 
then set its distance to the sun, which it can measure using the apparent solar diameter.67  In the 
via buccosa, the planet can simply measure the extrinsic force and set distance accordingly.  
Thus, the orbit has a plausible, even “probable,” “natural cause.”  Indeed, both the extrinsic and 
intrinsic forces can be “reduced to magnetic virtues,” and the planetary minds can be eschewed 
in favor of magnets. 
In order to move in an ellipse, however, the planet has to somehow recognize the 
perpendicular to the apsidal line.  This perpendicular, though, is not directed toward any physical 
body or even a geometric center.  In a spherical representation of space, from which lines have 
been banished, this direction is literally inconceivable.  Neither Kepler, nor his supposed 
planetary minds can recognize the direction as a direction.  This means, for Kepler, that the 
ellipse is irreconcilable with physical causes.  If the planet, even conceived as a mind, cannot 
“respect the sine,” no physical cause could, either.  Thus, Kepler does not see how his 
description of the elliptical orbit can be causally explicable.  Facing this obstacle, he begins to 
consider how magnetic forces acting on the planet could be made to “respect the sine.” 
4.9 THE PROBLEM OF DIRECTION:  GILBERT’S LAW OF THE WHOLE AND 
THE MAGNETIC BALANCE 
Kepler’s first attempt to devise a magnetic libration that “respects the sine” ends, as usual, in an 
instructive failure.  He imagines that the planet is endowed with some magnetic axis that causes 
the planet to approach and recede from the sun: 
The eccentricity smacks entirely of magnetic force, as it is in my commentaries:  
so that if the globe of mars has a magnetic axis, one pole seeking the sun, the 
other fleeing, and this axis were pointed in the middle longitudes, then as long it 
is turned [versatur] in the descending semicircle, maximally in middle longitudes, 
it would point the seeking pole toward the sun, and thus always approach the sun, 
                                                 
67 See Ibid., 561ff. 
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but maximally in middle longitudes, not at all at apsides.  And then in the 
ascending semicircle, it flees the sun equally.68
Kepler pictures a magnetic planet, with its axis parallel (or at least inclined to) the plane of its 
eccentric.  At apsides, the poles of the planet are “pointed in the middle longitudes,” that is, 
perpendicular to the line of apsides and, thus, the radius to the sun.  At apsides, then, the planet is 
neither attracted nor repelled by the sun, since neither pole is inclined toward the sun.  As the 
planet moves through its “descending orbit” from aphelion to perihelion, however, the axis is 
“turned” so that the seeking pole is inclined toward the sun, causing an attraction.  This attraction 
is greatest where the axis is most inclined to the sun – in “middle longitudes.”  In the other, 
“ascending” half of the orbit, the reverse occurs, and the planet flees the sun, just as it had 
approached it. 
There are two interesting things to note about this description.  First is the notion that the 
axis of the planet at apsides “points in middle longitudes.”  This is a jarring locution.  Until this 
point, Kepler has consistently used “middle longitudes” to refer to a place on the planet’s orbit.  
Though somewhat vague, it has always signified the location of the planet when it has completed 
about a quarter or three quarters of its orbit.  In other words, Kepler means the point on the orbit 
where a radius from the planet to some center (sun, eccentric center, or equant point) is 
perpendicular to the apsidal line.  In this context, though, the planet is not at “middle longitude.”  
It is at apsides, along the apsidal line, at null longitude.  That is, the planet is not located 
perpendicular to the apsidal line.  Instead, the planet’s axis is directed perpendicular to the 
apsidal line. 
This “pointing in middle longitude” does not depend on any presumed center.  The 
direction of the axis is not toward or away from any point.  It is simply perpendicular to a 
presupposed line.  Moreover, the direction is self-parallel – it is perpendicular to the apsidal line 
at all points in space.  Very subtly, Kepler has introduced a self-parallel orientation of space.  
“Pointing in middle longitude” has become a way to describe a direction rectilinearly, without 
reference to a center. 
The second thing to notice in this passage is that, besides at apsides, Kepler continues to 
describe direction spherically, referring to radii to a center.  He assumes that as the planet moves 
through its orbit, the axis must “turn” in order to point toward the sun.  At “middle longitude” – 
                                                 
68 Kepler, Werke XV, 251. 
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now understood, once more, as a location – the axis’s inclination toward the sun is maximal.  
This description implies that if the planet did not “turn,” i.e. if its axis maintained the same 
direction, its axis would stay perpendicular to the planet-sun radius, as it is directed at apsides.  
Thus, the axis would not incline toward the sun.  By way of contrast, if the direction of the axis 
of the planet were described rectilinearly, and was thought to maintain the same orientation 
perpendicular to the line of apsides, it would not have to “turn” in order to point toward the sun 
at “middle longitude.”  Kepler has introduced a rectilinear orientation of space.  Yet he has not 
fully switched to a rectilinear representation of space.  His descriptions still depend on 
geometrical centers. 
Kepler introduces the following section of his letter as a stream-of-consciousness 
brainstorm.  “Indeed, allow me, very happy Fabricius,” he writes, “while I work to speak with 
you, to profit from my exercise.”69  What follows is, in fact, a quick succession of slightly 
different hypotheses, all based on the assumptions described above.  Here, Kepler tries to derive 
the “strength” of the magnetic vis insita, which he believes is proportional to the speed of the 
planet’s approach or repulsion from the sun.  He is not primarily concerned with the direction of 
the force, and he assumes that the planet is attracted or repelled along the radius to the sun. 
Kepler realizes, from the ellipse model, that the speed of the planet’s approach (and 
receding) is slow near apsides and maximal around middle longitude.  This entails, in effect, that 
the strength of the attraction goes as the sine of some anomaly, since sine is null at 0° and 180° 
and maximal at 90°.  Hence, Kepler seeks some way to make the strength, and thus the speed, go 
as the sine.  However, he also knows that the distance of the libration is somehow related to the 
versed sine or secant, both functions of the “sine of the complement” or cosine.  At this point, 
though, Kepler cannot reconcile the fact that physical considerations seem to call upon the sine 
while the observationally correct path calls upon the cosine.  Nor is he able to reconcile the 
strength of the attraction with the actual distance of approach, which he assumes should be 
proportional, since the sine changes quickly at null longitude, where the cosine changes slowly, 
and visa versa at middle longitudes.  After struggling with the problem without reaching a 
resolution, Kepler moves on to other topics, then sets the letter aside. 
                                                 
69 Ibid. 
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When Kepler returns to the letter “after some weeks’ interposition,” he brings a new 
conception of the magnet and a new way to model its action.  Remarkably, this new model is 
explicitly linked to a fresh appreciation of William Gilbert’s magnetic philosophy:70
Let the same figure of the body of the planet as above be proposed.  I have said 
similarly above, the planet is considered as a globe or as a plane circle; now also I 
say this, it is considered as a plane circle or as a line.  For, from Gilbert the 
Englishman, it is certain, and also [it is certain] in itself without his authority, 
magnetic virtue extends in a right [line].  [Virtutem magneticam porrigi in 
rectum.]  Whereby the globe is feigned to consist of infinite plane circles, parallel 
to the eccentric, of which each is the same reason, thus because of this rectilinear 
virtue, the plane circle consists of infinite right [lines], of which likewise each is 
the same reason.  Therefore the body of the planet can be thus considered, as any 
right [line], since none of the others impedes, as above I constructed falsely.71
From Gilbert, Kepler has learned two things.  First, magnetic virtue is fundamentally linear – it 
“extends in a right [line].”  Thus, though magnetic action propagates spherically through space, 
the action itself always respects the magnetic axis, the line extending through the magnet’s poles.  
In his previous attempt at describing the intrinsic force, Kepler had reduced the volume of the 
planet to the area of a cross-section.  Now, he further reduces that area to a line representing its 
magnetic axis.72
Second, Kepler has learned that magnets retain their orientation in space, even as they 
move about.  Thus, Mars need not “turn” in order to keep its magnetic axis towards the sun, as he 
had “constructed falsely.”  Instead, the axis always points in the same direction, and can be 
considered as a single line, so long as “nothing else impedes.”  Of course, Kepler is now 
conceiving direction according to a rectilinear orientation of space, where the axis stays 
“pointing in middle longitude” rather than changes its deflection from a radius to the center. 
Here, Kepler is capitalizing on Gilbert’s notion of verticity and the “law of the whole.”  
In De Magnete, Gilbert showed that the (spherical) magnet possessed an inherent linear axis 
                                                 
70 Kepler’s first mentions Gilbert in his Apologia pro Tychone contra Ursum, which was composed shortly after the 
appearance of De Magnete in 1600.  Jardine, The Birth of History and Philosophy of Science: Kepler's A Defence of 
Tycho Against Ursus, 146. 
71 Kepler, Werke XV, 253. 
72 This passage is particularly interesting because it includes Kepler’s first mention of right lines with regard to 
planetary motion.  Recall that Kepler chides his younger self, in the second edition of the Mysterium, for failing to 
recognize the necessity of lines in the construction of the motion of planets.  This comment implies that lines must 
somehow be necessary to account for the elliptical path of planets.  Here it becomes clear that, according to Kepler, 
lines are necessary to account for the magnetic (or magnetic-like) forces that cause the planets to move in an 
elliptical orbit. 
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between its two poles.  The magnet could be said, therefore, to “point” or “be directed” along a 
line.  Moreover, the magnetic virtue acted according to this line.  “Direction,” for example, was 
the power of a magnet to align needles with this axis.  For Gilbert, then, the essential feature of a 
spherical magnet was its linear axis and poles, instead of its center or even its spherical shape.  
Kepler takes this to mean that he can represent the body of the planet as a line instead of sphere 
or circle. 
Gilbert also wrote of a magnet’s ability to conform its native verticity to an external 
magnetic influence.  In the case of the Earth, the planet conforms its axis to a rectilinear “law of 
the whole” that pervades the universe.  Thus, the direction of the earth’s axis, conceived 
rectilinearly, does not change, even if the planet were to move through space around some 
center.  Gilbert used this conformity to explain Copernicus’s third motion – the direction of the 
earth’s axis toward a single part of the sky.73  Kepler uses Mars’s linear verticity to explain why 
its axis stays along the perpendicular to the apsidal line.  In doing so, however, Kepler has 
adopted a variation of Gilbert’s rectilinear representation of space.  Just as Gilbert dismisses 
Copernicus’s third motion as a non-motion, Kepler now describes the direction of Mars’s 
magnetic axis as a line which “nothing else impedes,” not as the result of a “turning.” 
Considering the planetary body as a line maintaining a self-parallel orientation allows 
Kepler to employ a new kind of model for the magnetic action of the sun on Mars. 
Therefore, let AD be the magnetic axis, fleeing in A, seeking in D, representing 
one of the infinite right [lines] of virtue in the body of Mars.  But let B be the 
middle point of AD, sun in BI, the said approach is the cause such that the flight 
does nothing, because A and D are in equal operation.  Therefore, this is like 
equilibrium.  See my Optics, chapter I.  Now let the sun be in BGK.  And by the 
center B and the distance BD, circle DG is delineated, and from G, let the section 
of the circle with the perpendicular line from the sun to DA be led.  If therefore 
GB is the support and AB, BD the arms of a balance, as DC to CA will be the 
strength of angle DBG to the strength of ABG.  And so this flight is as much as 
DC, and the seeking as much as AC.  Take from AC the equal of DC, which is 
                                                 
73 A phenomenon Kepler considers shortly hereafter.  See below.  At the juncture in the Astronomia Nova 
corresponding to this part of the letter, Kepler digresses on the subject of Copernicus’s “third motion.”  He notes, in 
accord with Gilbert, that “Copernicus was deceived here when he thought he needed a special principle to cause the 
earth to reciprocate annually from north to south and back so as to produce summer and winter, and to bring about 
the equality of the tropical and sidereal years (to the extent that they are equal) by its efforts at producing equal 
periods.  For all those effects are obtained by having the earth’s axis, about which the diurnal motion is made, retain 
a single, constant direction…”  Kepler, Astronomia Nova, 551.  Once again, we see the crucial importance of 
Copernicus’s “third motion” in the switch from spherical to rectilinear representations of space. 
 118 
AS.  Therefore SC is the measure of the seeking, and AD the measure of the 
seeking at no angle.  And as AD to SC, thus BD to BC or GH.  Therefore the sine 
of the digression of the planet from apogee or perigee measures the speed of the 
approach.74
Earlier, Kepler had related the “strength” of magnetic action to volumes, areas, and circular 
angles.  Representing the planet as a line, however, suggests the action of a magnetic balance.  
The magnetic axis, AD in Figure 15, is suspended from the line to the sun GB.  The forces on 
this “balance” will now be measured by parts of a line, rather than the areas and angles employed 
above, according to the “law of the balance.” 
Unpacking the dense logic of the above passages is worthwhile, especially Kepler’s 
mention of his Optics.  The passage Kepler has in mind is found in chapter 1, proposition 20, 
where Kepler seeks to prove that “Light that has approached the surface of a denser medium 
obliquely, is refracted towards the perpendicular to the surface.”75  The first part of the proof is a 
consideration of a balance loaded unequally so that it comes to equilibrium inclined to the 
horizontal.  Here, Kepler relates his “law of the balance,” which correlates the inclination of the 
balance to the difference in the loads on the balance.  According to Kepler, each arm of the 
balance can be found, depending on the loads, anywhere between (in Figure 16) B and F: 
About center A, with radius AC, let the circle AD be described, and in it the 
perpendicular BAF.  It is evident that neither of the weights at C and D can either 
descend lower than F or be raised higher than B.76
The total possible descent of either arm of the balance, then, is from B to F.  Accordingly, claims 
Kepler, the arms will divide this total descent between themselves in a ratio equal to that 
between their respective loads: 
And since both are of this nature, that they tend to the bottom, and they mutually 
compete with each other, they divide up the descent BF between themselves in 
that ratio in which they themselves are.  From D and C let the perpendiculars DG, 
CH be drawn.  Now from what has been said, BH, the descent of the weight C, 
will be to BG, the descent of the weight D, as the weight C is to D.77
                                                 
74 Kepler, Werke XV, 253-4. 
75 Johannes Kepler, Optics:  Paralipomena to Witelo & Optical Part of Astronomy, trans. William H. Donahue 
(Santa Fe: Green Lion Press, 2000), 27. 
76 Ibid., 32. 
77 Ibid. 
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In other words, the vertical descents of the arms will be in the same proportion as their weights.  
For example, if the weight on D is twice the weight on C, then the vertical position of D (i.e., G) 
will be twice as far along BF as the vertical position of C (i.e., H).  This implies that BG will be 
two-thirds of BF, while BH will be one-third of the distance. 
Kepler goes on to show that his “law of the balance,” applicable to equal-armed balances, 
is equivalent to the mechanical law of the lever, which dictates that a unequal-armed balance will 
equilibrate horizontally if the length of its arms are proportional to its loads: 
I say that this is the proportion of the unequal armed balance.  For also, because 
HAC, GAD are equal, and CA, AD are equal, and H, G are right, AH, AG will 
also be equal, and therefore also the remainders of the equals HB, GF.  Therefore, 
as C is to D, so is FG to GB.  From F let a perpendicular be drawn to CD, and let 
this be FK.  Therefore, since CAH, FAK are equal, and CA, AF are equal, and H, 
K are right, CH, FK will also be equal.  Likewise also AH, AK.  Consequently, 
the remainders of the equals AB, AD, AF, that is, HB, GF, and KD, are also 
equal.  Therefore, as C is to D, so is DK to KC.  And if the beam CD, thus loaded, 
be suspended from the support at K, it will be the ratio of the unequal armed 
balance, and C, D will weigh equally, as is demonstrated in mechanics.78
By a series of constructions and comparisons, Kepler shows how a point, K, can be found on the 
equal-armed balance such that, if the balance were hung from that support instead of its center, 
the resulting unequal-armed balance would have arms CK and KD such that the ratio of their 
lengths would be equal to the ratio of the weights C and D.  In this case, the resulting balance 
would “weigh equally” – horizontally – since it satisfies the classical law of the lever:  weight C 
is to weight D as KD is to CK. 
Kepler then goes on to apply this statical “protheorem”79 to a mechanical problem of 
impact or pressure.  He compares light encountering a refracting surface to the percussive action 
of a “missile” striking a “panel” or to the continuous pressure exerted by a stream encountering 
an oar.80  He then tries to determine how the panel or missile will move as a result of the impact.  
First, he considers a body striking the panel or oar directly, along the perpendicular.  In Figure 
17: 
                                                 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid., 33. 
80 In the Optics, Kepler defines “violent motion” or “impulse” as an attribute of light.  Therefore, he conceives the 
action of light as something similar to the action of hard bodies colliding.  Reflection, for example, is not merely a 
turning back of a light ray, but a “repercussion [repercussus].”  See Ibid., 26, 34. 
 120 
Let AB be a panel, C the center, ED perpendicular through it; as, if a globe or 
missile were carried from E into the panel AB, it would drive it forward towards 
D; or as if AB were oars, of equal length on both sides, and ED were a river.  For 
since ECA, ECB are right, the arms AC, CB are placed in equal balance, and meet 
the impact of the mobile body with an equal power.81
The ends of the panel, or the oars, A and B, will be driven forward by the impact.  The distance 
each end is moved, however, depends on the “power” with which it resists the action of the 
impact.  To measure this power of resistance, Kepler compares the situation to the balance he has 
already described.  He implies that ends of the panel or oars are akin to the arms of the balance, 
while the force of impact or pressure is similar to the force exerted by the balance’s support.  
This case, therefore, is similar to a level balance, where each arm exerts equal resistance to the 
support.  Carrying the analogy back to the case of impact, Kepler concludes that A and B have 
equal power of resistance, and thus are moved equally forward. 
Next, Kepler considers the case of an oblique impact or pressure: 
Now let the oblique FC strike at C and let it be extended to K.  And let the missile 
or the stream rush in from F to AB.  Since the angle ACF is less than the angle 
FCB, the parts AC, CB will not be impelled with equal force, but the one that 
resists more will feel the blow more.  And the one that faces at an obtuse angle 
resists more than that facing at an acute angle.  Therefore, the exterior part CB 
will resist more...  Therefore, there is a greater impression of violent motion on 
CB.  So when AB is moved in position, B advances more than A.82
This situation is akin to an equal-armed balance loaded with unequal weights.  In this case, 
Kepler argues, the ends of the balance resist the force of the support unequally.  As a result, the 
balance will come to equilibrium tilted downward toward the heavier, more resistant, weight.  In 
this position, the support makes an obtuse angle with the heavier weight.  (The balance is 
imagined to hang from a support rather than rest on a fulcrum.)   Again arguing by analogy, 
Kepler concludes that the end of the panel or oar making an obtuse angle with the path of the 
incident percussant will resist its action more, and therefore be moved farther, than the end or oar 
making an acute angle.  Hence, the panel or oars will be moved from AB to HI by the force of 
the impact or pressure. 
                                                 
81 Ibid., 33. 
82 Ibid., 33-4. 
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In the Optics, Kepler does not attempt to quantify the difference between the motion of A 
and the motion of B (as he does in the letter to Fabricius).  It suffices to show that the motion of 
A, AH, is less than that of B, BI.  From this, Kepler can conclude that the surface of the panel, 
now at HI, is turned toward the original perpendicular, DE.  This, he claims, shows that an 
incident ray of light will be refracted toward the perpendicular when it encounters the refractive 
surface, since “this behavior of violent physical motion also flows back to what is analogous to 
light.”83
This part of Kepler’s proof is not relevant to our discussion except for a tangential 
comment Kepler makes in passing.  Considering specifically the action of a stream on an 
obliquely positioned oar, Kepler says that, since the end of the oar B resists the impact more than 
A, it will be moved further.  However, he continues, if the oars are “artificially held back in this 
position AB,” the “oar AB will at length be pushed forth to the shore,” toward B.84  In other 
words, if the oar is kept parallel to itself, “in this position AB,” by some “artificial” faculty 
resisting rotation, then the effect of the stream’s pressure will be to move the oar in the direction 
of B.  As noted, this comment is tangential to Kepler’s argument, since he is concerned with how 
the refracting surface is “turned aside” by light, and he makes no attempt to elaborate or quantify 
this lateral motion.  It will become important, however, in the context of the Martian orbit.85
We can now turn to the argument Kepler presents in the letter to Fabricius.  Though he 
does not say it explicitly, it is clear from his reference to the Optics that Kepler considers the 
magnetic force of the sun in a way similar to the action of light on a refracting surface.  Thus, the 
impinging solar force can be likened to the force exerted by the support of a balance, while its 
effect is determined by the “strengths” of resistance in the planet.  The more “resisting” end of 
the planet’s magnetic axis will have a greater effect.  If the planet is “artificially” kept parallel to 
itself, “in position,” the magnetic axis will not rotate about its center, but move closer or further 
from the sun.  The motion, moreover, will be along the direction of the axis, just as the oar is 
moved along its own length. 
As we shall discuss in further detail below, though, Kepler has learned from Gilbert that 
the earth’s magnetic axis is kept parallel to itself by its own “native verticity” and a universal 
                                                 
83 Ibid., 34. 
84 Ibid. 
85 This is apparently the source of the stream analogy that appears in chapter 57 of the Astronomia Nova, though in 
that case, the oar is assumed to turn, rather than remain parallel. 
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“law of the whole.”  Thus, it is plausible to believe that a similar faculty keeps Mars’s magnetic 
axis pointed “in middle longitude.”  If this is the case, then the planet’s intrinsic, magnetic force 
will cause a motion toward and away from the sun, not along the radius to the sun, but along the 
direction of its magnetic axis – along the perpendicular to the apsidal line, as required by the 
geometric construction of the ellipse.  As long as some faculty “knows” how to keep the planet’s 
magnetic axis “in position,” always pointed in the same direction perpendicular to the apsidal 
line, the vis insita will move the planet in the proper direction. 
Using the analogy of a magnetic balance also allows a quantification of the planet’s 
motion toward and away from the sun, which Kepler presents in the letter to Fabricius in the 
passage quoted above.  The support of the planetary “balance” is assumed to be BG (in Figure 
15), the line to the sun.  The strength of the magnetic attraction is assumed to act at D, while the 
repulsion acts at A.  Assuming that the position of the balance is “like equilibrium,” Kepler has 
shown (in the Optics) that there is a point C, found by constructing a perpendicular to AD from 
G, such that DC is to CA as the repulsive action is to the attractive action.  That is, the “flight is 
as much as DC, and the seeking as much as CA.”  The difference between the seeking and flight, 
then, will be measured by the difference between these distances, which is SC.  Thus, SC is to 
the net attractive force as AD is to the maximum attractive force possible (“the seeking at no 
angle”).  Halving both these quantities (which preserves the proportions), we find that the net 
attraction is measured by BC or GH, the sine of angle IBG.  Thus, the “sine of the digression of 
the planet from apogee or perigee”86 measures the force of attraction or repulsion.  Therefore, the 
same sine also measures “the speed of the approach.”  Not only is the planet attracted or repulsed 
in the right direction, it is attracted or repulsed by the right amount. 
This result is interesting for Kepler because he finally has a plausible physical 
mechanism that measures the strength of approach that varies as the sine of the anomaly.  This 
satisfies the requirements of his observational model, which entails that the rate of the planet’s 
approach to the sun should be slow at apsides and maximal at middle longitudes.  Equally 
important, however, is the issue of direction.  The magnetic force acting on the planet is not 
directed toward a center, but in a constant direction – perpendicular to the apsidal line.  Thus, 
this solves the question raised earlier:  how does the planet recognize the perpendicular?  The 
                                                 
86 Earlier, Kepler uses “digression of the planet from apogee” to signify the mean anomaly.  Here, he means the 
eccentric anomaly. 
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answer is given by the supposition of a rectilinear orientation.  The planet’s magnetic (or mental) 
power is then assumed to respect this direction, just as Gilbert’s “verticity” respects the “law of 
the whole” – thereby keeping the planet’s magnetic axis pointed “in middle longitudes.”  That is, 
the physical cause of the planet’s proper distance (the intrinsic force) acts according to a 
direction conceived on the basis of a presupposed self-parallel orientation, not a center. 
4.10 THE PROBLEM OF SINES AND COSINES:  SUMS OF FORCE 
At this point, however, Kepler stumbles over a block that will require another spark of genius to 
overcome.  He tries to relate the strength of the intrinsic force and, thus, the speed of approach, 
to the actual lengths of descent at each point on the orbit.  At first, he erroneously assumes that 
the libration itself will also vary as the sine, so that the length of libration is directly proportional 
to the speed of approach:                                      
This is geometrically demonstrated and most certain.  And thus if our principles 
are correct, all the libration will follow the law of the sine of the digression from 
apogee.  But because experience and the ellipse by experience very certainly 
made firm wants the libration to follow the versed sine of the digression from 
apogee, that is not by GH but by HI, therefore our principles are necessarily to be 
changed.  We have substituted, in effect, for GH the perpendicular HI.  And thus, 
therefore, in principles we ought to accept for AD the perpendicular FI.  In other 
words, one must say that the planet is at apsides not when its magnetic axis is 
perpendicularly inclined to the line from the sun, but when it is united with it (if it 
can).  While although I am unable to reconcile my first intuitions with the 
magnetic virtue with the appearances, nevertheless it strikes me in a wonderful 
way.87
The libration, Kepler knows, varies as the versed sine of the anomaly, that is, as HI in Figure 14, 
not the sine, GH, which is the supposed measure of force.  The versed sine, meanwhile, is 
derived from the sine of the complement of the anomaly, CG.  So, the elliptical path seems to 
require the entire planet to be rotated 90°, so that the magnetic axis would “measure” the 
complement of the anomaly.  In other words, at aphelion, the planet will have its axis directed 
towards the sun, and it will retain this direction parallel to the line of apsides thereafter.  This, 
                                                 
87 Kepler, Werke XV, 254. 
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however, entails that the force of attraction is maximal at aphelion, contrary to the hypothesis.  
Kepler is back where he started, unable to reconcile sines and cosines. 
Kepler finds the idea that the axis maintains its orientation striking “in a wonderful way.”  
He further explores the notion by considering Gilbert’s special case – the earth’s magnetic axis.  
He wonders if the earth behaves as his “first intuitions” suggest, keeping the plane of its axis 
perpendicular to the line of apsides.  To find out, Kepler turns to observations: 
For in my Commentaries, this objection has been left [unanswered]:  If the planets 
produce eccentricities by a magnetic virtue with their axis directed towards the 
same parts of the universe, the Earth will do the same.  But the axis of the Earth is 
the only one, which is pointed from [Cancer] to [Capricorn]:  it falls in this 
direction in the summer, and winter.  Around this the whole remaining body is 
turned daily.  Therefore, the apogee of the earth is fixed in 0 deg. [Aries], 0 deg. 
[Libra].  But it is seen to be otherwise, and indeed not in [Aries], [Libra] but in 
[Capricorn] (because the Sun is in [Cancer])…  Now, this is testified by 
experience, the line of apsides meets the line of the axis directly, therefore the 
apogee of the earth is stable in 0 [Capricorn].88
The earth’s magnetic axis remains parallel, “directed towards the same parts of the universe,” 
throughout the year.  Since the magnetic axis, according to Gilbert and Kepler, is identical to the 
rotational axis, it must be pointed directly toward or away from the sun at the solstices.  Hence, 
the direction of the earth’s axis lies along the line between Cancer and Capricorn.  If this 
direction perpendicular to the line of the earth’s apsides, the apsides will be found in Aries and 
Libra.  Observations show, however, that the earth’s perihelion is in Capricorn (when the sun is 
in the direction of Cancer), and the aphelion is in Cancer.  Thus, observations indicate it is more 
likely that the earth’s magnetic axis is “united” with the line to the sun at aphelion than 
perpendicular to it.89
These observations lead Kepler to consider physical causes once more. 
                                                 
88 Ibid. 
89 In fact, the line of the earth’s axis, magnetic or otherwise, has nothing to do with its line of apsides.  The two can 
differ by any angle, and will, in the fullness of time.  At this point, Kepler also discusses observational uncertainty 
about the position of the earth’s apsides, noting that different astronomers place them at different points in the 
ecliptic.  Ptolemy had them in Gemini and Sagittarius, while contemporaries placed them at differing points in 
Cancer and Capricorn.  This leads Kepler to suggest that the plane of the earth’s orbit “does not remain very 
perfectly in the same plane.”  That is, the plane of the earth’s orbit might itself rotate around the sun, moving the 
apsidal line.  This is, in fact, the case, but the proposition was very much debatable in the seventeenth century.  
Kepler clearly worked on this issue between 1605 and 1609.  Much of the material published in the Astronomia 
Nova developed subsequent to the letter (excluding the work on latitude) concerns the rotation of the apsidal line.  
See, especially, Kepler, Astronomia Nova, 553-4. 
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But before I sing the triumph, I must think about the physical cause, if it is 
possible that, as the magnetic axis is constructed at apogee, it remains in the direct 
line from the sun?  For what is it, which does similarly, that we may ascribe the 
cause?  The earth, in Aries, is turned about its axis pointing north toward the 
region of the sun in the center, away in Libra.  What therefore is the cause of this 
recession, the cause of this accession to the sun?  Also in [Aries] and in [Libra] 
days are equaled by nights in the whole world.  In [Cancer], [Capricorn] parts of 
the globe lack light.  What, then, this cause of approach?  But set aside this 
present question [and] bring us back to the scheme of the body of Mars.90
Suppose a planet keeps its magnetic axis parallel to the line of apsides, i.e., as it is “constructed 
at apogee… in the direct line from the sun.”  This, from observations, seems to be how the earth 
behaves.  Thus, the north end of the earth’s axis is pointed toward the sun near aphelion, in 
Cancer, and away near perihelion in Capricorn.  Thus, as the earth moves through its orbit from 
Capricorn to Cancer, through the equinox in Aries, the north end of the earth’s axis is “turning” 
toward the sun.  The opposite is true at the other equinox in Libra.  What is the cause of this 
“turning”?  That is, what is the physical cause that keeps the planet’s axis parallel to itself? 
(Notice that Kepler is mixing his representations of space at this point.  In the above 
passage, he describes the fact that the earth’s axis remains parallel as a “turning.”  This 
description is to be understood in a spherical representation of space, where direction is 
referenced to the center.  On the other hand, he has just written that the axis remains “directed 
toward the same parts of the universe,” implying that it does not turn.  Regardless of description, 
what Kepler seeks is a physical reason the earth’s axis stays parallel to itself.  His answer will 
depend on a rectilinear representation of space.) 
Some force keeps the earth’s magnetic axis parallel to itself.  Therefore, a similar force 
might keep Mars’s axis parallel to itself.  This returns Kepler to his balance model in his 
“scheme of the body of Mars.”  There, he assumed some force acted to keep the arms of the 
balance in the same direction, perpendicular to the line of apsides, counteracting the tendency of 
the axis to point toward the sun.  The action of this force on the attractive and repulsive ends of 
the Martian axis obeyed the law of the balance.  As a result, the net attraction or repulsion was 
proportional to the sine of the anomaly, as required by the ellipse.   
                                                 
90 Kepler, Werke XV, 255. 
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At this juncture, Kepler reveals his remarkable intuition and mathematical prowess in the 
crucial realization that the total libration was proportional, not to the strength of the attractive 
force itself, but to the sum of the momentary actions of the force: 
Two words:  1.  That the versed sine IH measures the portion of the libration is 
testified by experience of observation.  2.  The right sine GH with the vigorous 
demonstration given in the Optics, measures the force of approach, or of the 
libration.  These two I have thought until now to be contrary, but it seems they are 
not.  For one thing is the measure of the strength of the libration, another thing 
now performs the measure of the parts of libration.  There, IF represents the total 
libration, IH the part comprising the eccentric anomaly signified by IG.  Here, DB 
represents the maximum strength, GH the strength of the moment in angle GBI.  
But DB does not signify all the strengths combined, thus GH does not all the 
strengths for the whole arc of the anomaly GI.  But if you collect the sum of the 
sine of 90 which is 578,943,140, this is the measure of the strength, which indeed 
is the common effect of half the libration or BI.  Thus therefore also if you collect 
the sum of the sine from all the steps in GI, this will measure the portion of the 
performance of the libration, which if it produces a line so long, as long as HI, the 
versed sine, from which experience stands, then we have reconciled experience 
with the demonstration of the balance.91
Kepler had thought that the “portion of libration” measured by the versed sine in the 
observationally confirmed ellipse was irreconcilable with the “force of approach” measured by 
the sine in the balance model.  Now, he understands that they can be reconciled if the libration is 
thought of as the sum of the “strengths combined.”  This is, of course, Kepler’s proto-calculus 
that has been much celebrated by historians.92  In the letter, Kepler proceeds to execute a 
calculation showing the proportionality of the sum of the sines (i.e., the area GHI in Figure 14) to 
the whole quadrant DBI is roughly equal to that of the versed sine HI to the libration at 
quadrature, BI.  In other words, he shows that the libration varies as the sum of the sines.  Thus, 
Kepler is satisfied that the planet’s intrinsic force indeed varies according to the sine of the 
anomaly.93
                                                 
91 Ibid., 255-6. 
92 Aiton, “Infinitesimals and the Area Law.”; Koyré, The Astronomical Revolution: Copernicus, Kepler, Borelli, 
272; Paolo Mancosu, Philosophy of Mathematics & Mathematical Practice in the Seventeenth Century (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1996), 38-39. 
93 I am eliding the very important point that the anomaly in question here is the eccentric anomaly.  However, 
Kepler has rejected physical references to empty points, such as the eccentric center.  Thus, the anomaly should be 
the equated anomaly, which is measured to the body of the sun.  In the Astronomia Nova, Kepler dismisses this 
difference as insignificant.  Kepler, Astronomia Nova, 558; Stephenson, Kepler's Physical Astronomy, 115-16.  
Later, in the Epitome of Copernican Astronomy, Kepler introduces another libration or “wobble” of the magnetic 
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Finally, then, Kepler has reconciled the requirements of his elliptical orbit with a 
plausible physical cause: 
Therefore we have adduced the thing in the senses [i.e., observations] into 
closeness with the best reasons.  We conclude, therefore, the body of the planet 
must be considered as if it were magnetic, which approaches or flees by the law of 
the balance, and the diameter of virtue points in the middle longitudes.94
Mars can be thought of as a magnetic body with an axis that remains “pointed in middle 
longitudes” – perpendicular to the apsidal line.95  The two poles of the axis attracted and repelled 
by the sun.  Thus, as Mars moves around its orbit, the planet is first attracted to the sun and 
descends from aphelion to perihelion.  Then the planet is repelled, and it ascends back to 
aphelion.  In both cases, the speed of the planet’s approach or repulsion is maximal at middle 
longitude, when the axis is pointed directly toward the sun. 
The strength of the attraction or repulsion at each point in the orbit, meanwhile, is given 
by the sine of the anomaly.  At all points on the orbit, the axis will tend to point toward the sun.  
However, the axis is kept perpendicular to the apsidal line by some directive faculty, which also 
acts on the poles of the axis.  If the forces counteracting the attraction to the sun keep the axis in 
equilibrium, they will vary according to the law of the balance.  Thus, the net attraction or 
repulsion caused by the directive faculty is equal to the net attraction or repulsion to the sun that 
causes the planet to approach or flee the sun.96  That is, the force of attraction and, thus, the 
speed of its approach, will vary according to the sine of the anomaly, and Kepler has 
mathematically shown how a force varying according to the sine can produce a libration varying 
according to the versed sine. 
                                                                                                                                                             
axis precisely equal to the optical equation – the difference of the two anomalies.  Thus, the axis “measures” the 
eccentric anomaly even though it is physically affected according to the equated anomaly.  See Kepler, Epitome of 
Copernican Astronomy & Harmonies of the World, 99-106; Stephenson, Kepler's Physical Astronomy, 146-72. 
94 Kepler, Werke XV, 256. 
95 The “truly shattering objection” that the axis of the earth apparently remains parallel to the apsidal line Kepler 
decides to leave unanswered.  Ibid. 
96 Kepler assumes that the more the axis is inclined toward the sun, the more it seeks to direct itself to the sun.  Thus, 
the “retentive force” holding the axis parallel is maximal at middle longitude, even though the tendency to turn in 
the direction of the sun is, presumably, null (or “evanescent”), since the axis is already pointed toward the sun.  See 
below.  Kepler, Astronomia Nova, 553. 
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In the Astronomia Nova, Kepler explains this arrangement in greater detail.  He envisions 
a magnetic axis in the body of Mars, which is kept parallel either by a “retentive” force or an 
“animate faculty”:97
As before, let there be certain regions of the planetary body in which there is a 
magnetic force of direction along a line tending towards the sun.  However, 
contrary to the previous case, let it be an attribute, not of the nature of the body, 
but of an animate faculty of the sort that governs the body of the planet from 
within, that as it is swept along by the sun, it keeps that magnetic axis always 
directed at the same fixed stars…  The result will be a battle between the animate 
faculty and the magnetic faculty, and the animate will win…  On the basis of 
these presuppositions, the planet’s mind will be able to intuit and perceive the 
strength of the angle from the wrestling match between the animate faculty, which 
is designed to keep the magnetic axis in line, and the magnetic power of directing 
it towards the sun.98
The magnetic axis tends to point toward the sun.  It is held in place, however, by the animate 
faculty, which counteracts the magnetic power.  Yet, the magnetic power of direction is 
increased as the axis is more inclined to the sun, so the animate faculty will have to “struggle” 
more vigorously to keep the axis in line.  Thus, by sensing this “struggle,” the planet can “intuit” 
the angle of anomaly.  In other words, the magnetic power of the planet becomes a measuring 
device by which the planet knows its position in the orbit: 
There was consequently a need for us to equip the mind with an animate faculty, 
as well as a magnetic one, and to contrive a battle between the two which would 
remind the mind of its duties, of which it could not have been reminded by the 
equality of either the times or the spaces traversed.  So again we have asked 
nature to assist the mind.99
The natural, magnetic faculty assists the planetary mind to determine its orbital position.  Once 
the mind knows its position, it can (by measuring the apparent solar diameter) fulfilling its 
“duty” to maintain the proper distance to the sun. 
Kepler admits that this magnetic/animate mechanism might seem bizarre to some readers: 
                                                 
97 Kepler gives both explanations.  See Ibid. 
98 Ibid., 567. 
99 Ibid., 569. 
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Moreover, I don not know whether I have given sufficient proof to the 
philosophical reader of this perceptive cognition of the sun and the fixed stars, 
which I myself so easily accept, and bestow upon the planet’s mind.100
Thus, Kepler does not believe he has proven that Mars possesses a mind, or even a magnetic axis 
as he has described.  This, though, is not really his concern.  The aim all along has been merely 
to establish a plausible physical cause, however far-fetched: 
I will be satisfied if this magnetic example demonstrates the general possibility of 
the proposed mechanism.  Concerning its details, however, I have doubts.101
If Kepler can establish the “general possibility” of the mechanism, even by appealing to minds, 
he can cache the mechanism, and thus the elliptical orbit it produces, in the realm of the possible.  
In this, at least, he has succeeded. 
4.11 CONCLUSION:  THE STATUS OF LINES IN GILBERT AND KEPLER 
Kepler, finally, has satisfied all his desiderata.  He has constructed the true, “physical” path of 
the Martian orbit.  It is causally explicable and agrees with observations.  As he writes to 
Fabricius: 
Furthermore, at the same time you see both that that most earnestly desired union 
is now finally complete…  Everything I sought has been accomplished; the causes 
of each eccentricity are given.  You have an astronomy without hypotheses.  
[Astronomiam habes sine hypothesibus.]  Of course it seems that up to now it had 
been an hypothesis when I said that Mars’s eccentric is a perfect ellipse.  But this 
was previously concluded from physical causes; it is not therefore a hypothesis in 
my Commentaries.  It is indeed in the calculation, but it is also a true supposition 
of the true path of the planets, giving the distances and the equations.102
When Kepler first proposed the ellipse, it was merely a hypothesis – a mathematical conceit.  
Still, it was a good description of the orbit, and accurate planetary positions and distances could 
be calculated.  Now, however, the physical causes of the motion have been given, so the ellipse 
                                                 
100 Ibid., 570. 
101 Ibid., 559. 
102 Kepler, Werke XV, 261.  Translation from Voelkel, The Composition of Kepler's Astronomia Nova, 200-1. 
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transcends description.  It is the “true supposition of the true path,” both descriptive and 
explicable.  By reconciling description and explanation, Kepler has produced “astronomy 
without hypotheses.” 
Kepler could not have effected this “most earnestly desired union,” though, without 
adopting a rectilinear orientation of space.  The accurate description of the Martian orbit required 
geometric constructions that could not be described in spherical representation of space.  In 
particular, the perpendicular to the apsidal line is a direction that cannot be specified in relation 
to a presupposed center.  As a result, Kepler could not conceive how the planet might “respect 
the sine.”  The solution only came when Kepler realized that magnetic action could be described 
on the basis of “right lines.”  Gilbert had used presupposed lines to describe magnetic forces.  
These lines, moreover, could pick out a privileged, self-parallel direction, or orientation, 
“pointing in middle longitude” perpendicular to the apsidal line.  Thus, by adopting a rectilinear 
representation of space, Kepler can assume a direction in space.  He can then describe a magnetic 
or animate faculty on the basis of that direction, and then use this faculty to explain the ellipse.  
The presupposition of a rectilinear orientation allows the reconciliation of description and 
explanation.  It allows the true discovery of the ellipse. 
Kepler’s essential realization that magnets respect lines is taken from Gilbert.  Both 
Kepler and Gilbert rely on a presupposed linear orientation to describe and explain phenomena.  
There is an important difference, however, between Kepler’s “right lines” and Gilbert’s “law of 
the whole.”  For Gilbert, the “law of the whole” was an objective feature of the universe.  It was 
physically instantiated by what amounted to a magnetic field.  Thus, Gilbert’s orientation had a 
real existence outside the supposition of any (created) mind.  For Kepler, on the other hand, the 
ontic status of “right lines” is less clear.  Sometimes, Kepler suggests that a “retentive force” 
keeps a magnet in the presupposed direction, in a manner quite similar to how Gilbert’s “law of 
the whole” keeps the earth’s axis in one direction.  More generally, however, Kepler writes of an 
“animate faculty” which “respects” or “recognizes” the orientation.  This suggests that the 
orientation is not physically instantiated, but is a subjective feature of the animate faculty’s 
perception.  In this case, “right lines” are more clearly an assumption by which minds come to 
describe and explain phenomena.  They are part of the subjective conceptual framework used to 
understand the world. 
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This makes a subtle but important difference in the way rectilinear representations of 
space are used.  For Gilbert, there can be only one rectilinear orientation of space, which is 
determined by the objective field that instantiates it.  For Kepler, the orientation is a mental 
construct, and minds are free to choose it as is convenient.  In other words, the choice of 
orientation becomes, in some sense, conventional and situation-specific.  The choice is dictated 
by the exigencies of the situation one seeks to describe or explain.  Kepler, for example, finds the 
direction perpendicular to the apsidal line convenient.  Thus, this is the direction he assumes 
when explaining the motion of the planet.  However, this direction, in absolute terms, is different 
for each of the planets.  Kepler also uses the direction parallel to the apsidal line at some points 
in his argument, as he sees fit.  With Kepler, then, rectilinear representation of space, originally 
suggested to Gilbert by the phenomenal features of magnets, is ensconced in the realm of the 
conceptual and conventional.  We shall see how this shift to the subjective is mirrored in the 
conceptual framework employed by Descartes. 
Of course, Kepler’s adoption of a rectilinear orientation represents only a small step 
towards a rectilinear representation of space.  In general, Kepler’s spatial framework remained 
spherical.  He continued, for example, to privilege a geometric center, embodied by the sun.  
Indeed, the rectilinear orientation was only assumed in order to describe and explain the vis 
insita.  Meanwhile, the anima motrix moving the planets around their orbits is always, for 
Kepler, described on the basis of a spherical framework.  It emanates radially from the center and 
moves planets circularly about it.  Thus, even in the late Epitome, Kepler composes the radial 
action of the vis insita with the fundamentally circular motion caused by the anima motrix in 
order to derive the motion of the planet.103  In the end, the final move to a rectilinear 
representation of space came only when Newton replaced the circular action of the anima motrix 
with the linear action of Cartesian inertia in his descriptions and explanations of the planetary 
movements. 
                                                 
103 As Koyré notes, Caspar’s reconstruction of Kepler’s argument here is conceptually mistaken along precisely 
these lines:  “Now, the concept of motion underlying Caspar’s proof is quite different from that of Kepler; it implies 
the principle of inertia and the preponderance of the straight line over the circle.  Consequently, the elements of 
motion – lateral and centripetal – which comprise the orbital motion are straight lines; and the elements of this latter 
motion are (infinitesimal) straight lines whose direction is that of the tangent to that point on the (curved) orbit 
occupied (for a moment) by the moving body.  However, these elements are not at all straight lines in Kepler’s view; 
those connected with libration undoubtedly are; but those connected with lateral motion are (infinitesimal) circular 
arcs.  Even the infinitesimally short tangents play no part in his arguments.”  Max Caspar and Walther von Dyck, 
eds., Johannes Kepler Gesammelte Werke (München: C.H. Beck, 1937), VII 598; Kepler, Werke XV, VII 598; 
Koyré, The Astronomical Revolution: Copernicus, Kepler, Borelli, 321. 
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Kepler’s long and trying struggle with the Martian orbit showed that the presupposition 
of a rectilinear orientation is necessary to establish and explain the true elliptical orbits of the 
planets.  Thus, God himself could not have constructed this “complete, thoroughly ordered 
universe” without appeal to “right lines.”  Kepler was wrong to eschew lines in the Mysterium.  
Enlightened by his own “conquest of Mars,” and his encounter with William Gilbert, Kepler 


















































































































































Figure 17.  Optical Percussion. 
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5.0  INERTIAL DEFLECTIONS, REPRESENTATIONS OF SPACE, AND 
GALILEAN INERTIA 
This chapter examines two passages in Galileo’s Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World 
Systems, first published in 1632.  The passages are fascinating for two reasons.  First, they show 
that Galileo predicted, at least in passing, the inertial deflection of projectiles, a phenomenon not 
experimentally observed until 16791 and not quantified until 1835.2  This effect is significant, 
since it depends on the conservation of linear, not circular, inertia.  Second, these passages 
expose a deep tension in the way Galileo dealt with spatial relations and properties.  Recognizing 
this spatial ambivalence, in turn, helps clarify Galileo’s notion of inertia.  Altogether, then, a 
thorough investigation of these passages informs the vast historical literature surrounding 
Galilean inertia in particular and the development of early modern science in general. 
As we shall argue, Galileo consistently employed an Aristotelian, spherical representation 
of space in order to describe and explain large-scale phenomena, but used a rectilinear 
representation of space to handle small-scale phenomena.  The tension revealed in the passages 
arises when these different representations are used to describe the same phenomenon.  Yet the 
intersection of the two representations of space also leads to the prediction of inertial deflections.  
Ultimately, Galileo himself reconciled these representations of space by appealing to the 
                                                 
1 In 1679, Isaac Newton, following the logic sketched below, was the first to straightforwardly predict the eastward 
drift of falling bodies.  Moreover, he designed an experiment to demonstrate this effect that he thought would “argue 
ye diurnall motion of ye earth.” Robert Hooke later carried out the experiment, the success of which he judged a 
conclusive “Demonstration of the Diurnall motion of the earth as you [Newton] have very happily intimated.”  See 
H. W. Turnbull, ed., The Correspondence of Isaac Newton, vol. II (1676-1687) (Cambridge: University Press for the 
Royal Society, 1960), Letter no. 236, p. 302 and Letter no. 240, p. 313. 
2 By Gaspard Gustave de Coriolis.  The effects described by Galileo are today subsumed under a class of 
phenomena known as Coriolis Effects.  These are “uncaused” deflections brought about by inertial, and therefore 
linear, motion in a rotating reference frame.  The deflections result from the rotation of the frame itself, rather than 
any physical forces operating within the frame.   To avoid the appearance of anachronism, however, we will use the 
term “inertial deflections.”  René Dugas, A History of Mechanics, trans. J. R. Maddox (New York: Dover 
Publications, 1988), 374-80; René Dugas, “Sur l'origine du théorème de Coriolis,” Revue Scientifique Revue Rose 
Illustrée 79, no. 5-6 (1941). 
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Archimedean approximation, which explicitly privileged the spherical over the rectilinear.  In 
short, the passages discussed in this paper demonstrate both Galileo’s remarkable, forward-
looking physical intuitions, as well as his attachment to the spherical framework of his 
Aristotelian predecessors. 
5.1 THE PROBLEM OF FREE FALL 
Copernicus’s geokinetic hypothesis may have solved problems related to the physics of the 
celestial spheres.  As we have seen, Copernicus himself thought his system was more consistent 
with Aristotelian principles than the Ptolemaic astronomy he sought to replace.  For terrestrial 
physics, however, the motion of the earth caused a host of problems.  It was clear to most late-
Renaissance philosophers that the Copernican hypothesis was incompatible with Aristotelian-
Scholastic principles of terrestrial motion.  The existing physics predicted a slew of effects of a 
moving earth that were simply not observed. 
One of the many effects at issue involved falling bodies.  Consider a ball released from 
the top of a tower.  The scholastic account of the ball’s motion says the ball, because of its 
natural heaviness, drops in a straight line toward the center of the universe, a point that happens 
to coincide with the center of the earth.  If one assumes the earth is rotating eastward about its 
center once a day, however, the tower will move a considerable distance3 in the second or two 
the ball takes to fall.  Thus, according to scholastic physics, the ball should land far to the west of 
the tower, left behind by the earth’s rapid rotation.  Of course, this is not the case.  The ball 
actually lands where one would expect it to if the earth did not move – near the foot of the tower.  
Either the motion of the earth would have to be rejected, or the Scholastic physics would have to 
be amended to account for the appearance of the earth’s stability. 
Today, we have come to accept the rotation of the earth, and we have adopted a new set 
of physical principles to account for terrestrial motion.  We understand that the ball falls at the 
foot of the tower because of inertia.  Before being dropped, the ball partakes of the general west-
to-east motion of the tower, the ground, and the whole earth.  After it is released, the ball 
                                                 
3 Near the equator, more than half a mile in two seconds. 
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conserves this motion, even as it falls.  Hence, the ball moves along with the tower and falls at its 
base. 
However, the ball does not land exactly at the foot of the tower, but slightly to the east.  
This is because of the principle of linear inertia.  Bodies tend to perpetuate their motion in 
straight lines.  That is, an undisturbed moving body will move at a uniform speed in a straight 
line.  In the case of the ball, the top of the tower is further from the axis of the earth’s rotation 
than points closer to the surface, all of which are rotating at the same angular speed – one 
revolution per day.  Therefore, the top will have a greater linear velocity than the lower parts of 
the tower and the ground on which it stands.  The ball, when released, will retain this greater 
linear velocity and outpace the tower and the ground beneath, thus falling to the east of the point 
directly below the point from which it was dropped, ahead of the earth’s rotation. 
Notice that a principle of circular inertia will not lead to this result.  Suppose bodies tend 
to preserve their motion around a stipulated axis.  On a rotating earth, bodies rotate daily around 
the earth’s axis of rotation.  If we assume a principle of circular inertia, bodies will preserve this 
motion.  That is, a body left undisturbed will move in a circle parallel to the earth’s equator at a 
constant angular velocity, conserving angular momentum.  In the case of the dropped ball, the 
top of the tower has the same angular velocity as all the other parts of the tower, as well as the 
ground beneath, since all rotate around the earth’s axis once a day.  If the ball, once released, 
conserves this angular momentum, it will fall exactly at the foot of the tower, directly below the 
point from which it was dropped.  Circular inertia does not produce an eastward deflection of the 
falling body. 
The eastward deflection of a falling body is a direct consequence of the principle of linear 
inertia and the rotation of the earth.  If an author were to predict its existence, one could 
reasonably infer that the author at least glimpsed the notion of linear inertia and its implications.4  
In fact, Galileo does predict, at least in passing, the eastward deflection of falling bodies. 
Towards the end of the second day of the Dialogue, Galileo discusses an objection to the 
rotation of the earth put forward by a pupil of the Jesuit scholastic Christopher Scheiner – 
                                                 
4 Alexander Koyré, for example, argues that a correct solution of the problem of free fall, including the concomitant 
recognition of linear inertia, is the culmination of early modern reasoning.  It marks the moment renaissance 
philosophers were finally able to “free themselves from the conjoint influence of tradition and common sense, to 
draw – and to accept – the inevitable consequences of their own fundamental concepts.”  By the way, Koyré 
explicitly denies that Galileo happened on this solution.  Alexandre Koyré, “A Documentary History of the Problem 
of Fall From Kepler to Newton,” Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 45, no. 4 (1955): 329. 
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Joannes Georgius Locher.  In his Mathematical Disquisitions (1614), Locher had argued that a 
cannon ball falling from the orbit of the moon would take six days to reach the center of the 
earth.  Galileo places the argument in the mouth of Simplicio: 
SIMP. …it is indeed a most incredible thing (in his [Locher’s] view and mine) 
that during its descent it should keep itself always in our vertical line, continuing 
to turn with the earth about its center for so many days, describing at the equator a 
spiral in the plane of the great circle, and at all other latitudes spiral lines about 
cones, and falling at the poles in a simple line.5
A falling ball is not left behind by a spinning earth.  Instead, it seems to fall vertically, forever 
remaining over the same spot on the earth’s surface.  Now, if the earth were spinning, Locher 
continues, the ball would have to describe wildly implausible figures in order to remain in the 
vertical line over the same spot on the earth’s surface.  This consequence seems absurd.  There is 
no physical reason a body would move in such strange paths.  Hence, we have a reductio ad 
absurdum, and the argument serves as a refutation of the motion of the earth. 
Galileo, in the mouth of Salviati, replies, based on the square law of falling bodies, that a 
cannon ball falling from the orbit of the moon would take less than three hours to reach the earth.  
Thus, it would not have to describe wildly implausible curves as it fell.  Simplicio, then, is left 
with the simpler objection that “it seems to me a remarkable thing in any case that in coming 
from the moon’s orbit, distant by such a huge interval, the ball should have a natural tendency to 
keep itself always over the same point of the earth which it stood over at its departure, rather 
than to fall behind in such a very long way.”6
To this, Salviati replies: 
                                                 
5 “...è ben, per suo e mio parere, incredibilissima cosa che ella nel descendere a basso si andasse sempre mantenendo 
nella nostra linea verticale, continuando di girare con la Terra intorno al suo centro per tanti giorni, descrivendo 
sotto l'equinoziale una linea spirale nel piano di esso cerchio massimo, e sotto altri paralleli linee spirali intorno a 
coni, e sotto i poli cadendo per una semplice linea retta.”  Galileo Galilei, Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief 
World Systems, trans. Stillman Drake (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 219; Galileo Galilei. Le 
Opere di Galileo Galilei, Antonio Favaro, ed., (Florence: Barbera, 1890-1908), VII 245.  (Text here and below from 
Galileo Galilei, Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi del mondo tolemaico e copernicano (E-text, 2004 [cited 
2006]); available from 
http://www.liberliber.it/biblioteca/g/galilei/dialogo_sopra_i_due_massimi_sistemi_del_mondo_tolemaico__etc/rtf/di
alog_r.zip.)  See also Koyré, “A Documentary History of the Problem of Fall From Kepler to Newton,” 330-2. 
6 “...parmi ad ogni modo che venendo dal concavo della Luna, distante per sí grand'intervallo, mirabil cosa sarebbe 
che ella avesse instinto da natura di mantenersi sempre sopra 'l medesimo punto della Terra al quale nella sua partita 
ella soprastava, e non piú tosto restar in dietro per lunghissimo intervallo.”Galilei, Dialogue, 233; Galilei. Opere, 
VII 259. 
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SALV.  The effect might be remarkable or it might be not at all remarkable, but 
natural and ordinary, depending upon what had gone on before.  If, in agreement 
with the supposition made by the author [Locher], the ball had possessed the 
twenty-four-hour circular motion while it remained in the moon’s orbit, together 
with the earth and everything else contained within that orbit, then that same force 
which made it go around  before it descended would continue to make it do so 
during its descent too.  And far from failing to follow the motion of the earth and 
necessarily falling behind, it would even go ahead of it, seeing that in its approach 
toward the earth the rotational motion would have to be made in ever smaller 
circles, so that if the same speed were conserved in it which it had within the 
orbit, it ought to run ahead of the whirling of the earth, as I said.7
To clarify the sense of this passage, consider a vertical line extended from the center of the earth, 
through a single point on the earth’s surface, to the orbit of the moon.  If we assume that the 
earth is rotating, all segments of the line will move with the same angular velocity as the line 
rotates around the earth’s axis – they all make one rotation in twenty-four hours.  However, each 
segment of the line describes a slightly smaller circle than the segment above, since the former is 
closer to the axis of rotation.  In order for a ball the fall along the vertical line, its rotation must 
describe “ever smaller circles.”  By the same token, each segment of the vertical line has a 
slightly slower tangential velocity than the one above.  Thus, if the cannon ball conserves the 
tangential motion it had at the beginning of its fall, when it was “in the moon’s orbit,” it will fall 
ahead of the line, since its tangential motion is greater than that of the lower segments of the line.  
That is, the ball “ought to run ahead of the whirling of the earth” – to the east, ahead of the 
motion of the ground beneath. 
It is amazing how clearly this passage replicates the deduction of the eastward deflection 
of falling bodies we sketched above.  We can very safely infer that Galileo is assuming a 
principle of linear inertia, at least in the small scale.  While Galileo gives no indication that the 
falling body would fly off to infinity along a straight line if it were suddenly released from the 
earth’s gravity, he does suppose that it conserves its linear, tangential speed from moment to 
moment as it descends through the “ever smaller circles.”  The conservation of angular, circular 
                                                 
7 “L’effetto può esser mirabile, e non mirabile, ma naturale e ordinario, secondo che sono le cose precedenti.  
Imperrocchè, se la palla (conforme a’ supposti che fa l’autore) mentre si tratteneva nel concavo della Luna aveva il 
moto circolare delle ventiquattr’ore insieme con la Terra e co’l resto del contenuto dentro ad esso concavo, quella 
medesima virtù che la faceva andare in volta avanti lo scendere, continuerà di farla andar anco nello scendere; e 
tantum abest che ella non sia per secondare il moto della Terra, ma debba restare indietro, che più tosto dovrebbe 
prevernirlo, essendochè nell’avvicinarsi alla Terra il moto in giro ha da esser fatto continuamente per cerchi minori:  
talchè, mantenendosi nella palla quella medesima velocità che ell’aveva nel concavo, dovrebbe anticipare, come ho 
detto, la vertigine della Terra.” Galilei, Dialogue, 233; Galilei. Opere, VII 259-60. 
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motion, on the other hand, would cause the ball to fall in the vertical line, not ahead of it.  On the 
basis of this linear principle, Galileo gives both a clear prediction of the eastward deflection and 
an accurate explanation of its cause, all in one concise statement.  At least in this case, a 
principle of linear inertia is apparent in Galileo’s argument. 
Notice, however, that the passage itself is equivocal.  The first part of the passage appeals 
to the conservation of circular motion.  Galileo says that the fall of the ball upon the place 
beneath is not remarkable if the ball “possessed the twenty-four-hour circular motion” and 
preserves this circular “going around” while it descends.  So it’s not remarkable that “the ball 
should have a natural tendency to keep itself always over the same point” – which refutes 
Locher’s scholastic objection.  In this part of the passage, Galileo assumes that circular motion is 
conserved and predicts no deflection at all.  Only the latter part of the passage appeals to a 
conservation of linear motion, and only in the latter part that the eastward deflection is 
mentioned. 
5.2 HUNTERS AND CANNONS 
Free fall is not the only phenomenon to exhibit a deflection due to the conservation of linear 
motion and the rotation of the earth.  Projectiles will also deflect in relation to the surface of the 
earth.  Consider, for example, a cannon fired directly along the meridian, due south in the 
northern hemisphere.  Just as the top of a tower is further from the earth’s axis than its base, 
smaller latitudes (those closer to the equator) are further from the axis than greater latitudes 
(those closer to the pole).  This is a simple consequence of the earth’s orbicular shape.  Hence, 
since the whole earth rotates uniformly, bodies at higher latitudes have a lesser linear velocity 
than bodies at smaller latitudes.  If one fires a cannonball southward in the northern hemisphere 
(or northward in the southern), the projectile is fired with a lesser eastward momentum than the 
ground over which it passes in flight.  Since the projectile conserves this lesser velocity, it will 
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drift westward relative to the ground.  In other words, the cannonball will land west of the 
meridian from which it was fired and along which it was aimed.8
Galileo also predicts this westward deflection in the Dialogue.  Galileo introduces the 
case of a cannon firing along the meridian in the voice of Salviati, who recapitulates scholastic 
arguments against the motion of the earth: 
SALV.  …Not only this, but shots to the south or north likewise confirm the 
stability of the earth; for they would never hit the mark that one had aimed at, but 
would always slant toward the west because of the travel that would be made 
toward the east by the target, carried by the earth while the ball was in the air.9
According to scholastic principles, the projectile should move in a line toward the pole during its 
flight.  While the ball is airborne, however, the earth’s continuing rotation will carry the target a 
considerable distance eastward.  Thus, the shot will miss to the west.  An artilleryman’s ability to 
hit a target simply by aiming at it, a scholastic would conclude, is evidence against the rotation 
of the earth. 
Galileo has Salviati return to the issue of marksmanship and aim later in the Dialogue by 
way of a discussion of bird hunting.  Salviati reports that hunters are able to hit their targets 
simply by keeping a moving bird in their sights, as if the bird were motionless: 
SALV.  …They work in exactly the same way as if shooting at a stationary bird; 
that is, they fix their sights on a flying bird and follow it by moving the fowling 
piece, keeping the sights always on it until firing; and thus they hit it just as they 
would a motionless one.  So the turning motion made by the fowling piece in 
following the flight of the bird with the sights, though slow, must be 
communicated to the ball also; and this is combined with the other motion, from 
the firing.10
                                                 
8 The reverse is also true.  A cannonball fired northward in the northern hemisphere (or southward in the southern) 
will drift east of the meridian. 
9 “Ma non meno di questi, i tiri altresí verso mezo giorno o verso tramontana confermano la stabilità della Terra: 
imperocché mai non si correbbe nel segno che altri avesse tolto di mira, ma sempre sarebbero i tiri costieri verso 
ponente, per lo scorrere che farebbe il bersaglio, portato dalla Terra, verso levante, mentre la palla è per aria.”  
Galilei, Dialogue, 127; Galilei. Opere, VII 153. 
10 “...operano nello stesso modo per appunto che quando tirano all'uccello fermo, cioè che aggiustano la mira 
all'uccel volante, e quello co 'l muover l'archibuso vanno seguitando, mantenendogli sempre la mira addosso sin che 
sparano, e che cosí gli imberciano come gli altri fermi. Bisogna dunque che quel moto, benché lento, che l'archibuso 
fa nel volgersi, secondando con la mira il volo dell'uccello, si comunichi alla palla ancora e che in essa si congiunga 
con l'altro del fuoco...”  Galilei, Dialogue, 178; Galilei. Opere, VII 204. 
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Galileo, as Salviati, imagines a hunter turning on his heel in order to keep his sights trained on a 
bird.  The hunter matches the angular velocity of his gun (and the bullet within) to the angular 
velocity of the bird, both measured from the axis of rotation, the hunter himself.  When the gun 
is fired, the bullet gains a motion toward the bird.  Nevertheless, according to Salviati, it 
maintains its original angular velocity, equal to that of the bird.  Together, the two motions – one 
toward the bird, one matching its progress across the range – result in the bullet striking the 
target. 
Salviati argues that this is analogous to a cannon firing along the meridian on a moving 
earth.  He notes that in this case, the cannon is always aimed at the mark directly to the north or 
south.  Thus, just as the marksman hits the bird by maintaining his aim, the cannon also hits the 
mark: 
SALV.  …Upon this depends the proper answer to that other argument, about 
shooting with the cannon at a southerly or northerly mark…  I reply, then, by 
asking whether it is not true that once the cannon was aimed at a mark and left so, 
it would continue to point at that same mark whether the earth moved or stood 
still.  It must be answered that the sighting changes in no way; for if the mark is 
fixed, the cannon is likewise fixed; and if it moves, being carried by the earth, the 
cannon also moves in the same way.  And if the sights are so maintained, the shot 
always travels true, as is obvious from what has been said previously.11
As in the hunter’s sport, the gun, shot, and target all share the same angular velocity before 
firing, in this case caused by the rotation of the earth.  This angular velocity is then conserved 
after the cannon is fired.  Thus, as long as the cannon is initially aimed at the target, the shot will 
land true, even if the target moves west to east as the earth rotates. 
It is clear from his analyses that Salviati is applying a principle of circular inertia.  A 
projectile shares the diurnal rotation of everything else on the surface of the earth, including the 
target.  This angular momentum is conserved by the projectile before, during, and after its 
launch.  As a result, it strikes the target, just as if the earth were not rotating at all.  Salviati 
                                                 
11 “E di qui depende la propria risposta all'altro argomento del tirar con l'artiglieria al berzaglio posto verso 
mezogiorno o verso settentrione... Rispondo dunque domandando se, aggiustata che si sia l'artiglieria al segno e 
lasciata star cosí, ella continua a rimirar sempre l'istesso segno, muovasi la Terra o stia ferma. Convien rispondere 
che la mira non si muta altrimenti, perché, se lo scopo sta fermo, l'artiglieria parimente sta ferma, e se quello, portato 
dalla Terra, si muove, muovesi con l'istesso tenore l'artiglieria ancora; e mantenendosi la mira, il tiro riesce sempre 
giusto, come per le cose dette di sopra è manifesto.”  Galilei, Dialogue, 178-79; Galilei. Opere, VII 204. 
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concludes, confuting the scholastic argument he presented earlier, that an artilleryman’s ability to 
hit his target simply by aiming at it is not evidence against the motion of the earth, after all. 
At this point, though, another character in the Dialogue, Sagredo, interrupts to object to 
Salviati’s interpretation.  According to Sagredo, it is linear, not angular, velocity that is 
conserved: 
SAGR.  Just a minute please, Salviati, while I bring up something which occurs to 
me about these hunters and the flying birds.  I believe that their way of operating 
is as you said, and I likewise think that it results in hitting the birds… But in the 
marksman’s shooting, the motion of the fowling piece with which he is following 
the bird is very slow in comparison with the bird’s flight.  It seems to me to 
follow from this that the small motion conferred upon the shot by the turning of 
the barrel cannot multiply itself in the air up to the speed of the bird’s flight, once 
the ball has left, in such a way that it always stays aimed at the bird.  Rather, it 
seems to me that the bullet would necessarily be anticipated and left behind.12
Before being fired, the bullet has a much smaller linear velocity than the bird, since it is much 
closer to the axis of rotation, even though both move with the same angular speed.  Once in 
flight, then, the shot conserves this smaller velocity.  It “cannot multiply itself in the air up to the 
speed of the bird’s flight” and will miss behind.  As the bullet passes along its trajectory, it 
cannot spontaneously increase the small linear speed it possessed in the barrel to equal the 
greater linear speed of the bird in flight.  If the testimony of the hunters were strictly true, they 
would always miss. 
Sagredo’s principle of linear inertia leads him to a very different explanation of the 
hunters’ ability to hit a bird.  They may indeed report keeping the moving bird in their sights, but 
other factors must be involved: 
SAGR.  …So I believe that among the reasons that the marksman hits the bird, 
besides that of his following its flight with the gun barrel, there is that of 
anticipating it somewhat by keeping the sights ahead.  Moreover, I believe the 
shooting is done not with a single ball but with a large number of pellets which, 
                                                 
12 “Fermate un poco in grazia, signor Salviati, sin che io proponga alcun pensiero che mi si è mosso intorno a questi 
imberciatori d'uccelli volanti: il modo dell'operar de' quali credo che sia qual voi dite, e credo che l'effetto parimente 
segua del ferir l'uccello... ...ma nel tiro dell'imberciatore il moto dell'archibuso, col quale va seguitando l'uccello, è 
tardissimo in comparazion del volo di quello; dal che mi par che ne séguiti che quel piccol moto che conferisce il 
volger della canna alla palla che vi è dentro, non possa, uscita che ella è, multiplicarsi per aria sino alla velocità del 
volo dell'uccello, in modo che essa palla se gli mantenga sempre indirizzata, anzi par ch'e' debba anticiparla e 
lasciarsela alla coda.”  Galilei, Dialogue, 179; Galilei. Opere, VII 205. 
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spreading out in the air, occupy a very large space.  And on top of this there is the 
very great speed with which they go toward the bird upon leaving the gun.13
The initial disparity in linear velocities is compensated by various other features of the hunters’ 
sport.  Moreover, Sagredo notes, the bullet’s motion toward the bird is much faster than either 
transverse motion.  As a result, the bullet cannot fall far behind during its flight, and will miss by 
only a small distance, easily covered by the spread of the pellets.  Nevertheless, the fact remains 
that a single bullet will miss if the gun is kept aimed at its target. 
As for cannons firing along the meridian, Sagredo holds that Salviati’s discussion is 
mostly correct, since the difference in initial, eastward linear velocities between cannonball and 
target is not as great as that between the bullet and the bird. 
SAGR.  …but it does not seem to me that these actions exactly agree with those 
of shooting a cannon, which must hit just as accurately when gun and target are 
moving as when both are at rest.  The disparity seems to me to be that in shooting 
the cannon, it and the target are moving with equal speed, both being carried by 
the motion of the terrestrial globe.14
Both the cannonball and the target are carried around by the rapid eastward motion of the earth.  
They can be considered as moving with equal initial linear velocity, which is conserved by the 
ball after firing.  Hence the ball will keep up with the target and hit it just as if both were at rest.  
In any case, the initial speed of the ball is not “very slow” in relation to its target. 
Strictly speaking, however, the linear velocities of ball and target are only equal if both 
are located at the same latitude on the surface of the earth.  As we have seen, if the latitude 
differs, the cannonball and target will have different speeds, and the shot will miss: 
SAGR.  …Although the cannon will sometimes be placed closer to the pole than 
the target and its motion will consequently be somewhat slower, being made 
                                                 
13 “Talché del colpire dell'imberciatore crederei che ne fusser cagioni, oltre al secondar il volo col moto della canna, 
l'anticiparlo alquanto, con tener la mira innanzi, ed oltr'a ciò il tirar (com'io credo) non con una sola palla, ma con 
buon numero di palline, le quali, allargandosi per aria, occupano spazio assai grande, ed oltre a questo l'estrema 
velocità con la quale dall'uscita della canna si conducono all'uccello.”  Galilei, Dialogue, 179; Galilei. Opere, VII 
205. 
14 “...ma non mi par già che tale operazione sia del tutto conforme a questa de i tiri dell'artiglieria, li quali debbon 
colpire tanto nel moto del pezzo e dello scopo, quanto nella quiete comune di amendue: e le difformità mi paion 
queste. Nel tiro dell'artiglieria, essa e lo scopo si muovono con velocità eguale, sendo portati amendue dal moto del 
globo terrestre...”  Galilei, Dialogue, 179; Galilei. Opere, VII 205. 
14 “...e se ben tal volta l'esser il pezzo piantato piú verso il polo che il berzaglio, ed in conseguenza il suo moto 
alquanto piú tardo, come fatto in minor cerchio, tal differenza è insensibile, per la poca lontananza dal pezzo al 
segno.”  Galilei, Dialogue, 179; Galilei. Opere, VII 205. 
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along a smaller circle, this difference is insensible because of the small distance 
from the cannon to the mark.15
The effect may be insensible, since the disparity in initial velocities is almost negligible, but it is 
clear that Sagredo acknowledges its presence.  The ball will fall west of the mark if the cannon is 
at higher latitude.  Once again, we have witnessed Galileo deducing a physical prediction from a 
principle of linear, not circular, inertia. 
It is not Galileo’s usual practice to put important arguments, let alone experimental 
predictions, in the mouth of Sagredo.  Usually these come from Salviati, Galileo’s stand-in.  
Here, however, Salviati endorses Sagredo’s reasoning: 
SALV.  See how far the flight of Sagredo’s wit anticipates and gets ahead of the 
crawling of mine, which might perhaps have noticed these distinctions, but not 
without long mental application.16
Galileo explicitly validates Sagredo’s discussion, including the prediction that a cannon fired to 
the north or south will miss its target.  The prediction of an “insensible” variation is left as a 
positive affirmation.  At the same time, though, Salviati does not renounce his own appeals to 
circular inertia.  He simply moves on to other topics. 
Though Sagredo’s prediction demonstrates Galileo’s acceptance of linear inertia, the 
statement is again equivocal.  It comes in the course of an argument between two characters in 
the text, both of whom seem to speak with Galileo’s voice, but only one of whom accepts a 
principle of linear inertia and the resulting drift of projectiles.  In essence, Galileo disagrees with 
himself over the linearity or circularity of inertia and, in the end, leaves the issue unresolved.  He 
remains unclear as to whether we are to accept circular inertia, like Salviati, or linear inertia, like 
Sagredo.  He never says which of his characters is right. 
Galileo’s indecision regarding the nature of inertia leaves the appearance a tension 
between linearity and circularity in his thought.  Galileo explicitly recognizes that the two 
principles of inertia lead to different conclusions about the outcome of a physical situation, so it 
seems he should choose which principle, and thus which prediction, is the right one.  It seems 
                                                 
15 “...e se ben tal volta l'esser il pezzo piantato piú verso il polo che il berzaglio, ed in conseguenza il suo moto 
alquanto piú tardo, come fatto in minor cerchio, tal differenza è insensibile, per la poca lontananza dal pezzo al 
segno.”  Galilei, Dialogue, 179; Galilei. Opere, VII 205. 
16 “Ed ecco di quanto il volo dell'ingegno del signor Sagredo anticipa e previene la tardità del mio, il quale forse 
arebbe avvertite queste disparità, ma non senza una lunga applicazion di mente.”  Galilei, Dialogue, 180; Galilei. 
Opere, VII 205. 
 150 
strange, to modern eyes, that he does not.  The remainder of this paper will be an attempt to 
explain this apparent tension.  As we shall argue hereafter, this internal tension points to a 
deeper, conceptual conflict in Galileo’s description and explanation of phenomena. 
5.3 RECTILINEAR AND SPHERICAL SPACE 
Galileo’s inertial bivalence ultimately derives from a dual representation of space:  he uses two 
different spatial frameworks to represent phenomena – one rectilinear, one spherical.  Galileo 
uses both kinds of spatial framework throughout the course of his work.  Importantly, they are 
always distinguished by the size of the space they are meant to represent.  For global-scale 
phenomena, particularly those involving the rotation of the earth, Galileo employs a spherical 
representation of space.  That is, he presupposes a center, then specifies locations, directions, and 
other spatial properties in relation to that point.  For smaller, local-scale spaces, such as a 
laboratory, Galileo uses a rectilinear representation of space.  Location, directions, etc., are 
specified in relation to a presupposed line or orientation.  In general, then, small-scale 
phenomena are described linearly, while global-scale situations are represented spherically. 
5.3.1 Large-Scale Space 
Galileo’s spherical representation of global- or cosmic-sized space is a consistent feature of his 
thought throughout his career.  In the early De Motu tract (c. 1591), written even before Galileo 
accepted Copernicanism, Galileo describes an Aristotelian, spherical structure of space, built 
around the presupposed center of the universe: 
If, for example, we suppose that nature, at the time of the construction of the 
universe, divided all the common matter of the elements into four equal parts, and 
then assigned to the form of the earth its own matter [i.e., earth], and likewise to 
the form of air its own matter [i.e., air], and that he form of the earth caused its 
matter to be compressed in a very narrow space, while the form of the air 
permitted the placing of its matter in a very ample space, would it not be 
reasonable for nature to assign a larger space to air, and a smaller space to earth?  
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But in a sphere the spaces become narrower as we approach the center, and larger 
as we recede from the center.17
In this rather peculiar “just-so” story, Galileo speculates about the creation of the universe.  He 
describes how the elements were placed in a previously empty space according to their form.  
This primordial space, however, has a spherical structure.  Spaces, for instance, are distinguished 
by their distance from the center.  Thus, intuitively speaking, this space is “narrower” nearer the 
center.  A portion of space with unit radial height and unit solid angle will have a greater volume 
further from the center.  The appropriate place for denser elements, then, is in the denser, 
“narrower” space, which explains their location nearer the center.  This cosmogony relies on the 
spherical structure Galileo assigns to cosmic space in and of itself.18
The notion of natural place is carried into the Dialogue, where Galileo again discusses 
the notion of cosmic order.  He argues that the world is inherently ordered, with each body in its 
prescribed place: 
SALV.  …I admit that the world is a body endowed with all the dimensions, and 
therefore most perfect.  And I add that as such it is of necessity most orderly, 
having its parts disposed in the highest and most perfect order among 
themselves.19
The various parts of the universe are each “disposed” in their appropriate places.  Place, 
however, is here specified by a distance from a stipulated center.  Consequently, circular motions 
around the presupposed center preserve the inherent order of the universe: 
                                                 
17 “Ut si, exempli gratia, intelligamus, naturam in prima mundi compagine totam elementorum communem 
materiam in quatuor aequas partes divisisse, deinde ipsius terrae formae suam materiam tribuisse, itidem et formae 
aëris suam, terrae autem formam materiam suam in angustissimo loco constipasse, aëris autem formam in 
amplissimo loco materiam suam reposuisse, nonne congruum erat ut natura aëri magnum spatium assignaret, terrae 
minus?  At angustiora sunt loca in sphera quo magis ad centrum accedimus, ampliora vero quo magis ab eodem 
recedimus.”  Galileo Galilei, “De Motu,” in On Motion and On Mechanics, ed. Stillman Drake and I. E. Drabkin 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1960), 15; Galilei. Opere, I 253.  Kepler similarly argues that the density 
of bodies near the sun is consonant with the “certain form of narrowness” of “the very places which are near the 
centre.”  Kepler, Epitome of Copernican Astronomy & Harmonies of the World, 40. 
18 A similar discussion appears in the dialogue form of the De Motu.  There, Galileo comments that the “argument is 
not to be considered a conclusive reason for this disposition of the elements, still it has in it some appearance of 
truth.”  See Stillman Drake and I. E. Drabkin, Mechanics in Sixteenth-Century Italy (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1969), 339; Galilei. Opere, I 374-5. 
19 “...ed ammetto che il mondo sia corpo dotato di tutte le dimensioni, e però perfettissimo; ed aggiungo, che come 
tale ei sia necessariamente ordinatissimo, cioè di parti con sommo e perfettissimo ordine tra di loro disposte.”  
Galilei, Dialogue, 19; Galilei. Opere, VII 43. 
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SALV.  This principle being established then, it may be immediately concluded 
that if all integral bodies in the world are by nature moveable, it is impossible that 
their motions should be straight, or anything else but circular; and the reason is 
very plain and obvious.  For whatever moves straight changes place and, 
continuing to move, goes ever farther from its starting point and from every place 
through which it successively passes.  If that were the motion which naturally 
suited it, then at the beginning it was not in its proper place.  So then the parts of 
the world were not disposed in perfect order.  But we are assuming them to be 
perfectly in order; and in that case, it is impossible that it should be their nature to 
change place, and consequently to move in a straight line.20
Galileo concludes that bodies do not move naturally in straight lines.  This would entail they 
sought a change of place, since straight motion always changes distance to the center, and places 
in the cosmos are specified by their distance from a center.  Straight-line motion would cause a 
rearrangement of what is assumed to be perfectly arranged.  Since circular motions around the 
center do not affect “place,” they do not disrupt the “perfect order” of the cosmos.  Hence, if a 
body’s nature allows for motion, the movement can only take place circularly around the center.  
This argument, however, relies on the presupposition of a center and spherical structure of the 
space wherein bodies are “placed.”  In the Dialogue, as in the De Motu, Galileo subscribes to a 
spherical conception of cosmic space. 
(It should be noted that Galileo’s view of cosmic space changed between the De Motu 
and the Dialogue.  When Galileo wrote the earlier tract, he used the stipulation of a universal 
center as a basis for the argument that all the terrestrial elements had a natural heaviness – i.e., a 
natural tendency to move toward the center.  This, in turn, accounted for the earth’s stability at 
the center of the universe.  Since elemental earth, of which the terrestrial globe was primarily 
composed, was supposed to possess more innate heaviness than the other elements, it tended to 
congregate and remain around the center.  By the time of the Dialogue, however, Galileo had 
accepted Copernicanism, and rejected the Aristotelian identification of the center of the universe 
and the terrestrial center.  The stipulation of a spatial center, therefore, was open to choice: 
                                                 
20 “Stabilito dunque cotal principio, si può immediatamente concludere che, se i corpi integrali del mondo devono 
esser di lor natura mobili, è impossibile che i movimenti loro siano retti, o altri che circolari: e la ragione è assai 
facile e manifesta. Imperocché quello che si muove di moto retto, muta luogo; e continuando di muoversi, si va piú e 
piú sempre allontanando dal termine ond'ei si partí e da tutti i luoghi per i quali successivamente ei va passando; e se 
tal moto naturalmente se gli conviene, adunque egli da principio non era nel luogo suo naturale, e però non erano le 
parti del mondo con ordine perfetto disposte: ma noi supponghiamo, quelle esser perfettamente ordinate: adunque, 
come tali, è impossibile che abbiano da natura di mutar luogo, ed in conseguenza di muoversi di moto retto.”  
Galilei, Dialogue, 19. Galilei. Opere, VII 43. 
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SAGR.  …Moreover, it appears that Aristotle implies that only one circular 
motion exists in the world, and consequently only one center to which the motions 
of upward and downward exclusively refer.  All of which seems to indicate that 
he was pulling cards out of his sleeve, and trying to accommodate the architecture 
to the building instead of modeling the building after the precepts of architecture.  
For if I should say that in the real universe there are thousands of circular 
motions, and consequently thousands of centers, there would also be thousands of 
motions upward and downward.21
In other words, Galileo accepts Copernicus’s view that there are “many centers” in the 
universe.22  For the purposes of description and explanation, one may select any one of these 
centers and construct a spherical frame around it.  There could be “thousands” of meanings of 
“upward” and “downward,” depending upon which center is chosen as the central point of 
reference.  The center of the earth is not especially privileged.  Even so, Galileo continues to 
assume, as did Copernicus, that spatial properties are specified in relation to centers.  “Upward” 
and “downward” are still directed away from and toward a center.23) 
The Dialogue also contains a remarkable discussion of the motion of the moon.  Though 
tangential to the main line of argument in this essay, the discussion is particularly interesting 
because it contrasts Galileo’s spatial conception with those of Copernicus and Gilbert, which we 
have discussed previously.  It is also a striking demonstration of Galileo’s use of a spherical 
conception of space.  Recall Copernicus’s “third motion.”  Copernicus described the behavior of 
the axis of the earth using a spherical representation of space.  He specified the direction of the 
axis in relation to a radius to the assumed center – in this case, a point at or near the center of the 
sun.  On this specification of direction, the direction of the axis changes as the earth rotates 
                                                 
21 “Vedesi in oltre che Aristotile accenna, un solo esser al mondo il moto circolare, ed in conseguenza un solo 
centro, al quale solo si riferiscano i movimenti retti in su e in giú; tutti indizi che egli ha mira di cambiarci le carte in 
mano, e di volere accomodar l'architettura alla fabbrica, e non costruire la fabbrica conforme a i precetti 
dell'architettura: ché se io dirò che nell'università della natura ci posson essere mille movimenti circolari, ed in 
conseguenza mille centri, vi saranno ancora mille moti in su e in giú.”  Galilei, Dialogue, 16; Galilei. Opere, VII 40. 
22 See Copernicus, De Rev, 46. 
23 A related confusion about which center to place at the center of a spherical representation of space underlies 
Galileo’s oft-debated “blunder” in the “Sunspot Proof” of the earth’s motion.  See Galilei, Dialogue, 351-55, 486-
87; Owen Gingrich, “The Galileo Sunspot Controversy:  Proof and Persuasion,” Journal for the History of 
Astronomy 34(I), no. 114 (2003); Keith Hutchison, “Sunspots, Galileo, and the Orbit of the Earth,” Isis 81, no. 1 
(1990); Koestler, The Sleepwalkers, 476-79; A. Mark Smith, “Galileo's Proof for the Earth's Motion from the 
Movement of Sunspots,” Isis 76, no. 4 (1985); David Topper, “Colluding With Galileo:  On Mueller's Critique of 
My Analysis of Galileo's Sunspot Argument,” Journal for the History of Astronomy 34(I), no. 114 (2003); David 
Topper, “Galileo, Sunspots, and the Motions of the Earth:  Redux,” Isis 90, no. 4 (1999).  The moon’s motion (or 
non-motion) also raises similar difficulties.  Galileo refers the moon’s motion to a center, but he cannot decide 
whether the appropriate center is the earth or the center of the moon’s epicycle.  See Galilei, Dialogue, 65. 
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around the sun, even though the axis remains parallel to itself, pointed toward the same part of 
the sky.  The representation of space leads to a description of a change of direction – a motion.  
Hence, Copernicus concluded, the observed behavior of the axis was a “third motion” of the 
earth. 
As we have noted in, Gilbert employed a linear representation of space to describe the 
motion of the earth’s axis.  On his view, directions are specified in relation to a self-parallel 
linear orientation at all points in space.  Thus, the direction of the earth’s axis is the same at all 
points in its orbit.  It remains parallel to itself not because it changes direction, but because the 
direction does not change.  According to Gilbert, Copernicus’s “third motion” is not a motion at 
all. 
Galileo clearly thought highly of Gilbert’s magnetic philosophy.  In the Dialogue, Galileo 
counts himself among those who have “attentively read [Gilbert’s] book and carried out his 
experiments.”  Consequently, Galileo reports – as a fact – Gilbert’s observation that 
Copernicus’s “third motion” is “not a real thing, but a mere appearance” that does not require 
“any cause of motion.”  He also goes on to relate Gilbert’s speculation that there is a magnetic 
“force inhering in the terrestrial globe and making it point with definite parts of itself toward 
definite parts of the firmament.”24  It is equally clear, however, that Galileo did not understand 
the rectilinear representation of space that led Gilbert to the rejection of the “third motion.”  In 
fact, when Galileo deals with an analogous situation in the Dialogue, he applies a spherical 
representation of space and, as a result, commits the reverse of Copernicus’s own mistake.  He 
describes a motion as a non-motion. 
The phenomenon in question is the motion of the moon.  Just as the earth revolves around 
the sun, the moon revolves around the earth.  Now, as the moon revolves, one side is always 
facing the earth, so the side of the moon visible from the earth is always the same.  In the First 
Day of the Dialogue, Galileo describes this behavior in a fashion similar to the way Copernicus 
describes the earth.  In particular, he has Sagredo comment: 
SAGR.  …Assuming for the sake of the argument that there is someone on the 
moon who can see the earth, he will see the entire surface of the earth every day, 
by virtue of the moon’s motion with respect to the earth every twenty-four or 
                                                 
24 Galilei, Dialogue, 398-400. 
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twenty-five hours.  But we shall never see more than half the moon, since it 
makes no revolution of its own, as it would have to do for all of it to show itself.25
Galileo specifies the direction of the face of the moon in relation to the radius between it and the 
center of its orbital motion, the earth.  Since the same face always faces the earth, the radius 
always intersects the same half of the moon.  In other words, the “direction” the moon faces, so 
conceived, does not change – i.e., the moon “makes no revolution of its own.” 
Sagredo’s comment assumes that the moon rotates around the earth on a simple circular 
orbit.  As Galileo knows, however, most contemporary astronomers supposed that it orbited on 
an epicycle.26  In this case, a rotation would be required to keep a single face directed toward the 
earth, as Salviati notes: 
SALV.  Provided that the very opposite is not implied; namely, that its own 
rotation is the reason that we do not see the other side – for such would have to be 
the case if the moon should have an epicycle.27
Again, the direction of the moon’s face is referred to a center of its motion.  In this case, though, 
direction is specified in relation to a radius to the center of the epicycle, not the center of the 
earth.  If the moon were not to rotate about its axis, a radius connecting the moon and the center 
of the epicycle would always intersect the same face.  Hence, the same side of the moon would 
always be directed toward the center of the epicycle, and its aspect toward the earth would 
change.  In order to keep one half toward the earth, Salviati implies, the moon must rotate at the 
same rate, and in the opposite sense, as it rotates around its epicycle.  This change of “direction” 
would be “the reason we do not see the other side” as the moon orbits on its epicycle. 
Galileo’s discussion of the moon’s rotation makes it clear, however, that he is employing 
a spherical representation of space.  Whether or not the moon orbits on an epicycle, the direction 
it faces is specified in relation to a radius to a center – that of the earth for Sagredo’s simple 
orbit, that of the epicycle for Salviati’s epicyclic orbit.  In the former case, the “direction” of the 
                                                 
25 “...dato e non concesso che nella Luna fusse chi di là potesse rimirar la Terra, vedrebbe ogni giorno tutta la 
superficie terrestre, mediante il moto di essa Luna intorno alla Terra in ventiquattro o venticinque ore; ma noi non 
veggiamo mai altro che la metà della Luna, poiché ella non si rivolge in se stessa, come bisognerebbe per potercisi 
tutta mostrare.”  Ibid., 65; Galilei. Opere, VII 90. 
26 In the Ptolemaic system, an epicycle (and a rotating eccentric center) was used to model the moon’s orbit.  
Copernicus used two epicycles.  See Copernicus, De Rev, Bk IV, esp. 189ff; Ptolemy, The Almagest, Bk. V, esp. 
333ff. 
27 “Purché questo non accaggia per il contrario, cioè che il rigirarsi ella in se stessa sia cagione che noi non 
veggiamo mai l'altra metà; ché cosí sarebbe necessario che fusse, quando ella avesse l'epiciclo.”  Galilei, Dialogue, 
65; Galilei. Opere, VII 90. 
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moon’s face does not change.  In the latter, it changes in order to negate the effect of the 
epicyclic rotation.  In a rectilinear representation of space, by contrast, the same part of the moon 
always faces the earth because the moon rotates – changes the direction of its face with respect to 
a self-parallel orientation – at the same rate it revolves about the earth, not an epicycle. 
Like Copernicus, Galileo specifies direction in relation to a radius to a center.28  Thus, 
though Galileo notes Gilbert’s observation that Copernicus’s “third motion” is actually a 
“staying,” he, in Sagredo’s case, attributes a “staying” to the moon that is really a motion.  In 
Salviati’s case, meanwhile, he attributes the wrong rotation.  He fails to notice these errors 
because his specification of direction relies on a spherical representation of space.  He reports 
Gilbert’s conclusion, but he has not adopted Gilbert’s rectilinear space. 
5.3.2 Small-Scale Space 
While his representations of global-scale spaces are consistently spherical, Galileo consistently 
uses a rectilinear representation of space for small-scale phenomena.  Consider the description of 
a laboratory frame in the First Day of the Dialogue: 
SALV.  Therefore if you assign any point for the point of origin of your 
measurements, and from that produce a straight line as the determinant of the first 
measurement (that is, of the length) it will necessarily follow that the one which is 
to define the breadth leaves the first at a right angle.  That which is to denote the 
altitude, which is the third dimension, going out from the same point, also forms 
right angles and not oblique angles with the other two.  And thus by three 
perpendiculars you will have determined the three dimensions AB length, AC 
breadth, and AD height, by three unique, definite, and shortest lines.29
Here, dimensions are specified by reference to presupposed “determinants” – basically, 
conceptual representations of the dimensions.  Each of these “determinants” is both linear and 
perpendicular to the others.  A body is “measured,” then, by specifying its magnitude in each of 
                                                 
28 See Gingrich, “The Galileo Sunspot Controversy:  Proof and Persuasion.” 
29 “Adunque se voi stabilirete alcun punto per capo e termine delle misure, e da esso farete partire una retta linea 
come determinatrice della prima misura, cioè della lunghezza, bisognerà per necessità che quella che dee definir la 
larghezza si parta ad angolo retto sopra la prima, e che quella che ha da notar l'altezza, che è la terza dimensione, 
partendo dal medesimo punto formi, pur con le altre due, angoli non obliqui, ma retti: e così dalle tre perpendicolari 
avrete, come da tre linee une e certe e brevissime, determinate le tre dimensioni, AB lunghezza, AC larghezza, AD 
altezza.”  Galilei, Dialogue, 13-4; Galilei. Opere, VII 37. 
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these dimensions.  That is, the measure of a body is given by the distance it subtends along 
directions parallel to the three assumed “determinants” of dimension.  The dimensions denoted 
by the “determinants” are parallel to themselves (and perpendicular to one another) throughout 
the space.  In the small scale, a body can be described on the basis of a presupposed linear 
framework. 
The three “determinants” of dimension also allow the specification of directions.  For 
instance, the direction “down” is denoted by the “determinant” of height. Thus, in a spatial 
framework structured by one set of dimensions, the direction “down” will be everywhere parallel 
to itself and everywhere perpendicular to the directions denoted by the other determinants.  In 
other words, the small-scale space structured by the single set of dimensions is oriented.  It 
possesses a self-parallel orientation (i.e., the vertical) by which directions can be specified.30
There are similar examples of Galileo’s use of a rectilinear representation of space for 
small-scale phenomena throughout his texts.  In the early De Motu, a linear framework grounds 
Galileo’s discussion of inclined planes: 
Let there be a line ab directed toward the center of the universe and thus 
perpendicular to a plane parallel to the horizon.  And let bc lie in that plane 
parallel to the horizon.  Now from point b let any number of lines be drawn 
making acute angles with line bc, e.g., lines bd and be.  The problem, then, is why 
a body moving down descends most quickly on line ab; and on line bd more 
quickly than on be, but more slowly than on ba; and on be more slowly than on 
bd.31
Galileo assumes that the vertical is directed “toward the center of the universe,” i.e., the 
terrestrial center.  The direction “down” is specified throughout the discussion as the direction 
parallel to the vertical line towards the center.  The horizontal, meanwhile, is denoted by a plane 
everywhere perpendicular to the vertical line.  Very similar discussions of planes appear in the 
First Day of the Dialogue and the Third Day of the Discourse.  The derivation of the parabolic 
                                                 
30 In fact, any of the three “determinants” would suffice as an orientation.  As we shall see, however, the 
“determinant” of “down” is most important.  The assumption of a particular “down” in the small scale allows the 
transition to the spherical representation of space employed in the large scale.  Significantly, this entails that the 
orientation of the space is not arbitrary.  It is determined by the larger scale representation of space within which the 
local framework is supposed to fit.  This nesting of frameworks will be addressed below. 
31 “Sit itaque linea ab, ad centrum mundi tendens, quae ad planum horizonti aequidistans sit perpendicularis; in 
plano autem horizonti aequidistanti sit linea bc; ex puncto autem b educantur lineae quoteunque, que cum linea bc 
angulos acutos contineant, sintque lineae bd, be.  Quaeritur igitur cur mobile, descendens, citissime descendat per 
lineam ab; per lineam vero bed, citius quam per be, tardius tamen quam per ba; et per lineam be, tardius quam per 
bd.”  Galilei, “De Motu,” 63-4; Galilei. Opere, I 296-97. 
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path of projectiles in the Discourse also relies on the assumption that the vertical (accelerated) 
motion of a thrown body is everywhere parallel to itself and everywhere perpendicular to its 
horizontal (uniform) motion.32  Thus, the use of linear representations of space for small-scale 
phenomena persists throughout Galileo’s intellectual career. 
There are two features of Galileo’s framework for small-scale space that deserve special 
notice.  First, note that Galileo never implies that the “determinants” of dimension can be 
considered as infinite.  The assumed lines that denote dimensions do not stretch to infinity.  Also, 
the dimensions denoted by the assumed “determinants” are only parallel to themselves and 
perpendicular to one another in one small region of space.  If one were to move to another region 
of space and construct a new set of “determinants,” there is no guarantee that the new “height” 
will be parallel to the old “height,” and similarly for “length” and “breadth.”  In fact, as we shall 
see, in most cases the new dimensions will not be parallel to the old ones.  Altogether, then, the 
space structured by a single set of presupposed lines is limited to some local region of the 
cosmos.  Galileo’s linear representation of space only applies on the small scale.  Only local 
phenomena can be described and explained on the basis of a rectilinear representation of space. 
Second, note that the orientation of the representation of space is not completely 
arbitrary.  In particular, the line denoting “height” and, thus, the vertical (directions “up” and 
“down”) is everywhere restricted to a specific direction.  The vertical always corresponds to a 
line perpendicular to the earth’s surface, and, by extension, toward the terrestrial center.  
Similarly, since “length” and “breadth” are perpendicular to “height,” they are restricted to the 
horizontal plane – i.e., the plane perpendicular to the vertical.  (Within this plane, though, the 
orientation of “length” and “breadth” is arbitrary.)  In other words, the orientations of the 
presupposed linear “determinants” that ground descriptions and explanations in Galileo’s small-
scale space are, in part, determined by his framework for larger spaces, which includes a 
presupposition of the center toward which the vertical is directed.  We shall see how this allows 
the small-scale representation of space to “fit” within a larger spherical spatial framework. 
                                                 
32 Galileo Galilei, Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences, trans. Henry Crew and Alfonso de Salvio (New York: 
Dover Publications, 1954), “Fourth Day,” esp. 248ff. 
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5.4 LINEAR AND CIRCULAR INERTIA 
Stillman Drake has argued that the apparent tension between linear and circular inertia in 
Galileo’s work is a result of the medieval distinction between “natural” and “violent” or 
“impressed” motions.  We shall argue below that Drake’s explanation is insufficient, but his 
discussion leads us in the right direction.  For Galileo’s predecessors and contemporaries, 
“natural” and “violent” motion constituted two distinct physical regimes, each appealing to 
different causal explanations.  Of course, the particulars of individuals’ physical theories varied, 
but the broad outline, including the separation of “natural” and “violent” phenomena, applied 
generally.33  Natural motion, on the one hand, was a result of the inherent nature of the moving 
body itself.  The cause, therefore, was an essential and ever-present feature of the body.  Hence, 
the body would always tend to move, and would do so, unless impeded by some external 
obstacle.  Violent motion, on the other hand, was caused by some external source of motion.  
The external cause would impress some motive power, or impetus, on the object (or, on the 
Aristotelian view, on the medium surrounding it), setting it in motion. 
While Galileo adopted the vocabulary of “natural” and “violent,” he modified both 
theories in such a way that essentially dissolved the distinction.  As for natural motion, Galileo 
acknowledged the medieval view that heavy bodies fall, and light bodies rise, because of their 
internal heaviness, or lightness.34  In addition, however, he argued that a terrestrial body was, by 
its nature, “indifferent” to circular motion around the earth.  A heavy body might naturally seek 
the center of the earth, and resist motion away from the center, but it would neither seek nor 
resist motion that did not change its altitude.  Once set in motion by an external cause, then, the 
                                                 
33 The distinction between “natural” and “violent” motion is present, in a way, in the impetus theories of Galileo’s 
medieval predecessors.  Generally speaking, they held that the original “motor” of a body could be natural (e.g., 
gravity) or unnatural (a violent propulsion).  The original force would then impart an impetus that continued the 
motion.  For a discussion of this general point, see Clagett, The Science of Mechanics in the Middle Ages, 678-81.  
For particular examples, see the work of John Buridan (Clagett, The Science of Mechanics in the Middle Ages, 534-
6, 57-62.), Nicole Oresme (Clagett, The Science of Mechanics in the Middle Ages, 570.), and Giovanni Battista 
Benedetti (Drake and Drabkin, Mechanics in Sixteenth-Century Italy, 216-8.).  For one example of the distinction 
without reference to impetus, see Niccolò Tartaglia (Drake and Drabkin, Mechanics in Sixteenth-Century Italy, 72, 
75-6.) 
34 Galileo asserted, however, that the distinction was relative, not absolute.  That is, for Galileo, all terrestrial 
elements possessed an innate tendency to move downward.  This tendency was simply more effective in the “heavy” 
elements.  Thus, the “light” elements, fire and air, were displaced upward by the “heavy” elements water and earth.  
See Galilei, “De Motu.”  A similar position had been suggested earlier by Benedetti, though it is unclear how much 
Galileo knew of it.  See Drake and Drabkin, Mechanics in Sixteenth-Century Italy, 37-41, 196ff. 
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body would continue to move horizontally, i.e., around the center, until impeded by another 
external obstacle.  Strictly speaking, this was initially an impressed motion, but the motion 
continued by virtue of the body’s natural “indifference.”  Thus, Galileo included continued 
horizontal motion in the class of “neutral” or “natural” motions.35
Galileo accepted, meanwhile, that “violent” motions were caused by an externally 
impressed impetus.  Early in his career, in the De Motu treatise, he argued that the impetus in a 
body would spontaneously dissipate, like sound in a bell or heat in an iron bar.36  Later, however, 
Galileo came to believe that this impetus is “indelibly impressed.”37  That is, it does not dissipate 
spontaneously, but tends to remain in the body.  Thus, freed from external encumbrances, a body 
set in “violent” motion would retain its impressed impetus and continue to move perpetually.  In 
practice, however, this does not actually happen, since the impetus is quickly removed by 
external resistance.38
Notice that Galileo’s view of “natural” and “violent” motions reduces the distinction 
between them.  Both theories of motion entail a basic inertial principle.  The continued motion 
(or rest) of a body is explained by the body’s ability to preserve an initial state of motion (or 
rest).  If the motion is “natural,” the body is “indifferent” to its original motion, and continues to 
move.  If the motion is “violent,” the body retains its original impetus, and continues to move.  In 
either case, the body receives an initial motion and then conserves it.  Galileo’s use of two 
distinct vocabularies to describe and explain motions belies what Drake calls the “essential core 
of the inertial concept”39 common to all:  A body is indifferent to motion and rest, and will 
continue in either state if undisturbed.  Galileo uses this basic notion to explain both “natural” 
and “violent” motions. 
                                                 
35 See Galilei, Dialogue, 147ff.  Similar theories had been adumbrated earlier by Nicole Oresme and Girolamo 
Cardano.  See Clagett, The Science of Mechanics in the Middle Ages, 602-3, 81-2; Drake and Drabkin, Mechanics in 
Sixteenth-Century Italy, 28-9; Dugas, A History of Mechanics, 63. 
36 Galilei, “De Motu,” 79-80.  This had been the position of his teacher, Francesco Buonamico.  Clagett, The Science 
of Mechanics in the Middle Ages, 666-7; Koyré, Études Galiléennes, 28ff.  Buonamico was himself following the 
tradition of Simplicius, Philoponus, Avicenna, Franciscus de Marchia and others who held that impetus was self-
corrupting.  See Clagett, The Science of Mechanics in the Middle Ages, ch. 8. 
37 Galilei, Dialogue, 154. 
38 This view of impetus corresponded with the theories of Buridan, Oresme, and others who held that impetus tended 
to remain in a body, but was diminished by external resistance or contrary forces (such as gravity).  See Clagett, The 
Science of Mechanics in the Middle Ages, ch. 8, 666-9. 
39 Stillman Drake. Essays on Galileo and the History and Philosophy of Science, N. M. Swerdlow and Trevor 
Harvey Levere, eds., vol. II (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 143. 
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Galileo’s idea of inertia, in its barest form, is not explanatory, though.  The simple 
proposition “bodies continue their motion” cannot account for any real phenomenon.  It must 
first be deployed in a context that gives significance to this statement.  That is, there must be 
some way to tell whether a body is continuing its motion; some way to tell what such behavior 
“looks like.”  Basically, the continuation of motion means that a body moves with the same 
motion at subsequent times.  Two motions are the “same” if they are in the same direction at the 
same speed.  The specification of direction and speed, however, are determined by an assumed 
representation of space.  Hence, the core concept of Galilean inertia must be associated with a 
particular concept of space before it can be applied to a phenomenon.  The spatial framework 
cashes out the meaning of “continued motion” and maps the inertial principle onto the 
phenomenon it is meant to explain. 
Galileo’s two conceptions of space profoundly affect his causal account of terrestrial 
motions.  The core principle takes on different explanatory guises – one linear, one circular – 
depending on the situation to be explained.  Whether inertia is assumed to be linear or circular 
depends on the spatial framework by which the physical situation is represented. 
In a rectilinear representation of space, directions are specified in relation to an 
orientation – a stipulated line or ray.  A particular direction is then conceived as an angular 
deflection from that orientation.  Two motions, are in the same direction, then, if they are equally 
deflected from the orientation – i.e., linear and parallel to one another.  Speeds, meanwhile, are 
specified as some relation between distance and time.  Distance, in a rectilinear space, is 
measured linearly.  Thus, two motions have the same speed if they cover the same linear distance 
in the same time.  Therefore, if one supposes a rectilinear representation of space, the core 
concept of Galilean inertia entails that a body in motion will continue to move parallel to itself – 
along a straight line – with uniform linear speed. 
In a spherical representation of space, directions are related to the center.  They are 
specified as deflections from a radius to the center.  Two motions are the same if they share a 
deflection from the radius.  Circular motion around the center, therefore, retains its direction, 
since the motion is always perpendicular to the radius.  Restricting ourselves to this case, since it 
is the one that concerns Galileo,40 the speed of circular motion is related to the angular distance 
                                                 
40 Linear motions directly to and from the center also retain their direction in a spherical frame, but Galileo always 
considers these to be accelerated or decelerated, and therefore not inertial. 
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subtended in some amount of time.  Hence, in a spherical representation of space, Galilean 
inertia entails circular motion with uniform angular velocity. 
We have argued that Galileo employs a linear representation of small-scale spaces and a 
spherical representation of large-scale spaces.  It follows that linear inertia applies in small-scale 
situations, while circular inertia pertains to large-scale phenomena.  In fact, Galileo applies these 
inertial principles fairly consistently according to scale.  For example, Galileo usually considers 
projectiles as small-scale phenomena.  Hence, he usually ascribes a linear principle of inertia to 
explain their behavior.  Take his description of a rock thrown from a notched stick in the 
Dialogue: 
SALV:  Then let us proceed.  Simplicio, tell me what motion is made by that little 
rock, tight in the notch of the stick, when the boy moves it so as to cast it a long 
way?... 
SIMP:  So far as I can see, the motion received on leaving the notch can only be 
along a straight line.  Or rather, it is necessarily along a straight line, so far as the 
adventitious impetus is concerned.  Seeing that it described an arc caused me 
some little trouble, but since that arc bends always downward, and not in any 
other direction, I recognized that this inclination comes from the weight of the 
stone which naturally pulls it down. The impressed impetus, I say, is undoubtedly 
in a straight line… 
SALV:  You have reasoned well, and have shown yourself half a geometer.  Keep 
it in mind, then, that your real concept is revealed in these words; that is, that the 
projectile acquires an impetus to move along the tangent to the arc described by 
the motion of the projectile at the point of its separation from the thing projecting 
it.41
The thrown rock is a small-scale phenomenon.  It occurs in a limited space.  As a result, Galileo 
assumes a rectilinear representation of space.  The rectilinear representation of space, 
meanwhile, leads to a linear principle of inertia or, in this case, “impetus.”  The rock, if the effect 
of its weight is ignored, will continue moving in a straight line.  Of course, the derivation of the 
parabolic trajectory of projectiles in the Discourse also relies on a linear representation of space, 
                                                 
41 “SALV. Seguitiamo dunque: e dicami il signor Simplicio qual sia il moto che fa quel sassetto stretto nella cocca 
della canna, mentre il fanciullo la muove per tirarlo lontano...  SIMP. Secondo me il moto concepito nell'uscir della 
cocca non può esser se non per linea retta; anzi pur è egli necessariamente per linea retta, intendendo del puro 
impeto avventizio. Mi dava un poco di fastidio il vedergli descriver un arco; ma perché tal arco piega sempre 
all'ingiú, e non verso altra parte, comprendo che quel declinare vien dalla gravità della pietra, che naturalmente la 
tira al basso. L'impeto impresso dico senz'altro ch'è per linea retta...  SALV. Voi benissimo avete discorso, e vi sete 
dimostrato mezo geometra. Ritenete dunque in memoria che il vostro concetto reale si spiega con queste parole: cioè 
che il proietto acquista impeto di muoversi per la tangente l'arco descritto dal moto del proiciente nel punto della 
separazione di esso proietto dal proiciente.”  Galilei, Dialogue, 191-2; Galilei. Opere, VII 217-18. 
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where the “horizontal” is understood as a plane “represented by a straight line”42 perpendicular 
to the vertical.  This assumption leads to the linear conservation of horizontal motion and, in 
turn, to the parabola. 
On the other hand, Galileo usually considers oceanic voyages as examples of global-scale 
phenomena.  Consider the following from the Letters on Sunspots: 
And therefore, all external impediments removed, a heavy body on a spherical 
surface concentric with the earth will be indifferent to rest and to movements 
toward any part of the horizon.  And it will maintain itself in that state in which it 
has once been placed; that is, if placed in a state of rest, it will conserve that; and 
if placed in movement toward the west (for example), it will maintain itself in that 
movement.  Thus a ship, for instance, having once received some impetus through 
the tranquil sea, would move continually around our globe without ever stopping; 
and placed at rest it would perpetually remain at rest, if in the first case all 
extrinsic impediments could be removed, and in the second case no external cause 
of motion were added.43
The motion of the ship on a long voyage is a globally-sized phenomenon.  Hence, the 
representation of space is spherical, so the “horizontal” is a “spherical surface concentric with 
the [center of] the earth.”  It follows, then, that motion is conserved circularly, and the ship, once 
moved, will “move continually around our globe.”  Similarly, in the Dialogue, Galileo concludes 
that a “ship, when it moves over a calm sea” is “disposed to move incessantly and uniformly 
[around the earth] from an impulse once received.”44  The global scale of the situation leads to a 
spherical representation of space and thence to a principle of circular inertia. 
Every once in a while, however, Galileo presents a situation that is neither small- nor 
large-scale.  The motion of a projectile on a rotating earth is one such circumstance.  As we have 
seen, projectiles are usually thought of as small-scale phenomena, but the rotation of the earth is 
obviously of a global-scale.  In the absence of a clear determination of scale, it is unclear which 
                                                 
42 Galilei, Discourse, 250. 
43 “...e però, rimossi tutti gl’impedimenti esterni, un grave nella superficie sferica e concentrica alla Terra sarà 
indifferente alla quiete ed a i movimenti verso qualunque parte dell’orizonte, ed in quello stato si conserverà nel qual 
una volta sarà posto; cioè se sarà messo in stato di quiete, quello conserverà, e se sarà posto in movimento, v. g. 
verso occidente, nell’istesso si manterrà:  e così una nave, per essempio, avendo una sol volta ricevuto qualche impet 
per il mar tranquillo, si moverebbe continuamente intorno al nostro globo senza cessar mai, e postavi con quiete, 
perpetuamente quieterebbe, se nel primo caso si potessero rimuovere tutti gl’impedimenti estrinseci, e nel secondo 
qualche causa motrice esterna non gli sopraggiugnesse.”  Galileo Galilei, Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo (New 
York: Doubleday, 1957), 113-4; Galilei. Opere, V 134-35. 
44 “...una nave che vadia movendosi per la bonaccia del mare...  e però disposta... a muoversi, con l'impulso 
concepito una volta, incessabilmente e uniformemente.”  Galilei, Dialogue, 148; Galilei. Opere, VII 174. 
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of the two conceptions of space should be used to represent the situation.  As a result, Galileo 
equivocates.  He represents the same phenomenon both ways – linearly and spherically.45
It is this equivocation that gives rise to the apparent tension between linear and circular 
inertia.  Consider the passages presented at the beginning of this essay.  When Salviati responds 
to Simplicio’s argument about the cannonball dropped from the orbit of the moon, his response 
comes in two parts.  The first part is preoccupied with the “twenty-four-hour circular motion” of 
the “earth and everything else contained within that [i.e., the moon’s] orbit.”  Salviati regards the 
situation spherically, ascribes circular inertia (or impetus – he speaks of the “force” which makes 
the cannonball move), and concludes that the ball will fall upon the “point of the earth which it 
stood over at its departure.”  The second part of the response, however, focuses on the 
cannonball’s local-scale “approach toward the earth” through successive small regions of space 
from moment to moment.  Thus, Salviati switches to a linear representation of space and a linear 
principle of inertia.  On this view, the ball conserves its linear speed and “ought to run ahead of 
the whirling of the earth.” 
In the argument over hunters and cannons, Salviati is mainly concerned with the rotation 
of the earth and applies a spherical concept of space.  Since the turning of the hunter represents 
the turning of the earth, he assumes a spherical framework for both the hunters and the cannons.  
The resulting appeal to circular inertia leads to a prediction that the shots will hit their targets.  
Sagredo, meanwhile, focuses on the motion of the projectiles as they move from gun to target.  
These are taken to be local phenomena, and he applies a linear concept of space.  Thus, he 
appeals to linear inertia and predicts the shots will miss.  Salviati sees one large motion of earth, 
gun, shot, and target together.  Sagredo sees small movements of the projectiles from gun to 
target.  The kind of motion and the scale of the phenomenon seem to indicate both 
representations of space, and Galileo uses both.  Consequently, he predicts two outcomes of the 
experiment.  The appearance of a tension between linearity and circularity arises from Galileo’s 
dual representations of space. 
                                                 
45 The situation is also compatible when Galileo uses a small-scale phenomenon as an analogy for larger-scale 
phenomenon.  The discussion of bird hunting above is one example, where Salviati applies a principle of circular 
inertia to a small-scale phenomenon.  Another example is Drake’s favorite hobby-horse, Galileo’s discussion of 
centrifugal motion, where Galileo uses the linear impetus applicable to a whirled object to explain why objects do 
not fly off a spinning earth.  (Galilei, Dialogue, 192ff.)  Drake calls this the “single instance [sufficient] to show that 
Galileo recognized the possibility of rectilinear inertia.”  Stillman Drake, Galileo Studies (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1970), 267. 
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5.5 CONCEPT OF INERTIA 
At this point, we should pause to clarify our position on issues often discussed in the literature.  
Historians have long debated the modernity of Galilean inertia.  This debate has run along three 
lines.  First, whether Galilean inertia is circular or linear.  Second, whether Galilean inertia is 
more like the pre-Galilean, medieval theory of impetus or the post-Galilean, “classical”46 theory 
of inertia.  Finally, whether the first issue has anything to do with the second – i.e., whether a 
principle of inertia must be linear in order to be “modern.”  Clearly, the first facet of the 
argument is the concern of this essay.  The second issue, however, is not germane to our 
discussion, (obviating any need to discuss the third).  Yet, since the two points are closely 
related, we should explain why the latter can be avoided. 
On the impetus theory of motion, the movement of a body is the result of a physical 
cause, or force, added to the body when it is first set in motion.  When the body is deprived of 
this additional impetus, it returns to and remains at rest.  On the modern, inertial view, on the 
other hand, motion and rest are simply states of a body.  Once a body is put into a state of motion 
or rest, it will simply remain in that state.  No additional cause or force is needed to preserve the 
motion.  The historical debate ensues because Galileo is stubbornly ambiguous about what he 
means when he talks about bodies retaining their motions.  He seems to speak both ways.  
Sometimes, he describes bodies as “indifferent” to states of motion and rest.  Thus, it seems that 
motion is a state and lacks a continuing cause.  Elsewhere, motion is brought about by a 
persisting impetus, and Galileo certainly drew upon the impetus theories of his forbears and 
teachers47 when formulating his own view.  In the Letters on Sunspots passage quoted above, for 
example, Galileo mentions states of motion and impetus in successive sentences.  Hence, 
historians can attribute any number of positions to Galileo on the basis of his texts.48
                                                 
46 Here, “classical” (Koyré’s term) refers to modern physics prior to the advent of relativity and quantum mechanics. 
47 See above. 
48 Koyré, for example, argues that Galilean inertia was, first, irreducibly circular and, second, akin to medieval 
theories of impetus.  On both counts, he claims, Galileo’s “physics of impetus is incompatible with the [modern] 
principle of inertia.” Koyré, Études Galiléennes, 64.  Drake, for his part, is satisfied that Galileo “could perceive the 
possibility of continued uniform rectilinear motion,” even though most of his statements actually refer to some form 
of circular inertia.  Drake, Galileo Studies, 271.  Galileo’s retention of circularity, however, is merely a “secondary” 
consideration.  For Drake, Galileo’s principle of “indifference” to states of motion and rest is paramount, and draws 
his notion of inertia away from medieval notions of impetus and into line with the modern concept, linear or not.  
See Drake, Galileo Studies, 246-7.  Anneliese Maier and Maurice Clavelin advocate a similar position, stressing the 
continuity between motion and rest in Galileo’s later work.  See Clavelin, “Conceptual and Technical Aspects of the 
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We can skirt this debate because it revolves around the ontic status of the continued 
motion, not the epistemological and physical issues with which we are concerned.  We are not 
interested in deciding whether the motion is caused by a real power, an impetus, superadded to 
the body, or if the motion is simply an inherent state of the body itself.  In either case, the 
explanatory value of “inertia” is the same.  Galilean inertia, whatever its ontic status, entails that 
a moving body, left undisturbed, will continue its motion.  Galileo can appeal to “inertia” to 
explain why a body keeps moving.  He says that the continued motion is caused by a body’s 
inertia.  That is, inertia explains phenomena, regardless of the metaphysical details of the 
concept.  Galileo’s lack of interest in the metaphysics, meanwhile, leaves the ontic question 
subsequent historians and philosophers have argued how to fill. 
Like Galileo, we are concerned with the explanatory role of inertia, not its true being.49  
Notice also that Galileo’s metaphysical disinterest helps account for the dissolution of the 
distinction between “natural” and “violent” motion mentioned above.  For Galileo, “natural” 
motion is merely an internal state of a body otherwise indifferent to motion or rest.  No thing has 
been added to the body to make it move.  “Violent” motion, on the other hand, is the result of an 
“impetus,” a quality superadded to the body by an external cause.  The body gains a quality it did 
not possess before it was set in motion.  Thus, the difference between these two kinds of motion 
is the ontic status of its theoretical cause.  The phenomenal properties of “natural” and “violent” 
motion are essentially the same:  the body is set in motion and then retains that original motion.  
It is not possible to tell what kind of motion is taking place just by looking at it.  By disregarding 
ontological differences, Galileo did dissolve the distinction between “natural” and “violent” 
motion into a “core inertial concept.” 
As Stillman Drake notices, however, Galileo continues to distinguish between “natural” 
and “violent” motion.  Moreover, Galileo generally associates rectilinearity with the “violent” 
motion of bodies.  That is, the continuation of “violently” impressed motions was in a straight 
                                                                                                                                                             
Galilean Geometrization of the Motion of Heavy Bodies.”; Anneliese Maier, On the Threshold of Exact Science, 
trans. Steven D. Sargent (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982), esp. 103-23.  Wallace Hooper, 
meanwhile, holds that Galileo possessed a theory of linear conserved motion, but that this was too similar to 
medieval impetus to be considered modern.  See Wallace Hooper, “Inertial problems in Galileo's preinertial 
framework,” in Cambridge Companion to Galileo, ed. Peter Machamer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), 171. 
49 This is why, like Galileo, we have used the terms “inertia” and “impetus” interchangeably.  For Galileo’s 
indifference to causes, see Galilei, Discourse, 166; Galilei. Opere, VIII 202; Koyré, Études Galiléennes; Wallace, 
Prelude to Galileo: Essays on Medieval and Sixteenth-Century Sources of Galileo's Thought, 149. 
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line.50  Galileo’s theory of “natural” or “neutral” motion, meanwhile, usually implies circular 
motion.  Terrestrial bodies are “indifferent” to motions that do not change their altitude, so they 
continue in circular motion around the earth.  As Drake argues: 
...Galileo is pretty consistent in applying the idea of essential circularity to 
instances in which the motion is a “natural” one in his sense; that is, a motion 
induced by an innate tendency of the body to move when it is set free.  The idea 
of essential rectilinearity, on the other hand, he applied most specifically to 
instances of “violent” motion – cannonballs and projectiles thrown by slings.51
Whenever Galileo speaks of “natural” motion, he generally assumes a principle of circular 
inertia.52  When he describes “violent” motions, he appeals to linear inertia. 
This terminological practice serves to confuse the first two facets of the historical 
discussion of Galilean inertia.  “Natural” motion, akin to the classical notion of inertial 
indifference, seems attached to decidedly medieval circular motions.  “Violent” motions, 
redolent of medieval impetus, seem associated with modern linearity.  Historians, therefore, are 
free to emphasize and downplay these links.53  In our view, though, Galileo’s consistent 
association of linearity and circularity with violence and nature does not imply that the two 
distinctions are the same.  Indeed, Galileo’s ignorance of the latter, ontological distinction does 
not imply that he can sidestep the former, explanatory distinction.  While the distinction between 
“natural” and “violent” motions may not be observed in phenomena, the distinction between 
linear and circular inertia is.  The two principles lead to different explanations and different 
predictions of phenomena, as is clear in the passages discussed above.  Thus, the distinction 
between linear and circular inertia is not grounded merely in the difference between “natural” 
and “violent” motion. 
The essential concept of inertia, common to both “natural” and “violent” modes of 
explanation, must be deployed in the context of a representation of space, and there is a real, 
                                                 
50 Drake, Galileo Studies, 270. 
51 Ibid., 274. 
52 We are restricting the discussion to the unaccelerated, horizontal motion of bodies around the earth.  Clearly, 
Galileo also speaks of falling and floating bodies as examples of vertical, accelerated motions that are “natural” but 
neither circular nor inertial. 
53 Drake, for example, argues that the association of “natural” and “violent” with circular and inertial is merely a 
rhetorical device.  Drake claims that Galileo’s haphazard switches between “natural” and “violent” are intended to 
“lead his readers easily along” from the “less involved” notion of circular inertia to the “more refined principle of 
linear inertia.”  Drake, Galileo Studies, 270.  Koyré, on the other hand, argues that the circularity of “natural” 
motion reveals the medieval hantise du sphérique et du circulaire in Galileo’s work. See Koyré, Études Galiléennes, 
187, 273.   
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conceptual difference between linear and spherical spatial concepts.  Linear inertia results from a 
linear representation of space, the circular inertia a spherical frame.  Thus, one cannot simply 
discuss linear and circular inertia in terms of “natural” and “violent” motions.  The first two 
facets of historical debate, often confused, must be cleaved off from one another.  Galileo’s 
appeals to linear and circular inertia point to a significant conceptual bivalence in Galileo’s 
treatment of phenomena:  his dual representation of space.  The terminological distinction 
between “natural” and “violent” motion, meanwhile, is merely incidental to the true conceptual 
difference between circular and linear inertia.  We can therefore concern ourselves with the 
linearity and circularity of Galilean inertia without addressing its ontic status, or, for that matter, 
its modernity. 
Galileo’s consistent association of the terminological distinction with the conceptual one, 
which Drake was right to point out, only obscures the duality of his representations of space.  
Yet the very consistency of the association indicates that there is some link between the modes of 
explanation and the inertial principles that must be accounted for.  In fact, the linkage is 
established via Galileo’s representations of space.  For Galileo, and just about everyone else 
before him, “violent” motions were necessarily temporary and short-lived.  The motion imparted 
to the moving body (or the conducting medium) always dissipated rapidly, either spontaneously 
or, as Galileo held, because of external resistance.54  This implies that “violent” phenomena are 
temporary, fleeting, and – most importantly – small.  In other words, “violent” motion, such as 
that of a projectile, generally takes place in the small-scale.  This entails, as we have seen, that 
“violent” motions are represented linearly, and this, in turn, means they are explained by linear 
inertia.  Conversely, for Galileo and his peers, “natural” motions, like those of terrestrial bodies 
around the center of the earth, were perpetual and global.  For Galileo, these motions demanded 
a spherical representation and, thus, circular inertia.  The indirect association of linearity with 
“violent” and circularity with “natural” is a consequence of their separate, direct associations 
with linear or spherical representations of space.  The indirect association, meanwhile, hides the 
direct ones.  Drake noticed the indirect links, but not the direct ones.  The direct links, moreover, 
                                                 
54 Galileo believed one could separate the conserved motion from the resistances it encountered, but only in the 
abstract.  In reality, resistance always overcomes the impressed motion.  In the Dialogue, for example, Galileo 
assumes that an impressed motion is preserved supposing all “external and accidental impediments” are ignored.  
Galilei, Dialogue, 147-8. 
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reveal the real explanatory difference between linear and circular inertia, which Drake and others 
likewise missed. 
5.6 THE ARCHIMEDEAN APPROXIMATION 
While the use of two representations of space generates the appearance of inconsistency when it 
comes to his explanatory principles, Galileo himself does not think the two spatial concepts are 
incompatible.  In the small-scale, rectilinear space is to be used, just as spherical space is to be 
used at larger scales.  As for middle-sized phenomena, the two representations are meant to “fit” 
together such that the differences in description, explanation, and prediction arising from the 
different conceptual frameworks are “insensible” and therefore negligible. 
In fact, Galileo gives an explicit approximation by which one can translate the 
representation of a phenomenon from one spatial framework to the other.  The “Archimedean” 
approximation handles the transition from one spatial frame to the other, as explained in the De 
Motu: 
Now I am not unaware that someone at this point may object that for the purpose 
of these proofs I am assuming as true the proposition that weights suspended from 
a balance make right angles with the balance – a proposition that is false, since the 
weights, directed as they are to the center [of the universe], are convergent.  To 
such objectors I would answer that I cover myself with the protecting wings of the 
superhuman Archimedes, whose name I never mention without a feeling of awe.  
For he made this same assumption in his Quadrature of the Parabola…55
Or in the Discourse: 
I ask you not to begrudge our Author that which other eminent men have assumed 
even if not strictly true.  The authority of Archimedes alone will satisfy 
everybody.  In his Mechanics and in his first quadrature of the parabola he takes 
for granted that the beam of a balance or steelyard is a straight line, every point of 
                                                 
55 “Hic autem non me praeterit, posse aliquem obiicere, me ad has demonstrationes tanquam verum id supponere 
quod falsum est:  nempe, suspense pondera ex lance, sum lance angulos rectos continere; cum tamen pondera ad 
centrum tendentia concurrerent.  His responderem, me sub suprahumani Archimedis (quem nunquam absque 
admiratione nomino) alis memet protegere.  Ipse enim hoc idem in sua Parabolae quadratura supposuit;”  Galilei, 
“De Motu,” 67; Galilei. Opere, I 300. 
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which is equidistant from the common center of all heavy bodies, and that the 
cords by which heavy bodies are suspended are parallel to each other.56
An authority no less than the “superhuman Archimedes” legitimates Galileo’s use of dual spatial 
concepts.  The direction in which heavy bodies tend – i.e., “down” – can be represented by a 
“convergent” direction in spherical space, or by a “parallel” one in rectilinear space.  In either 
case, the one representation approximates the other.  Similarly, the “horizontal plane, which 
slopes neither up nor down” can be “represented by a straight line as if each point on this line 
were equally distant from the center” or as a curved surface concentric with the spatial center.57  
As one shifts from one representation to another, one can simply substitute one signification of 
“down” or “horizontal” for the other.  Galileo assumes that any difference in the “proofs,” 
descriptions, and explanations resulting from different spatial concepts will be negligibly small.  
Thus, both the large-scale spherical representation and the small-scale rectilinear representation 
of space are legitimate conceptual bases for the description and explanation of phenomena. 
Of course, Galileo acknowledges, the Archimedean approximation is only valid under 
certain conditions: 
Some consider this assumption permissible because, in practice, our instruments 
and the distances involved are so small in comparison with the enormous distance 
from the center of the earth that we may consider a minute of arc on a great circle 
as a straight line, and may regard the perpendiculars let fall from its two 
extremities as parallel.58
The linear representation must “fit” within the larger spherical space.  That is, the dimensions of 
the bit of space to be represented must be small compared to its distance to the center of the 
spherical frame (in this case, the earth’s center) so that the curvature of the space’s spherical 
representation is negligible.  Put more simply, rectilinear representations are only applicable to 
                                                 
56 “...ma ben, all’incontro, domando che elle non contendano al nostro Autor medesimo quello che altri grandissimi 
uomini hanno supposto, ancor che falso.  E la sola autorità d’Archimede può quietare ogn’uno, il quale nelle sue 
Mecaniche e nella prima Quadratura della parabola, piglia come pricipio vero, l’ago della bilancia o stadera essere 
una linea retta in ogni suo punto equalmente distante dal centro commune de i gravi, e le corde alle quali sono 
appesi i gravi esser tra di loro parallele...”  Galilei, Discourse, 251; Galilei. Opere, VIII 274. 
57 “...noi supponghiamo che il piano orizontale, il quale non sia nè acclive nè declive, sia una linea retta, quasi che 
una simil linea sia in tutte le sue parti equalmente distante dal centro...”  Galilei, Discourse, 250; Galilei. Opere, 
VIII 274. 
58 “...la qual licenza viene da alcuni scusata, perchè nelle nostre pratiche gli strumenti nostri e le distanze le quali 
vengono da noi adoperate, son così piccole in comparazione della nostra gran lontananza dal centro del globo 
terrestre, che ben possiamo prendere un minuto di un grado del cerchio massimo come se fusse una linea retta, e due 
perpendicoli che da i suoi estremi pendessero, come se fussero paralleli.”  Galilei, Discourse, 251; Galilei. Opere, 
VIII 274-75. 
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small-scale phenomena relatively distant from the presupposed center.  Also, the vertical 
direction of the rectilinear representation must roughly coincide with the vertical of the spherical.  
That is, the linear vertical must be directed to the spherical center at some point in the space, as 
we have seen.  If these conditions are met, Galileo assumes, the approximation will hold and his 
deductions will be valid in either conceptual frame.  For example, he claims only “insensible 
changes” in the parabolic trajectory would result from switching from a rectilinear to spherical 
representation of projectile motion.59
The Archimedean approximation finally resolves the apparent tension between linearity 
and circularity we have been discussing.  It does so in two respects.  First, Galileo is not 
concerned with unobservable effects.  His project in (the first three Days of) the Dialogue, for 
example, is to “show that all experiments practicable upon the earth are insufficient measures for 
proving its mobility, since they are indifferently adaptable to an earth in motion or at rest.”60  In 
other words, Galileo wants to demonstrate that no terrestrial observation can prove the motion or 
stability of the earth.  (In the Fourth Day, Galileo attempts to use observations of the tides to this 
end.)  Unobservable effects are neither here nor there – they neither help nor hinder Galileo’s 
case.  Galileo is perfectly aware that, in the case of the hunters and cannons, Salviati and Sagredo 
reach different conclusions about the outcome of the situation because of their differing 
representations of space.  But because the two representations approximate one another,61 
Galileo assumes that the resulting differences will be negligible.  Thus, the argument between 
Sagredo and Salviati, which seems like conceptual dissonance to a modern reader, is actually 
acceptable in Galileo’s eyes, so long as the difference between Sagredo’s prediction and 
Salviati’s remains unobservable.62  In the end, Galileo can dismiss their disagreement by 
                                                 
59 “...ben potranno solo insensibilimente alterar quella figura parabolica...”  Galilei, Discourse, 252; Galilei. Opere, 
VIII 275.  Galileo leaves these “insensible changes” unanalyzed.  He argues that they would be easily overwhelmed 
by air resistance, anyway.  On the other hand, he does say that his argument would fail were the projectile to fall to 
the center of the earth, where the Archimedean approximation breaks down.  See Wallace, Prelude to Galileo: 
Essays on Medieval and Sixteenth-Century Sources of Galileo's Thought, 151ff. 
60 “...mostrare tutte l’ esperienze fattibili nella Terra essere mezi insufficienti a concluder la sua mobilità, ma 
indifferentemente potersi adattare così alla Terra mobile, come anco quiescente;”  Galilei, Dialogue, 6; Galilei. 
Opere, VII 30. 
61 The phenomenon in question – cannon fire on the surface of the earth – occupies a small space far enough from 
the center of the earth to satisfy, in Galileo’s view, the conditions of the Archimedean approximation. 
62 For more on the rhetorical role of experiment in Galileo, see Dear, Discipline and Experience:  The Mathematical 
Way in the Scientific Revolution. 
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pointing out that the westward deflection caused by the rotation of the earth, as predicted by 
Sagredo, “is insensible because of the small distance from the cannon to the mark.”63
In the second place, Galileo’s discussions of the Archimedean approximation leave no 
doubt as to which spatial concept he considers the “real” representation of space and which the 
mere approximation.  Even though they are legitimate presuppositions from which valid 
arguments can be deduced, the propositions underlying a rectilinear representation of space are 
“false.”  Rectilinear concepts do not correspond to the actual state of affairs.  “Down” is not self-
parallel, but convergent.  The “horizontal” really is a spherical surface.  While it is permissible to 
use a rectilinear frame to represent small-scale spaces, this is only an approximation of the 
spherical reality.  Galileo is willing to assume a rectilinear conception of space for the sake of 
argument.  In reality, though, Galileo thinks space is spherical.  It follows from this that, though 
linear inertia can legitimately be used to predict phenomena, it is just the consequence of a small-
scale, approximate spatial framework.  Galileo does not deny that Sagredo’s prediction is valid, 
yet the conclusion has been drawn from a false premise.  Globally, Galilean inertia is circular. 
5.7 CONCLUSION 
For Alexandre Koyré, the distinguishing characteristic of early modern science is the principle of 
linear inertia.  The development of this single notion marked the passing of ancient and medieval 
physics and the advent of the new scientific order.  To accept it meant the rejection of the 
“essential traits” of medieval science, teleological metaphysics and the evidence of “common 
sense.”64  Acceptance of linear inertia also required, said Koyré, the “geometrization of space” – 
the adoption of a rectilinear, “Euclidean” representation of space.65  It is this last move that 
Koyré denies Galileo, who Koyré claims always suffered from l’hantise du sphérique et du 
                                                 
63 Galilei, Dialogue, 179.  In fact, Galileo even calculates the effect of the earth’s rotation on the range of a 
cannonball fired along the parallel, i.e., east and west, and finds that the westward shot would fall about one inch 
shorter than an eastward one.  He finds that the effect is insignificant, not because it does not occur – he insists that 
“each one of these variations [in the ranges] contains one of one inch caused by the motion of the earth [cagianato 
dal moto della Terra]” – but because to make the effect observable, one would have to find “a method of shooting 
with such precision [tanto esatta] at a mark that you never miss by a hairsbreadth.”  See Galilei, Dialogue, 182; 
Galilei. Opere, VII 208. 
64 Koyré, Études Galiléennes, 33. 
65 Ibid., 15. 
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circulaire, the haunting or obsession of the spherical and circular.66  Thus, though Galileo did 
reject teleological explanation and “common sense” evidence, he did not formulate a principle of 
linear inertia.  Hence, Koyré famously argues, Galileo was but the last of the medievals, not the 
first of the moderns. 
Koyré’s placement of Galileo amongst medieval philosophers is disputed, most notably 
by Stillman Drake.  Drake contends that it is Koyré, not Galileo, who is “haunted” by circularity.  
He claims that the “essential core of the inertial concept” is “a body’s indifference to the states of 
motion and rest, and its perpetual continuance in either state if undisturbed.”67  Galileo clearly 
had possession of this notion.  Therefore, concludes Drake, Galileo was the first to formulate the 
principle of inertia, its circular nature notwithstanding.  Koyré’s insistence on linear inertia, 
meanwhile, is merely “a question of formal criteria, not one of significant fact.”  Thus, Koyré’s 
claim that Galileo was unable to conceive of inertial movement in straight lines is just an “ill-
founded conjecture concerning Galileo’s mental processes,” not an accurate characterization of 
the historically significant aspects of his science.68
Galileo’s own work indicates that things are both better and worse for the theses of Koyré 
and Drake.  In fact, Galileo comes closer to the principle of linear inertia than Koyré seems to 
allow.  Galileo does accept and use a rectilinear representation of space for small-scale spaces.  
There are instances in which he applies a principle of linear inertia to small- and even medium-
scale phenomena.  His predictions of the inertial deflection of projectiles in the passages 
presented at the start of this paper are two examples.  Nevertheless, Galileo remained deeply 
troubled by his fundamentally spherical representation of space – more troubled than Drake 
would like to admit.  Indeed, the tension between linear and circular principles of inertia results 
in the equivocation we have witnessed in the same passages.  The resolution of this tension 
reveals the true extent to which the “hantise of the spherical” affects his science. 
Consideration of Galileo’s representations of space finally dissolves Koyré’s historical 
paradox: 
                                                 
66 Ibid., 187, 273. 
67 Drake. Essays on Galileo and the History and Philosophy of Science, 143. 
68 Ibid., 144. 
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If, as we believe has been shown, Galileo did not formulate the principle of 
inertia, how is it that his successors and pupils could think they found it in his 
works?69
Our answer is Drake’s answer – the premise is wrong.  Galileo did accept a rectilinear 
representation of space and he did formulate the principle of linear inertia.  It was present in his 
work.  Nevertheless, Koyré is, in the end, right.  Galileo’s linear inertia is not a fundamental 
principle, but an approximation of one.  It results from the rectilinear approximation of an 
ultimately spherical space.  Galileo has not overcome the medieval conception of a spherical 
space.  He still suffers from the l’hantise du sphérique et du circulaire.   It remained for 
Galileo’s “successors and pupils” – especially, as we will see, Descartes – to promote his 
approximation to the foundation and, at least in Koyré’s eyes, become modern. 
 
                                                 
69 Koyré, Études Galiléennes, 292.  Translation is Drake’s.  See Drake, Galileo Studies, 265. 
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6.0  PROMOTION TO THE FOUNDATIONS:  CARTESIAN SPACE 
In the previous chapter, we argued that Galileo’s representation of space was fundamentally 
spherical.  His fleeting intimations of a linear space were meant as small-scale approximations of 
a spherical cosmic space.  Galileo’s linear space merely “fit” into the larger spherical scheme.  
As a result, Galileo’s ultimate explanations of physical phenomena appealed to a principle of 
circular inertia predicated on his spherical conceptual framework.  As we will discuss in the 
present chapter, the situation for René Descartes is almost precisely reversed.  Descartes 
supposes that cosmic space is spherical, containing countless vortices whirling about centers, but 
this conception of space is “built up” out of local, rectilinear spaces.  Thus, the local does not 
approximate the global; the global extrapolates from the local.  Descartes brings linearity to the 
fore and makes his world fundamentally linear.  His explanations of phenomena ultimately 
appeal to a linear principle of motion and to the rectilinear representation of space it presupposes. 
One concern of this chapter is to explain why Descartes adopts his representation of 
space.  This is not an easy task.  Descartes, unlike some of the authors we have discussed, seems 
to have “gone linear” from the start.  Even in his earliest writings, he has already adopted a linear 
conception of space.  There is no apparent shift to linearity (as in Kepler) or a flirtation with it 
(as in Galileo) to be found in his work.  Nor is there much textual evidence that might indicate 
why Descartes chooses to assume lines rather than centers.  He simply does so.  We are forced to 
speculate as to why.  In what follows, we shall suggest that Descartes’ linearity is a result of his 
early work on optics and geometry.  In optics, the behavior of light recommended a rectilinear 
representation of phenomena, while Descartes’ geometric method required the presupposition of 
lines.  In other words, Descartes’ representation of space is suggested by the subjects he studied 
at the beginning of his philosophical career. 
It is easier to trace the development of Descartes’ conception of space once he began 
using a rectilinear framework.  As we will show, rectilinearity becomes an increasingly 
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important and fundamental aspect of Descartes’ thinking about the natural world as a result of 
his attempts to systematize and unify his philosophical system.  For instance, a rectilinear 
concept of space becomes the basis for his fundamental physical principles, including linear 
inertia.  This conceptual development is particularly evident in Descartes’ doctrine of place and 
motion.  Rather than abandon the rectilinear context, Descartes defends it against a difficulty it 
raises in relation to the conception of motion he wants to hold. 
6.1 DESCARTES’ CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
In his Rules for the Direction of the Mind, written before 1628,1 Descartes develops a somewhat 
intricate account of sensory experience.  According to this theory, physical phenomena are 
intuited by the human mind as a result of two mediations.  First, external objects bring about 
motions in the body’s sensory organs and nerves.  These motions are collected by the “corporeal 
imagination” in the brain, which forms a bodily, corporeal representation or image of the sensory 
environment.2  Second, this imaginary representation comes under the consideration of the 
intellect – the mental “power by which we know things.”3  The thoughts and ideas generated in 
the mind by this process of consideration constitute the experience of the physical phenomena. 
Neither the bodily representation nor the mental consideration proceed by direct 
representation or resemblance.  In the second case, in fact, there can be no resemblance between 
the imaginary representation and the corresponding thoughts and ideas brought about by the 
intellect.4  The intellect, Descartes argues, is a “purely spiritual” faculty,5 and “nothing quite like 
                                                 
1 For this date, see René Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, trans. John Cottingham, Robert 
Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), I 7. 
2 Ibid., I 42. 
3 Ibid., I 42. 
4 In the process of bodily representation, Descartes argues that there is a correspondence, but not a resemblance, 
between the motions of material bodies and the motions of the corporeal imagination that represent them, just as the 
motion of the non-writing end of a pen corresponds to the motion of the tip, but does not resemble it.  Ibid., I 45, 47.  
This preliminary, corporeal representation of physical phenomena does not greatly concern us.  Hence, in what 
follows, we will tend to identify the imaginary representation with the body itself.  It should be kept in mind, 
however, that this process of representation can have a significant effect on experience as a whole, as when the 
sensory organs are diseased, for example. 
5 Ibid., I 42. 
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this [spiritual] power is to be found in corporeal things”6 such as the corporeal imagination.  The 
intellect, therefore, cannot transfer the bodily image of a phenomenon into the mind by some 
kind of mimesis or resembling representation.  The mind cannot simply “see” the imaginary 
representation in the body. 
Instead, Descartes explains, the intellect intuits sensed physical phenomena by 
“measuring” their imaginary representations in certain respects, depending on the features of the 
sensory objects under consideration: 
Thus, when the problem concerns number, we imagine some subject which is 
measurable in terms of a set of units.  The intellect of course may for the moment 
confine its attention to this set; nevertheless we must see to it that, in doing so, it 
does not draw a conclusion which implies that the thing numbered has been 
excluded from our conception.7
If, for instance, the mind is concerned with some question of number, it will direct itself to a 
measurement of the relevant units contained in the imaginary representation.  Suppose the mind 
wishes to count the sides of an observed cube.  It will measure the number of units – sides – 
represented in the corporeal imagination.  The intellect, meanwhile, can ignore (i.e., leave 
unmeasured) other observed features of the cube, such as its color, even though those features 
are represented in the imagination, since they are part of the sensory environment.8
Descartes calls the various aspects of physical phenomena an intellect can measure (via 
the imaginary representation) the “dimensions”: 
By ‘dimension’ we mean simply a mode or aspect in respect of which some 
subject is considered to be measurable.9
In other words, the intellect intuits sensed phenomena by measuring their dimensions.  The 
resulting mental experience is constituted in terms of the dimensions.  An idea of a physical 
phenomena consists of a conjunction of measured magnitudes of dimensions. 
Of course, Descartes continues, the number of ways the intellect can consider an object is 
“countless”: 
                                                 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., I 61. 
8 Descartes’ point in this passage is that the intellect’s ability to focus on one aspect of a body does not imply that 
the resulting “measurement” has an existence independent of the object measured.  Thus, for instance, the mind can 
concern itself solely with number, but this does not imply that number exists independently of the things numbered. 
9 Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, I 62. 
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Thus length, breadth, and depth are not the only dimensions of a body:  weight 
too is a dimension – the dimension in terms of which objects are weighed.  Speed 
is a dimension – the dimension of motion; and there are countless instances of this 
sort.10
The intellect can consider an object in any number of ways.  A red bouncing ball, presented to 
the intellect via the senses and corporeal imagination, can be considered with respect to its 
extension, its weight, its speed, and so on.  Together or in part, these measurements constitute the 
intellect’s conception of the ball – i.e., the mental experience of the ball.11
Note that the dimensions with respect to which the intellect considers objects are features 
of the mental faculty apart from the corporeal imagination or physical objects themselves.  The 
dimensions are antecedently understood by the intellect and brought to bear on imaginary 
representations.  They are not perceived or discovered in the representation.  Descartes does 
allow that some dimensions are “real.”  That is, they correspond to some “real basis” in the 
physical bodies themselves.12  Yet the “real” dimensions are no different in existence or function 
from dimensions that are “arbitrary inventions of our mind”: 
It is clear from this that there can be countless different dimensions within the 
same subject, that these add absolutely nothing to the things which possess them, 
and that they are understood in the same way whether they have a real basis in the 
objects themselves or are arbitrary inventions of our mind.  The weight of a body 
is something real; so too is the speed of a motion, or the division of a century into 
years and days; but the division of the day into hours and minutes is not.  Yet 
these all function in the same way from the point of view simply of dimension, 
which is how they ought to be viewed here and in the mathematical disciplines.  
Whether dimensions have a real basis is something for the physicists to 
consider.13
On the one hand, measuring a century as a number of years and days is “real,” since such units 
correspond to actual features of the earth’s annual orbit and daily rotation.  On the other hand, 
counting a day as so many minutes and hours is an “arbitrary” measure, since these units do not 
correspond with distinct features of the physical phenomena.  These units are merely imposed by 
                                                 
10 Ibid. 
11 Though, again, Descartes stresses that a lack of experience (that is, “measurement”) does not imply a lack of 
existence.  The ball has a weight even if the intellect does not actually concern itself with it.  Moreover, “weight” is 
a “dimension.”  The weight of the ball is “a mode or aspect... considered to be measurable.”  The intellect could 
consider the ball’s weight even if it does not. 
12 Given the distinction between corporeal and “spiritual” entities, however, it is hard to see how this 
correspondence might be established. 
13 Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, I 62-63. 
 179 
the intellect.  The point here, though, is that the physical difference between “real” and 
“arbitrary” dimensions does not correspond with any distinction in their use by the intellect.  
“Real” and “arbitrary” dimensions have the same intellectual function and existence.  The mind 
simply measures dimensions, “real” or not.  This implies that dimensions are grounded in the 
mind rather than in physical bodies.  Any correspondence of a mental dimension with the distinct 
features of physical phenomena is accidental.14
Also in this vein, Descartes claims that dimensions can be considered in relation to 
different physical phenomena or objects: 
Indeed, it is by means of one and the same idea that we recognize in different 
subjects each of these familiar entities, such as extension, shape, motion and the 
like (which we need not enumerate here).  The question whether a crown is made 
of silver or of gold makes no difference to the way we imagine its shape.  This 
common idea is carried over from one subject to the other solely by means of a 
simple comparison, which enables us to state that the thing we are seeking is in 
this or that respect similar to, or identical with, or equal to, some given thing.15
The dimension, shape, is “one and the same,” when it is measured in otherwise distinguishable 
objects.  A singular, unitary dimension is in use whenever the intellect measures the shape of an 
object.  Again, this implies that shape, and the other dimensions, have a mental existence apart 
and prior to the objects they are used to measure.  The intellect, of its own accord, brings 
dimensions to the process of intuition and generates the experience of physical phenomena with 
respect to them. 
Notice, then, that Descartes’ dimensions play the role of what we have called “concepts.”  
Dimensions, like concepts, are antecedently understood mental entities that make phenomena 
intelligible.  Dimensions determine how physical objects are intuited by the intellect.  For 
instance, the dimension “weight” warrants the intellect’s measurement and, thus, the experience 
of a body’s weight.  Reciprocally, the dimension dictates what such a measurement means – 
which feature of the body (as represented in the imagination) is picked out by the intellect’s 
intuition of “weight.”  In the same way, the mental concept “weight” allows the intelligible 
                                                 
14 At least at this stage of Descartes’ argument.  Later, Descartes will argue that “real” dimensions such as length, 
breadth, depth, and motion are epistemically more fundamental than “arbitrary” dimensions because they are 
essential properties of physical bodies. 
15 Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, I 57. 
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description of weight and dictates what such a description means.  Dimensions, like concepts, are 
the forms of intuition by which we make physical phenomena understood.16
6.2 DESCARTES’ REPRESENTATION OF SPACE 
Having analogized Descartes’ dimensions with concepts, we can set about describing his 
representation of space by seeking the set of dimensions he uses to intuit spatial properties and 
relations.  As we have glimpsed above, though, Descartes argues that the intuition of spatial or 
bodily extension17 always entails the intuition of three dimensions:  length, breadth, and depth: 
By ‘extension’ we mean whatever has length, breadth and depth...  This notion 
does not, I think, need any further elucidation, for there is nothing more easily 
perceived by our imagination.18
Extension simply means extension in length, breadth, and depth.19  Whenever we seek to intuit a 
spatial extension, we do so by measuring its extension in three directions.  That is, length, 
breadth, and depth are dimensions by which the intellect comes to experience spatial extension.  
Thus, whatever else can be said about Descartes’ representation of space, it certainly includes the 
dimensions length, breadth, and depth.  There may be other concepts involved, and we are free, 
of course, to ignore any or all of these dimensions, as when we only consider a body’s surface.  
However, length, breadth, and depth are always at least available to the intellect.  Whenever we 
encounter a physical object or phenomenon, we are always capable of “measuring” extension in 
length, breadth, and depth.  The directions are always part of the conceptual framework we 
                                                 
16 Our original elucidation of “concept” supposed that the intellect could intuit phenomena without being able to 
intelligibly express such experiences.  That is, there could be a mental representation of a physical phenomenon 
prior to its description.  In our view, description would require a further mental operation – conceptualization – 
beyond bare experience.  Descartes’ view differs only in that he seems to preclude this possibility.  For Descartes, 
conceptualization and mental experience occur as one.  Without measurement of dimensions, there is no experience. 
17 Descartes argues that the intuition of a body is inseparable from the intuition of extension:  “We do not form two 
distinct ideas in our imagination, one of extension, the other of body, but just the single idea of extended body.”  
“Extension” and “body” both refer to the same feature, or “idea,” in imaginary representations.  Hence, the concept 
of extension and the concept of body is one and the same.  Whatever dimensions used to measure the one will be the 
same as those used to measure the other.  Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, I 60. 
18 Ibid., I 59. 
19 Here, Descartes is taking over a definition of extension originally employed by Euclid (Definition I of Book XI of 
the Elements).  See Jammer, Concepts of Space, 56, 175. 
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employ to experience the physical world.  The intellect already knows how to apply these 
concepts in order to generate a measurement.  The directions are presupposed.  They are prior to 
experience, and the basis of it. 
It is clear from Descartes’ discussion, moreover, that length, breadth, and depth are 
conceived linearly, in relation to straight lines.  In Descartes’ terms, extension, and therefore 
length, breadth, and depth, are “simple” concepts – they can be directly and immediately known 
by the intellect: 
That is why, since we are concerned here with things only in so far as they are 
perceived by the intellect, we term ‘simple’ only those things which we know so 
clearly and distinctly that they cannot be divided by the mind into others which 
are more distinctly known.  Shape, extension and motion, etc. are of this sort; all 
the rest we conceive to be in a sense composed out of these.20
Extension – meaning a body’s extension in length, breadth, and depth – can be perceived by the 
intellect “distinctly” and immediately.  These are primitive concepts, out of which others can be 
composed, but themselves impossible to analyze further.  Hence, they require no preliminary act 
of measurement or conceptualization before they are applied.  The intellect does not need to 
“know” anything else about a body before measuring its extension in length, breadth, and depth. 
The simplicity of length, breadth, and depth implies that they are rectilinear directions.  
In the Rules, Descartes draws a distinction between “absolute” and “relative” concepts.  He then 
classifies “straight” as an “absolute” concept: 
I call ‘absolute’ whatever has within it the pure and simple nature in question; that 
is, whatever is viewed as being independent, a cause, simple, universal, single, 
equal, similar, straight, and other qualities of that sort.21
“Straight” is a “pure and simple” nature.  It can be recognized by the intellect directly.  Like 
other “simple” concepts, it does not require a composition of underlying intellectual 
“measurements” along more fundamental “dimensions” in order to be recognized in an object.  
By contrast, “oblique” – i.e., curvilinear – is a “relative” concept.  It can only be “deduced” by a 
series of inferences from absolute, simple concepts.22  That is, the intellect can only come to 
know curvilinearity in an object by relating the already intuited knowledge of other, more 
                                                 
20 Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, I 44. 
21 Ibid., I 21. 
22 Ibid. 
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fundamental concepts.  (We shall see below why, according to Descartes, curvilinearity requires 
reference to other concepts.) 
For Descartes, therefore, it would be contradictory if length, breadth, and depth were 
conceived as curvilinear directions.  Length, breadth, and depth are “simple.”  They can be 
intuited and known by the intellect directly, without reference to other concepts.  If they were 
curvilinear, however, they could only be known by inference from more fundamental intuitions 
based on more fundamental concepts.  They would not be “simple.”  Hence, the directions must 
be straight – i.e., rectilinear – since they are immediately known. 
Descartes’ account also implies that the recognition of length, breadth, and depth does 
not require the supposition of privileged locations or centers.  Again, these are simple concepts.  
The intellect always already knows how to apply them to bodies.  If length, say, were directed to 
or away from a privileged location, on the other hand, the “measurement” of length would 
require a prior recognition of the privileged location or center by the intellect.  That is, the 
intellect would not “know” how to apply the concept of length.  It would have to “find” the 
center first.  The “measurement” could then proceed as a composition of this preliminary 
intuition with others.  In this case, the intellect’s intuition of length would not be “simple,” 
direct, and immediate, and similarly for breadth and depth, contrary to Descartes’ assertions.  
Thus, Descartes’ representation of space comprises presupposed rectilinear directions – length, 
breadth, and depth – independent of privileged locations or centers.23
Note, finally, that the orientation of Descartes’ rectilinear representation of space is a 
matter of arbitrary choice, rather than something corresponding to features of physical bodies 
themselves.  Descartes stresses that length, breadth, and depth are concepts applied by the 
intellect to imaginary representations of physical bodies.  There is nothing in bodies or their 
representations that dictates which “mode or aspect” is to be “measured” as its length, etc.: 
We should note incidentally that there is merely a nominal difference between the 
three dimensions of body – length, breadth and depth; for in any given solid it is 
quite immaterial which aspect of its extension we take as its length, which as its 
breadth, etc.  Although these three dimensions have a real basis at any rate in 
every extended thing simply qua extended, we are no more concerned with them 
                                                 
23 Nancy L. Maull, “Cartesian Optics and the Geometrization of Nature,” in Descartes:  Philosophy, Mathematics 
and Physics, ed. Stephen Gaukroger (Sussex: Harvester Press, 1980), esp. 262-63. 
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here than with countless others which are either intellectual fictions or have some 
other basis in things.24
Physical bodies are extended things.  It is always possible to “measure” their length, breadth, and 
depth – simply because they are extended.  Nothing, however, necessitates that a particular 
aspect – i.e., a certain direction in the body – is to be conceived as its length, breadth, or depth.  
There is no feature of a body that the intellect must consider as a particular spatial dimension.  
On the contrary, the aspect of the body measured as its length, breadth, or depth is a matter of 
arbitrary intellectual choice.  In other words, the orientation of the rectilinear space is something 
chosen by the observing and intuiting subject, rather than something discovered in the physical 
phenomena.  We shall see below how the arbitrary orientation distinguishes the Cartesian 
representation of space from those of his predecessors. 
6.3 THE ORIGINS OF CARTESIAN SPACE 
If we seek the source of Descartes’ rectilinear representation of space, we must examine his work 
prior to the Rules.  Descartes’ intellectual career did not begin in earnest until he met Isaac 
Beeckman in Holland over the late fall and winter of 1618-19.  The two men apparently 
discussed several topics, including music, hydrostatics, and falling bodies.  The primary subjects 
of Descartes’ researches, however, seem to have been optics and geometry,25 and examples from 
these two disciplines appear in the Rules.  (Specifically, Descartes discusses the optical problem 
of the anaclastic curve to illustrate Rule Eight and he applies Rules Fourteen through Eighteen to 
the case of geometrical reasoning.)  Hence, it is reasonable to assume that Descartes’ 
representation of space was, at least in large part, inspired by his work in optics and geometry. 
It is somewhat difficult to reconstruct the state of Descartes’ thinking about geometry and 
optics in the period before to the Rules.  His mature treatises, the Optics and Geometry were not 
                                                 
24 Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, I 63. 
25 Perhaps harmonics should also be included among Descartes’ foremost interests during this period.  However, 
unlike in optics and geometry, this early interest does not persist. 
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published until 1637.26  However, it is clear that some, if not most, of the results reported in 
those tracts were worked out much earlier.  Indeed, as noted, the Rules mentions the anaclastic 
curve, which is the primary concern of the Optics.27  Also, the latter part of the extant Rules 
(Rules Fourteen to Twenty-one) provide a near complete summary of the analytic methods found 
in the Geometry, including solving for unknowns using equations (Rule Nineteen), algebraic 
notation (Rule Sixteen), and representing mathematical operations as manipulations of line 
segments (Rule Eighteen).  Moreover, Descartes’ Cogitationes Privatae,28 which date from 
1619-21, include a description of the mechanical means of constructing conic sections found in 
the Tenth Discourse of the Optics and of the use of a “circinus” to construct curves, as in the 
Geometry.  Thus, it is quite safe to assume that, by the time of the Rules, Descartes already 
possessed the rudiments, if not much more, of what would later appear in the Optics and 
Geometry. 
6.3.1 Optics 
The study of optics in general would not have predisposed Descartes toward the adoption of a 
rectilinear representation of space.  In Descartes’ time, light was considered from two points of 
view.29  On the one hand, it was thought of as a spherical phenomenon.  Light spreads out in all 
directions from a central source, so that the projection of a luminous point forms a sphere around 
it.  Johannes Kepler, for example, says that all luminous things (those that “share in light”) 
“imitate the sun,” which occupies the “middle place... and the center” and “pour[s] itself forth 
                                                 
26 See René Descartes, Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry, and Geometry, trans. Paul J. Olscamp 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001); René Descartes, The Geometry of René Descartes, trans. David Eugene Smith and 
Marcia L. Latham (New York: Dover Publications, 1954). 
27 The Rules also seems to adumbrate the sine law of refraction reported in the Optics, which Descartes knew by 
1626, or so.  In fact, I would claim that Descartes’ success with the anaclastic led him to attempt a systematization 
of his method in order to apply it to other lines of inquiry, which is the project of the Rules.  In other words, the 
work reported in the Optics and Geometry directly inspired the Rules.  Whether this is actually the case does not 
materially affect the present discussion, though.  See Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, I 29; A. I. 
Sabra, Theories of Light from Descartes to Newton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 103ff. 
28 René Descartes. Oeuvres de Descartes, Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, eds., 12 vols. (Paris: 1897-1913), X 213-
56. 
29 This dual consideration of light follows a long tradition.  See Dijksterhuis, The Mechanization of the World 
Picture, 150; David C. Lindberg, “The Genesis of Kepler's Theory of Light:  Light Metaphysics from Plotinus to 
Kepler,” Osiris 2 (1986). 
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equably into the whole orb.”30  On this view, light is described as a series of spheres expanding 
from the luminous source at the center of the projected “orb.”  Naturally, this account suggest a 
spherical representation of space centered on the source of light. 
On the other hand, it was universally acknowledged in the seventeenth century that the 
individual parts of light or “rays” propagate linearly, unless they encounter refractive or 
reflective surfaces.  For instance, after noting the spherical shape of the luminous projection, 
Kepler goes on to say that “nature of light is to move in straight lines, as long as it is not at all 
affected by the interposition of surfaces.”31  Light is here thought of as a collection of straight 
lines propagating from a source.  The infinitude of rays spreading from the source in all 
directions constitutes the orb of light.  Considered individually, though, the behavior of the rays 
indicates a linear framework.  Hence, the behavior of light could suggest both spherical and 
linear representations of space, depending on whether light was considered as single spherical 
projections or as a multitude of linear ones.32
Descartes’ work on optics followed the prevailing theories of the medieval authors 
Alhazen and Witelo, perhaps as handed down by Kepler himself.33  His focus, however, was not 
on optics in general, but on problems in catoptrics and dioptrics – the behavior of reflected and 
refracted light.  This brought his attention to bear mainly on individual rays, which, it was 
assumed, acted along straight lines: 
And in the same way considering that it is not so much the movement as the 
action of luminous bodies that must be taken for their light, you must judge that 
the rays of this light are nothing else but the lines along which the action tends.  
So that there is an infinity of such rays which come from all points of luminous 
bodies, toward all points of those that they illuminate, in such a manner that you 
can imagine an infinity of straight lines... Moreover, these rays should always be 
                                                 
30 Kepler, Optics, 19-20.  Descartes called Kepler his “first teacher in optics.”  Descartes. Oeuvres de Descartes, II 
86. 
31 Kepler, Optics, 34. 
32 As we have seen, Kepler stresses the former view in his astronomical work.  He compares the anima motrix that 
emanates from the sun and moves the planets around their orbits to the action of light.  Both propagate spherically 
from the central body, i.e., the sun, and diminish in intensity as distance increases.  Moreover, in both cases the 
purported forces or actions are described in relation to a spherical framework.  A center is presupposed – the sun – 
as is the indistinguishability of locations at equal distances from the center.  The sphericity of the anima motrix 
explains its ability to move the planets circularly around the sun. 
33 Neil M. Ribe, “Cartesian Optics and the Mastery of Nature,” Isis 88, no. 1 (1997): 45; Sabra, Theories of Light 
from Descartes to Newton, 72n13. 
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imagined to be exactly straight, when they go through only one transparent body 
which is uniform throughout...34
For Descartes, as for his predecessors, the action of light spreads out spherically from all points 
of a luminous source.35  The individual parts of that action, the “rays,” however, follow straight 
lines.  Descartes enjoins his reader to identify a ray of light with the line along which it acts.  
This, in turn, legitimates the depiction of a ray as a line.  Descartes can simply stipulate that a 
line, perhaps drawn on a page, is a ray and that geometric manipulations of lines represent the 
actual behaviors of rays of lights.  On this basis, the remainder of the Optics goes on to use 
geometric arguments to describe optical phenomena.36
This fundamental linearity of light suggests representing optical phenomena using a 
rectilinear conception of space.  Consider, for example, Descartes’ analysis of reflection: 
Let us consider then that a ball, being impelled from A toward B, meets at point B 
the surface of the ground CBE which, preventing it from going further, causes it 
to turn away; and let us see in what direction...  Moreover, it must be noted that 
the determination to move toward a certain direction, as well as movement and 
any other sort of quantity generally, can be divided among all the parts of which 
we can imagine that it is composed; and we can easily imagine that that 
determination of the ball to move from A to B is composed of two others, one of 
which causes it to descend from the line AF toward the line CE and the other at 
the same time makes it go from the left AC toward the right FE; so that the two, 
joined together, conduct it to B along the straight line AB.37
Here, the reflection of a ray of light is compared to the motion of a tennis ball rebounding from 
the ground.  The incident ray is represented by the line AB.  Its direction or “determination,” 
moreover, is described in relation to this line – i.e., along AB, from A to B.  There is no central 
point by which the direction is specified.  Note also that Descartes argues the direction AB can 
be decomposed into other directions.  These directions are specified in relation to presupposed 
lines (from AF to CE and from AC to FE – that is, along the perpendicular between the two 
parallels), which are themselves simply “imagined.”  The directions must also be self-parallel 
since their direction toward CE and FE results in the straight motion from A to B.  If the two 
                                                 
34 Descartes, Discourse, 70. 
35 Descartes departs from his forbears, however, by saying that light is not a motion per se, but a tendency to move.  
This tendency, something like a pressure, spreads out “in all directions” from a central source, and can act on the 
optical sense when it comes into contact with it. 
36 Shea argues that this “diagrammatic” form of argument is fundamental to all of Cartesian science.  William R. 
Shea, The Magic of Numbers and Motion (Canton, MA: Science History Publications, 1991). 
37 Descartes, Discourse, 75-6. 
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directions were not parallel to themselves throughout the space, their composition at each point 
of the ray would result in deflected, curvilinear motion.  Descartes represents the action of a ray 
of light using a rectilinear representation of space.  He assumes linear, self-parallel directions 
without referring to centers.38
Notice also that the representation of space, in this case, has an arbitrary orientation.  The 
decomposition of the direction of the light ray is a matter of subjective choice.  The privileged 
directions in the space are merely “imaginary,” with no basis in the phenomenon.  In the given 
example, Descartes chooses the vertical and horizontal directions because they happen to 
correspond to the tangential and normal components of the (planar) reflective surface.  This 
choice is convenient, since only the normal component is affected by reflection.  This 
decomposition, though, is chosen only for convenience.  There is nothing about the physical 
situation that dictates this choice.  The very possibility of decomposing the motion this way, in 
fact, allows for decompositions in other directions.  As Descartes writes, we are entitled to any 
decomposition “we can imagine.”  Already in the Optics, we see glimpses of the arbitrarily 
oriented rectilinear space evident in the Rules. 
6.3.2 Geometry 
Descartes’ early work in geometry also suggested the priority of lines, if not a rectilinear space, 
per se.  As he explained to Beeckman in 1619, Descartes sought “a completely new science by 
which all questions in general may be solved that can be proposed about any kind of quantity, 
continuous as well as discrete.”39  That is, Descartes aimed at a geometrical method that could 
solve any quantitative problem whatsoever.  He acknowledged that this task was “incredibly 
ambitious,” but claimed that he had “through the dark confusion... seen some kind of light.”40
The “light” he had seen, Descartes continued, was the use of his “new compasses,” which 
he described in the Cogitationes Privatae and the Geometry.  These compasses could be used to 
find any number of mean proportionals between given quantities expressed as line segments or, 
                                                 
38 Maull, “Cartesian Optics and the Geometrization of Nature.”; Ribe, “Cartesian Optics and the Mastery of Nature.” 
39 Henk Bos, Redefining Geometrical Exactness:  Descartes' Transformation of the Early Modern Concept of 
Construction (New York: Springer, 2001), 232; Descartes. Oeuvres de Descartes, X 156-7. 
40 Bos, Redefining Geometrical Exactness:  Descartes' Transformation of the Early Modern Concept of 
Construction, 232; Descartes. Oeuvres de Descartes, X 157-8. 
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alternatively.  It was well-known that the discovery of mean proportionals was the key to several 
mathematical problems, such as doubling the cube.  In fact, in 1593 François Viète had shown 
that all “solid,” third-degree problems in geometry41 could be solved by the construction of two 
mean proportionals or the trisection of an angle.  Descartes expected (not unreasonably, though 
he had no proof) that problems of higher degrees, which included nearly all existing unresolved 
mathematical puzzles, could be solved by the construction of additional mean proportionals.  If 
the any third-degree problem could be solved by constructing two mean proportionals, then 
perhaps all fourth-degree problems could be solved by the construction of three mean 
proportionals, and so on.  The compasses could be used to construct these additional mean 
proportionals.  In other words, Descartes’ compasses presented the possibility of solving most, if 
not all, existing mathematical puzzles.  They held out the promise of a “completely new 
science.”42
The compasses operated by constructing curves that satisfied the proportionalities sought 
in the problem under investigation.  They did so by ensuring that the position of each linear part 
of the compass retained the proper relation to the other parts as the compass was manipulated.  
The necessary curve was then generated by the intersection of two of these linear parts.  In other 
words, the curve was constructed by the motion of a point along a presupposed line.  The line 
itself, meanwhile, moved along a second assumed line with a motion commensurate with that of 
the point along the first.  (The mechanical connections of the compass ensured the 
commensurability of these motions.)  As Descartes put it, the curve was generated by a “single, 
continuous motion” of the various mechanically interconnected parts of the compass.43
                                                 
41 Problems of the form x3+ax2+b2x+c3=y3, where all the terms represent three-dimensional solids. 
42 See Bos, Redefining Geometrical Exactness:  Descartes' Transformation of the Early Modern Concept of 
Construction, 243.  It is not clear that Descartes was aware of the particulars of Viète’s work in 1619.  Gaukroger 
and Shea point to Descartes’ use of Clavian notation in 1619 to argue that he had not read Viète, who used the 
modern notation Descartes later adopted in his Géométrie.  This is not conclusive, nor does it imply that Descartes 
was unaware of Viète.  In any case, both Gaukroger and Shea agree that Descartes was inspired to treat the “whole 
of knowledge” by his geometric successes.  Stephen Gaukroger, Descartes:  An Intellectual Biography (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995), 105ff; Shea, The Magic of Numbers and Motion, 44-45, 48. 
43 The compass could not generate “mechanical” curves, generated by two or more distinct and incommensurate 
motions.  Problems requiring such curves could not be solved using Descartes’ method.  In his letter to Beeckman, 
Descartes called such curves “imaginary only” and he excluded them from the scope of the Geometry.  For examples 
of mechanical and geometrical curves and the operation of Descartes’ compass, see Henk Bos, “On the 
Representation of Curves in Descartes' Géométrie,” Archive for History of Exact Sciences 24 (1981); Bos, 
Redefining Geometrical Exactness:  Descartes' Transformation of the Early Modern Concept of Construction, 
231ff; Mancosu, Philosophy of Mathematics & Mathematical Practice in the Seventeenth Century, ch. 3. 
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The point here is not to limn the details of Descartes’ early work on geometry.  It suffices 
to note that Descartes’ geometry requires the presupposition of straight lines, in the form of his 
“new compasses,” in order to construct curves.  The compass is simply postulated prior to any 
particular problem or situation and then used to construct the necessary curve.  In other words, 
curves are generated on the presupposition of straight lines.  Descartes’ geometry, like his optics, 
requires the assumption of straight lines in order to represent, in this case mathematical, 
problems.  By the same token, it is in his geometry that we find the root of Descartes’ assertion 
that curvilinearity is a “relative” notion requiring a relation between “absolute” straight lines.  
Curves are constructed from linear motions.  The precedence of linearity in Descartes’ 
geometrical method eventually filtered into the nascent philosophical method found in the Rules. 
In summary, Descartes seems to have adopted a rectilinear representation of space by the 
time he wrote the Rules in the mid-1620s.  While the origins of this spatial concept are somewhat 
unclear, it is not altogether surprising given Descartes’ earlier work in optics and geometry.  A 
rectilinear space is appropriate to Descartes’ treatment of optical phenomena, and his 
geometrical reasoning reinforced this suggestion by holding lines to be more basic than curves.  
Meanwhile, it is possible the success of Descartes’ derivation of the anaclastic curve on the basis 
of these investigations, as well as the promise of a “new science” of geometry, led Descartes to 
attempt an expansion of his methods into other fields of inquiry, which is precisely the “mathesis 
universalis” he proposes in the Rules.44  This expansion, however, promoted the rectilinear 
spatial framework from a privileged place in optics and geometry to a privileged place in 
philosophy in general.   
At this point, one might object that Descartes’ rectilinear representation of space is a 
cause of his linear representation of optical phenomena and geometrical problems, not a result of 
it.  We do not have a strong response to this objection.  There is no way to be sure what the 
ultimate source of Descartes’ linearity actually was. We only wish to argue that a rectilinear 
framework was implicit in the optical theories and geometrical method to which Descartes 
subscribed.  Therefore, a rectilinear representation of space was at least associated with his early 
work on optics and geometry and was then developed into his broader philosophical program. 
The important thing to note, though, is that Descartes’ rectilinear representation of space, 
however it actually came about, did so in a practical and applied context.  In his early work, 
                                                 
44 Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, I 19.  
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Descartes was trying to solve very specific descriptive and explanatory problems in narrow 
subject matters.  His choice to privilege lines over points and spheres proved appropriate and/or 
convenient to the problems at hand.  Indeed, the choice led to remarkable success:  the discovery 
of the anaclastic curve and analytic geometry.  The rectilinear representation of optical 
phenomena and geometric curves allowed fruitful descriptions and explanations.  This initial 
descriptive and explanatory success led Descartes to adhere to a rectilinear framework in his 
later, broader work.45
6.4 PLACE AND MOTION IN THE RULES 
Despite Descartes’ acceptance of a rectilinear concept of space in the Rules, he was also willing 
to countenance privileged locations as part of his spatial framework.  In some contexts, Descartes 
presupposes points in addition to lines in order to describe phenomena.  In one passage, 
Descartes falls into the Aristotelian, spherical representation of the relative placement of the 
terrestrial elements: 
An example of composition by way of conjecture would be our surmising that 
above the air there is nothing but a very pure ether, much thinner than air, on the 
grounds that water, being further from the centre of the globe than earth, is a 
thinner substance than earth, and air, which rises to greater heights than water, is 
thinner still.46
In this case, locations as well as directions are described in relation to a presupposed center, 
which corresponds with the center of the terrestrial body.  Above and height are understood as 
“being further from the centre.”  Locations are distinguished by their distance from the center.  
Thus, direction and location are conceived “relatively.”  They rely on the more basic assumption 
of a privileged center.  While this passage only appears in passing as an example of faulty 
                                                 
45 For more on this process of expansion, see Massimo Galuzzi, “Il Problema delle Tangenti nella “Géométrie” di 
Descartes,” Archive for History of Exact Sciences 22 (1980): 39-40; Gaukroger, Descartes:  An Intellectual 
Biography, esp. ch. 4; Timothy Lenoir, “Descartes and the Geometrization of Thought:  The Methodological 
Background of Descartes' Géométrie,” Historia Mathematica 6 (1979); Maull, “Cartesian Optics and the 
Geometrization of Nature.”; Ribe, “Cartesian Optics and the Mastery of Nature.” 
46 Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, I 47. 
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reasoning and should not be construed as a clear depiction of Descartes’ concept of space, it does 
show he is capable of adopting privileged locations in order to describe spatial properties. 
Descartes’ description of “place” also implies, in an interesting way, the assumption of 
privileged locations.  According to Descartes, the “place” of a body can only be specified in 
relation to a privileged reference frame: 
When, for example, they [philosophers] define place as ‘the surface of the 
surrounding body’, they are not really conceiving anything false, but are merely 
misusing the word ‘place’, which in its ordinary use denotes the simple and self-
evident nature in virtue of which something is said to be here or there.  This 
nature consists entirely in a certain relation between the thing said to be at the 
place and the parts of extended space.47
Here, “place” or location consists in a “relation” between the body48 to be located and the “parts 
of extended space” – the frame of reference in which the body will be located.  The 
determination of a frame of reference, though, requires the identification of at least one spatial 
“part” to be used as the origin of the frame – a “point of reference.”  The spatial part has to be 
stipulated by the intellect before it can locate a body in a place.  Descartes requires presupposed 
privileged locations in order to describe “place.” 
Notice that this definition makes place a relative concept, at least in the Rules.  In order to 
intuit a body’s place, the intellect must first recognized a privileged “part” of space to fix the 
reference frame.  Then, the body can be “said to be here or there” in virtue of its position relative 
to the privileged frame.  The intellect, therefore, can only intuit a body’s place by composing a 
prior intuition of the spatial frame with an intuition of the body’s relation to that frame.  Place is 
not directly and immediately intuited.  It is not a simple concept. 
This raises a problem with Descartes’ view of motion.  According to this position, motion 
should be a simple and directly intuited concept which is known “so clearly and distinctly that 
[it] cannot be divided by the mind into others which are more distinctly known.”49  Nevertheless, 
Descartes goes on to define motion as change of place: 
For example, can anyone fail to perceive all the respects in which change occurs 
when we change our place?  And when told that ‘place is the surface of the 
                                                 
47 Ibid., I 53. 
48 The “place” in question here can refer either to the body itself or the space it occupies, since Descartes identifies 
these two concepts.  In this context we will dispense with the distinction.   
49 Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, I 44. 
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surrounding body’, would anyone conceive of the matter in the same way?  For 
the surface of the ‘surrounding body’ can change, even though I do not move or 
change my place; conversely, it may move along with me, so that, although it still 
surrounds me, I am no longer in the same place.50
The body moves if and only if it changes its place.  If the body does not change place, it does not 
move, even if the surrounding bodies change.  On the other hand, if the place changes, the body 
moves, even if the surrounding bodies remain the same.51  Place, however, is a relative concept.  
Place is specified in relation to an assumed origin which must be known prior to the intuition of a 
body’s place.  The intellect, therefore, can only know that a body is in motion by first 
recognizing the privileged “parts of extended space” by which its place is known.  Contrary to 
Descartes’ contention, motion is not simple or directly intuited.  It cannot be ascribed to a body 
in and of itself.  It is only understood relative to a location taken to be fixed in virtue of which 
the body is “said to be here or there.”  We return this issue below. 
Of course, assuming a privileged origin is not incompatible with the fundamentally 
rectilinear space Descartes describes in the Rules.  In the context of the above definition of place, 
for example, direction still extends rectilinearly in the “extended space,” which is still defined as 
extension in length, breadth, and depth.  Nor does the passage imply the privileged origin is 
anything but an arbitrary feature of subjective representation.  It need not correspond to any 
actual object, as in the description of terrestrial elements above.  Descartes is, at this point, 
willing to assume primitive locations, in addition to lines, as constituent parts of his 
representation of space. 
6.5 THE WORLD 
In the Rules, Descartes noted that the solution of the anaclastic curve required a “knowledge of 
the action of light,” which in turn necessitated knowing “what a natural power in general is.”52  
Thus, in Descartes’ view, his optical and geometrical work led naturally to an investigation of 
                                                 
50 Ibid., I 49. 
51 Here, Descartes rejects the position that place be identified with the surround – the bodies which contain the place 
in question.  This is significant, since he will later come to adopt a very similar view. 
52 Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, I 29. 
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the fundamental structure of nature – that is, to physics.  Descartes followed this path of inquiry 
in the World, written from about 1629 to 1633 (and emended thereafter).  In that work, Descartes 
constructs on the basis of a few fundamental physical principles or “Laws of Nature,” then 
argues that this constructed world is indistinguishable from the actual one, implying that its basic 
principles are in fact those of the real world. 
A rectilinear representation of space remains fundamental to Descartes’ description of the 
World.  Descartes proposes, for example, that the matter of his imagined cosmos “uniformly fills 
the entire length, breadth, and depth of this great space in the midst of which we have brought 
our mind to rest.”53  As in the Rules, space, in and of itself, is extension in three presupposed 
directions, which are specified in relation to assumed right lines. 
The rectilinear representation of space takes on a new significance in the World, 
however.  In the Optics, Descartes had acknowledged that light tends to act in straight lines.  
Now, he extends this principle to all bodies: 
I shall add as a third rule that, when a body is moving, even if its motion most 
often takes place along a curved line and, as we said above, it can never make any 
movement that is not in some way circular, nevertheless each of its parts 
individually tends always to continue moving along a straight line.54
Even if a body actually moves along a curved path, its inherent tendency is to move along a 
straight line.  Thus, if a moving body is released from all constraints, it will continue its motion 
along a rectilinear path.  What was originally supposed true about light is now posited as true of 
all bodies.  It is a “rule” or “Law of Nature” that bodies have linear inertia.  All bodies tend to 
continue moving along a straight line.55
In the Rules, the rectilinear action of light was explained on the grounds that nature acts 
simply and straight motion is more simple than curved.  Here, the justification is also based on 
the simplicity of nature and of the straight line: 
This rule rests on the same foundation as the other two, and depends solely on 
God’s conserving everything by a continuous action, and consequently on His 
                                                 
53 René Descartes, The World and Other Writings, trans. Stephen Gaukroger (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), 22. 
54 Ibid., 29. 
55 As some commentators have noted, Beeckman held that a body, once moved, will continue moving; a principle he 
probably imparted to Descartes.  However, Beeckman’s principle, like Galileo’s “core inertial concept” applied 
equally to linear and circular motions.  Gaukroger, Descartes:  An Intellectual Biography, 82. 
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conserving it not as it may have been some time earlier but precisely as it is at the 
very instant He conserves it.  So, of all motions, only motion in a straight line is 
entirely simple and has a nature which may be grasped wholly in an instant.  For 
in order to conceive of such motion it is enough to think that a body is in the 
process of moving in a certain direction, and that this is the case at each 
determinable instant during the time that it is moving.56
Bodies tend to move linearly because linear motion is simple.  In the terms of the Rules, linear 
motion is “absolute” – it can be “wholly” and directly grasped in a single instant, without 
reference to other bodies or other instants.  Since nature or, as in this case, God acts in the 
simplest way possible, He preserves the state of a body’s motion that can be understood most 
simply or “absolutely.”  This is linear motion, since linearity alone can be grasped in a single 
instant.  Linear motion is simple, so it is the kind of motion conserved by the simple action of 
God.57
Notice, again, that the “simplicity” of rectilinear motion depends on Descartes’ rectilinear 
concept of space.  Straight motion is simple because it preserves direction.  “It is enough to 
think,” says Descartes, “that a body is in the process of moving in a certain direction” at every 
instant of its motion.  As it moves along a straight path, a body is always moving in a “certain 
direction” that does not change.  In general, though, straight motion only preserves direction in a 
rectilinear space, where direction is conceived as self-parallel.  In other representations of space, 
motion along a straight line is not necessarily always in the “same direction.”  By contrast, 
curved motion, including circular motion, changes direction when direction is conceived in a 
rectilinear frame.  As Descartes puts it, “to conceive of circular motion, or any other possible 
[curved] motion, it is necessary to consider at least two of its instants, or rather two of its parts, 
and the relation between them.”58  In other words, curves are not simple in a linear space.  To 
describe them, one must relate the various rectilinear directions in which the body moves during 
different parts of its motion.  (Notice how this conception of curves as “relative” is a direct echo 
of the precedence given to lines in Descartes’ geometry.59) 
                                                 
56 Descartes, The World, 29-30. 
57 Recall, the distinction between linear and all other kinds of motion is simply intuited.  The distinction between 
motion and rest, not addressed here, is more problematic. 
58 Descartes, The World, 30. 
59 As Emily Grosholz notes, “the straight line segments of the Geometry seem to correspond nicely to the inherently 
uniform, rectilinear motion of the bits of matter which are the simples in the physics.”  Emily R. Grosholz, 
“Geometry, Time and Force in the Diagrams of Descartes, Galileo, Torricelli and Newton,” PSA:  Proceedings of 
the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988, no. 2 (1988): 244. 
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Descartes can call linear motion “simple” because he has already presupposed lines in his 
conception of space.  In the Rules, Descartes’ rectilinear representation of space was used 
because it conveniently represented optical phenomena or grounded his geometrical method.  In 
the World, though, the scope and importance of the rectilinear framework increased markedly.  
The rectilinear representation of space comes to ground Descartes’ fundamental physical 
principles, including a principle of linear inertia.60
6.6 COSMIC VORTICES 
The fundamental “Laws of Nature” Descartes proposes in the World all concern local 
phenomena.  They govern the behavior of individual, particulate bodies either alone or in 
interaction with other particulate bodies.  Thus, the rectilinear representation of space that 
underlies Descartes’ basic physical principles applies especially in the small scale, where those 
principles can be directly applied to the individual interacting bodies.  In the World, though, 
Descartes does not limit his discussion to small-scale phenomena.  He also considers large-scale 
systems of many interacting bodies.  In particular, he tries to explain celestial phenomena, such 
as the motions of the planets and comets.  To do so, Descartes adopts a spherical representation 
of space. 
Descartes supposes that the universe contains an indefinite number of celestial vortices, 
each whirling about a central star.  These vortices are each described in relation to a presumed 
center, which happens to coincide with the star.  Our solar system, for example, contains a vortex 
around the sun.  Thus, positions and directions within our vortex are specified relative to the 
central solar body: 
From [the properties of a vortex] you will realise immediately that the highest 
planets must move more slowly than the lowest, that is, those closest to the Sun, 
                                                 
60 Machamer asks why and how Descartes assumes that the simplicity of straight lines constrains God’s action.  This 
remains an open question.  The point here is that the assumed simplicity of straight lines arises in a physical context 
independent of and prior to Descartes’ metaphysical consideration of God’s action.  See Peter K. Machamer, 
“Causality and Explanation in Descartes' Natural Philosophy,” in Motion and Time, Space and Matter, ed. Peter K. 
Machamer and Robert G. Turnbull (Ohio State University Press, 1976).  Playing counterfactuals for a moment, had 
Descartes held, like his Aristotelian predecessors, that circular motion around the center was “simple,” God’s 
assumed simplicity would likely have entailed, for Descartes, a principle of circular inertia similar to Galileo’s. 
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and that all the planets move together more slowly than the comets, which are 
nevertheless further away.61
The locations of the planets are here described by specifying their distance to the center.  “High” 
is interpreted as further from the center.  Hence, “higher” planets are described as further from 
the central point –the sun.  Conversely, “lower” planets are described as closer.  In general, 
Descartes describes the behavior of a vortex using a spherical representation of space centered on 
a stipulated central body. 
Descartes also proposes that the earth itself possesses a vortex.  Thus, terrestrial 
phenomena are described using a spherical representation of space centered on the earth: 
Then consider that, since there is no space such as this beyond the circle ABCD 
[around the earth] that is void and where the parts of the heavens contained within 
that circle are able to go, unless others which are exactly similar replace them 
simultaneously, the parts of the Earth cannot move away any further than they do 
from the centre T either, unless just as many parts of heaven or other terrestrial 
parts required to fill them come down to replace them.  Nor, conversely, can they 
move closer to the centre unless just as many others rise in their place...  Now it is 
evident that, since much more terrestrial matter is contained within this stone than 
is contained in an amount of air of equal extent... the stone should not have the 
force to rise above it; but on the contrary this amount should rather have the force 
to make the stone fall downwards.62
Here, “above” means further from the center.  “Downwards” is toward the center.  Descartes, 
that is, employs a spherical representation of space in order to describe the vortex around the 
earth, just as he does describing the one around the sun.  He assumes a central point near (though 
not quite identical to) the center of the earth, and then specifies directions and locations in 
relation to it. 
This leads to the striking and tell-tale description of the moon’s behavior as a stasis, 
rather than a rotation: 
So it [the moon] must remain as if attached to the surface of a small heaven 
ABCD and turn continually with it about T.  That is what prevents its forming 
another small heaven around it, which would make it turn again around its own 
centre.63
                                                 
61 Descartes, The World, 35. 
62 Ibid., 49. 
63 Ibid., 46. 
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In other words, on Descartes’ view, the moon does not rotate “around its own center.”  The fact 
that it does not have its own vortex is meant to explain why not.  Of course, as we have discussed 
before, such a description only makes sense in a spherical representation of space, where the 
direction of the moon’s “face” is referred to a radius to the center.  Only in a spherical 
conception of space centered on the earth does this direction remain constant as the moon orbits 
the earth.  Thus, the moon’s behavior can only be described as a “staying” or non-motion in a 
spherical space.  Descartes description is indicative of his spherical framework. 
Now, according to Descartes, there is no inconsistency between the rectilinear space used 
to represent small-scale phenomena and the spherical space used to represent cosmic vortices.  
Any contradiction between the two is cleared up by his account of vortex creation: 
For, first, because there is no void at all in this new world, it was not possible for 
all the parts of matter to move in a straight line.  Rather, since they were all just 
about equal and as easily divisible, they all had to form together into various 
circular motions.  And yet, because we suppose that God initially moved them in 
different ways, we should not imagine that they all came together to turn around a 
single centre, but around many different ones, which we may imagine to be 
variously situated with respect to one another.64
All bodies tend to move rectilinearly according to the fundamental physical principles Descartes 
has suggested.  Since the universe is a plenum and “there is no void,” however, all actual motion 
is constrained to follow closed paths.  Thus, when matter was set in motion at the creation, it 
instantly formed itself into whirling vortices filling the universe.65
This account makes it clear, though, that the small-scale rectilinear descriptions of 
phenomena take precedence over the spherical descriptions of the cosmic vortices.  
Fundamentally, the universe is rectilinear, and bodies really do tend to follow the presupposed 
rectilinear structure of space – the assumed linear directions.  Together, the tendencies of 
individual bodies generate spherical vortices, but the spherical representation of space used to 
describe them is just a manner of speaking.  It is convenient given the spherical shape of a 
vortex.  A rectilinear representation of space must be assumed in order to describe the basic 
physical causes of all motions.  A spherical space is merely convenient to describe the effects of 
                                                 
64 Ibid., 32-3. 
65 See Wallace E. Anderson, “Cartesian Motion,” in Motion and Time, Space and Matter, ed. Peter K. Machamer 
and Robert G. Turnbull (Ohio State University Press, 1976). 
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those causes.  For Descartes, rectilinear small-scale space “builds up” into cosmic spherical 
space.66
6.7 PLACE AND MOTION IN THE PRINCIPLES OF PHILOSOPHY 
The conception of motion and place that Descartes presents in the World is not significantly 
developed beyond that of the Rules.  He still wants motion to be a simple notion that can be 
directly intuited: 
By contrast, the nature of the motion that I mean to speak of here is so easily 
known that even geometers, who among all men are the most concerned to 
conceive the things they study very distinctly, have judged it simpler and more 
intelligible than the nature of surfaces and lines, as is shown by the fact that they 
explain ‘line’ as the motion of a point and ‘surface’ as the motion of a line.67
Motion is supposed to be an obvious concept in need of no further elaboration.  One simply 
knows it when one sees it.  Nevertheless, upon further exposition, Descartes defines motion as 
change of place: 
For my own part, I know of no motion other than that which is easier to conceive 
of than the lines of geometers, by which bodies pass from one place to another 
and successively occupy all the spaces in between.68
In other words, motion is simply a continuous change of place.  Yet place is no better understood 
in the World than it was in the Rules.  In fact, for local-scale phenomena, Descartes does not 
discuss how place is defined, and we can assume that the relative conception of place described 
in the Rules still applies.  For cosmic phenomena, meanwhile, places are specified in relation to 
the assumed center, as we have seen.  Thus, despite Descartes’ intentions, motion remains a 
relative concept in the World.  Nevertheless, Descartes could justify leaving the “simple” nature 
                                                 
66 Note that Descartes’ account of vortex formation is hand-waving at best.  He does not link the vortex to his 
fundamental laws of nature in anything more than a superficial, qualitative way.  In particular, his account of the 
centrifugal force responsible for gravity is questionable.  Descartes’ successors, Huygens in particular, take up these 
issues.  See E. J. Aiton, The Vortex Theory of Planetary Motion (New York: Elsevier, 1972). 
67 Descartes, The World, 26. 
68 Ibid., 27. 
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of motion unelaborated by appealing to the fact that most philosophers and geometers considered 
it unproblematic.69
In the Meditations on First Philosophy (1641), though, Descartes began to question the 
bases of all intuitions, including the “pure and simple natures” he had taken for granted until 
then.  Once he adopted this program of radical doubt, Descartes had to suppose that philosophers 
and geometers could be deceived.  He was forced to reexamine how one can know something 
moves.  In the Meditations, Descartes established a standard for sure knowledge:  “clear and 
distinct” ideas could be known without doubt.  Their validity is guaranteed by the benevolence of 
God.  Therefore, one could know that something is moving if one could gain a “clear and 
distinct” idea of its motion.  To ensure that knowledge of motion is possible, then, Descartes was 
forced to establish that one can obtain a “clear and distinct” idea of motion.  He tackles this 
project in the Principles of Philosophy, published in 1644.70
                                                 
69 This appeal was somewhat disingenuous.  Certainly, philosophers considered motion to be a basic notion.  
Physical laws depended on the motions of the interacting bodies.  However, most of Descartes’ peers considered 
motion a conceptual composition of distance and time.  One could not measure motion directly – one had to measure 
time and distance covered, then calculate the motion.  In other words, motion was considered basic but not simple.  
Descartes’ insistence that motion is simple is associated with his willingness to adopt collisions as the basic model 
of physical phenomena.  In Descartes’ laws of collision, speeds or velocities appear as independent variables.  This 
was a marked departure from his predecessors, who used balance models precisely because one of the two 
independent variables, time, was removed from consideration by the rigid nature of the balance.  Thus, two 
interacting bodies could have different motions, but the motions would have to take place in the same time, so the 
motions could be measured simply by the distance covered.  See Joseph E. Brown, “The Science of Weights,” in 
Science in the Middle Ages, ed. David C. Lindberg (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978); Peter K. 
Machamer, “Galileo's Machines, His Mathematics, and His Experiments,” in The Cambridge Companion to Galileo, 
ed. Peter K. Machamer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
70 In the Meditations, Descartes concludes that we can be sure of our experience of the physical world, so long as the 
experience consists of clear and distinct ideas.  Thus, our clear and distinct knowledge of motion is ultimately 
warranted by the direct action of God, whose benevolence prevents Him from deceiving us about the truth of clear 
and distinct ideas.  By the time of the Principles, though, it is no longer clear exactly how God warrants our 
knowledge of motion.  That is, it is not clear whether we are to take Descartes to mean that motion is a real property 
of bodies, a position defended by Daniel Garber, or to mean that God directly endows the intellect with a clear and 
distinct perception of motion that does not depend in any way on the actual properties of extended things, a position 
defended by Peter Machamer and J. E. McGuire.  This debate, however, is tangential to our argument, since it, at 
this point, it only concerns the absolute nature of the intuition of motion, regardless of the ultimate cause of that 
intuition.  In either case, though, the appeal to God to warrant knowledge requires an simple and direct intuition of 
motion.  Since God, a supremely independent being, Himself associates motion with body (in the body or in the 
intellect), there must be a clearly, distinctly, and immediately known fact of the matter about a body’s state of 
motion.  Motion cannot depend on the intellectual compositions of mortal, dependent creatures.  Daniel Garber, 
Descartes' Metaphysical Physics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); Peter K. Machamer and J. E. 
McGuire, “Descartes' Changing Mind,” (forthcoming); Peter K. Machamer and J. E. McGuire, Descartes' Epistemic 
Stance: Mind, Body and the Causes (forthcoming). 
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The Principles does not significantly alter the rectilinear representation of spatial 
extension or the basic physical principles presented in the World.71  It does, however, present a 
refined doctrine of place and motion in an attempt to solve this epistemological problem 
regarding motion.  Without too much detail, Descartes’ ultimate solution is to require motion to 
be a simple concept – a property of a body that can be known directly, without needing prior 
intuitions.  If motion is a “pure and simple nature” pertaining to a body in and of itself, then it 
can be perceived clearly and distinctly whenever a body is perceived.  That is, a body’s state of 
motion must be directly intuited, without reference to other intuitions.  This entails that motion 
cannot be a relative mode of a body, distinguished by relation to an assumed origin, since this 
concept of motion requires a prior intuition of the origin.  Hence, Descartes must establish 
motion as a simple concept. 
This epistemological requirement runs counter to a fundamental feature of Descartes’ 
rectilinear representation of space.  In a rectilinear space, the presupposed primitives are lines, 
not points.  There are no inherently privileged locations by which places can be simply 
described.  Locations are only specifiable in relation to points taken to be privileged by the 
subjective observer and superadded to the representation of space.  To describe a phenomenon 
using a rectilinear framework, then, one must stipulate an arbitrary origin over and above the 
geometric structure of the space itself.  One does so by choosing a point to call fixed (usually by 
selecting an object to “mark” the location – the center of the earth, for instance) and in virtue of 
which a body is “said to be here or there.”  This stipulation, together with the directions already 
part of the spatial concept, establishes the frame of reference by which the phenomenon is 
described.  Locations can then be described relative to that frame.  Descartes, as we noted, 
proposed this conception of location in the Rules. 
By the time of the Principles, this relative description of place is no longer acceptable 
because it leads to a relative notion of motion.  If motion is simply change of place, a body 
moves only if its place relative to the chosen origin changes.  A body’s state of motion or rest 
depends on the point by which its place is specified.  Choosing a different point might change the 
                                                 
71 Emily R. Grosholz, “A Case Study in the Application of Mathematics to Physics:  Descartes' Principles of 
Philosophy, Part II,” PSA:  Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986, no. 
1 (1986). 
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body’s state of motion.72  Yet motion is supposed to be an mode of the body itself.  It is 
supposed to be a clear and distinct idea.  One should not have to consider any other entity to 
know if a body is moving, including other bodies taken to be motionless. 
In the end, Descartes tries to have it both ways.  He presents two different definitions of 
what he labels “external place.”73  Strictly speaking, place is specified in relation to the body 
itself: 
...external place can be taken to be the surface which most closely surrounds the 
thing placed.  It must be noticed that by ‘surface’ we do not understand here any 
part of the surrounding bodies, but only the boundary between the surrounding 
and surrounded bodies, which is simply a mode...  which is not a part of one body 
more than of the other...74
Place, in this strict sense, is specified in relation to a set of points – actually, the entire surface – 
that marks the boundary of the body.  Thus, place in the strict sense becomes a simple concept.  
The place of a body is specified by reference to an extensional property of the body – its surface.  
Place can be intuited simply, through the same intellectual act by which the extension itself 
comes to be known.  Place is just a “mode” of a body itself.  No reference to any prior intuition 
of another entity is required to specify location. 
Motion, therefore, also becomes a simple concept.  In the strict sense, a body’s place is 
related only to its own boundary, but Descartes notes that the boundary of a body is a mode 
shared by the bodies contiguous with it.  Thus, a body is considered moving if it separates from 
the surface shared by the surround, i.e., if it is “transferred” from the vicinity of one set of bodies 
to another.75  A body moves if it changes place with respect to its own surface.  In effect, a body 
is its own absolute reference frame.  The origin of the reference frame can be “marked” by the 
surface the body shares with its surround.  Since there can be no universal frame of reference, it 
might not be possible to give an absolute location of the body in the universe, but it is possible to 
                                                 
72 See Edward Slowik, “Descartes, Spacetime, and Relational Motion,” Philosophy of Science 66, no. 1 (1999): 125-
6. 
73 “External place,” the location of an object, is distinguished from “internal place,” the volume a body occupies.  
See Edward Grant, “Place and Space in Medieval Physical Thought,” in Motion and Time, Space and Matter, ed. 
Peter K. Machamer and Robert G. Turnbull (Ohio State University Press, 1976). 
74 René Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, trans. Valentine Rodger Miller and Reese P. Miller (Dordrecht: D. 
Reidel, 1983), II.15 p.46. 
75 Ibid., II.25 p.51. 
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distinguish its motion from rest simply by intuiting all of its own modes.  Motion and rest are 
“merely diverse modes of the body in which they are found.”76
Descartes’ strict sense of place answers the question of motion’s epistemological warrant.  
We can know a body moves because separation from its surround is a simple intuition.  This 
opens the possibility that we can have a clear and distinct idea of motion, the validity of which 
can be guaranteed by the Deity.77  Physically, however, the solution is not quite satisfactory.  
Descartes is literally playing a shell game.  By reducing a body’s place to a property of the body 
itself, without reference to any other body or location, he is in effect saying, “Wherever a body 
is, there it is.”  While this makes place  and motion simple, it does not allow physically adequate 
specifications of locations.  Describing place this way does not tell one where to find the body in 
space or how it is located relative to other bodies.  External place in the strict sense is not useful 
if one wishes to describe physical situations. 
As a result, Descartes falls back on the “ordinary” and relative sense of place, where 
location is specified by reference to a given, fixed location: 
Moreover, in order to determine that situation [among other bodies] we must take 
into account some other bodies which we consider to be motionless:  and, 
depending on which bodies we consider, we can say that the same thing 
simultaneously changes and does not change its place.78
Here, a body’s place or “situation” is described by assuming other bodies to be fixed and 
motionless.  The place is then described relative to the stipulated bodies.  This is similar to the 
concept of place Descartes recognized in his earlier texts.79  While this notion is not simple, it 
does accord with the fact that the rectilinear concept of space does not provide privileged 
locations by which absolute places could be specified.  Descartes’ dual conceptions of place 
satisfy divergent requirements of his epistemological system:  the need for a simple intuition of 
place, on the one hand, and the lack of means to describe place, on the other. 
                                                 
76 Ibid., II.27 p.52. 
77 Descartes also used this strict definition of place and motion also helped allay concerns about the Copernicanism 
implicit in his cosmology.  Since, in Descartes’ system, the earth does not move relative to the layer of air and ether 
immediately surrounding it, he can contend that the earth does not separate from its surround and, therefore, does 
not move.  This consideration, though, runs parallel to and independent of the development discussed here.  Ibid., 
III.29 p.95. 
78 Ibid., II.13 p.45. 
79 In the Rules, Descartes allowed the specification of place in relation to “parts of extended space.”  Here, he 
requires the specification in relation to other bodies.  This difference is minor, especially since extension and body 
are equivalent.  
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We should also note that Descartes considers and rejects another possible solution to the 
problem of place and motion.  Descartes’ could try to resolve the impasse by establishing a 
universal frame of reference by which one might absolutely determine the motion or rest of 
bodies.80  He could, for example, stipulate that the sun (or some other body) absolutely does not 
move.  As a result, the sun would be a fixed point of reference.  If bodies change their place 
relative to the sun, they absolutely move.  The sun (or any other point motionless with respect to 
the sun) would be the origin of a fixed, universal frame of reference – an absolute space.81
Descartes, however, dismisses this solution outright.  On his view, it is impossible to find 
any inherently privileged center by which a universal frame of reference could be established: 
Finally, if we think that no truly motionless points of this kind are found in the 
universe, as will later be shown to be probable; then, from that, we shall conclude 
that nothing has an enduring, fixed and determinate place, except insofar as its 
place is determined in our minds.82
There is no way one could determine whether a point in the universe is fixed and, therefore, a 
possible origin of an absolutely fixed reference frame.  Hence, there is no way to know that the 
location of such a point is “fixed and determinate.”  We can specify the location of bodies only 
by stipulating fixed reference points.  But this is a determination of our subjective minds, not 
reality itself.  Objectively, all place is relative.83
The dual definitions of place are an ingenious attempt to work around the problem of 
place and motion, but, in the end, the solution is divergent.  Either place is relative or it is simple; 
it cannot truly be both.  In the Principles, the dual conceptions of place are never adequately 
reconciled, and Descartes left it to his successors to resolve the tension.  Nevertheless, we should 
emphasize that the problem itself is due to Descartes’ firm allegiance to a rectilinear concept of 
space, which itself represents a fundamental break with the spherical past.  Descartes has 
                                                 
80 By point of contrast, this will be Isaac Newton’s solution to the same fundamental problem. 
81 Note that the passage from the World mentioned above (Descartes, The World, 22.) seems to suggest that 
Descartes flirted with this solution.  There, he suggests that one’s mind can be placed in an extended space prior to 
the filling of the space with body.  This space, prior to body and motion, would qualify as an absolute space.  Yet, 
Descartes does not elaborate this conception of space, either in the World or thereafter, and he rejects it in the 
Principles. 
82 Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, II.13 p.45. 
83 In a sense, this is the ultimate solution of the Copernican problem which began this project.  Copernicus asked, in 
a world with many centers, how do we choose the right one?  Descartes rejects the question.  Since there are many 
centers, he says, there are none. 
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spawned a new way of seeing the world.  It is not without its difficulties,84 but the difficulties are 
ones never faced before. 
6.8 ARBITRARY SPATIAL ORIENTATION 
 At this point, we should address in greater detail two of the more important and novel features 
of the Cartesian representation of space.  First, Descartes acknowledges that the geometric 
entities he assumes in order to represent space are entirely arbitrary, chosen for the sake of 
convenience.  The lines by which “length,” “breadth,” and “depth” are specified need not 
correspond with any real, objective features of the physical world.  Physical bodies and spaces 
are extended in three dimensions “simply qua extended.”  They possess extension simpliciter, 
which is undifferentiated with respect to particular directions.  As a result, what aspect one 
“takes” as “length,” etc., is “immaterial” and merely “nominally” distinguished from any other 
direction.  No feature of a body or space is inherently its “length.”  Dimensions, meanwhile, are 
only aspects by which a body or space “is considered to be measurable.”85  Thus, we are free to 
assume any direction we wish in order to measure the “length,” “breadth,” or “depth” of a body.  
The dimensions are modes of a subjective idea of body or space – of its representation by a 
subjective observer – not of the body or space in and of itself. 
Descartes’ position completes a progression we have noted in earlier chapters.  Alongside 
the general trend towards rectilinear representations of space, conceptions of space, once 
regarded as transcendent, objective features of the world, have become conventional, situation-
specific, and subjective assumptions.  Gilbert’s cosmic orientation, for example, was fixed by the 
Creator at the time of the creation.  Hence, it transcended any particular observer or situation.  
For Kepler, the orientation was a feature of the representation of a particular physical situation, 
i.e., a planetary orbit.  However, the orientation corresponded to a real feature of that 
phenomenon, the perpendicular to the line of apsides (or the apsidal line itself).  Thus, while the 
                                                 
84 Another problem, not mentioned above, is that it is not clear how motion can be identified over time.  If motion is 
separation from the surround, how can one say that the movement of a body is “the same” in successive instants, 
when the surround has already changed.  This is particularly troubling, since Descartes’ physical principles rely on 
God’s preservation of “the same” motion in a body over time.  See Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 171. 
85 Descartes, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, I 62. 
 205 
orientation may have been specific to the phenomenon, it was not arbitrary, and different 
observers were not free to choose the orientation of their space.  Similarly, for Galileo, a 
rectilinear representation of space always had to “fit” into the spherical representation it was 
meant to approximate.  Thus, the orientation of the vertical always had to coincide with the 
vertical of the spherical system – determined by the center of the earth or sun.  For Descartes, 
though, the orientation of the rectilinear representation of space is a purely subjective choice, 
independent of any features of the phenomena.  Of course, different observers might choose to 
privilege the same direction, but that choice would be merely conventional, made on the basis of 
descriptive convenience, not objective reality. 
Secondly, and consequently, Descartes’ concept of space is rigorously isomorphic.  For 
Descartes, there can be no inherently privileged direction or point.  The choice of one direction 
to call “down” is as good as any other.  Privileged directions or points, qua geometric entities, 
lose any vestige of significance for the phenomena represented.  As a result, they also lose their 
causal efficacy.86  For Gilbert, the cosmic orientation was instantiated by a universal magnetic 
field.  Similarly, for Kepler, the orientation of the space was “respected” by a planet’s internal 
magnetic virtue.  For Galileo, as for many others, heavy bodies possess an innate tendency to 
move “downward” toward the geometric point coinciding with the center of the earth or 
universe.  In each of these cases, the actions of causes depend on the geometric features of the 
space used to represent the phenomena.  For Descartes, however, physical causes cannot “line 
up” with the representation of space, since the representation of space does not respect any 
objective feature of the physical situation.  Different observers are free to choose different 
representations of a single phenomenon, and it would be absurd to think that this changes the 
physical features of that phenomenon, or the laws of nature that govern it. 
These conceptual developments are reflected in Descartes’ physical principles.  His 
“rules” of impact, for example, do not distinguish one spatial direction from another: 
It must also be noticed that one movement is in no way contrary to another 
movement of equal speed; but that, strictly speaking, only a twofold opposition is 
found here.  One is between movement and rest… the other is between the 
                                                 
86 See Dudley Shapere, “The Causal Efficacy of Space,” Philosophy of Science 31, no. 2 (1964).. 
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determination of a body to move in a given direction and the encounter, in its 
path, with a body which is either at rest or moving in a contrary manner…87
The directions in which percussent and resistent move are arbitrary.  Motion along different 
directions is “no way contrary.”  Thus, for example, motion along the surface of the earth cannot 
be opposed to motion towards the center of the earth.  Motion in a given direction is only 
opposed to rest and motion along the same direction in the opposite sense, or “determination.”  
Directions, in themselves, are all considered equivalently. 
This does not change the fundamental fact that a representation of space does affect 
physical theories.  As we have seen, Descartes’ physical principles, including linear inertia, are 
justified by assuming the simplicity of linear motion.  This assumption is only warranted, 
however, supposing a rectilinear concept of space.  In any other conceptual framework, 
Descartes would have to explain why straight motion is simple and, thus, why bodies tend to 
follow them.  Changing the spatial concept changes the explanatory requirements.  The 
representation of space used to describe phenomena frames the theory used to explain them. 
6.9 CONCLUSION 
The Cartesian rectilinear representation of space marks a profound shift to a new way of seeing 
the world.  For the first time, we are presented with a subjective, isomorphic, and linear 
representation of space.  Descartes himself seems to have adopted this fundamental feature of his 
thought from the earliest years of his career.  While we cannot be sure of the reasons why 
Descartes adopted a rectilinear spatial concept, it does seem related to his early work on optics 
and geometry.  As his philosophical program developed, however, the linear framework formed 
the essential basis for Descartes’ descriptions and explanations of phenomena.  Small-scale 
interactions – collisions – between bodies were represented in a rectilinear space and explained 
on the basis of rectilinear physical principles, including rectilinear inertia.  In the case of large-
scale ensembles of bodies, such as the celestial vortices, Descartes did resort to spherical 
                                                 
87 Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, II.44 p.63. 
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descriptions, but this spherical construction was constructed out of smaller, rectilinear spaces.  
For Descartes, the rectilinear took precedence over the spherical. 
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7.0  CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTUS 
This project set out to describe a transition in Western Civilization’s understanding of the 
physical world during the first half of the seventeenth century. This transition affected 
representations of space – the conceptual frameworks by which observers generate descriptions 
of spatial properties and relations.  In particular, the period witnessed a shift from a spherical, 
Scholastic worldview to a rectilinear, Cartesian framework.  This transition from spherical to 
rectilinear space came about as an iterative reciprocation between three levels of understanding:  
concepts, descriptions, and explanations.  Adjustments at any level led to adjustments at the 
others, such that by the end of the period we have studied, the conceptual apparatus, descriptions 
of phenomena, and explanatory theories used to understand the world had markedly changed.  
Therefore the conceptual transition both accompanied and enabled significant developments of 
the physical theories used by natural philosophers to explain the phenomena of the universe. 
7.1 THE CONCEPTUAL, DESCRIPTIVE, AND EXPLANATORY PROBLEMS 
At the end of the medieval era, Aristotelian Scholastic physics, and the Ptolemaic astronomy 
based on it, dominated Western understanding of the natural world.  These theories constituted a 
remarkably coherent edifice, and could explain most terrestrial phenomena, as well as the 
motions of the planets.  To do so, they appealed to “natures” – the inherent tendencies of bodies.  
These “natural” explanations, however, were dependent on the assumption of a central point.  In 
the terrestrial realm, for example, bodies naturally moved either towards or away from the 
universal center, while celestial bodies naturally rotated around it.  Thus, Scholastic physics was 
grounded in a spherical concept of space, which presupposed the central point essential to its 
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explanations.  As long as one granted the conceptual framework, one could broadly accept many, 
if not most, of the Scholastic explanatory accounts. 
The first cracks in this edifice came at the level of description.  Nicolaus Copernicus 
noticed that there was an incongruity between the Scholastic physical explanations and the 
Ptolemaic astronomical descriptions.  The problem was subtle.  The general outlines of both 
theories – planets or spheres moving spherically about a center – were all of a piece and 
consistent.  The trouble lay in the details, with Ptolemy’s use of an equant to describe the motion 
of the planets (and some other finer points).  Copernicus thought that the equant violated the 
principles of Scholastic physics since it described a non-uniform rotation, whereas Scholastic 
physics accounted for uniform motions.  As a result, he gave up the equant point in the 
descriptions of astronomical phenomena to save the Scholastic explanations.  Copernicus 
sacrificed the descriptions in order to preserve the explanation – scrapping Ptolemy to save 
Aristotle.  In place of Ptolemaic descriptions, Copernicus substituted his own, in which he 
described many phenomena as motions of the earth, rather than motions of the heavenly bodies. 
Copernicus thought he could bring astronomy into line with acceptable physical 
principles by simply redescribing the celestial motions.  However, his move was not so 
straightforward.  It undermined both the conceptual and explanatory parts of the scholastic 
edifice.  The conceptual part because Copernicus destroyed the unity of the center.  Copernicus 
was forced to conclude that there were “many centers,” so there were many spherical frames, 
each an independent space with its own descriptive structure.  Notions essential to Scholastic 
explanations, such as “up,” “down,” “around,” and “simple motion,” lost their determinate and 
unique meanings.  Instead of one universal conceptual scheme, Copernicus gave rise to at least 
two – one around the sun, another around the earth – if not more. 
The explanatory part of the Scholastic edifice was likewise threatened.  In the first place, 
the notions crucial to explanations lost their fixed meanings, so it was no longer clear what 
phenomena they accounted for.  The natural “downward” tendency of a stone, for instance, could 
explain the stone’s motion if “down” meant toward the center of the earth, but not if it meant 
toward the center of the sun.  Hence, each descriptive frame had to be associated with its own set 
of explanations.  Celestial physics became distinct from terrestrial physics.  Secondly, 
Copernicus’s theory included novel descriptions that needed to be assimilated into the 
explanatory theory.  The rotation of the earth and everything on it was a particular problem.  The 
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old explanations were no longer sufficient.  They could account for the stone’s fall, but not why 
it kept up with the place on the rotating earth from which it was dropped.  Another of the “new” 
descriptions was especially significant for the story told in this project:  Copernicus’s third 
motion.  Copernicus’s descriptions of the earth’s motions ascribed a rotation to its axis in relation 
to the ecliptic.  Those who subsequently hoped to accept this “motion” were forced to provide an 
explanation of it.  This proved difficult, and the problem accelerated the shift toward a rectilinear 
spatial concept.  In the end, the explanatory problem of the “third motion” was solved by 
changing the representation of space such that the “third motion” was no longer a motion. 
As a result of Copernicus’s geokinetic hypothesis, two difficulties became the litmus tests 
of physical thought that natural philosophers were forced to address.  First, the descriptive 
problem of picking the “right” center.  If the center of the spatial framework underlying the 
description of phenomena did not coincide with the center of the earth, where was it?  Was it the 
center of the sun?  How might one know?  Second, the explanatory problem of accounting for 
the “new” motions of the earth and everything on it.  How was it that the earth rotated around its 
own axis and revolved around the sun and no terrestrial phenomenon could be made to exhibit 
those motions?  If the earth really moved, what were the physical principles governing the 
behavior of terrestrial bodies?  Eventually, solving the difficulties raised by Copernicus’s 
astronomy required both a new conceptual framework and a new physics. 
7.2 THE CELESTIAL SOLUTIONS:  GILBERT AND KEPLER 
William Gilbert attacked the explanatory problems regarding the earth’s motions while avoiding 
the problem of centers.  In fact, he punctiliously restricted his discussion to terrestrial motions, so 
the issue of centers other than the earth’s own was not raised.  He never even explicitly admitted 
the earth’s motion around the sun.  Gilbert’s explanatory strategy, meanwhile, was to describe 
the earth as a spherical magnet.  He argued that all of the descriptions applicable to magnets were 
applicable to the earth as well.  Hence, the motions of a magnet caused by its magnetism are also 
caused in the earth.  The earth’s magnetism explains its motion. 
Gilbert’s line of argument, though, imported the conceptual apparatus appropriate to the 
description of spherical magnets into the description of the earth.  This representation of space is 
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not quite the same as the spherical framework used by the Scholastics.  It is a geographical 
representation, where the spheres are not constructed around a presupposed central point, but in 
relation to stipulated poles.  The poles, in turn, can be used to define an axis.  When Gilbert 
applied this representation to the earth, he extrapolated the axis so that it became an orientation 
of space itself.  This “verticity” was then used to redescribe the earth’s third motion as non-
motion, thereby simplifying the task of explaining it.  Gilbert’s conception of the universe 
presupposed a linear orientation in addition to the poles, center, and spherical surface of the 
earth.  His account of terrestrial motions, and the third motion in particular, required new 
descriptions based on a novel concept of space. 
Johannes Kepler took up a project similar to Gilbert’s – to provide explanations for the 
planetary movements described by Copernicus – only Kepler addressed Mars’s revolution 
around the sun, instead of the earth’s own rotations.  His explanatory aims were tempered, 
though, by his particular religious outlook.  For Kepler, the goal became reconciling descriptions 
of planetary phenomena with a plausible causal explanation.  He adjusted both descriptions and 
explanations, each in turn, trying to bring them together.  The “most earnestly desired union” of 
explanation and description, however, could not be effected without an adjustment at the 
conceptual level.  He adopted Gilbert’s rectilinear, oriented space in order to represent the 
planetary vis insita – the planet’s own contribution to its motion.  Thus, for Kepler, one aspect of 
the planetary phenomena could only be described and explained assuming a rectilinear 
conception of space. 
Note that the conceptual adjustments made by Gilbert and Kepler in the context of 
planetary motions are solutions to explanatory problems.  Gilbert and Kepler were both faced 
with a motion they could not explain – the changing direction of a planet’s magnetic axis of 
virtue.  Their solution was to adopt an altered representation of space in which the “change” is 
described as a “staying.”  This new conception does not obviate the need for causes, and both 
Gilbert and Kepler appeal to physical causes that respect the orientation of their space (the “law 
of the whole” and the planet’s “animate faculty,” respectively).  However, it does obviate the 
need for causal action.  Gilbert and Kepler do not need to explain how the causes act.  They do 
not need to elaborate physical principles that govern how the causes function.  The causes merely 
maintain a stasis – they remain constant. 
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Nevertheless, the causes in question do not respect any center in the phenomenal system.  
One need not “know” where some center is in order to give an account of the cause.  In other 
words, the presupposition of a center is not causally necessary (at least in the limited cases we 
discussed).  On the other hand, the causes do require a presupposition of fixed linear orientations.  
The causes are said to remain constant in relation to these orientations, keeping a rectilinearly 
conceived direction the “same.”  Presupposed fixed rectilinear orientations were not provided by 
a spherical concept of space, though.  A new, rectilinear framework had to be adopted.  Thus, the 
explanatory problems addressed by Gilbert and Kepler were solve by altering the conceptual 
scheme in which phenomena were described and explained.1
7.3 THE TERRESTRIAL SOLUTIONS:  GALILEO AND DESCARTES 
The trend toward linearity also affected seventeenth century understanding of phenomena on the 
surface of the earth.  Once Copernicus raised the possibility of a rotating earth, both supporters 
and opponents of his theory were faced with problems regarding terrestrial physics.  The 
Copernicans had to explain why bodies apparently behaved exactly as one would expect if the 
earth did not move, while their opponents had to argue why supposing the earth moved, even in 
light of Copernican explanations, was physically unreasonable.  Many of the cases involved in 
these disputes involved the continuation of rotational motion by bodies separated from the 
earth’s motion.  It was asked, for example, how falling bodies might keep up with the rotation of 
the earth so as to fall on the spot below their release point, or how a cannonball fired vertically 
might maintain its rotational motion so as to fall back upon the cannon.  Within the Scholastic 
framework of the period, there were two possible explanations for a body’s continued motion 
around the center of the earth.  First, one could argue that the body’s continued motion was 
“natural.”  On this view, it was simply a constitutive feature of terrestrial bodies to rotate around 
the earth’s axis, whether they were attached to the earth or not.  Second, one could say that the 
earth’s motion was “impressed” on the body before its release and that the body retained this 
“violent” motion once separated from the earth. 
                                                 
1 In Kepler’s case, recall, only the vis insita is rectified.  The vis extrinsica/vis praehensiva/anima motrix – i.e., the 
cause that moves the planets around the sun – remained spherically described and explained. 
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One of Galileo Galilei’s remarkable physical achievements was to dissolve the difference 
between these two explanatory regimes under the single principle of “inertia”:  a body, once 
moved, will continue to move.  Galileo did not, however, dissolve the distinction between the 
two representations of space upon which the two physical regimes were based.  “Natural” motion 
was thought to perpetuate rotation around a presupposed point, the center of the earth, and was 
thus represented spherically on a global scale.  “Impressed” motion was supposed to continue 
along straight lines for short distances, implying a small-scale rectilinear representation of space.  
As a result, Galileo used a rectilinear representation of small-scale space in situations where 
“impressed” motion had applied.  He employed a spherical frame for larger spaces, where 
phenomena had been explained by appealing to “natural” motions.  Galileo’s attempts to explain 
terrestrial phenomena on a moving earth, therefore, led to a dual representation of space:  
rectilinear in the small scale, spherical in the large scale.  The Copernican hypothesis demanded 
novel explanations of phenomena.  Galileo’s new explanations, in turn, hung two spatial 
concepts in the balance, each applicable in its own way. 
Ultimately, however, Galileo held that the spherical concept of space was more 
fundamental than the linear.  A rectilinear framework could be used to describe small-scale 
phenomena, but this was merely an approximation of the really spherical cosmos.  In the case of 
Galileo, the explanatory pressures of the geokinetic hypothesis failed to produce a conceptual 
shift. 
For Descartes, the balance swung the other way.  He, too, had a dual representation of 
space, rectilinear in the small scale and spherical in the large scale.  Yet, in the face of the same 
explanatory problems raised by a moving earth, Descartes chose to privilege the rectilinear over 
the spherical, perhaps because of his youthful interest in optics and geometry.  For the first time, 
an author had proposed a fundamentally rectilinear framework to describe and explain terrestrial 
phenomena.  Descartes’ physical principles, including his concept of inertia, relied on a linear 
space independent of centers.  In the same way, Descartes eliminated the conceptual problem 
raised by Copernicus by dismissing the need for centers altogether.  Still, even Descartes’ 
conversion to a truly rectilinear space was not whole-hearted.  He, like Galileo, continued to 
represent large spaces spherically, now as a convenient way to represent situations involving 
many bodies.  In particular, he continued to explain celestial and gravitational phenomena on the 
basis of spherically described vortices. 
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In the century between 1543 (the date of Copernicus’s De Revolutionibus) and 1644 (that 
of Descartes’ Principles), the explanatory and conceptual difficulties raised by Copernicus’s 
redescription of celestial phenomena had brought about a reconceptualization of space.  The 
Scholastic, spherical worldview had given way to the rectilinear conception of space embodied, 
for terrestrial phenomena, in the work of Descartes and, for celestial phenomena, in the work of 
Kepler.  This shift, moreover, was both a result and a cause of the notable advances in physical 
theory of the period as iterative reciprocal adjustments affected the conceptual, descriptive, and 
explanatory understanding of nature. 
Of course, we have not told the whole story.  There are many aspects of the transition 
from spherical to rectilinear we have merely glimpsed, if we addressed them at all.  For example, 
one could say much more about descriptions of magnetism and geographic representations prior 
to Gilbert.2  Once could also investigate the impetus theories of motion that led to Galileo’s work 
or the optical and mathematical theories that led to Descartes’.  In addition, one might discuss the 
history of the parallelogram composition of forces, another physical principle that relies on a 
rectilinear representation of space.3  Ultimately, the development of rectilinear representations of 
space is merely one thread in the vastly interconnected intellectual complex that is the Scientific 
Revolution.  Time and space prevent any project from pursuing all the available connections to 
their ends. 
7.4 THE CONTINUATION:  HUYGENS, NEWTON, AND BEYOND 
Nor is the work of Descartes, or even the rest of the Scientific Revolution, the end of the story.  
The rectilinear representation of space raised as many difficulties after Descartes as the spherical 
representation had after Copernicus.  Even Descartes himself never fully accepted the relativism 
inherent in a rectilinear spatial concept, and he continued to represent celestial phenomena 
                                                 
2 For geography, the work of Mercator and White is obviously important, while Gilbert’s own sources, Cabeus and 
Peregrinus, are significant for magnetism. 
3 The parallelogram composition of forces supposes that two forces continue to act in the same direction – i.e., 
parallel to themselves – thereby producing a net effect oblique to both.  This is similar to the composition of motions 
in Descartes’ optics discussed above.  Simon Stevin, who influenced Descartes’ early work on statics, might be an 
important figure in this context.  Descartes. Oeuvres de Descartes, X 228. 
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spherically, around stipulated centers.  Responses to these new difficulties led to further 
iterations of reciprocal adjustments at all levels of physical understanding, even into the present 
day. 
Pointing toward future research, we can outline two very different responses to the 
challenges of Cartesian space in the work of Christiaan Huygens and Isaac Newton.  As we have 
seen, Descartes never quite solved the problem of place and motion.  In a rectilinear 
representation of space, there are no primitive locations, so it is, strictly speaking, impossible to 
specify fixed, absolute places.  Hence, it is also impossible to specify absolute motions, when 
motion is defined as change of place.  This raises problems of description and explanation, since 
descriptions usually include a specification of where things are, and explanatory principles often 
rely on such notions as the quantity of motion or speed of a body.4  In a rectilinear space, though, 
these are not simple and clearly defined attributes of a body, but quantities only specifiable 
relative to an arbitrary reference frame.  Descartes’ solution was to fudge the concept of place.  
He adopted two conceptions of the same term – one relative, one absolute – and used each as 
consistency required. 
Huygens, in particular, was not satisfied with Descartes’ ambivalence.  He recognized the 
fundamental inconsistency in calling place and motion relative and absolute at the same time.  
Huygens responded by embracing the relativism inherent in rectilinearity.  He precludes any 
possibility of determining a fixed and absolute sense of place.  Place and, thus, motion are 
strictly relative concepts: 
Both the motion of bodies and their equal and unequal speeds must be understood 
in relation to other bodies considered to be at rest, even if both sets of bodies 
happen to be involved in some other common motion.5
Huygens rejects Descartes’ absolute notion of place.  Place and motion are determined relative to 
“bodies considered to be at rest.”  A body cannot have a fixed and determinate amount of motion 
or speed.  It can only have a motion relative to something else. 
Incidentally, Huygens’s relativism allowed the “correction” of Descartes’ basic physical 
principles.  Descartes’ “Laws of Nature,” presented in the World and the Principles of 
                                                 
4 This is at least true of the descriptions and physical principles employed by the philosophers we have discussed. 
5 Richard J. Blackwell and Christiaan Huygens, “Christiaan Huygens' The Motion of Colliding Bodies,” Isis 68, no. 
4 (1977): 575.  See also similar statements at Christiaan Huygens. Oeuvres Complètes, 22 vols. (Le Haye: M. 
Nijhoff, 1888-1950), XVI 222 and XXI 507-8. 
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Philosophy constitute a “contest” model of collision.  In a collision between any two bodies, the 
“stronger” body – i.e., the one with greater “force” of motion or resistance – will “win out” over 
the “weaker” body.  While the concept of “force” is not well developed by Descartes, the general 
structure of the theory is plausibly coherent if there is an absolute fact of the matter about which 
of the two bodies is “stronger.”  This cannot be established using the relative sense of place and 
motion.  Descartes’ rules of collision are not independent of the frame of reference, and different 
physical outcomes are predicted depending on which bodies are considered as moving.  
Descartes’ problematic notion of absolute motion, however, seems to license a distinction 
between “stronger” and “weaker” bodies.  It is supposed to allow an objective characterization of 
the physical situation.  If the concept of absolute motion is granted, Descartes’ theory of 
collisions is (possibly – depending on the interpretation of “force”) internally coherent.6  
Nevertheless, Descartes’ contest model of collision leads to empirically faulty descriptions of the 
behavior of bodies.  For example, Descartes concludes that a smaller body can never bring about 
motion of a larger body at rest, a principle that is demonstrably false.7
For Huygens, there is no absolute concept of motion, so the “contest” model of collision 
is untenable.  There is simply no way to distinguish the amount of motion or rest in a body.  
Thus, it is impossible to say which of two colliding bodies is “stronger” or “weaker.”8  All that 
matters, says Huygens, is the motion of the two bodies relative to one another.  Any motion 
common to both, i.e., resulting from the choice of reference frame, has no physical effect, “as if 
that additional motion were totally absent.”9  Huygens’s basic assumption of relative place 
implies that the outcome of a collision is independent of the frame of reference.  In fact, Huygens 
assumes this independence of reference frames as an axiom in order to prove his rules of 
collision – transforming from one frame to another to show one physical situation is equivalent 
to another already addressed. 
As it turns out, of course, Huygens’s notion of relative place and motion do lead to 
empirically valid laws of collision.  The point here, though, is that Huygens is motivated by his 
                                                 
6 See Garber, Descartes' Metaphysical Physics, 241. 
7 Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, II.49 p.66. 
8 One can perhaps read an even stronger thesis in Huygens.  He can be seen as claiming that there is simply no fact 
of the matter about a body’s state of motion.  Thus, it is not just that a subjective observer cannot determine a body’s 
state of motion, but that there is no real state of motion to be determined.  This is beyond the scope of our 
discussion, however. 
9 Blackwell and Huygens, “Christiaan Huygens' The Motion of Colliding Bodies,” 575. 
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dissatisfaction with Descartes’ attempt to resolve a conflict between his conception of space, 
which leads to relativism, and his explanatory principles, which required absoluteness.  Huygens 
comes down firmly on the side of relativism, fully accepting the implication of a rectilinear 
conception of space.  This conceptual stance, though, both forced and allowed him to adjust the 
basic physical principles used to explain phenomena. 
Newton’s tack, by contrast, is to fall on the side of absoluteness.  Like Descartes, he 
distinguishes between a “vulgar,” relative notion of place “which our senses determine by its 
position [relative] to bodies” taken as fixed,10 and an absolute, “immovable” place.  This 
absolute place is not, however, specified in relation to the “superficies” of a body, but to a single, 
universal reference frame, which is absolutely and objectively at rest.  The universal reference 
frame, however, is merely a stipulation.  There is no way to know whether any body is truly 
fixed with respect to absolute space, “because the parts of that immovable space... do by no 
means come under the observation of our senses.”11  All we can observe, says Newton, is a 
body’s relative place with respect to other bodies.  Thus, even though a body possesses a unique, 
definite place, this place is not specifiable. 
An absolute conception of place, though, grounds an absolute or “true” concept of 
motion.  For Newton, bodies have absolute motions.  They move with an objective speed with 
respect to absolute space.  It is not a subjective question whether a body is moving or how fast it 
moves.  However, since absolute space is not accessible to subjective knowledge, it is not 
possible to determine a body’s true motion.  Nevertheless, Newton can argue that the “true” 
motion is a real property of the body which has observable “properties, causes and effects.”12  
The motion of two bodies relative to one another, for example, is the observable difference of 
their unobservable true motions, while the endeavor to recede from the axis is a real effect of a 
“true” rotation.  The objective nature of motion, in turn, allows Newton to use motion to define 
physical causes of phenomena.  Apparent changes in the true motions of bodies are evidence of 
real physical forces.  According to Newton, these forces explain the behavior of the universe. 
The existence of an absolute reference frame, even if it is precluded from knowledge, 
eliminates the relativity inherent in a rectilinear space.  Motions are objective features of bodies.  
                                                 
10 Isaac Newton, The Principia, trans. Andrew Motte (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1995), 13. 
11 Ibid., 18. 
12 Ibid., 15. 
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The forces that cause and explain motions, therefore, must also be true features of the universe.  
The addition of a fixed frame to the Cartesian concept of space licenses Newtonian arguments in 
favor of a force ontology.  That is, the conceptual stance warrants the epistemic evidence for 
Newton’s explanatory entities. 
We can also compare Newton’s and Huygens’s responses to the particular problem of 
gravitation in the wake of Descartes.  Earlier philosophers had explained gravitation, both 
terrestrially and celestially (though these were distinct problems) by appealing to geometric 
points or directions qua points or directions.  Aristotle, and the Scholastic philosophers following 
him, thought it was “natural” for heavy terrestrial bodies to move toward the center of the 
universe and for the planets to move around it.  In fact, it was elemental earth’s tendency to 
move toward the center (qua geometric point) that explained the earth’s position at the center of 
the universe.  Epicurus, meanwhile, supposed that all bodies fall “down,” where “down” was a 
presupposed, geometric orientation of space.13
Once Descartes adopted a subjective, rectilinear, isotropic representation of space, points 
and lines lost their causal efficacy.  It was no longer possible to explain a body’s fall by 
appealing to a geometric center, since the representation of space rendered such a point 
conceptually unavailable.  Likewise, it became necessary to explain why planets remained in 
their orbit without assuming they innately respected a central point.  An explanation based on an 
object’s tendency toward, away from, around, or along some geometric entity became incoherent 
in a Cartesian space, where all such entities are arbitrarily determined.14
Descartes replaced the scholastic theories of “natural” motion towards centers with his 
vortex theory.  On this view, heavy bodies are pushed toward a central point by the pressure of a 
subtle fluid rotating around it.  Descartes held that all bodies tend to move in straight lines.  The 
rotation of the subtle fluid, therefore, resulted in a centrifugal tendency amongst its constituent 
parts.  Heavy bodies released into the surrounding fluid would be pushed inward by the outward 
pressure.  Thus, bodies tended to move toward the center, not qua geometric point, but qua 
                                                 
13 Some philosophers, including Copernicus and Gilbert, suggested that terrestrial gravity was an inherent tendency 
of terrestrial bodies to unite themselves with other terrestrial bodies.  This suggestion was only mildly satisfactory, 
as we have seen.  It failed to explain the actual location of the earth – that is, why terrestrial bodies congregate 
around one point rather than another – and, furthermore, why the center of the terrestrial conglomeration moved 
around the sun.  Also, the orbital motion of planetary bodies was not addressed by this theory. 
14 Koyré would label Descartes’ move an “abstraction” of space.  See Koyré, Études Galiléennes, 15, 79.  In his 
terms, Descartes removes the terminus ad quem from physical explanations.  Koyré, Études Galiléennes, 92. 
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physical center of a real rotation of bodies.  This fluid pressure was supposed to account for both 
the fall of terrestrial bodies toward the earth and the revolution of planets around the sun, since 
both earth and sun were supposed to be at the center of a vortex. 
Huygens accepted vortices as the cause of celestial and terrestrial gravitation.  However, 
he thought Descartes had not finished the job of explaining the operation of a vortex.  In 
particular, he felt that Descartes had not satisfactorily shown how the basic physical principles, 
governing collisions between two particles at a time, gave rise to the centrifugal and centripetal 
forces in a rotating ensemble of particles: 
We understand the nature of straight movement well enough, and the laws which 
govern bodies in the exchange of their movements, when they collide.  But as 
much as one considers this sort of movement, and the reflections which arise from 
[collisions] between the parts of matter, one finds nothing which determines them 
to tend towards a center.15
Huygens accepted the laws governing the motions of colliding bodies, but he did not see how 
this essentially rectilinear behavior could bring about a centrifugal tendency in the subtle fluid 
and thus a tendency toward the center in heavy bodies.  (In effect, he accused Descartes of 
replacing the Scholastics’ unexplained tendency toward a center with an unexplained tendency 
away from a center.)  As a result, Huygens set out to investigate fluid dynamics in an attempt to 
explain how the laws of collision could cause centrifugal force, and thus how a vortex could 
cause gravitation.16
In a sense, Huygens’s attempt to link the explanation of collisions with the explanation of 
gravity was also an attempt to unify the spatial framework used to represent collisions with the 
concept of space applicable to the vortices. Descartes had already linked the explanation of 
gravitation on earth with the explanation of gravitation in the heavens by ascribing both to 
vortices.  At the same time, he had used the spherical representation of space associated with 
vortices to describe both the solar system and the earth.  Huygens tried to complete the 
unification by linking the explanation of small-scale phenomena, collisions, with that of global- 
and cosmic-scale phenomena, the vortices.  Since these two sets of explanations were based on 
                                                 
15 Christiaan Huygens, “Discours de la Cause de la Pesanteur,” in Oeuvres Complètes vol. XXI (Le Haye: M. 
Nijhoff, 1888-1950), 451. 
16 See Huygens’s De Vi Centrifuga (written c. 1659, published 1703) and Discours de la Cause de la Pesanteur 
(published 1690, though also written earlier) 
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different representations of space, Huygens’s unifying project entailed, in part, demonstrating 
how the rectilinear framework applied to collisions could “build up” into the spherical spatial 
concept associated with vortices.  The explanatory synthesis required a conceptual one.17
Like Huygens, Newton sought to explain gravitation without appealing to geometric 
centers.  To do so, Newton supplemented Descartes’ laws of collision with a fundamental 
physical principle of his own – the law of universal gravitation.  He simply argued that all bodies 
are subject to a force impelling them toward all other bodies that is proportional to the mass of 
the bodies and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them.  This 
relationship could be derived from the observed behavior of bodies.18  Basically, though, this 
was an end run around the problem.  Scholastic physics had appealed to an inherent tendency to 
approach a center.  In the absence of centers, Newton appeals to an inherent tendency to 
approach other bodies.  Thus, all bodies have an inherent tendency toward the gravitational 
center of a system, not as a geometric center, but as a center of gravitational force.  Still, Newton 
left the ultimate cause of this innate tendency unexplained.19  To many, Huygens included,20 it 
was as unintelligible as the Scholastic “natures.” 
Newton also unified the small-scale linear space of collisions and cosmic space.  Without 
vortices, however, Newton’s cosmic space was the rectilinearly-structured space of Kepler’s vis 
insita.  In the first proposition of the Principia, Newton divides a gravitational orbit into an 
infinity of instants.  In each instant, the orbiting body continues its motion due to its (Cartesian) 
linear inertia, which takes the place of Kepler’s vis extrinsica.  To this movement is added a 
motion to the center, caused by the (percussive) action of the gravitational force, which is the 
equivalent of Kepler’s vis insita.  The path of the body is then derived from a composition of the 
two motions.  Newton’s analysis, however, relies on the assumption that the two motions of the 
body – one inertial, the other gravitational – remain parallel to themselves throughout the instant 
in question.  In other words, the motions are not directed toward any presupposed center, but are 
directed along presupposed, self-parallel orientations – the parallel actions are the same action.  
Newton, like Kepler, assumes that the intrinsic or gravitational force moving the body toward the 
center respects linear directions, not centers.  This assumption allows Newton to treat the motion 
                                                 
17 At this point of my research, I do not know how successful Huygens was in this regard. 
18 If one assumed an absolute space, as noted above. 
19 Newton, Principia, 442. 
20 Huygens, “Discours de la Cause de la Pesanteur,” 445-6. 
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of the planets using the same rectilinear framework used to represent collisions, at least in each 
instant of the orbit.  This Newtonian “synthesis” of small-scale and cosmic spaces depends, in 
part, on the fact that the space used to represent inertia and percussive action, taken from 
Descartes, has the same rectilinear structure as the one he uses to represent the gravitational 
force, taken from Kepler.  Their shared rectilinear framework renders the forces 
commensurate.21
Furthermore, by treating all phenomena using a single spatial framework, Newton could 
use one set of explanation in all parts of space and at all spatial scales.  In other words, the 
conceptual synthesis allowed Newton to assimilate all phenomena, both celestial and terrestrial, 
into one explanatory scheme – the Newtonian Synthesis as commonly understood.  The shift to a 
rectilinear representation of space, for both terrestrial and celestial phenomena, was an essential 
and enabling feature of Newton’s remarkable physical system. 
7.5 CONCLUSION 
The reciprocation between concept, description, and explanation continued long after Descartes, 
Huygens, and Newton.  Philosophers like G. W. Leibniz and Immanuel Kant and physicists like 
Michael Faraday and J. C. Maxwell contributed to the development of representations of space 
as part of physical understanding.  In the modern era, the links between concept, description, and 
explanation have become more explicit, especially in the context of general relativity.  In a sense, 
solving Albert Einstein’s field equations is determining the spatial concept – the shape of space.  
The shape of space, meanwhile, explains the inertial and gravitational behavior of bodies.  
Concept, description, and explanation continue to interact, but now they do so within a single, 
overarching metatheoretical framework.  Philosophers of science, meanwhile, are also concerned 
                                                 
21 For the relation between Newtonian to Cartesian space, see J. E. McGuire, “Space, Geometrical Objects and 
Infinity:  Newton and Descartes on Extension,” in Nature Mathematized, ed. William R. Shea (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 
1983).  Note that Newton’s views on space developed through his career.  His early De Gravitatione privileges 
closed geometric solids, including spheres, as the basis of spatial descriptions.  Later, Newton bases his treatment of 
space on straight lines.  See Isaac Newton, “De Gravitatione et Aequipondio Fluidorum,” in Unpublished Scientific 
Papers of Newton, ed. A. Rupert Hall and Marie Boas Hall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962). 
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with the concept of space as it is used in today’s physical theories.  Our work is a natural prelude 
to theirs.22
Representations of space have long been significant in the development of physical 
understanding.  Physicists and philosophers have adjusted explanations in response to conceptual 
changes, and concepts have been altered in response to explanations, while descriptions have 
evolved according to both.  The result has been the continued advance of the understanding of 
nature.  The present project has only addressed this reciprocation as it occurred in the first half of 
the seventeenth century, and this only superficially.  We hope, though, that this is merely the 
start of a broader and deeper examination of representations of space throughout the course of 
mankind’s investigation of nature. 
 
                                                 
22 This is only meant to be suggestive.  I do not pretend to be a philosopher of space or relativity.  See Albert 
Einstein, “Foreword,” in Concepts of Space, by Max Jammer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954). 
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APPENDIX 
EXCERPTS OF LETTER FROM JOHANNES KEPLER TO DAVID FABRICIUS, 11 
OCTOBER 1605 
The following consists of a translation of significant portions of a letter written (in Latin) by 
Johannes Kepler, at Prague, to David Fabricius, in Osteel.  This translation is based on the 
transcription found in Johannes Kepler Gesammelte Werke vol. XV.1  I have placed the figures 
in the text as they appear in the transcription.  The original manuscript is to be found in the 
Pulkowo Observatory, Kepler Manuscripts X.  For a more complete discussion, see the chapter 
on Kepler, above. 
 
[2472]  11. You will have all of what I have professed up until now in my Mars [Commentary].  
Seeing the distances constructed from a perfectly circular eccentric sin in excess, both in [the 
distances] themselves, and in their effect on the prostaphaerises of the annual orb, and in the 
equations of the eccentric, just as much as my ellipse (which varies very little from the oval), 
which I described numerically to you above, sins in the defect:  very rightly I have argued this 
[following] way.  The circle and ellipse are from the same genre of figures, and fail equally in 
different ways, therefore the truth is in the middle, and the figures between ellipses are nothing 
but ellipses.  And thus, the path of Mars is definitely an ellipse, the leftover little moon shape 
[lunula] [248] of half the width of the previous ellipse.  The size of the lunula, though, was 858 
of 100000.  Therefore, it ought to be 427 parts [wide], which is exactly the shortening of the 
                                                 
1 Kepler, Werke XV, no. 358, 240-80.  Special thanks are due to Paolo Palmieri for his assistance in preparing this 
translation. 
2 Page numbers correspond to the pagination in the Gesammelte Werke. 
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distances in the middle longitudes, constructed from the perfect circle.  This I say is the truth 
itself.  And see how meanwhile I was thrown back into mental wanderings and new labor.  
Indeed, see how miserably I wander onto the truth, following that [maxim], one who never 
doubts, is never certain about anything.  The former ellipse with shortening of 858 had a natural 
cause, namely that the said center of the epicycle slowly advances, when the planet is turned in 
the apogee of the epicycle, [and] faster below.  But, the epicycle itself advances equally in equal 
times.  This was moderately agreeable to nature.  Now, however, if the ellipse with shortening of 
429 were to obtain, I am missing the natural cause.  For it was absurd that the center of the 
epicycle advances unequally, and the circumference of the epicycle neither equally, nor 
unequally around its own center, but with a peculiar inequality, which would be at least half the 
inequality of the center.  Indeed, I speak now with you not out of my Commentaries – that is, on 
the basis of natural reasons – but from Ptolemy and the ancient astronomy, as you may 
understand me. 
 
A is the sun, AE the line of apsides, AD 100,000, AC 9264.  And C is 
the point of equal motion of D, the center of the epicycle.  And thus, if 
the line CDR equals the true apogee of the epicycle, then the path of the 
planet follows a perfect circle.  For DF is led parallel to AC, RDO 
equals ADC, and ODF equals DAE, and RDF equals DCE, the mean 
anomaly, because the period [return] of the epicycle and concentric are 
equal, here clearly turning by equal motion, which is in itself unequal.  Now, joining F and A 
makes a line so long, that if from C a perfect eccentric is described with radius AE, it will indeed 
cross at F.  And also, this hypothesis, which I proposed in 1602, is false.  On the contrary, C 
remains the equant point of D, line ADO follows the line of true apsides of the epicycle, and O is 
the true apsis of the epicycle; as it is DCE, the mean anomaly, is constituted equally by ODF, 
and DF is inclined to AC, which is equally if the said epicycle moves equally in equal time 
around its center.  Now this is the very close hypothesis, [Kepler’s marginal comment: NB this in 
the Commentary.] which I use in 1603.  And which you hold in 1604.  And which had a tolerable 
natural cause.  But, deducing from the first [249] excess and the second defect, CA is to be 
halved or bisected in B, and BDS is to be the true apsis of the epicycle, and thus C hitherto the 
equant center of D.  But now, SDF is equal to DCE, the mean anomaly, and DF is less inclined to 
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AC than before.  And with this hypothesis, the distance of F from A is now closer to the truth 
than before, and FAE is closer to the true coequated [anomaly].  Indeed, I say “closer,” but not 
“true,” so as to allow the construction of the computation of the physical equation. 
 
Still, this hypothesis (as I may go on in the laying out of my ratiocinations) did not satisfy me, 
since the point B lacked a natural cause.  For point C will have a natural cause, which is to say 
AC and DF are made equal, which amounts to, if I may say, the distances being [proportional to] 
the delays in equal arcs of the eccentric.  On the other hand, another thing attracted me to the 
natural cause:  this, of course, which I have seen helping the secant of the greatest equation of the 
epicycle. 
 
 AF, that is, (at angle 5 degrees 18 minutes) would be 100429.  And 
thus, FA is longer than DA, by 429 small parts.  And because the 
distance FA follows from the re-utilization of the perfect eccentric, 
and 429, found above, is exactly the shortening of distances for the 
true hypothesis.  Therefore, if we substitute FA for DA, we have the right distances in the middle 
longitudes. 
 
At once, I seized on this for the natural hypothesis:  the planet does not rotate in the 
circumference of the epicycle GFI, but librates in the diameter HDK.  And now I constructed the 
distances and the whole table of equations from this. 
 
 But yet, I am a wretch.  This Easter holiday at last I tested the thing, which, if I 
had been considering [properly], I would have been able to remember that earlier 
in my commentaries it was demonstrated that this kind of path of the planet does 
not compose an ellipse, which my above argument stated, but in the octants 
expands in cheeks from the ellipse towards the perfect circle.  The argument, 
therefore, has been all wrong:  Libration in the diameter of the epicycle equals the 
ellipse in the middle longitudes and in apsides, therefore equals it wherever.  
s this [hypothesis], as before in the old false hypothesis, performs neither the duty 
of distances nor of eccentric equations.  O fruitful society of both things, which never does not 
False!  And thu
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direct me into total perplexity.  Therefore, I now have this, Fabricius:  the path of the planet is 
truly an ellipse, which Durer has similarly called an oval, or certainly insensibly different from 
some ellipse.  I have computed the eccentric equations [250] in acronychal positions, they take 
the task to the nail; of the distances I would say almost the same, but the method of examining 
them is somewhat more lax, which always leaves me about 100 parts in doubt, while the 
observations are optimal.  Indeed, you know the best observations can err by one minute.  But 
one minute vitiates the distance immensely, if the planet is near [the sun] or [opposition with the 
sun].  This, though, you will have as certain, that we come near the truth.  And thus the whole 
hypothesis I will delineate to you. 
 
Given the mean anomaly (by noting the location of aphelion, from which you now remove 5 
minutes, and noting the mean motion, which remains the same) the eccentric anomaly is sought, 
directly or by tabulation.  From tables thus:  the maximum equation from equations of triangular 
areas, which is 5 deg. 18 min. 30 sec., resolve this into seconds and divide this sum for all steps 
of the eccentric anomaly, then reduce back into the steps; and put [them] to your steps of the 
anomaly such that at 90 deg., the eccentric anomaly will be 5 deg. 18 min. 30 sec.  Therefore, at 
95 deg. 18 min. 30 sec. of mean anomaly, 90 deg. of eccentric anomaly is selected.  Indirectly, 
the same eccentric anomaly is thus selected.  While before semicircularity it is always less than 
mean anomaly, afterwards more, by conjecture you preconceive how much smaller, such that if a 
mean anomaly of 48 deg. 46 min. 0 sec. were given, I would conclude that the eccentric anomaly 
would be 45 deg.   This sine in sums of seconds 5 deg. 18 min. 30 sec. multiplied and by 100000 
divided, should give me 3 deg. 46 min. 0 sec. if I calculated well, at 45 deg, and 3 deg. 46 min. 
gives the mean anomaly.3  Have the eccentric anomaly as you multiply the sine of 45 deg., 
70711, in 430 parts, giving 303, which you take from the sine 70711, leaving 70408.4  You take 
therefore the sine of the complement of the eccentric anomaly, to it you add the eccentricity 9264 
in the upper semicircle of the eccentric, that is from 270 to 90.  You subtract in the lower, from 
95 1/3 to 264 2/3.  Or from the eccentricity you steal the sine of the complement if it is less.  
Then let it be that to that shortened sine, this sum or remainder, thus the whole sine to the 
tangent, which gives the angle of the coequated anomaly.  This will be either the coequated 
                                                 
3 5 deg. 18 min. 30 sec. x sin 45 = 3 deg. 46 min. 
4 430 x sin 45 = 303.  430 is the excess over 100000 of the planet sun distance at 90 deg. eccentric anomaly. 
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anomaly itself, or the excess of the coequated over a semicircle, or otherwise the complement of 
these to the semicircle, for the thing born.  Of this angle, you cut off a secant, and let it be that as 
the whole sine is to the sum or remainder, thus this secant is to the genuine distance from Mars to 
the sun. 
 
 This is fundamental in the ellipse and circle, that as the diameter of the circle 
to the shorter diameter of the ellipse, thus is FC to EC along the whole 
semicircle.  And also arc FD is to arc ED.  And so although DEG is shorter 
than DFG, nevertheless if DEG is allowed to be called 180 deg., then part DE 
[251] is allowed to be called that which DF really has.  Therefore, the 
eccentric anomaly here is DE.  Thus not arc DBE, which had deceived me 
from the time of Christmas to this Easter time.  FC is greater than EC as area DFA is to area 
DEA.  Therefore, although area DFG is greater than 1800000 (which I prove myself), 
nevertheless if area DEG retains the same name as area DFG, parts DEA and DFA will also have 
the same name, similarly DEB and DFB, as well as AEB and AFB, the area measuring the part 
of the physical equation.  Therefore, if the circle is given, then DF, or DBF, will be the eccentric 
anomaly, and area DFA will be the mean anomaly.  But now, in the ellipse, not DBE, but DE is 
the eccentric anomaly, and area DEA is the mean anomaly, and angle DAE is the coequated 
anomaly, and AE the true distance.  
 
Finally, you use the proportion of the orbs, which is 100000 to 152500.  If, then, you see that this 
is to be useful at all points, you will be able to use 152400 or 152600.  In [Pisces] I think two or 
three minutes are lacking by this and by the old hypothesis, perhaps because of a false 
assumption in [Pisces].  For [Mars] will have the greatest latitude at [opposition] in 93 years.  
But I do not see how I may be able to correct [this], such that the remaining points are inflicted 
with no detriments.  And yet these 3 minutes can [at opposition of sun and Mars] effect an 
appearance of 10 or 11 minutes.  But there is also that which I desire in this hypothesis:  namely 
that, though [I am] stretching [my mind] all the way to insanity, I cannot fashion the natural 
cause why Mars, which with such great probability should librate in the diameter (indeed, the 
thing was reducing so beautifully to magnetic virtues for us), should rather want to go in an 
ellipse or some path close to it.  Nevertheless, I think magnetic virtues may not always respect 
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the sine, but something somewhat different.  [Marginal comment:  Such a fool I was not to see 
how to construct the same distances with libration.] 
 
The eccentricity smacks entirely of magnetic force, as it is in my 
commentaries:  so that if the globe of Mars has a magnetic axis, one 
pole seeking the sun, the other fleeing, and this axis were pointed in 
the middle longitudes, then as long it is turned in the descending 
semicircle, maximally in middle longitudes, it would point the 
seeking pole toward the sun, and thus always approach the sun, but 
maximally in middle longitudes, not at all at apsides.  And then in the 
ascending semicircle, it flees the sun equally.  And thus perhaps (indeed allow me, very happy 
Fabricius, while I work to speak with you, to profit from my exercise) the law is something else, 
by which the magnet flees and follows something, than the sine.  Indeed, I posit, DFA is [252] 
the body of Mars, round, and DA the magnetic axis:  I have thus far posited that Mars is thus 
arranged, as having the sun in line BG, which is to say in K; this may be the proportion of its 
speed in approaching to the speed in approaching when it has the sun in D, which is the 
proportion of sine IH to sine IB.  And in this position IH is discovered exceedingly small, indeed, 
almost exactly the measure of the part of libration.  What if, therefore, thus this is the true 
proportion of speed, as HG to BD?  Or some other way.  For if we adhere to this magnetic 
hypothesis, we will be forced by certain reasons to ask for some other ways.  First, if the sun and 
the magnetic pole DA are in the same plane of the eccentric, we ought not be disturbed by a 
certain suspicion, as if what is said about the solid body of the planet’s globe differs for that of 
its greatest circle.  For I posit, as we have posited:  it is understood that the whole globe can be 
divided in infinite parallel circles, from greatest to smallest on both sides, all of which are 
equally disposed toward the Sun:  and thus the proportion will remain the same [after] 
multiplying the terms.  Therefore, circle FDIA is some circle in the body of the planet parallel to 
the eccentric, and FDI is the seeking semicircle, FAI the fleeing, the Sun in turning BI makes 
equilibrium, because of the semicircle, which is observed by the Sun, that is DIA, half DI is 
seeking, half IA fleeing.  Truly the Sun in BK, semicircle NGM is considered, in which NI is the 
seeking parts, IM the fleeing.  Put IO equal to IM, therefore IO will be annihilated by IM.  NO of 
the considered [part] is left as measure of the seeking faculty.  Where MI is the complement to 
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IG, the departing of the planet from apogee, and IO similar [to MI]; therefore arc ON is twice to 
IG the departure from apogee.  Because if the seeking parts equally large always seek equally 
wherever angle DBK, now the departure from apogee will measure the seeking entirely, and the 
shortening of the distances from [Mars] to [sun] will be equal in equal times.  But the strength of 
the angle is also to be considered.  For the Sun turning in BI, although nothing is operated on AI 
fleeing, nevertheless DI does not seek, because angle DBI has no strength, this is because parts 
DI are not directed to the sun in respect of their line of virtue BD.  But here I hesitate to project 
the measure of the angle as cause of the strength.  For perhaps the complement of angle DBG, 
GI, is measure of this?  I think not.  For when DBI begins to get smaller, then more it is useful to 
that, to the strength of the seeking, some small part of the shortening, [253] than while it is all 
spent.  Therefore maybe IH measures the strength by the sine DBG?  But this now is much more 
repugnant to what I have said.  [Marginal comment:  This is false.] 
 
[…] 
3.  I return to [Mars] after some weeks’ interposition.  Let the same figure of the body of the 
 
1
planet as above be proposed.  I have said similarly above, the planet is considered as a globe or 
as a plane circle; now also I say this, it is considered as a plane circle or as a line.  For, from 
Gilbert the Englishman, it is certain, and also [it is certain] in itself without his authority, 
magnetic virtue extends in a right [line].  Whereby the globe is feigned to consist of infinite 
plane circles, parallel to the eccentric, of which each is the same reason, thus because of this 
rectilinear virtue, the plane circle consists of infinite right [lines], of which likewise each is the 
same reason.  Therefore the body of the planet can be thus considered, as any right [line], since 
none of the others impedes, as above I constructed falsely.  Therefore, let AD be the magnetic 
axis, fleeing in A, seeking in D, representing one of the infinite right [lines] of virtue in the body 
of Mars.  But let B be [254] the middle point of AD, sun in BI, the said approach is the cause 
such that the flight does nothing, because A and D are in equal operation.  Therefore, this is like 
equilibrium.  See my Optics, chapter I.  Now let the sun be in BGK.  And by the center B and the 
distance BD, circle DG is delineated, and from G, let the section of the circle with the 
perpendicular line from the sun to DA be led.  If therefore GB is the support and AB, BD the 
arms of a balance, as DC to CA will be the strength of angle DBG to the strength of ABG.  And 
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so this flight is as much as DC, and the seeking as much as AC.  Take from AC the equal of DC, 
which is AS.  Therefore SC is the measure of the seeking, and AD the measure of the seeking at 
no angle.  And as AD to SC, thus BD to BC or GH.  Therefore the sine of the digression of the 
planet from apogee or perigee measures the speed of the approach. 
 
This is geometrically demonstrated and most certain.  And thus if our principles are correct, all 
the libration will follow the law of the sine of the digression from apogee.  But because 
experience and the ellipse by experience very certainly made firm wants the libration to follow 
the versed sine of the digression from apogee, that is not by GH but by HI, therefore our 
principles are necessarily to be changed.  We have substituted, in effect, for GH the 
perpendicular HI.  And thus, therefore, in principles we ought to accept for AD the perpendicular 
FI.  In other words, one must say that the planet is at apsides not when its magnetic axis is 
perpendicularly inclined to the line from the sun, but when it is united with it (if it can).  While 
although I am unable to reconcile my first intuitions with the magnetic virtue with the 
appearances, nevertheless it strikes me in a wonderful way.  For in my Commentaries, this 
objection has been left [unanswered]:  If the planets produce eccentricities by a magnetic virtue 
with their axis directed towards the same parts of the universe, the Earth will do the same.  But 
the axis of the Earth is the only one, which is pointed from [Cancer] to [Capricorn]:  it falls in 
this direction in the summer, and winter.  Around this the whole remaining body is turned daily.  
Therefore, the apogee of the earth is fixed in 0 deg. [Aries], 0 deg. [Libra].  But it is seen to be 
otherwise, and indeed not in [Aries], [Libra] but in [Capricorn] (because the Sun is in [Cancer]).  
What was truly in [Gemini], [Sagittarius].  To this objection I can respond nothing except this, 
similar things will be similarly demonstrated, [but are] not clearly the same thing.  Now, this is 
testified by experience, the line of apsides meets the line of the axis directly, therefore the apogee 
of the earth is stable in 0 [Capricorn].  Where one part of the objection is solved.  Of the other 
part I will respond thus:  in the maximum equation around 0 [Aries], 0 [Libra] the place of the 
Sun according to Tycho varies not at all, or the apogee is found at 0 [Capricorn] to 5 1/2 
[Capricorn].  In [Capricorn] and [Cancer] the error is some 11 minutes but the error cannot be 
derived from declination:  At a grade of 45 deg. (which is the observed declination to be 
extracted from the solar theory) some seven minutes of error in the place of the Sun, if the 
apogee is transposed by 5 ½ grades, but the seven minutes can be admitted, if in the declination 
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of this place, 2 minutes [255] of error may be granted in the observing.  Because if Tycho says, 
the declinations vindicate themselves of error, not as much as of 2 minutes, but clearly of a part 
of one minute:  therefore I will be able to deny it, either because the parallax errs in the smallest, 
or the obliquity of the ecliptic.  I will object to him the positions also in middle longitudes.  For 
year 1588, 3 March, the eclipse in [Pisces] shows [it] fixed 7 minutes more forward than in 
Tycho: and this makes it [agree] with the Landgrave.  Or I will perhaps say that the center of the 
Sun or Earth in annual revolution does not remain very perfectly in the same plane, from the 
same great circle, as neither [does] the Moon in monthly [revolution].  Of Mars thus I have 
carefully thought, if its latitude argues an entirely constant inclination.  But why if this is the 
cause, why after five years can I not yet obtain, as operations of an instituted method distances to 
[Sun] exhibiting agreement to themselves.  For meanwhile the place of [Sun] has been assumed 
to be known most certainly.  But why, by the ancients, was the apogee is placed in 5 ½ 
[Gemini]?  They, therefore, are said to have erred by 49 seconds in the place of the sun around 
apogee.  This, when they will have been used in the observation of the imperceptible solstices. 
 
But before I sing the triumph, I must think about the physical cause, if it is possible that, as the 
magnetic axis is constructed at apogee, it remains in the direct line from the sun?  For what is it, 
which does similarly, that we may ascribe the cause?  [Kepler’s marginal comment:  N.B. in the 
Commentaries.]  The earth, in Aries, is turned about its axis pointing north toward the region of 
the sun in the center, away in Libra.  What therefore is the cause of this recession, the cause of 
this accession to the sun?  Also in [Aries] and in [Libra] days are equaled by nights in the whole 
world.  In [Cancer], [Capricorn] parts of the globe lack light.  What, then, this cause of 
approach?  But set aside this present question [and] bring us back to the scheme of the body of 
Mars.  Two words:  1.  That the versed sine IH measures the portion of the libration is testified 
by experience of observation.  2.  The right sine GH with the vigorous demonstration given in 
the Optics, measures the force of approach, or of the libration.  These two I have thought until 
now to be contrary, but it seems they are not.  For one thing is the measure of the strength of the 
libration, another thing now performs the measure of the parts of libration.  There, IF represents 
the total libration, IH the part comprising the eccentric anomaly signified by IG.  Here, DB 
represents the maximum strength, GH the strength of the moment in angle GBI.  But DB does 
not signify all the strengths combined, thus GH does not all the strengths for the whole arc of the 
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anomaly GI.  But if you collect the sum of the sine of 90 which is 578,943,140, this is the 
measure of the strength, which indeed is the common effect of half the libration or BI.  Thus 
therefore also if you collect the sum of the sine from all the steps in GI, this will measure the 
portion of the performance of the libration, which if it produces a line so long, [256] as long as 
HI, the versed sine, from which experience stands, then we have reconciled experience with the 
demonstration of the balance.  Let us see.  Firstly, GI is 30 deg.  The sum of the first 30 sines is 
79,259,831.  If 578 etc.5 gives 100000, then 13,691 follows from 792 etc.6  But the versed sine 
of 30 is 13,397, a very small difference.  Secondly, IG 60 deg.   The versed sine IH will be 
50,000, but the sum of 60 sines is 290,801,743, which is a little bit more than half of 578 etc.,7 
which is 289,471,570. 
 
Therefore we have adduced the thing in the senses into closeness with the best reasons.  We 
of arc 30, the square you will find 26,794,9 the double of course of 13,397 itself.10
                                                
conclude, therefore, the body of the planet must be considered as if it were magnetic, which 
approaches or flees by the law of the balance, and the diameter of virtue points in the middle 
longitudes.  That truly shattering objection that the axis of the earth does not remain in the line of 
apsides yet extends thus for the planets we relinquish.  I will add but this non-geometric [point].  
In the beginning, when the sines are small, and the pick out small [parts] of the libration, the 
versed sine is less than half the little sum of librations from the collected sines, as the sum of 90 
sines, 5789 etc., gives 100,000, because the sine of 1 deg. – 1745, 30 follows.8  Against the 
versed sine of 1 deg. is 15, half.  Out of which I learn, which elsewhere I have now tested, the 
task is not to sum the collected sines and then by the rule of Detrus to operate, the task is only 
that I may obtain the squares of right sines by some artifice.  For the proportion of them is the 
same, which [is] of these sums.  But you ask how I obtain the squares of the right [sines]?  This I 
will teach you with the river derivation from the source of Bürgi.  The versed sine of some arc is 
half the square, of the subtended complement, last five rejected.  The arc is 60, sine 86,603.  The 
verse 13,397.  Complement 30 deg.  Half 15 deg., sine 25,882.  The double 51,764 is the chord 
 
5 i.e., 578,943,140. 
, not 30. 
,400,000.  “Reject” the last five places, leaving 26,794. 
6 i.e., 79,259,831. 
7 i.e., 578,943,140. 
8 This comes out to .3




[259]  21.  I might have tentatively denied any error in the birth of Cancellarius, but I am not yet 
ble to admit [it].  Because truly you say the year 1595 7 Dec. hour 7 p.m. was a similar position, 
of the triangle of equation to 
ontain 5 deg. 19 min. 10 sec.  Then the complement of the eccentric anomaly may be 86 37 10.  
7 is to be added to the radius, and thus I 
have the just distance.  Now the three sides in ADC are 
i
inquire AC from AD, DC C and AD, 
                             
a
and because of the failure to you around middle longitudes to elicit the distances, and because 
the case seems to you to be difficult, I will declare to you a better, and now most correct precept 
in this example, you will judge it from amongst my earlier forms. 
 
Because we are around middle longitudes, I conclude the area 
c
Let us see if I conclude well.  The sine of 86 37 10 is 99,826, the area of the maximal triangle is 
5 deg. 19 min. 43 sec. for an eccentricity of 9300.  This is 319 first or 19,183 second, which 
multiplied into the sine 99,826 give 19,150, which is 5 deg. 19 min. 10 sec. clearly as I 
concluded.  But you say this is not geometrical, and who could always be such a happy 
conjecturer?  A true objection, but it suffices for me that a geometrical table can be constructed 
from given eccentric anomalies, which I have had for some time, and from where I have brought 
this so happy conjecture.  From the same I can immediately say to you the 
complement of the coequated anomaly would be 80 42 40.  And the distance 
100,548.  But the example is woven of calculations from tables.  Therefore because 
the complement of the eccentric anomaly is 86 37 10, half of the above libration is 
released, remaining 3 deg. 22 min. 50 sec. 
 
Here I discover 54
given, to use any one for discovering angle A.  In principle 
the order is to inquire DC, which is sine 99,826 diminished 
ng to the sine.  And then use DC and DA in order, and a
, but I do not see the need to inquire DC.  It suffices for us A
by part of 432, answer fterwards to 
                                                                                                                                
10 This is an exceedingly bizarre derivation. 
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with AC is more simply given.  Therefore AB 9300, produces C 8 40 56.  Therefore angle A 81 




Achinstein, Peter. “Can There Be a Model of Explanation.” In Explanation, edited by David-
Hillel Ruben, 136-59. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. 
Aiton, E. J. “Infinitesimals and the Area Law.” In Internationales Kepler-Symposium, Weil der 
Stadt 1971, edited by Fritz Krafft, Karl Meyer and Bernhard Sticker. Hildesheim: 
Gerstenberg, 1973. 
———. The Vortex Theory of Planetary Motion. New York: Elsevier, 1972. 
Anderson, Wallace E. “Cartesian Motion.” In Motion and Time, Space and Matter, edited by 
Peter K. Machamer and Robert G. Turnbull, 200-23: Ohio State University Press, 1976. 
Aristotle. The Complete Works of Aristotle. Edited by Jonathan Barnes. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1984. 
Barker, Peter, and Bernard R. Goldstein. “Theological Foundations of Kepler's Astronomy.” 
Osiris 16 (2001): 88-113. 
Blackwell, Richard J., and Christiaan Huygens. “Christiaan Huygens' The Motion of Colliding 
Bodies.” Isis 68, no. 4 (1977): 574-97. 
Bos, Henk. “On the Representation of Curves in Descartes' Géométrie.” Archive for History of 
Exact Sciences 24 (1981): 295-338. 
———. Redefining Geometrical Exactness:  Descartes' Transformation of the Early Modern 
Concept of Construction. New York: Springer, 2001. 
Brown, Joseph E. “The Science of Weights.” In Science in the Middle Ages, edited by David C. 
Lindberg, 179-205. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978. 
Burtt, Edwin A. The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science. Rev. ed. Garden 
City: Doubleday, 1954. 
Butterfield, Herbert. The Origins of Modern Science. London: G. Bell, 1957. 
———. The Origins of Modern Science, 1300-1800. New York: Free Press, 1965. 
Caspar, Max. Kepler. Translated by C. Doris Hellman. London: Abelard-Schuman, 1959. 
 236 
Caspar, Max, and Walther von Dyck, eds. Johannes Kepler Gesammelte Werke. München: C.H. 
Beck, 1937. 
Clagett, Marshall. The Science of Mechanics in the Middle Ages. Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1959. 
Clavelin, Maurice. “Conceptual and Technical Aspects of the Galilean Geometrization of the 
Motion of Heavy Bodies.” In Nature Mathematized, edited by William R. Shea, 23-50. 
Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983. 
Copernicus, Nicolaus. On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres. Translated by A. M. Duncan. 
London: David & Charles, 1976. 
Davidson, Donald. “Causal Relations.” The Journal of Philosophy 64, no. 21 (1967): 691-703. 
Dear, Peter. Discipline and Experience:  The Mathematical Way in the Scientific Revolution. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. 
———. “Method and the study of nature.” In The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century 
Philosophy, edited by Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers, 147-77. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998. 
Descartes, René. Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry, and Geometry. Translated by Paul J. 
Olscamp. Indianapolis: Hackett, 2001. 
———. The Geometry of René Descartes. Translated by David Eugene Smith and Marcia L. 
Latham. New York: Dover Publications, 1954. 
———. Meditations on First Philosophy. Translated by John Cottingham. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
———. Oeuvres de Descartes. Edited by Charles Adam and Paul Tannery. 12 vols. Paris, 1897-
1913. 
———. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. Translated by John Cottingham, Robert 
Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch. 3 vols. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. 
———. Principles of Philosophy. Translated by Valentine Rodger Miller and Reese P. Miller. 
Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983. 
———. The World and Other Writings. Translated by Stephen Gaukroger. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
Dijksterhuis, E. J. The Mechanization of the World Picture. Translated by C. Dikshoorn. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961. 
 237 
Drake, Stillman. Essays on Galileo and the History and Philosophy of Science. Edited by N. M. 
Swerdlow and Trevor Harvey Levere. Vol. II. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1999. 
———. Galileo Studies. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1970. 
Drake, Stillman, and I. E. Drabkin. Mechanics in Sixteenth-Century Italy. Madison: University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1969. 
Dreyer, J. L. E. A History of Astronomy from Thales to Kepler. New York: Dover, 1953. 
Dugas, René. A History of Mechanics. Translated by J. R. Maddox. New York: Dover 
Publications, 1988. 
———. “Sur l'origine du théorème de Coriolis.” Revue Scientifique Revue Rose Illustrée 79, no. 
5-6 (1941): 267-70. 
Earman, John. World Enough and Space-Time. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1989. 
Einstein, Albert. “Foreword.” In Concepts of Space, by Max Jammer. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1954. 
Epicurus. “Letter to Herodotus.” In The Hellenistic Philosophers, edited by A. A. Long and D. 
N. Sedley. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 
Feldhay, R. “Producing Sunspots on an Iron Pan.” In Science, Reason, and Rhetoric, edited by 
Henry Krips, J.E. McGuire and Trevor Melia, 119-44. Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1995. 
Freudenthal, Gad. “Theory of Matter and Cosmology in William Gilbert's De magnete.” Isis 74, 
no. 1 (1983): 22-37. 
Friedman, Michael. “Explanation and Scientific Understanding.” In Theories of Explanation, 
edited by Joseph C. Pitt, 188-98. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. 
Furley, David J. “Aristotle and the Atomists on Motion in a Void.” In Motion and Time, Space 
and Matter, edited by Peter K. Machamer and Robert G. Turnbull, 83-100: Ohio State 
University Press, 1976. 
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Truth and Method. Translated by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. 
Marshall. 2nd, revised ed. New York: Continuum, 1989. 
Galilei, Galileo. “De Motu.” In On Motion and On Mechanics, edited by Stillman Drake and I. 
E. Drabkin, 13-114. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1960. 
———. Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi del mondo tolemaico e copernicano E-text, 2004 




———. Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems. Translated by Stillman Drake. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967. 
———. Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences. Translated by Henry Crew and Alfonso de 
Salvio. New York: Dover Publications, 1954. 
———. Discoveries and Opinions of Galileo. New York: Doubleday, 1957. 
———. Le Opere di Galileo Galilei. Edited by Antonio Favaro. Florence: Barbera, 1890-1908. 
Galuzzi, Massimo. “Il Problema delle Tangenti nella “Géométrie” di Descartes.” Archive for 
History of Exact Sciences 22 (1980): 36-51. 
Garber, Daniel. Descartes Embodied. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 
———. Descartes' Metaphysical Physics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. 
Gaukroger, Stephen. Descartes:  An Intellectual Biography. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. 
Gilbert, William. De Magnete. Translated by P. Fleury Mottelay. New York: Dover Publications, 
1958. 
———. De Magnete, Magneticisque Corporibus, et de Magno Magnete Tellure, Physiologia 
Nova. London: Peter Short, 1600. 
———. De Mundo Nostro Sublunari Philosophia Nova. Amstelodami: Ludovicum Elzevirium, 
1651. 
Gingrich, Owen. “The Galileo Sunspot Controversy:  Proof and Persuasion.” Journal for the 
History of Astronomy 34(I), no. 114 (2003): 77-78. 
Goldstein, Bernard R. “The Arabic Version of Ptolemy's Planetary Hypotheses.” Transactions of 
the American Philosophical Society 57, no. 4 (1967): 3-55. 
Grant, Edward. “Place and Space in Medieval Physical Thought.” In Motion and Time, Space 
and Matter, edited by Peter K. Machamer and Robert G. Turnbull, 137-67: Ohio State 
University Press, 1976. 
Grosholz, Emily R. “A Case Study in the Application of Mathematics to Physics:  Descartes' 
Principles of Philosophy, Part II.” PSA:  Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the 
Philosophy of Science Association 1986, no. 1 (1986): 116-24. 
———. “Geometry, Time and Force in the Diagrams of Descartes, Galileo, Torricelli and 
Newton.” PSA:  Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science 
Association 1988, no. 2 (1988): 237-48. 
 239 
Hahm, David E. “Weight and Lightness in Aristotle and His Predecessors.” In Motion and Time, 
Space and Matter, edited by Peter K. Machamer and Robert G. Turnbull, 56-82: Ohio 
State University Press, 1976. 
Heilbron, J. L. Electricity in the 17th and 18th Centuries. Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1979. 
Hempel, Carl G. Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of 
Science. New York: Free Press, 1965. 
———. “Studies in the Logic of Explanation.” In Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other 
Essays in the Philosophy of Science, 245-90. New York: Free Press, 1965. 
Henry, John. “Animism and Empiricism:  Copernican Physics and the Origin of William 
Gilbert's Experimental Method.” Journal of the History of Ideas 62, no. 1 (2001): 99-119. 
Hesse, Mary B. “Gilbert and the Historians (II).” The British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science 11, no. 42 (1960): 130-42. 
Hooper, Wallace. “Inertial problems in Galileo's preinertial framework.” In Cambridge 
Companion to Galileo, edited by Peter Machamer, 146-74. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998. 
Humphreys, Paul W. “Scientific Explanation:  The Causes, Some of the Causes, and Nothing But 
the Causes.” In Scientific Explanation, edited by Philip Kitcher and Wesley C. Salmon, 
283-306. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989. 
Hutchison, Keith. “Sunspots, Galileo, and the Orbit of the Earth.” Isis 81, no. 1 (1990): 68-74. 
Huygens, Christiaan. “Discours de la Cause de la Pesanteur.” In Oeuvres Complètes vol. XXI, 
443-508. Le Haye: M. Nijhoff, 1888-1950. 
———. Oeuvres Complètes. 22 vols. Le Haye: M. Nijhoff, 1888-1950. 
Jammer, Max. Concepts of Space. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954. 
Jardine, Nicholas. The Birth of History and Philosophy of Science: Kepler's A Defence of Tycho 
Against Ursus. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. 
———. “Galileo's Road to Truth and the Demonstrative Regress.” Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Science 7, no. 4 (1976): 277-318. 
Jones, Alexander. Provisional Translation of Ptolemy's Planetary Hypotheses, Book 1 Part 1 
2004 [cited 2005]. Available from 
http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/~ajones/ptolgeog/PlanHyp1.pdf. 
Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood. New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
 240 
Kelly, Sister Suzanne. The De Mundo of William Gilbert. Amsterdam: Menno Hertzberger & 
Co., 1965. 
Kepler, Johannes. Epitome of Copernican Astronomy & Harmonies of the World. Translated by 
Charles Glenn Wallis. Amherst: Prometheus Books, 1995. 
———. The Harmony of the World. Translated by E. J. Aiton, A. M. Duncan and J. V. Field. 
Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1997. 
———. Johannes Kepler Gesammelte Werke. Edited by Walther von Dyck and Max Caspar. 
Vol. XV. München: C.H. Beck, 1937. 
———. Mysterium Cosmographicum: The Secret of the Universe. Translated by A. M. Duncan. 
New York: Abaris, 1981. 
———. New Astronomy. Translated by William H. Donahue. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1992. 
———. Optics:  Paralipomena to Witelo & Optical Part of Astronomy. Translated by William 
H. Donahue. Santa Fe: Green Lion Press, 2000. 
Kitcher, Philip. “Explanatory Unification and the Causal Structure of the World.” In Scientific 
Explanation, edited by Philip Kitcher and Wesley C. Salmon, 410-506. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1989. 
———. “Theories, Theorists and Theoretical Change.” The Philosophical Review 87, no. 4 
(1978): 519-47. 
Koestler, Arthur. The Sleepwalkers. New York: Macmillan Co., 1968. 
Koyré, Alexandre. The Astronomical Revolution: Copernicus, Kepler, Borelli. Translated by R. 
E. W. Maddison. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1973. 
———. “A Documentary History of the Problem of Fall From Kepler to Newton.” Transactions 
of the American Philosophical Society 45, no. 4 (1955): 329-95. 
———. Études Galiléennes. Paris: Hermann, 1966. 
———. From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1957. 
Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 3rd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1996. 
Lakoff, George. Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things:  What Categories Reveal About the Mind. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987. 
Lenoir, Timothy. “Descartes and the Geometrization of Thought:  The Methodological 
Background of Descartes' Géométrie.” Historia Mathematica 6 (1979): 355-79. 
 241 
Levin, Michael E. “The Extensionality of Causation and Causal-Explanatory Contexts.” 
Philosophy of Science 43, no. 2 (1976): 266-77. 
Lindberg, David C. “The Genesis of Kepler's Theory of Light:  Light Metaphysics from Plotinus 
to Kepler.” Osiris 2 (1986): 4-42. 
Lucretius. “De Rerum Natura.” In The Hellenistic Philosophers, edited by A. A. Long and D. N. 
Sedley. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987. 
Ludlow, Peter. “Descriptions.” In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Ed Zalta. 
Stanford: Stanford University, 2004. 
Machamer, Peter. “Aristotle on Natural Place and Natural Motion.” Isis 69, no. 3 (1978): 377-87. 
Machamer, Peter K. “Causality and Explanation in Descartes' Natural Philosophy.” In Motion 
and Time, Space and Matter, edited by Peter K. Machamer and Robert G. Turnbull, 168-
99: Ohio State University Press, 1976. 
———. “Comment:  A New Way of Seeing Galileo's Sunspots (and New Ways to Talk Too).” 
In Science, Reason, and Rhetoric, edited by Henry Krips, J.E. McGuire and Trevor 
Melia, 145-52. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995. 
———. “Galileo's Machines, His Mathematics, and His Experiments.” In The Cambridge 
Companion to Galileo, edited by Peter K. Machamer, 53-79. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998. 
Machamer, Peter K., and J. E. McGuire. “Descartes' Changing Mind.” (forthcoming). 
———. Descartes' Epistemic Stance: Mind, Body and the Causes, forthcoming. 
Maier, Anneliese. On the Threshold of Exact Science. Translated by Steven D. Sargent. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1982. 
Mancosu, Paolo. Philosophy of Mathematics & Mathematical Practice in the Seventeenth 
Century. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
Martens, Rhonda. Kepler's Philosophy and the New Astronomy. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2000. 
Maull, Nancy L. “Cartesian Optics and the Geometrization of Nature.” In Descartes:  
Philosophy, Mathematics and Physics, edited by Stephen Gaukroger, 253-73. Sussex: 
Harvester Press, 1980. 
McGuire, J. E. “Space, Geometrical Objects and Infinity:  Newton and Descartes on Extension.” 
In Nature Mathematized, edited by William R. Shea, 69-112. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1983. 
Nadler, Steven. “Doctrines of explanation in late scholasticism and in the mechanical 
philosophy.” In The Cambridge History of Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, edited by 
 242 
Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers, 513-52. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998. 
Neugebauer, O. The Exact Sciences in Antiquity. Providence: Brown University Press, 1957. 
Newton, Isaac. “De Gravitatione et Aequipondio Fluidorum.” In Unpublished Scientific Papers 
of Newton, edited by A. Rupert Hall and Marie Boas Hall. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1962. 
———. The Principia. Translated by Andrew Motte. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1995. 
Ptolemy, Claudius. The Almagest. Translated by G. J. Toomer. New York: Springer-Verlag, 
1984. 
Ribe, Neil M. “Cartesian Optics and the Mastery of Nature.” Isis 88, no. 1 (1997): 42-61. 
Rosen, Edward. “The Commentariolus of Copernicus.” Osiris 3 (1937): 123-41. 
Ruben, David-Hillel. “Introduction.” In Explanation, edited by David-Hillel Ruben, 1-16. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. 
Sabra, A. I. Theories of Light from Descartes to Newton. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981. 
Salmon, Wesley C. Causality and Explanation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. 
———. “Four Decades of Scientific Explanation.” In Scientific Explanation, edited by Philip 
Kitcher and Wesley C. Salmon, 3-219. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1989. 
Scriven, Michael. “Explanation, Predictions, and Laws.” In Theories of Explanation, edited by 
Joseph C. Pitt, 51-74. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. 
Shapere, Dudley. “The Causal Efficacy of Space.” Philosophy of Science 31, no. 2 (1964): 111-
21. 
Shea, William R. The Magic of Numbers and Motion. Canton, MA: Science History 
Publications, 1991. 
Skinner, Quentin. “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas.” History and Theory 8, 
no. 1 (1969): 3-53. 
———. “A reply to my critics.” In Meaning and Context:  Quentin Skinner and His Critics, 
edited by James Tully. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988. 
Slowik, Edward. “Descartes, Spacetime, and Relational Motion.” Philosophy of Science 66, no. 1 
(1999): 117-39. 
 243 
Smith, A. Mark. “Galileo's Proof for the Earth's Motion from the Movement of Sunspots.” Isis 
76, no. 4 (1985): 543-51. 
Stephenson, Bruce. Kepler's Physical Astronomy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994. 
Suter, Rufus. “A Biographical Sketch of Dr. William Gilbert of Colchester.” Osiris 10 (1952): 
368-84. 
Swerdlow, Noel M. “The Derivation and First Draft of Copernicus's Planetary Theory:  A 
Translation of the Commentariolus with Commentary.” Proceedings of the American 
Philosophical Society 117, no. 6 (1973): 423-512. 
Topper, David. “Colluding With Galileo:  On Mueller's Critique of My Analysis of Galileo's 
Sunspot Argument.” Journal for the History of Astronomy 34(I), no. 114 (2003): 75-76. 
———. “Galileo, Sunspots, and the Motions of the Earth:  Redux.” Isis 90, no. 4 (1999): 757-67. 
Toulmin, Stephen, and June Goodfield. The Fabric of the Heavens:  The Development of 
Astronomy and Dynamics. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1961. 
Turnbull, H. W., ed. The Correspondence of Isaac Newton. Vol. II (1676-1687). Cambridge: 
University Press for the Royal Society, 1960. 
Voelkel, James R. The Composition of Kepler's Astronomia Nova. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2001. 
Wallace, William A. Prelude to Galileo: Essays on Medieval and Sixteenth-Century Sources of 
Galileo's Thought. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1981. 
———. “Randall Redivivus:  Galileo and the Paduan Aristotelians.” Journal of the History of 
Ideas 49, no. 1 (1988): 133-49. 
Westman, Robert S. “The Melanchthon Circle, Rheticus, and the Wittenberg Interpretation of the 
Copernican Theory.” Isis 66, no. 2 (1975): 164-93. 
Wilson, Curtis. “Kepler's Derivation of the Elliptical Path.” Isis 59, no. 1 (1968): 4-25. 
Woodward, James. “A Theory of Singular Causal Explanation.” In Explanation, edited by 
David-Hillel Ruben, 246-74. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. 
Zilsel, Edgar. “Copernicus and Mechanics.” Journal of the History of Ideas 1, no. 1 (1940): 113-
18. 
———. “The Origins of William Gilbert's Scientific Method.” Journal of the History of Ideas 2, 
no. 1 (1941): 1-32. 
 
 244 
